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1 
Overview and  
main messages 
 
 
The global economy appears to be transitioning 
toward a period of more stable, but slower growth. 
Global gross domestic product (GDP), which 
slowed in mid-2012 is recovering, and a modest 
acceleration in quarterly GDP is expected during 
the course of 2013. That progress will be masked in 
the annual data, however, with whole-year growth 
for 2013 projected at 2.2 percent, a touch slower 
than in 2012. The strengthening of quarterly 
growth will show up in whole-year global GDP 
growth of 3.0 percent for 2014 and 3.3 percent in 2015 
(table 1).  
  
Financial conditions in high-income countries 
have improved and risks are down, but growth 
remains subdued, especially in Europe  
High-income countries continue to face challenges 
to restore financial sector health, reform 
institutions, and get fiscal policy onto a sustainable 
path. However, the likelihood that these challenges 
provoke a major crisis has declined.  
  
Although acute risks have diminished, real-side 
activity remains sluggish. Among high-income 
countries, the challenges are especially difficult in 
high-income Europe, where growth is being held 
back by weak confidence and continued banking-
sector and fiscal restructuring. The recovery is on 
more solid ground in the United States, where a 
fairly robust private sector recovery is being held 
back, but not extinguished, by fiscal tightening. 
Meanwhile, in Japan, a dramatic relaxation of 
macroeconomic policy has sparked an uptick in 
activity, at least over the short term. Overall, 
growth in high-income countries is projected to 
accelerate slowly, with GDP expanding a modest 
1.2 percent this year, but firming to 2.0 and 2.3 
percent in 2014 and 2015, respectively.  
  
Growth is firming in developing countries, but 
conditions vary widely across economies 
In developing countries, GDP is expected to firm 
somewhat. Less volatile external conditions, a 
recovery of capital flows to levels that support 
growth, the relaxation of capacity constraints in 
some middle-income countries, and stronger 
growth in high-income countries are expected to 
yield a gradual acceleration of developing-country 
growth to 5.1 percent this year, and to 5.6 and 5.7 
percent in 2014 and 2015, respectively. 
  
Most developing countries have recovered from 
the crisis, so room for additional acceleration is 
limited 
The overall acceleration is not stronger because the 
majority of developing countries have more-or-less 
fully recovered from the 2008 financial crisis. For 
many of these countries, current and projected 
growth is broadly in line with underlying potential 
growth—leaving little room for acceleration. Thus, 
GDP in the East Asia & Pacific region is projected 
to increase 7.3 percent in 2013, but then expand at 
a broadly stable 7½ percent rate in each of 2014, 
and 2015. In Latin America, growth is expected to 
pick up in 2013 to about 3.3 percent, but then to 
stabilize at just below 4 percent in each of 2014 and 
2015. Already, growth in several countries in both 
regions is being held back by supply-side 
constraints that are manifesting themselves in 
inflation, asset-price bubbles, and deteriorating current 
account balances.  
  
Many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are also 
running at, close to, or above potential output, and 
risk building up inflationary pressures. Growth in 
the region is projected to firm over the projection 
period to 4.9, 5.2, and 5.4 percent in 2013, 2014, 
and 2015, respectively. Growth in South Asia is 
projected to pick up to 5.2 percent this year, 
following a very weak 2012 and then to firm only 
gradually to 6.0 and 6.4 percent in 2014 and 2015 
as spare capacity is reabsorbed.  
  
In developing Europe and the Middle East & 
North Africa, output gaps remain and growth 
is projected to strengthen  
Many countries in developing Europe have still not 
recovered from the crisis. Unemployment and 
spare capacity remain high, because activity has 
been weighed down by banking-sector, household, 
and fiscal restructuring (much like high-income 
Europe). As adjustments are completed, growth in 
the region is projected to strengthen progressively 
from 2.7 percent last year to 4.2 percent by 2015. 
Growth in the Middle East & North Africa has 
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The global outlook in summary 
(percentage change from previous year, except interest rates and oil price) 
 
Table 1.  
2011 2012 2013e 2014f 2015f
Global Conditions
World Trade Volume (GNFS) 6.2 2.7 4.0 5.0 5.4
Consumer Prices
G-7 Countries 
1,2 5.3 -0.6 -0.1 0.9 1.0
United States 2.4 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.5
Commodity Prices (USD terms)
Non-oil commodities 20.7 -9.5 -4.7 -1.1 -1.5
Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 
3 104.0 105.0 102.4 101.0 101.0
Oil price (percent change) 31.6 1.0 -2.5 -1.3 -0.1
Manufactures unit export value 
4 8.5 -2.1 2.4 2.2 1.9
Interest Rates
$, 6-month (percent) 0.8 0.5 0.7 1.1 1.4
€, 6-month (percent) 1.6 0.2 0.5 1.2 1.5
International capital flows to developing countries (% of GDP)
Developing countries
Net private and official inflows 5.2 5.0 4.7 4.4 4.3
Net private inflows (equity + debt) 5.0 4.9 4.7 4.4 4.3
East Asia and Pacific 5.7 4.6 4.2 3.9 3.8
Europe and Central Asia 5.5 5.7 6.5 6.1 6.0
Latin America and Caribbean 5.4 6.4 5.9 5.5 5.3
Middle East and N. Africa 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.4 1.7
South Asia 3.3 4.0 3.6 3.4 3.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.2 3.5 3.8 3.9 4.2
Real GDP growth
 5
World 2.8 2.3 2.2 3.0 3.3
Memo item: World (PPP weights) 3.8 2.9 3.1 3.8 4.1
High income 1.7 1.3 1.2 2.0 2.3
OECD Countries 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.9 2.2
Euro Area 1.5 -0.5 -0.6 0.9 1.5
Japan -0.5 2.0 1.4 1.4 1.3
United States 1.8 2.2 2.0 2.8 3.0
Non-OECD countries 4.9 2.8 3.1 3.7 3.9
Developing countries 6.0 5.0 5.1 5.6 5.7
East Asia and Pacific 8.3 7.5 7.3 7.5 7.5
China 9.3 7.8 7.7 8.0 7.9
Indonesia 6.5 6.2 6.2 6.5 6.2
Thailand 0.1 6.5 5.0 5.0 5.5
Europe and Central Asia 5.7 2.7 2.8 3.8 4.2
Russia 4.3 3.4 2.3 3.5 3.9
Turkey 8.8 2.2 3.6 4.5 4.7
Romania 2.5 0.7 1.7 2.2 2.7
Latin America and Caribbean 4.4 3.0 3.3 3.9 3.8
Brazil 2.7 0.9 2.9 4.0 3.8
Mexico 3.9 3.9 3.3 3.9 3.8
Argentina 8.9 1.9 3.1 3.0 3.0
Middle East and N. Africa -2.2 3.5 2.5 3.5 4.2
Egypt 
6 1.8 2.2 1.6 3.0 4.8
Iran 1.7 -1.9 -1.1 0.7 1.9
Algeria 2.4 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.5
South Asia 7.3 4.8 5.2 6.0 6.4
India 
6, 7 6.2 5.0 5.7 6.5 6.7
Pakistan 
6, 7 3.0 3.7 3.4 3.5 3.7
Bangladesh 
6 6.7 6.2 5.8 6.1 6.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.7 4.4 4.9 5.2 5.4
South Africa 3.1 2.5 2.5 3.2 3.3
Nigeria 7.4 6.5 6.7 6.7 7.0
Angola 3.4 8.1 7.2 7.5 7.8
Memorandum items
Developing countries
excluding transition countries 6.5 5.0 5.3 5.8 5.9
excluding China and India 4.5 3.3 3.5 4.2 4.4
6.
7. Real GDP at factor cost, consistent with reporting practice in Pakistan and India. See Table SAR.2, South Asia Regional Annex for details.
In keeping with national practice, data for Bangladesh, Egypt, India, and Pakistan are reported on a fiscal year basis in table 1.1. Aggregates that 
depend on these countries are calculated using data compiled on a calendar year basis.
Source:  World Bank.
Notes: PPP = purchasing power parity; e = estimate; f = forecast.
1. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
2. In local currency, aggregated using 2005 GDP weights.
3. Simple average of Dubai, Brent, and West Texas Intermediate.
4. Unit value index of manufactured exports from major economies, expressed in USD.
5. Aggregate growth rates calculated using constant 2005 dollars GDP weights.
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been disrupted by political and social tensions and 
Euro Area weakness. Assuming that tensions in the 
region gradually ease, growth is projected to slowly 
strengthen from 2.5 percent in 2013 to 3.5 percent 
in 2014 and 4.2 percent in 2015. 
  
Risks are less pronounced and more balanced than a 
year ago, with new risks gaining prominence 
Although acute risks in high-income countries are 
down, more modest downside risks linger as these 
economies continue to adjust. Importantly, downside 
risks are now balanced by the possibility of 
stronger growth should confidence improve more 
quickly than anticipated in the baseline.  
  
For developing countries that have already 
recovered from the crisis, or that are expected to in 
2013, macroeconomic policy may need to be 
tightened to contain or prevent inflation, asset-
price bubbles, and deteriorating current accounts. 
Tightening would have the further advantage of 
restoring depleted policy buffers. In countries 
where unemployment remains high and spare 
capacity is ample, notably in developing Europe, a 
loosening of policy may be in order where policy 
space exists. The rebalancing effort in China, and its 
unsustainably high investment rate are ongoing 
challenges. 
  
Most countries need to prioritize structural 
reforms to expand their growth potential  
While projected growth rates are satisfactory and 
well above the growth rates of the 1990s, they are 1
–2 percentage points slower than in the pre-crisis 
boom period. To achieve higher growth on a 
sustained basis, developing countries will need to 
focus on domestic challenges. These differ across 
countries, but share common themes. In general, 
policymakers will need to redouble efforts to 
restore and preserve macroeconomic stability and 
reduce bottlenecks by streamlining regulations; 
improving their enforcement; and investing in 
infrastructure, education, and health. 
  
New risks include a faster decline in commodity 
prices, ...  
Over the past year, energy and metals prices have 
been easing in response to supply and demand-side 
substitution induced by high prices (metal prices 
are down 30 percent since their February 2011 
peak). If prices decline to their longer-term 
equilibrium more quickly than assumed in the 
baseline, GDP growth among Sub-Saharan African 
metal exporters could decline by as much as 0.7 
percentage points, while current account and fiscal 
balances could deteriorate by 1.2 and 0.9 percent of 
GDP, respectively. Lower oil prices would have 
similar impacts for oil exporters (-0.4 percent of 
GDP), but would tend to benefit developing 
countries as a whole (+0.3 percent of GDP). 
 
… and the potential impacts of  a withdrawal of  
quantitative easing 
Quantitative easing has benefited developing 
countries by stimulating high-income-country 
GDP, lowering borrowing costs, and avoiding a 
financial-sector meltdown. On balance, the 
increased liquidity has not generated excessive 
capital flows to developing countries. Net capital 
flows to developing countries have recovered to 
4.2 percent of developing-country GDP, but 
remain well below the 2007 level of 7.2 percent of 
GDP. However, flows have been more volatile. 
Based on this experience, the recent intensification 
of monetary easing in Japan should not prove too 
disruptive for developing countries over the 
medium term, but it could generate large 
fluctuations in flows over the short run that are 
difficult to manage.  
  
Once high-income countries begin to pursue 
quantitative easing less actively or begin to unwind 
long-term positions, interest rates are likely to rise. 
Higher interest rates will increase debt-servicing 
costs, and could increase default rates on existing 
loans. Banks in countries that have enjoyed very 
strong growth and asset-price inflation, together 
with high levels of government or private sector 
debt, may be at particular risk. In the longer term, 
higher interest rates will raise the cost of capital in 
developing countries and can be expected to 
reduce the level of investment that firms wish to 
maintain. As investment rates adjust to these higher 
capital costs, developing-country investment 
spending and growth can be expected to decline by 
as much as 0.6 percentage points per annum after 
three years. 
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Recent Developments  
The global economy is transitioning into what is 
likely to be a smoother and less volatile period. 
Financial market risk indicators, such as credit 
default swap rates, sovereign debt spreads, and 
stock market volatility indicators have all improved 
significantly since June 2012 (figure 1).  
 
Financial market conditions have 
improved over the past year 
The improvement reflects progress toward fiscal 
sustainability in the Euro Area, reinforced 
assurances that the European Central Bank (ECB) 
will do whatever it takes to save the Euro Area, and 
concrete steps toward reinforcing those aspects of 
institutional weakness that contributed to Euro 
Area difficulties (box 1).  
 
These improved financial market conditions have 
persisted for almost a whole year, despite being 
subjected to stresses, including elections in several 
economies, concerns about a potential banking 
crisis in Slovenia, the Cyprus rescue package, and 
an extended period of very slow or negative 
growth. The durability of the improved indicators 
attests to the improvement in conditions. 
Nevertheless, concerns remain, particularly among 
banks in high-spread countries, which continue to 
be burdened by relatively large quantities of 
underperforming loans and relatively weak levels of 
capitalization (IMF 2013b). 
The better financial conditions in the Euro Area, in 
tandem with the extraordinary monetary policy 
steps undertaken by the Federal Reserve Bank in 
the United States, the Bank of England, the ECB, 
and most recently the Bank of Japan, have flooded 
markets with liquidity. This in turn has reduced 
yields on long-term debt and the price of riskier 
assets—including developing-country equities, 
bonds, and bank loans. As a result, by May gross 
capital flows to developing countries, which were 
weak for most of the post-crisis period, have 
recovered to close-to-peak levels. Bank lending and 
equity issuance has doubled relative to the same 
period a year ago (figure 2). Nevertheless, as a 
percent of developing-country GDP, capital flows 
remain well below pre-crisis levels. 
  
The recovery in bank flows is especially important, 
because it suggests that the most acute effects on 
developing countries of the deleveraging among 
high-income banks have passed. Most of the recent 
recovery in banking flows has benefitted 
developing Europe and Central Asia, which was 
the developing region hardest-hit by the crisis and 
by the Euro Area deleveraging process. Flows in 
most regions, except the Middle East & North 
AfricaFN1, were significantly higher than in 2012, 
with Europe & Central Asia (mainly banking and 
bond), and East Asia & Pacific (mainly bond and 
equity) recording the biggest increases.  
 
Despite the improvement in gross flows and 
in financial indicators among high-income 
countries, developing-country financial-
market prices have been weak. Thus, while 
stock markets in high-income countries 
surged in the post–June 2012 period (the 
 
Gross capital flows to developing countries 
have recovered in nominal terms 
Source: World Bank; Dealogic. 
Figure 2.  
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Financial indicators worldwide have  
improved since June 2012 
Source: World Bank; Bloomberg. 
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Stoxx Europe 600, Standard & Poor’s 500 
Index, and Nikkei 225 are up 17.5, 18.1, and 
44.5 percent, respectively), overall indexes for 
developing countries have declined. This said, 
some developing-country stock markets have 
shown strong gains, raising concerns about 
overvaluation. Equity market indexes in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand all recorded highs in 2013, partly 
reflecting strong inflows of foreign private 
capital. Indeed, stock markets in these 
countries have declined lately as concerns 
about high valuations and prospects of 
scaling back of the U.S. stimulus program 
weighed in on investor sentiment. 
The generally better performance of high-income 
stock markets in the recent period reflects both a 
difference in timing (developing-country stocks 
recovered earlier in the cycle), and the relatively 
high valuations that developing-country stock 
markets had at the start of the crisis. Currently 
price-earnings ratios of major developing-country 
firms remain much lower (between 12 and 18) than in 
high-income countries (where they are between 16 
and 24).  
 
Overall, net capital flows (inflows + outflows) to 
developing countries fell by about 7 percent in 
2012, reflecting broadly stable net inflows (1.5 
percent) and a 28.4 percent increase in outflows, 
  
Concrete steps taken to reduce Euro Area fragilities 
 
A wide range of significant steps taken over the past few years have calmed investors and led to a significant rebound in 
key markets. These steps and developments include: 
 ECB President Mario Draghi’s forceful “whatever it takes” speech on July 26, 2012 and the introduction of a new 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) facility; 
 Widespread fiscal consolidation that has brought Euro Area government deficits down from 6.4 percent of GDP 
in 2009 to an estimated 2.9 percent in 2012 (IMF 2013a), although the deficits of Ireland, and Spain still exceed 
5 percent of GDP;  
 Euro Area agreements to establish a banking union for the area; reinforce monitoring and respect of budgetary 
rules; require countries to enter into binding fiscal reform contracts; and proposals to increase democratic legitimacy; 
 Early repayment of more than 25 percent of ECB crisis loans by Euro Area banks during the first quarter of 2013 
(the loans were not due until 2014 and 2015).  
 
Other developments in 2013 have tested the resilience of this improved climate, including: 
 Inconclusive elections in Italy and weak polls for other leaders that underscore ongoing political risks;  
 Uncertainty about government’s willingness to accept conditionality if the OMT were activated;  
 Fears that the bailing in of depositors during the Cyprus rescue would lead to deposit flight in other European 
jurisdictions. 
 
While these developments led to some widening of credit default swap (CDS) rates and yields on the debt of high-
spread Euro Area countries, the increases were modest compared with earlier declines, and yields for high-spread coun-
tries are down for the year to date. 
 
Box 1.  
Box Figure 1.1 
Source: Bloomberg. 
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roughly proportionately distributed across foreign 
direct investment (FDI), equity, debt, and other 
outflows (table 2). Both net inflows and outflows 
are projected to rise. Overall net capital inflows 
should rise by about 5.7 percent in 2013, with 
much of the increase reflecting the stronger flows 
toward the end of 2012. They are expected to rise 
by 2.9 percent in 2014 and 7.5 percent in 2015, 
reaching $1.4 trillion or about 4.3 percent of 
developing-country GDP in 2015.  
 
Capital costs are rising, reflecting 
reduced high-income country risks 
  
Not only have developing-country stock markets 
underperformed high-income stock markets, 
developing country sovereign credit default swap 
(CDS) rates and yields (figure 3) have been rising, 
despite the improved ratings of developing 
countries, and strong investor appetite for 
developing-country bonds.FN2 
 
Rising spreads, even as demand is strong and 
growing, may reflect a welcome and ultimately 
healthy improvement in market perceptions of the 
riskiness of investing in high-income countries. 
Part of the decline in developing-country risk 
premiums over the past five years was due to the 
increased riskiness of high-income country debt.FN3 
Now that those risks have receded, investors may 
be shifting their portfolios back into high-income 
country assets, resulting in an increase in 
developing-country yields and spreads  and better 
stock-market performance in high-income 
countries.  
  
  
Net financial flows to developing countries ($ billions) Table  2. 
           2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e 2013f 2014f 2015f
Current account balance 409.4 233.0 173.3 129.6 -16.7 -74.9 -108.2 -126.3
Capital Inflows 812.7 701.0 1,218.8 1,175.0 1,192.4 1,260.9 1,297.4 1,394.8
Private inflows, net 782.3 620.0 1,145.6 1,145.1 1,178.3 1,250.2 1,290.7 1,391.7
  Equity Inflows, net 583.4 541.3 710.5 710.4 758.1 791.1 803.5 863.5
    Net FDI inflows 637.0 427.1 582.3 701.5 670.0 719.3 715.7 758.2
    Net portfolio equity inflows -53.6 114.2 128.2 8.9 88.1 71.8 87.8 105.3
  Private creditors. Net 198.8 78.7 435.1 434.6 420.2 459.1 487.2 528.2
      Bonds -8.6 61.0 129.7 123.8 190.3 187.3 164.4 151.9
      Banks 223.3 -11.9 37.2 108.2 82.0 104.7 125.3 146.9
      Short-term debt flows -17.1 17.8 257.6 189.3 141.0 158.5 188.2 221.1
      Other private 1.3 11.7 10.7 13.3 7.1 9.2 10.4 9.8
Official inflows, net 30.4 81.0 73.2 30.0 14.1 10.7 6.7 3.1
    World Bank 7.2 18.3 22.4 6.6 4.6
    IMF 10.8 26.8 13.8 0.5 -3.9
    Other official 12.4 35.9 36.9 22.8 13.4
Capital outflows -321.2 -175.2 -314.1 -284.7 -365.4 -371.3 -416.3 -464.4
    FDI outflows -211.8 -144.3 -213.9 -198.0 -238.0 -275.0 -325.0 -370.0
    Portfolio equity outflows -32.1 -75.9 -50.6 4.3 -12.4 -17.3 -24.3 -29.4
    Private debt outflows -78.3 50.7 -57.3 -81.0 -103.0 -72.0 -61.0 -56.0
    Other outflows 1.0 -5.7 7.7 -10.0 -12.0 -7.0 -6.0 -9.0
Net capital flows (inflows + outflows) 491.5 525.8 904.7 890.4 827.1 889.6 881.1 930.4
Net unidentified Flows/a -82.1 -292.8 -731.3 -760.8 -843.8 -964.5 -989.3 -1,056.7
Source: The World Bank
Note:  e = estimate, f = forecast
/a Combination of errors and omissions, unidentified capital inflows to and outflows from developing countries
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These developments may also reflect concern on 
the part of investors about inflation of asset prices 
in some developing countries (such as Brazil, 
Indonesia, Lao PDR, Philippines, Thailand, and 
Turkey) and the recent easing of commodity prices. 
Risk premia could have risen because high asset 
prices have been interpreted as a harbinger of 
sharp future correction; or if an expectation of 
lower commodity prices had raise concerns about  
future government revenues and governments’ 
capacity to repay existing debt and spending 
programs. 
  
Improved financial conditions are 
yielding stronger economic activity  
 
Global economic activity has strengthened over the 
past several months (figure 4). The turn around, 
which began in the East Asia & Pacific region, has 
spread more widely. Developing-country industrial 
production grew at a 5.1 percent annualized pace 
during the first quarter of 2013 (0.6 percent if 
China is excluded), and high-income-country 
industrial production expanded at a 2.9 percent 
annualized pace.  
 
Despite Euro Area weakness, high-income-country 
GDP growth strengthened in the first quarter of 
2013.  
 In the United States, GDP rose 2.4 percent in 
the first quarter of 2013, despite sharp payroll 
tax increases that have cut into consumer 
incomes. The strength was supported by a 
recovering housing market (house prices are at 
a two-year high) and an increase in payroll jobs 
(more than ½ a million jobs were added in the 
first quarter). Investment demand, which was 
unusually weak in the second half of 2012, has 
also contributed (durable goods orders 
increased at a 20 percent annualized pace 
through March, although order growth has 
since eased).  
 In Japan, the move toward a much more 
relaxed monetary and fiscal policy (first 
announced in November 2012 but made more 
concrete during the first quarter of 2013) 
prompted a sharp acceleration in GDP, which 
grew at a 4.1 percent annualized pace in the 
first quarter of 2013.  
 In the Euro Area, GDP contracted once again 
in the first quarter, declining at a 0.8 percent 
(saar, -0.2% q/q sa), with growth in Germany 
turning marginally positive. For the region as a 
whole, industrial production expanded at a 0.7 
percent annualized rate in the first quarter, and 
the  annualized pace of decline among high-
spread economies eased to only 0.3 percent.   
 
Developing-country growth eased in 
2013Q1 but remains solid 
 
Among those developing countries that report 
quarterly GDP, data suggest an acceleration in 
activity during the fourth quarter of 2012—notably 
in East Asia & Pacific, where quarterly GDP 
expanded by 8.3 percent in the fourth quarter (for 
more regional detail, see box 2 and the regional 
annexes). In South Asia, however, growth 
continued to be weak, with GDP growing at only a 
 
Aggregate industrial activity has picked up 
Source: World Bank; Datastream. 
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Developing country borrowing costs have risen 
but remain below historical averages 
Source: World Bank; JP Morgan. 
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4.7 percent annualized pace in the final quarter of 
2012. Industrial production data, which are 
available for a wider range of countries, display a 
clearer acceleration trend toward the end of 
2012. 
 
During the first several months of 2013, however, 
the pace of growth in developing countries appears 
to have slowed, particularly in East Asia, where 
quarterly growth in China, and Indonesia has eased, 
and actually turned negative in Malaysia and 
Thailand. Elsewhere signs are more mixed.  
Growth has slowed in Chile, Mexico, and South 
Africa, but strengthened in Philippines, Lithuania, 
Peru, Turkey, and Ukraine.  First quarter GDP in 
India also disappointed, expanding only 4.8 percent 
y-o-y or about 5 percent q/q saar. 
 
Available industrial production data confirm this 
mixed picture (figure 5), with activity rates slowing 
in East Asia & Pacific (to 8.6 percent saar), firming 
in Europe & Central Asia (at 2.4 percent), returning 
to positive territory in Latin America & the 
Caribbean (0.5 percent), and easing somewhat in 
South Asia at a robust 7.7 percent. Available data 
show that activity was contracting in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and rapidly in the Middle East & North 
Africa during the three months ending February 
2013. 
  
Although there are some signs of acceleration, 
output in several large middle-income countries 
remains weak, compared with the pre-crisis boom 
period. Growth rates in Brazil, India, the Russian 
Federation, Turkey, and South Africa are all well 
below post-crisis rates, despite relatively easy policy 
stances and amid indications of overheating in 
some (see discussion beginning on page 17). 
 
The sharp recovery in trade appears 
to be losing momentum 
 
After contracting for several months, global trade 
is expanding once again (figure 6), with the total 
volume of exports and imports rising at a 5.0 
percent annualized pace in the first quarter of 2013. 
The upturn in trade was driven by developing 
country imports, which rose at an 18.0 percent 
annualized pace in 2013Q1. This helped stir a 2.9 
percent annualized increase  in high-income 
country exports in 2012Q4 (figure 6).  
 
The pick-up in import demand among developing 
countries was broadly-based, with import volumes 
rising in East Asia & Pacific, Latin America & the 
Caribbean, and South Asia. Data for the Middle 
East lag and, as of February 2013, do not show 
signs of acceleration. The pick-up in global 
demand, including in high-income countries, is also 
supporting faster export growth in developing 
countries (box 3). Developing countries exports 
were expanding at a 15.5 percent annualized pace 
during the first quarter of 2013. 
 
Most recently, there are signs of an easing in the 
pace of global trade. Developing-country import 
demand slowed to an annualized pace of 10.8 
percent in April, and both export (-5.4 percent) and 
import  demand (-3.6 percent) from high-income 
 
Regionally, output shows signs of slowing in East Asia & Pacific, and stability or strengthening elsewhere 
Source: World Bank. 
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Recent Regional Economic Developments 
 
(The regional annexes to this volume contain more detail on recent economic developments and outlook, including country-specific forecasts. 
  
The East Asia & Pacific region led the rebound in global economic activity during the fourth quarter of 2012. The landscape 
for trade and industrial production is changing, however, reflecting China’s rebalancing efforts, the yen depreciation, lower 
commodity prices, capacity constraints (in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand), and a gradual tightening of 
macroeconomic policies. These factors have combined to reverse earlier output gains in China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thai-
land, and Vietnam contributing to easing of industrial production growth from double digit rates to just 6 percent annualized 
pace during the first quarter of 2013. Growth rates of both exports and imports are also moderating but regional trade contin-
ues to expand at double-digit rates. Industrial activity in the Philippines, which relied less on domestic stimulus measures, 
continues to expand by a double-digit rate in early 2013, partly because of the country’s strong trade linkages to a rebound-
ing Japan. A relatively loose policy stance in the region, excluding China, during 2012 has contributed to a buildup of debt 
and has fueled goods and asset price inflation.  
  
Output in the developing Europe & Central Asia region also improved considerably, growing at a 2.4 percent annualized 
pace in the three months ending March 2013. With the exceptions of Ukraine and Latvia, all countries had positive industrial 
production growth, and the rebound was particularly strong in Serbia. The US. dollar value of imports also accelerated during 
the first quarter, suggesting firming of domestic demand. However, US dollar value of regional exports have slowed with 
weak growth in Russia and Latvia, despite the strong import demand from developing countries and strengthening import 
demand from high-income Europe. Inflation has eased slightly since food price hikes and administrative tariffs caused it to 
gain momentum in the second half of 2012.  
  
Economic activity in Latin American & the Caribbean softened in the first quarter of 2013, with industrial production remain-
ing relatively flat, after a slight contraction in the fourth quarter. Slower domestic consumption in conjunction with weak exter-
nal demand caused economic activity to slow in many countries in the region, with annualized quarterly growth easing in 
Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and contracting in Venezuela. As elsewhere, regional import demand bounced back in 2012Q4 but has 
eased to a more sustainable pace of 8.7 percent annualized pace in 2013Q1. Meanwhile, lower commodity prices contribut-
ed to significant declines in export revenues. Despite slower growth than during the pre-crisis period, several countries in the 
region continue to struggle with high and even rising inflation, suggesting structural bottlenecks. Price controls in Argentina 
have partially contained inflation but could lead to shortages of certain goods, while in Venezuela the recent currency devalu-
ation has exacerbated local price pressures. In Brazil, inflation continues to surprise on the upside on higher food and service 
prices.  
  
Economic outturns in the Middle East & North Africa continue to be dominated by political and social developments. 
Among oil exporters, hydrocarbon output resumed its downward trend in the second half of 2012 as the boost from Libyan oil 
production to prewar levels faded. Output among oil importers rebounded at an annualized 10.4 percent pace in Q1, reflect-
ing a recovery in Egypt from sharp declines in 2012, but momentum has slowed reflecting rising political tensions in Egypt 
and Tunisia, spillovers from the Syrian conflict to Jordan and Lebanon, and weak external demand that have dampened ac-
tivity among oil importers. With the exception of Iraq and Morocco, inflation remains persistently high across the region, rising 
over 40 percent in the Islamic Republic of Iran because of a tightening of international sanctions. But there has been a slight 
easing in some economies as global food prices have moderated. Declining foreign exchange reserves, widening external 
and fiscal financing gaps (only partly reflecting weak demand from Euro Area trading partners) pose challenges to macroeco-
nomic stability and management in the region. Aid from the wealthier economies in the region has helped bridge financing 
gaps in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. 
  
Economic activity in South Asia picked up in the second half of 2012, supported by strengthening external demand and 
fiscal and policy reforms. By the first quarter of 2013, industrial production was rising at different paces in Bangladesh, India, 
and Pakistan, while in Sri Lanka, it stabilized in 2012Q4. After slowing sharply in 2012, regional export volume growth accel-
erated to a 15.7 percent annualized pace in the three months ending in April 2013. Year-on-year inflation rates are moderat-
ing across the region, helped in part by an easing of international commodity prices. As inflation moderated, monetary policy 
eased in Pakistan  (in late 2012), in Bangladesh and India (in the first half of 2013), and in Sri Lanka (2012H2 and 2013H1) 
to support growth. However, inflation momentum remains strong, particularly in Bangladesh and India, mainly reflecting sup-
ply-side constraints and entrenched inflationary expectations.  
  
Exports from Sub-Saharan Africa were not exempt from the decline in global trade during 2012 (the exception being agricul-
tural exporters whose trade held up during the second half of the year). Industrial production slowed sharply in the second 
half of 2012 among oil exporting economies (Angola, Gabon, and Nigeria), partly because of domestic challenges in Nigeria. 
Similarly, labor unrest was partly responsible for the flat growth in South Africa’s industrial production in 2012Q2 and Q3. 
South Africa GDP rebounded to 2.1 percent annualized pace in 2012Q4, before slumping once again in Q1 2013 to 0.9 per-
cent (q/q saar). Although more recent data for the rest of the region is not available, a similar mixed result is expected, with 
stronger global industrial production supporting growth in some, but weaker commodity prices cutting into incomes in others. 
Earlier policy tightening (particularly in East Africa) and improved harvests in 2012 have contributed to slow regional inflation, 
with prices rising at a 6.8 percent annualized pace during the first quarter. Rwanda took advantage of low interest rates and 
investor appetite for higher-yielding assets to issue its inaugural Eurobond in April 2013, while other countries in the region 
(including Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria) have plans to follow suit. 
Box 2.  
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countries turned negative in April. Also, China's 
economic growth appears to be losing momentum 
as export growth slowed from 12.7 percent (y/y) in 
April to one percent (y/y) in May - its slowest 
expansion in 15 months. With China being an 
important trading partner in many developing 
countries, weaker growth there will weigh down on 
the imports of other developing countries. 
  
Commodity prices have weakened in 
response to new capacity  
Despite the strengthening of the global economy, 
the prices of most industrial commodities have 
been declining (figure 7). While it is still too early to 
be certain, the declines appear to result from both 
increased supply and increased substitution on the 
demand side induced by the high prices of the past 
several years. 
 
Since 2000, capital expenditures by major firms in 
oil and metals markets have quintupled (figure 8). 
Overall, they increased an average of 15 percent 
annually since 2005 in the case of oil and 20 
percent in the case of metals. The impact of 
increased supply is most visible in energy markets 
(figure 9), where higher prices have made 
technologies economically viable and spurred large 
increases in North American oil and natural gas 
production and large increases in African oil 
production (see the Commodity Annex for a more 
complete discussion). Recent developments have 
also been influenced by the recovery of production 
in Middle East countries such as Libya and Iraq.  
  
Similarly, the coming on stream of new projects in 
Latin America (Chile, Peru), Africa (Zambia, 
Democratic Republic of Congo), and Asia (China, 
Mongolia) have placed substantial downward 
pressure on metals prices even as sales have 
strengthened. But demand suppression has also 
been at work. Global demand for refined metals 
increased 4.5 percent in 2012 (9.9 percent in 
China), but metal demand by Organization For 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) member countries fell by 3.9 percent in 
2012.  
  
The combination of increased supply and weak 
demand has yielded a buildup in global stocks. For 
example, combined copper stocks at the major 
metals exchanges are up 46 percent since 2012. 
Aluminum stocks, which have been rising since 
end-2010, increased 8 during the past 12 months. 
  
 
Commodity prices have been falling de-
spite stronger growth, due to increase supply 
Source: World Bank. 
Figure  7. 
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Capital expenditure in the resource sector is up 
5-fold since 2000, putting pressure on prices 
Source: World Bank; Bloomberg. 
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Developing-country imports have led a rebound 
in trade 
Source: World Bank; Datastream; Haver. 
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Expectations are that prices will continue to ease 
over the medium term. The World Bank forecast, 
which calls for the price of a barrel of oil to ease to 
$102 in 2013, and to $101 in 2015, reflects a 
technical assumption that oil prices will slowly 
decline between now and 2025 to a level consistent 
with the real cost of producing a barrel of oil from 
the Canadian tar sands using today’s technology 
(the Canadian tar sands are among the most 
abundant and most expensive to produce sources 
of crude oil). Metals prices are expected to decline 
in real terms by 3.7 and 1.4 percent in 2013 and 
2014, respectively, reflecting increased supply and a 
gradual reduction in the metals intensity of 
developing-country (especially Chinese) growth 
(see Commodity Annex for more details). Food 
prices are also projected to decline (7.7, 6.0, and 5.5 
percent over 2013–15), reflecting a gradual 
improvement in supply conditions and reduced 
production costs due to lower energy and fertilizer 
prices.  
Inflationary pressures remain subdued 
 
Despite the monetary stimulus in high-income 
countries and an acceleration in developing-country 
growth in 2012Q4, inflationary pressures remain 
relatively subdued, although East Asia & Pacific, 
the Middle East & North Africa and South Asia are 
showing signs of rising inflation (figure 10). 
Box .3  
  
South-South Trade 
 
As reported in the January 2013 edition of Global Economic Prospects (World Bank 2013a), more than half of developing-
country trade is now with other developing countries, up from 37 percent in 2001. China has played a big role in this pro-
cess (26 percent of total exports from all developing countries are going to China, up from 14 percent in 2001). But even 
excluding China’s trade with other developing countries, and not withstanding rhetoric suggesting that developing-country 
growth has come on the back of high-income imports, growth of trade between the remaining developing countries has also 
outpaced trade with high-income countries by a wide margin throughout the first decade of this century (box figures 3.1 and 
3.2).  
  
The U.S. dollar value of trade between developing countries has grown annually by an average of 19.3 percent over the 
past decade (17.5 percent if trade with China is excluded) versus about 11 percent for developing-country exports to high-
income countries. Importantly, every developing region shows the same basic trend, with intra-developing-country trade 
outstripping developing-developed trade, and by a large margin—except for Europe and Central Asia, where EU integration 
helped increase trade between the region and high-income countries. 
  
Interestingly, the rapid expansion of intra-developing-country trade reflects more than just commodity trade, with the value 
of developing-country exports of manufactures rising at about the same rate as the value of commodities as a whole. The 
result is all the more surprising because commodity prices more than doubled over the sample period, suggesting that the 
volume of manufacturing trade between developing countries was expanding particularly rapidly. The one broad commodity 
grouping that exceeded manufacturing trade growth was metals and ores, mainly reflecting the very strong demand in Chi-
na for these products. Excluding China from developing-country trade, the intra-developing country value of metals and ores 
trade grew somewhat less quickly than manufactures. 
Box 3. 
Box Figure 3.1   South-South imports, by type 
 
Source: World Bank; UNCTAD. 
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Inflation in high-income countries remains low. 
Inflationary pressures in China appear to have 
eased but may be intensifying in Indonesia and Lao 
PDR following years of rapid growth and relatively 
loose macroeconomic policy, and core inflation 
remains high in Vietnam. In the Middle East & 
North Africa, high prices reflect both efforts to 
reduce the fiscal burden of price subsidization by 
raising some regulated prices, as well as supply 
disruptions caused by civil and armed strife. In 
South Asia, increases in regulated prices have also 
played a role, as have tight market conditions 
despite the relatively slow pace of growth. 
 
In contrast, inflation rates in developing Europe 
and Central Asia have declined to close to 7 
percent, down somewhat from the 8½ to 9 percent 
average during the pre-crisis period. The easing 
partly reflects still-large output gaps, but structural 
reforms have also contributed.  
  
Monetary policy in developing countries continues 
to ease. Since January, the Reserve Bank of India 
has cut interest rates by a cumulative 75 basis 
points despite still strong inflationary pressures. In 
Mexico, the central bank has cut rates by 50 basis 
points—its first interest rate cut since July 2009. 
Other policy easing included a 100-basis-point cut 
implemented by the Bank of Colombia in three 
consecutive actions. Interest rates were also 
lowered in Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kenya, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, 
Uganda, and Vietnam. Only five developing 
countries (Brazil, the Arab Republic of Egypt, 
Gambia, Ghana, and Tunisia) have raised interest 
rates in 2013; Serbia raised and then cut rates. 
Although global inflationary pressures remain 
benign, given the lags in monetary policy 
transmission, this additional easing may add to a 
strengthening activity already under way, resulting 
in additional inflationary pressures in countries 
operating close to full capacity, without much 
payoff in additional output.  
 
Economic weakness in high-income 
countries has cut into aid flows 
 
Ongoing fiscal adjustments and budgetary 
problems among high-income countries have led to 
a decline in aid for two consecutive years for the 
first time since 1997. According OECD (2013) 
data, net official development assistance (ODA) 
flows in 2012 fell 4 percent in real terms to $125.6 
billion, bringing the total decline since 2010 to 6 
percent. As a share of Gross National Income in 
donor countries, ODA for developing countries 
fell to 0.29 percent in 2012 from 0.31 percent in 
2011. Cuts to aid budgets were steepest among 
high-spread Euro-area economies, with Spain 
having cuts its aid budget by 50 percent, Italy by 35 
percent, Greece by 17 percent, and Portugal by 13 
percent. ODA increased among only nine reporting 
economies, with Korea (18 percent), Luxembourg 
(10 percent), and Australia (9 percent) reporting the 
largest increases. Turkey almost doubled its 
assistance to North African countries after the 
Arab spring.  
 
The outlook for aid remains gloomy for poor 
countries. The OECD expects aid flows to recover 
only modestly in 2013 and to remain stable during 
 
Inflation is broadly under control 
Source:  World Bank; Datastream. 
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Increased supplies have opened up  
arbitrage opportunities 
Source: World Bank; Datastream. 
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2014 to 2016. The bulk of the increase in flows is 
expected to benefit middle-income Asian 
economies, with flows to countries with the largest 
Millennium Development Goals gaps declining. 
Bilateral aid to Sub-Saharan economies declined 7.9 
percent in 2012 in real-terms.  
 
Outside Europe, remittance flows to 
developing countries are largely 
unaffected 
 
The European debt crisis and rise in 
unemployment rates in high-income countries 
(which account for the bulk of remittance flows to 
developing countries) has negatively affected 
incomes of migrants and, in turn, their ability to 
send money home (for a more detailed discussion, 
see World Bank 2013a). Nevertheless, migrants 
appear to have absorbed these shocks to some 
extent and continue sending remittances to their 
family and friends in need. As a result, the value of 
remittances to developing countries rose to $401 
billion in 2012, up 5.3 percent. or about half the 
11.5 percent increase recorded in 2011. As a share 
of recipient-country GDP, remittances rose only 
0.2 percentage point.  
  
This aggregate story masks important differences 
across countries. For instance, the large number of 
migrants in the Arabian Gulf generated significant 
increases in remittance flows from the Gulf 
Cooperation Council countries—with the U.S. 
dollar value of remittances to South Asia and the 
Middle East & North Africa rising 12.3 and 14.3 
percent, respectively. By contrast, developing 
regions that are more closely tied to high-income 
Europe (figure 11), where the protracted debt crisis 
has taken a severe toll on economic activity, 
experienced much weaker increases in remittances. 
Remittance flows to the developing Europe & 
Central Asia region fell 3.9 percent and increased 
1.6 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa in U.S. dollar 
terms in 2012, following increases of 13.5 and 4.9 
percent, respectively, in 2011. Flows to Latin 
America were hit especially hard by the continuing 
downturn in Spain, where the unemployment rate 
rose above 26 percent, forcing many Latin 
American migrants to return home. The dollar 
value of remittance flows to Latin America rose 0.9 
percent in 2012, with absolute declines in some 
countries like Colombia (-2.3 percent) that have 
significant numbers of migrants in Spain. 
 
The U.S. dollar value of remittance flows to 
developing countries is projected to increase 6.7 
percent in 2013 and to gradually firm to a 10.2 
percent rate of increase in 2015, reflecting a modest 
easing in oil prices and a gradual strengthening  of 
growth in high-income countries. Despite the 
increases in nominal terms, flows are projected to 
remain broadly stable when expressed as a share of 
developing countries’ GDP.  
  
  
Global outlook: less 
volatility, somewhat 
stronger growth 
  
 
 
Hard data so far this year point to a global 
economy that is slowly getting back on its feet. 
However, the recovery remains hesitant and 
uneven. Several times since the onset of the crisis 
in 2008, expectations of a firming of growth have 
ended in disappointment. And the current 
conjuncture is no different. Forward-looking 
indicators, including business surveys, have 
strengthened over the past six months only to 
weaken again recently (figure 12).  
  
While an important clue as to current and future 
developments, a pessimistic bias has crept into the 
 
Remittances continued to expand in 2012, 
broadly in line with developing country GDP 
Source: World Bank. 
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relationship between Purchasing Manager’s Indexes 
(PMI) and actual output. Based on the historical 
relationship between industrial activity and the 
World Bank’s global PMI indicator (a weighted 
average of national and Markit PMI indicators), 
PMIs between 2010 and 2013 have been 
systematically  about 3.0 points lower than they 
should have been.  
  
While this pessimistic bias could be just a statistical 
artifact, it could also be an indicator of increased 
caution on the part of firms. Under this 
interpretation, firms having been disappointed by 
poor growth outcomes in the past may be skeptical 
of stronger growth now, and could be holding back 
on investment until they are sure that another 
slowing is not in the offing. Such behavior, may be 
self-fulfilling and could explain why despite 
improved conditions in financial markets, and the 
gradual accumulation of pent-up demand for 
consumer and investment durables, the recovery 
(especially in Europe) remains modest. 
  
A gradual recovery in high-income 
countries  
 
Activity in high-income countries has been under 
considerable pressure from fiscal and banking 
sector consolidation and associated uncertainties. 
These pressures are expected to remain over the 
forecast period, although the drag they are exerting 
on growth is projected to diminish, in part because 
much of the necessary adjustment has already been 
accomplished.  
  
In the United States, the private sector recovery 
appears to be relatively robust. By some measures, 
growth in the first quarter of 2013 was stronger 
than expected with industrial production expanding 
at a 4.4 percent annualized pace, and retail sales at a 
2.9 percent pace. First quarter GDP growth was 
relatively weak at 2.4 percent, in part because of a 
decline in government spending. The gathering 
momentum in the U.S. economy is both reflected 
in and prompted by an improving labor market 
(unemployment has fallen to 7.6 percent) and 
recovery in the housing market.  
  
Progress toward agreeing on a credible plan to 
bring the deficit down to sustainable levels has 
been slow. However, policy makers have extended 
both the debt ceiling and spending authorizations 
well into the future, thereby reducing the likelihood 
of a debt-ceiling confrontation and the threat of 
default. On the downside, both the tax increases 
agreed at the beginning of the year and the 
spending sequester will be a drag on growth in 
coming quarters, continuing to offset some of the 
strength from the private sector recovery. Overall, 
GDP growth for the year is projected to slow 
somewhat, compared with 2012, to about 2.0 
percent in 2013, before strengthening to 2.8 
percent in 2014 and 3.0 in 2015.  
  
The economy of the Euro Area remains very weak 
despite improved financial conditions and some 
signs of strengthening. On the positive side, 
funding costs in core Euro Area countries have 
declined, and lending has started to grow again. 
Imports, exports, and industrial production have all 
returned to positive (albeit modest) growth.  
  
However, borrowing costs in high-spread 
economies remain very high; unemployment 
continues to rise (including in so-called core 
economies); and weak growth is compromising 
progress on the fiscal front. Moreover, although 
important structural and fiscal consolidation 
reforms have been undertaken (see box 1), the pace 
of progress has eased, leading to concerns of 
reform fatigue, while several elections have 
highlighted popular discontent with austerity. 
Finally, unemployment is crushingly high in 
periphery economies (27 percent in Spain and 
Greece, 18 percent in Portugal, 14 percent in 
Ireland, and 12 percent in Italy). 
  
 
Business confidence has improved, but re-
mains weaker than conditions would suggest  
Source: World Bank; Haver Analytics; Markit. 
Figure 12. 
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Growth in the Euro Area is expected to pick up 
slowly during the course of 2013, in part because 
the drag from fiscal consolidation and banking 
sector restructuring in the core countries is 
expected to become less intense.FN4 As a result, 
quarterly growth for the Euro Area as a whole is 
expected to return to positive territory in the 
middle of 2013 and then gradually gain strength. 
Nevertheless, whole year GDP is projected to 
contract by 0.6 percent in 2013, with annual growth 
slowly strengthening to 0.9 percent in 2014 and to 
about 1.5 percent by 2015. Despite the return to 
positive growth, little progress is expected to be 
made in reducing unemployment. Weakness in 
high-spread economies where the deepest 
adjustments are occurring will continue, with 
growth not turning positive until 2014 and then 
only to a soft 0.3 percent. 
 
Growth in Japan rebounded in the fourth quarter 
of 2012 and into the first quarter of 2013, 
expanding at a 4.1 percent annualized pace, with 
consumer demand rather than investment a major 
driver—although industrial production expanded 
rapidly (8.9 percent in 2013Q1). Trade 
denominated in U.S. dollars has dropped off 
precipitously (as of April 2013, it was 8.0 percent 
lower than in June 2012), in part because of the 18 
percent depreciation of the Yen vis-à-vis the dollar 
since March 2012. The decline also reflects bilateral 
weakness in Japan’s exports and imports to and 
from China, apparently linked to tensions over 
disputed territories.  
  
The strength in the Japanese economy partly 
reflects the effects of announcements of a shift 
toward looser monetary policy made in November 
and confirmed with announcements of a large 
quantitative easing, fiscal stimulus and structural 
reform policy in January. Growth is projected to 
come in at 1.4 percent this year and in 2014 and at 
1.3 percent in 2015. For growth to remain strong 
through 2015, however, Japan will have to 
implement a robust set of productivity enhancing 
policy changes. Measures announced to date, 
include deregulation of the agriculture and 
electricity sectors, a relaxation of rules in health 
care, investment tax incentives, (including  FDI); 
some corporate governance reforms; and a partial 
relaxation of restrictions on the investment 
behavior of pension funds. 
 
Prospects for developing countries 
vary widely, reflecting local economic 
and policy conditions 
 
Overall, developing-country GDP is expected to 
firm somewhat in 2013, growing by 5.1 percent and 
gradually rising to 5.6 percent in 2014 and 5.7 
percent in 2015 (Box 4 provides a regional 
breakdown of prospects, while the regional 
annexes provide additional detail). That aggregate 
story, however, hides considerable regional and 
country-level variation (figure 13). At least four 
classes of developing countries can be identified:  
 countries (including many in East Asia and Sub
-Saharan Africa) that are growing rapidly and 
already close to or above potential, and 
therefore at risk of overheating;  
 
Acceleration will be muted in regions already operating at close to full capacity 
Source: World Bank. 
Figure 13. 
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Regional outlook 
 
Growth in the East Asia & the Pacific region slowed to 7.5 percent in 2012 largely due to weakening of growth in China 
(relative to the recent path). The regional growth is projected to slow further to 7.3 percent in 2013 with still weak 7.7 percent 
growth in China and easing of growth in the region excluding China from 6.2 percent in 2012 to 5.7 reflecting weak global 
demand and domestic policy tightening. The regional growth is projected to pick up to 7.5 percent in 2014 and 2015 as Chi-
na's growth firms up and growth in the region excluding China accelerates to 5.9 percent in 2014 and then 6 percent in 2015 
supported by strengthening global trade flows. The main risks to the region are internal, associated with a sharp reduction in 
Chinese investment, quantitative easing in Japan and rapidly rising debt and asset prices pose risks for Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand and the Philippines. Efforts to enhance productivity gains through market reforms should deepen, especially in 
Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam, while building buffers against future shocks remains a policy priority in Lao 
PDR, and small Pacific islands. 
  
GDP growth in Europe & Central Asia is estimated to have sharply slowed to 2.7 percent in 2012 from 5.6 percent in 2011 
as the region faced significant headwinds including weak external demand, deleveraging by European banks, a poor harvest, 
and inflationary pressures. While GDP growth in 2013 in the region will be supported by improved agricultural performance 
and reduced deleveraging pressures, the rebound will nevertheless be constrained by the weak carryover growth caused by 
low economic activity in 2012Q4; ongoing fiscal adjustments by the region’s economies, and high unemployment. The recov-
ery in export demand is expected to be gradual. The region’s growth is expected to reach 2.8 percent in 2013 and 4.2 per-
cent by 2015. Medium-term prospects for the region will critically depend on progress in addressing structural constraints to 
economic growth including capacity constraints, high unemployment, and lack of competitiveness.  
  
Growth in Latin America & the Caribbean is expected to strengthen to 3.3 percent in 2013, from 3.0 percent in 2012, sup-
ported by stronger demand domestically and abroad. Growth should converge toward potential after very weak growth in 
2012 in Brazil (0.9 percent) and Argentina (1.9 percent). Growth in most other countries is expected to ease slightly or decel-
erate this year. Growth is expected to decelerate markedly in Venezuela (to 1.4 percent), as highly expansionary policies are 
reversed. Over the medium term, the regional economy is expected to grow just under 4 percent annually, supported by 
stronger capital flows (notably FDI), recovering external demand, and structural reforms in some of the larger economies. 
Such improvements will be essential if the region is to sustain stronger growth over the medium term in the context of slow 
growth among major trading partners. Risks facing the region include the possibility of overheating in some of the faster -
growing economies and the potential impacts of even weaker-than-projected commodity prices. 
  
Growth in the Middle East & North Africa region is projected to slow to 2.5 percent in 2013, from 3.5 percent in 2012, re-
flecting a second year of recession in the Islamic Republic of Iran, subdued growth in the Arab Republic of Egypt, and a mod-
est pickup in Algeria. Political tensions remain high in advance of scheduled elections and referendums, and security risks 
are dragging down activity and investment. In the wake of lower private capital inflows since 2010, fiscal and external account 
imbalances among oil importers are increasing, in turn exacerbating funding pressures and undermining fiscal sustainability 
particularly in Egypt. However, a gradual strengthening of demand in key Euro Area trading partners and the moderation in 
global food prices could provide some respite in the near term. Among oil exporters, surging government spending has in-
creased vulnerability to a sustained fall in oil prices. Medium-term prospects hinge on the resolution of political tensions and 
security risks, and on the implementation of reforms to place the region’s economies on a more sustainable footing and to 
boost investment, jobs, and growth. 
  
GDP growth in South Asia slipped to 4.8 percent in 2012, mainly reflecting a continued deceleration in India, and slower 
growth in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Growth in Pakistan and Nepal remains sluggish, below regional peers. Regional GDP 
growth is projected to pick up to 5.2 percent in 2013, before accelerating to 6.1 percent and 6.4 percent in 2014 and 2015, in 
line with strengthening external demand, normal monsoons (after poor rains in 2012), and a gradual pickup in investment 
spending. Continued progress in fiscal consolidation and implementation of reforms that reduce structural constraints and 
lower inflationary expectations will determine the pace of recovery. Domestic risks that have gained in importance include a 
possible derailing of reforms, a resurgence of inflation, and weaker-than-expected monsoon rains.  
  
Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa has remained robust at an estimated 4.4 percent in 2012 (5.4 percent if South Africa is ex-
cluded), supported by resilient domestic demand and still relatively high commodity prices. Strengthening external and resili-
ent domestic demand, an accommodative policy environment, increasing investment, still high commodity prices, and in-
creased export volumes in countries with new mineral discoveries (Sierra Leone, Niger, and Mozambique) are expected to 
underpin a return to the region‘s pre-crisis growth rate of around 5.2 percent over the forecast horizon (2013–15). Nonethe-
less, risks remain tilted to the downside. A weaker-than-expected recovery in high-income countries and sharper-than-
expected decline in commodity prices will slow growth in the region and lead to deterioration in fiscal and current account 
balances, which remain strained in a number of economies in the region. Other domestic risks include overheating in econo-
mies operating close to capacity, adverse weather conditions, and political instability. 
Box 4.  
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 countries that appear to be running up against 
capacity constraints at growth rates well below 
the growth rates of the pre-crisis period, 
including several large and economically 
important middle-income countries;  
 countries with considerable slack in their 
economies, whether because of the severity of 
the post-crisis downturn (developing Europe), 
or because of social and political disruptions to 
economic activity (Middle East & North 
Africa); and finally  
 developing countries where recovery from the 
crisis appears complete, and there are no 
outward signs of overheating—this is the 
largest group of the four.  
 
Strong growth and capacity constraints are 
issues for many countries in East Asia, Sub-
Saharan Africa, and Latin America  
 
Policy makers in fast-growing economies that are 
close to (or above) full capacity should be focusing 
on avoiding overheating, rebuilding fiscal and 
monetary conditions, and implementing structural 
reforms to allow their economies to sustain the fast 
growth. Managing macroeconomic policy is 
difficult at the best of times. For fast-growing 
economies—especially those that are having 
success in exploiting previously untapped 
potential—the challenge is particularly difficult 
because judging where an economy is relative to 
potential is daunting when domestic economic 
structures are rapidly changing and both foreign 
and domestic investors are expressing strong 
confidence in an economy’s future (box 5). While 
there are clear costs associated with overheating, 
especially when fast growth has been accompanied 
by rapid credit expansion, there are equally clear 
opportunity costs associated with prematurely 
slowing an economy and potentially forgoing fast 
growth and rising incomes. 
 
For countries that combine rapid growth and 
already tight capacity conditions, the risks of 
overheating are higher; these risks include high or 
rising inflation or both (figure 14); growing current 
account deficits (as domestic supply is unable to 
meet rapidly rising demand); and asset price 
bubbles. In these economies, a tightening of either 
or both fiscal and monetary policy might be in 
order. That would be especially desirable in 
countries where monetary conditions have been 
relaxed in recent years, or where structural deficits 
are relatively high and the economy could therefore 
benefit from restoring some of the fiscal cushions 
that were expended in responding to the crisis.  
 
In China, ongoing rebalancing efforts remain a 
priority as does engineering a gradual decline in its 
unsustainably high investment rate. Should 
investments prove unprofitable, the servicing of 
existing loans could be come problematic — 
potentially sparking a sharp uptick in non-
performing loans that could require state 
intervention (see World Bank 2013a, for more). 
  
In still other countries, growth in the post-crisis 
period has been weaker than during the boom 
because of  underlying supply-side constraints 
 
Growth in Brazil, India, Russia, and South Africa 
has been 2–3½ percentage points slower since 
2010 than it was during the pre-crisis boom period 
of 2003–07 (table 3). While different factors are at 
play in each of these middle-income countries, 
there are several common factors. First, growth 
during the boom period was much stronger than 
during the preceding four years or even 10 years. 
Many began to think that these higher pre-crisis 
growth rates might be consistent with potential 
output growth, a view that the strong bounce-back 
of growth in the period immediately following the 
crisis seemed to confirm.FN5 However, countries 
have had difficulty sustaining such rapid growth 
without generating goods or asset price pressures.  
 
Inflation tends to be higher in countries 
with limited spare capacity 
Source: World Bank; Datastream. 
Figure 14. 
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This, plus increasing current account deficits, 
suggest that underlying potential output growth 
was slower than pre-crisis growth rates might have 
suggested. Indeed, World Bank estimates of 
potential output indicate that, in each of these 
countries, pre-crisis growth was well in excess of 
potential growth. Weak post-crisis growth in 
several of these countries has not generated 
significant spare capacity. Rather it has eliminated what 
were in some cases large positive output gaps in 2007.  
  
To the extent that current output gaps are relatively 
small (or positive), efforts to increase growth 
through monetary and fiscal stimulus risk being (or 
may have been) ineffective and might add to debt 
or inflationary pressures without any sustained 
progress in increasing output or reducing 
unemployment.  
  
According to the World Bank estimates in table 3, 
the 2012 output gap in Brazil, India, and Turkey is 
either positive or close to zero (less than 1 percent), 
suggesting limited scope for growth to accelerate in 
the short run (growth in 2012 was slower than 
potential growth in most of these countries). 
Moreover, growth rates in the future are likely to 
be constrained by the rate of growth of potential, 
which although higher than post-crisis averages for 
these countries, remains well below pre-crisis 
growth rates.  
 
Of course, there is considerable uncertainty 
surrounding these (or any) estimates of potential 
output.FN6 However, inflation increased over the 
past year in two of the five countries in table 3, and 
current account balances deteriorated in all but 
one. These developments suggest that supply 
constrains rather than deficient demand nay be at 
the root of the slower growth during recent years  
(table 4). 
  
For all of these countries, if growth is to return to 
pre-crisis growth rates on a sustainable basis, much 
more attention will need to be paid to policies that 
tackle supply-side bottle necks, whether they stem 
from weak or poorly enforced regulations, 
corruption, inadequate or irregular provision of 
electricity, or inadequate investments to improve 
educational and health outcomes. 
  
Output gaps and unemployment are persistent 
problems for many countries in developing 
Europe 
 
Several countries in developing Europe participated 
in the excesses of the pre-crisis boom period, with 
both households and firms taking on high levels of 
debt often denominated in foreign currency and 
often used to finance consumption rather than 
 
Inflation is rising or current account deterio-
rating in countries with tight output gaps  
    Source: World Bank. 
Table 4. 
Levels (MRV) Change in past year
Inflation 
(y/y)
Current 
account 
(% GDP)
Inflation 
percentage 
points
Current 
account 
(% GDP)
Brazil 6.5 -2.3 1.4 -0.2
India 9.4 -5.4 -0.9 -1.9
Russia 7.4 3.9 3.6 -1.4
Turkey 6.5 -6.0 -5.0 3.7
South Africa 5.9 -6.2 -0.2 -2.8
  
Growth post-crisis has been much weaker than during the pre-crisis period in several middle-income 
countries  
Note 1: Average annual compound growth rate 
Note 2: Calendar year average of fiscal year GDP measured at factor cost for India 
Source: World Bank.  
Table 3.  
Average Growth Output Gap Growth in 2012
1995-99 1999-03 2003-07 2010-12 2007 2010 2012 Actual Potential
Brazil 1.4 2.3 4.7 1.8 1.7 2.4 -0.8 0.9 3.2
India 6.6 5.4 8.8 6.1 2.5 2.2 0.9 5.3 6.8
Russia -0.4 6.8 7.6 3.9 9.7 -1.9 -1.3 3.4 3.7
Turkey 3.4 3.0 7.3 5.4 4.3 -2.4 -0.2 2.2 4.0
South Africa 2.4 3.4 5.2 2.8 5.0 -0.7 -1.0 2.5 3.0
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Slower growth in the post-crisis period mainly reflects a return to underlying potential growth rates after 
above-potential growth during the boom period  
 
Defining potential growth and why it is important 
Forecasting is always a challenging exercise—even more so 
when the global economy is going through a large adjustment. 
To provide some anchor to the forecasting process, the World 
Bank relies on potential GDP (growth). 
  
Potential output is defined as the trend growth in the productive 
capacity of the economy, that is, it is the estimated level of out-
put attained when the entirety of the capital stock and effective 
labor supply is employed. It is thus a measure of the maximum 
sustainable output (growth)—the level of real GDP (growth) in a 
given year that is consistent with a stable inflation and the way 
in which the factors of production, capital and labor, are optimal-
ly combined in the production process.  
  
In calculating the potential GDP, working-age data comes from 
the United Nations, while the capital stock is estimated using 
the perpetual inventory method from investment data and as-
suming a depreciation rate of 7 percent (IMF 2005). TFP was 
calculated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter through spot estimates 
of total factor productivity (TFP) (i.e. the Solow residual).  
  
In the pre-crisis period, developing-country GDP grew 2 percentage 
points faster, on average, than potential GDP 
Developing-country GDP grew on average by 8.3 percent each 
year between 2005 and 2007, approximately 2.0 percentage 
points faster than the annual growth of potential output1 during 
that period. As a result, World Bank estimates suggest that de-
veloping-country demand was fully 3.5 percentage points higher 
than supply in 2007 (output was broadly in balance in 2005). 
  
The crisis erased excess demand, with most countries returning  
reabsorbing spare capacity relatively quickly 
With the crisis, developing-country growth slowed sharply from 
8.5 percent to 1.9 percent between 2007 and 2009, broadly the 
same slowdown observed in high-income countries in percent-
age point terms (6.6 points for developing countries, 6.3 points 
for high-income countries). As a result, the excess demand of 
the end of boom period was erased and a negative output gap 
of 0.9 percent of potential GDP was opened up by 2009. The 
rebound in activity in 2010 more than absorbed the gap, with 
positive or close to zero output gaps in all developing regions 
except Europe and Central Asia. Slower-than-potential growth 
in East Asia & Pacific, and South Asia closed output gaps from 
above, while growth broadly in line with potential in Latin Ameri-
ca has kept the gap closed in that region. In Sub-Saharan Afri-
ca, where estimates of potential are particularly difficult, GDP 
has grown less quickly than potential in the post-crisis period, 
opening up a small negative output gap.  
  
Growth since the crisis has been constrained by domestic bottle-
necks and productivity, stymieing efforts to use expansionary mac-
roeconomic policy to boost growth 
While growth during the post-crisis period has been slower than 
during the pre-crisis period, it has, on average, been in line with 
underlying potential growth. Potential growth for all developing 
regions has slowed relative to the boom period by an estimated 
0.5 percentage point. Slower population and TFP growth have 
contributed to the slower growth. The rate of growth of the capi-
tal stock for all developing regions increased, but declined if 
China is excluded from the calculation. In terms of contributions 
to potential growth, about ¼ of the slowdown is attributable to 
slower population growth for the developing world excluding China and ⅔ due to slower TFP growth. The major contributor to 
slower potential growth in South Asia was slower capital stock accumulation. Weaker TFP growth was the largest driver of 
slower growth among BRICS, while in Latin America & the Caribbean, weaker population growth was a major factor. 
  
To achieve faster growth, developing countries will have to focus on supply-side reforms 
There is obviously significant uncertainty surrounding measures of output gaps and potential output, particularly among de-
veloping countries where the structure of economies is changing so quickly. Nevertheless, these results serve as a reminder 
that developing countries will need to continue with structural policy reforms that eliminate bottlenecks, enhance productivi ty, 
and stimulate capital accumulation if they are to achieve sustainably faster growth rates over the medium term.  
Box 5.  
 
1. The data reproduced in this box derive from the World Bank’s macroeconometric model and its estimates of total factor productivity (TFP) and potential 
output. These estimates are derived following a production-function technique similar to that used by the OECD and the European Commission, as described 
in (Burns, Janse van Rensburg, and Bui 2013). Future TFP growth, which influences current TFP growth through the employed smoothing algorithm, is 
assumed to be equal to the average observed in the pre-boom period 1995-2005. 
Potential output and its determinants Box table 5.1 
Source: World Bank. 
1995-2005 2005-2007 2007-2009 2009-2012 2012-2015
Developing countries
Actual GDP 4.8 8.3 3.8 6.2 5.5
Potential GDP 4.9 6.3 6.1 5.8 5.7
Total Factor Productivity 2.1 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.3
Capital Stock 4.3 7.7 7.9 8.0 7.3
Working-Age Population 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.7
East Asia & Pacific
Actual GDP 7.4 11.6 8.0 8.5 7.5
Potential GDP 8.1 9.1 8.9 8.6 8.0
Total Factor Productivity 4.0 4.9 4.7 4.4 4.2
Capital Stock 9.4 10.5 11.1 11.3 9.5
Working-Age Population 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.3
Europe & Central Asia
Actual GDP 4.0 7.7 -1.5 4.6 3.6
Potential GDP 3.2 5.4 4.3 3.7 3.8
Total Factor Productivity 2.8 2.7 2.0 1.8 1.8
Capital Stock -0.1 7.3 5.8 5.5 5.3
Working-Age Population 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.4 0.5
Latin American & Caribbean
Actual GDP 2.9 5.5 1.0 4.4 3.7
Potential GDP 2.9 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.4
Total Factor Productivity 0.7 1.2 1.2 1.1 0.9
Capital Stock 2.7 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.9
Working-Age Population 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4
Middle-East & North Africa
Actual GDP 4.4 5.6 3.7 1.9 2.4
Potential GDP 4.3 4.3 3.8 3.1 2.8
Total Factor Productivity 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.1 0.1
Capital Stock 3.3 5.4 6.0 5.1 4.0
Working-Age Population 3.2 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.2
South Asia
Actual GDP 5.8 8.9 5.3 7.3 5.9
Potential GDP 6.0 7.4 7.1 6.7 6.1
Total Factor Productivity 2.3 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.4
Capital Stock 6.4 9.8 9.3 9.1 7.5
Working-Age Population 2.4 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9
Sub-Saharan Africa
Actual GDP 4.0 6.7 3.6 4.7 5.2
Potential GDP 3.8 5.2 5.3 4.9 5.1
Total Factor Productivity 1.0 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.1
Capital Stock 2.4 5.9 7.1 6.4 6.9
Working-Age Population 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.7
(Average annual percent change)
Output gaps Box table 5.2 
Source: World Bank. 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Developing -0.2 1.5 3.5 3.1 -0.9 0.6 1.0 0.1 -0.6
East Asia & Pacific -2.0 -0.4 2.5 2.2 0.8 1.6 1.5 0.6 -0.2
Europe & Central Asia 3.4 6.0 8.0 7.0 -3.6 -2.1 -0.2 -1.1 -1.9
Latin America & Caribbean -0.5 1.3 2.9 2.8 -2.5 -0.3 0.4 -0.1 -0.1
Middle-East & North Africa 0.0 0.9 2.6 2.6 2.4 4.1 2.1 -1.0 -2.5
South Asia -0.5 0.8 2.3 0.8 -1.0 1.8 2.4 0.8 -0.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.4 1.8 3.2 2.9 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.8 -0.9
Output Gap ((actual GDP - potential)/potential, %)
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investments in new productive capacity. In 
addition, the banking sectors in many of these 
countries had close relations with European banks. 
As a result, their own difficulties in dealing with 
rising quantities of nonperforming loans were 
magnified by a drying up of external funding 
sources upon which many banks had relied. As in 
high-income Europe, the adjustment that ensued 
following the crisis was brutal. Unemployment 
soared to record levels, as banks deleveraged and 
households and firms cut into spending in an effort 
to repair damaged balance sheets. Fiscal conditions 
deteriorated throughout the region, with severe 
consequences in a few countries where public debt 
levels had risen even during the boom years. 
  
The good news is that growth rates for many of the 
hardest-hit countries have recovered to levels close 
to their underlying potential output. However, 
growth has not been strong enough to make 
significant inroads into existing unemployment and 
spare capacity.FN7 Arguably, these economies have 
been caught in a high unemployment equilibrium. 
Traditional policy advice in situations like this 
would be to use fiscal and monetary policy to 
stimulate growth and help close output gaps, but 
for many countries already high fiscal deficits and 
the necessity of restoring bank balance sheets limit 
the scope for such actions (figure 15). For these 
countries, policy may have to focus on increasing 
economic flexibility (including labor retraining) to 
promote improved competitiveness and take 
advantage of faster growth elsewhere. 
  
Output gaps are small and appear to be closing 
for the majority of  developing countries 
 
The bulk of developing countries are in a relatively 
positive place, with modest output gaps (countries 
close to the center of the figure 16), that are closing 
(countries in the green-shaded portions of the 
graph), either because output growth has slowed 
below potential and is therefore easing inflationary 
pressures, or because output is growing somewhat 
faster than potential. In these economies, policy 
appears to be broadly on track, although authorities 
may need to examine the overall stance of fiscal 
policy to evaluate whether there is scope for a 
gradual tightening to regenerate buffers consumed 
during the crisis period or to tighten monetary 
policy and in some cases rebuild reserves to 
provide room for a monetary policy easing should 
the global economy weaken sharply. 
  
  
Post-crisis risks have 
receded, with domestic 
challenges gaining 
prominence 
  
 
 
The cumulative steps taken by Euro Area countries 
over the past several years have greatly reduced the 
fiscal sustainability problems on the continent. The 
 
Output gaps are small or closing in the 
majority of developing countries 
Source: World Bank. 
Figure 16. 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that 
⅔ of Euro Area countries have already done 
enough fiscal adjustment (through end of 2013) to 
achieve debt sustainability and debt reduction (IMF 
2013b, 8). This fiscal consolidation although 
enormously painful has, in conjunction with 
reassurances offered by the European Central Bank 
(ECB), helped restore confidence in the Euro Area 
even as concerns about individual countries and 
banks remain. Indeed, as the uncertainty evoked by 
the Cyprus rescue effort illustrated, continued 
careful management of conditions at both the 
country level and the regional level is required.  
Much of the uncertainty that surrounded U.S. fiscal 
policy toward the end of 2012 has dissipated. 
Congress has twice extended the debt ceiling well 
in advance of reaching it, reducing the likelihood 
that a return of brinkmanship will cause the debt to 
go unpaid. The decision to allow payroll taxes to 
expire and increase tax rates on some wealthier 
individuals, together with the spending cuts 
associated with the sequester have reduced the U.S. 
general government deficit by an estimated 1½ 
percent of GDP.  
  
Nevertheless, little progress has been made toward 
setting U.S. fiscal policy on a sustainable medium-
term path. At 7.0 percent of GDP in 2012, the 
general government deficit remains very high, and 
gross general government debt is projected to 
reach 107 percent of GDP in 2013. As a result, the 
IMF 2013b) estimates that an additional deficit 
reduction of some 8.2 percent of GDP will be 
required before fiscal policy in the United States 
returns to a sustainable path (almost twice the 
estimated cuts required in the Euro Area). In Japan, 
the same number is more than twice as high again, 
even when seeking the less ambitious objective of 
reducing general government gross debt to 173 
percent of GDP. 
  
Traditional risks have receded, but 
other risks and challenges have 
emerged or grown in stature  
  
Even as the post-crisis risks from the high-income 
world have declined in importance, a new set of 
uncertainties and risks are emerging or gaining in 
stature. For instance, developing countries are 
increasingly concerned about: 
 the potential effects of the radical relaxation of 
both fiscal and monetary policy in Japan; 
 the potential impacts on revenues, government 
balances, and growth among commodity 
exporters, if the increased supply and demand 
suppression that high commodity prices have 
evoked begins to generate strong downward 
pressures on commodity prices;  
 domestic challenges, including inflationary 
pressures and asset price bubbles, and weaker 
than pre-crisis growth rates. 
 The challenges that the eventual withdrawal of 
quantitative easing may bring.  
  
Dealing with sharply relaxed fiscal 
and monetary policy in Japan  
 
After several months of signaling that they would 
be loosening fiscal and monetary policy, Japanese 
authorities announced at the beginning of 2013 a 
three-pronged macroeconomic growth strategy, 
comprising new public works spending of ¥10 
trillion, a new monetary policy aimed at reaching a 
2 percent inflation target in the medium term, and 
structural policies aimed at increasing total factor 
productivity growth. For the moment, the precise 
nature of the programs is not entirely clear—for 
example, only about half of the announced new 
spending appears to be net new spending. Similarly, 
the impact and details of announced to incite firms 
to invest, reduce protection in the service and 
agricultural sectors and stimulate female labor 
participation is unclear. The monetary easing, 
which, as announced, would about the same size as 
the third round of quantitative easing (QE3) in the 
United States, has only just begun. 
  
Japanese quantitative easing can be expected to 
affect developing countries in three ways: 
 The yen’s depreciation is likely to dampen 
developing-country exports (figure 17). However, 
income elasticities are typically larger than price 
sensitivities and in this particular instance, 
developing countries gain from increased 
import demand from Japan might outweigh 
the losses associated with the Yen’s (real) 
depreciation;  
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 By adding to the looseness of global monetary 
conditions, through lower global interest rates 
and perhaps increased capital inflows, 
potentially adding to overheating pressures, 
especially in developing East Asia & Pacific; 
 Through increased demand for final goods and 
intermediate products used in Japanese 
exports, mainly benefiting countries involved 
in the supply chains of Japanese exporters. 
 Longer-term unless the structural component 
of the reform agenda is successful in boosting 
productivity and GDP growth, the fiscal and 
monetary stimulus elements are unlikely to 
have a lasting positive effect for developing 
country GDP, while increased liquidity and 
indebtedness could prove destabilizing. 
  
Ultimately the overall impact on individual 
developing countries will depend in part on the 
importance of Japan as a trading partner, the size 
of liquidity leakage from the Japanese economy, the 
extent that individual developing countries attract 
additional capital flows, and the extent to which the 
quantitative easing boosts Japanese final and 
intermediate demand for the exports of developing 
countries (box 6 and the Exchange Rate Annex 
cover different channels and likely impacts in more 
detail).  
  
Finally, the financial impact of Japanese quant-
itative easing could be attenuated by the scaling 
back or even withdrawal of U.S. quantitative 
measures (see the following discussion for more on 
this point).  
  
Past investments are boosting the 
supply of industrial commodities, 
potentially ending the supercycle  
 
Since early 2011, industrial commodity prices have 
been weakening, a process that appears to be 
intensifying in 2013, despite signs that the global 
economy is gaining strength (figure 18). Indeed, 
since their peak in early 2011, the price of metals 
and minerals is down 30 percent and that of energy 
is down 14 percent, with prices off 12 and 5 
percent, respectively, between January 2013 and the 
end of May 2013. This price weakness has sparked 
discussion about whether a supercycle in 
commodity prices is coming to an end—
particularly within the metals industry, where large 
increases in supply are coming on stream in 
response to investments spurred by the high prices 
of the past several years. FN8  
 
While the baseline assumption of a gradual easing 
in prices over the projection period remains the 
most likely outcome, a steeper decline cannot be 
ruled out. Table 5 reports the results of two 
simulations. The first scenario examines the 
impacts on developing-country GDP, current 
accounts, and fiscal balances of a scenario where 
oil prices, reach the real long-term supply cost of 
$80 per barrel  (industry experts’ current estimate 
of the cost of profitably extracting oil from the 
 
Since early 2011, metals and energy prices have 
been weakening  
Source: World Bank; Datastream. 
Figure 18. 
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Potential impacts of Japanese quantitative easing on developing countries 
 
The yen’s depreciation caused developing-country exchange rates to appreciate 1.7 to 3.7 percentage points more than would 
have been the case otherwise  
Since September 2012, the yen has depreciated in real effective terms by 21 percent. So far, the impact on developing 
economies is measurable, if relatively muted. Developing-country real-effective exchange rates appreciated by 4.7 percent 
over the same period, which was 3.5 percentage points more than their average appreciation over any six-month period 
between 2005 and 2012. Countries in East Asia & Pacific have closer direct trade ties with Japan and their currencies were 
hit harder, rising by 6.1 percent versus an earlier average appreciation of 2.4 percent. Thailand experienced a sharp 12.5 
percent real-effective appreciation of its currency. Simulations suggest that in the absence of the yen’s depreciation, curren-
cies in developing countries generally and in East Asian developing countries specifically would have appreciated 1.7 and 
3.7 percentage points less quickly.  
  
The yen’s depreciation likely to dampen developing-country exports 
The yen’s depreciation will tend to make imports more expensive for Japanese consumers and will, therefore, initially reduce Japa-
nese demand for developing-country imports. However, typically income elasticities are larger than price sensitivities and in this partic-
ular instance, developing country exporters’ gains from increased import demand from Japan might outweigh the losses associated 
with the Yen’s (real) depreciation. 
 
Effects are not larger because few developing countries compete directly with Japan 
Impacts on developing-country exports to the rest of the world would be limited because few compete directly with Japan. 
Only four developing countries have an export similarity index with Japan in excess of 50 (100 implies an identical export 
structure), and even for those where similarities are relatively high, impacts may be limited given differences in markets 
served (Mexico competes in the auto sector, but is focused in the U.S. market, which represents only 22 percent of Japa-
nese auto exports). 
  
Countries like Thailand and Philippines that are in Japan’s supply chain may benefit from increased Japanese exports 
Suppliers of parts and components to Japan in regional production networks, particularly Thailand and the Philippines, 
could benefit from gains by Japanese exporters in global markets and even derive additional benefits through increased 
potential FDI from Japan. Firms in trade partner countries (including those in East Asia & Pacific) would also benefit from 
Japanese technology, machinery, and equipment at competitive costs. In the area of service trade, tourists from developing 
East Asia to Japan would have increased purchasing power that would contribute to further narrowing Japan’s trade deficit 
with the region. Trade partners in the region and globally would benefit from an increase in Japan’s demand for global im-
ports. 
  
Quantitative easing will help keep interest rates low and may contribute to the volatility of capital flows  
The announced quantitative easing component of the Japanese stimulus package is roughly twice the size of QE3 in the 
United States. However, financial leakages to developing countries are unlikely to be twice those associated with the U.S. 
QE3 because capital outflows from the United States tend to flow more directly to developing countries than do Japanese 
outflows (only 3 percent of Japanese portfolio outflows are directed to developing countries, versus 8.3 percent for the Unit-
ed States). However, Japanese capital markets are thinner than U.S. capital markets and, therefore, may be less able to 
absorb the additional capital flows, forcing a larger share to leak out. Finally, IMF (2013d) found that the impacts of QE3 on 
developing countries was much less marked than earlier episodes because markets were much calmer then (as they are 
now). 
  
Evaluations of the effect of U.S. QE on developing countries offer unclear guidance about the potential impact of Japanese QE 
Finally, it is not all that clear what the impact of the leakages (however large they may be) will be on developing countries. 
Research by the Asian Development Bank (2013) suggests that the main impact on developing countries of the U.S. quanti-
tative easing was globally positive, mainly because it lowered borrowing costs and boosted demand. Similarly IMF (2013d) 
suggests that flows to developing countries have not been excessive and have been broadly manageable, although volatili-
ty associated with changed sentiment in high-income countries has generated temporary strains and monetary policy chal-
lenges. While lower interest rates may be contributing to asset bubbles and excess risk taking, they have also permitted the 
relatively inexpensive financing of a great deal of capacity enhancing investment.  
  
By extending periods of low interest rates and boosting capital flows, Japanese QE could exacerbate regional bubbles 
Japanese QE will undoubtedly serve to keep borrowing costs down for an even longer period than would have occurred 
otherwise. That may contribute to asset price bubbles and volatile capital flows, although to what extent is difficult to evalu-
ate, just as the evidence concerning the impact of the U.S. policy in this regard is mixed.  
 
Box 6.  
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Table .5 
 
Impact of a more rapid supply-induced decline in industrial commodity prices 
 
Table  5.  
Scenario 1: Oil price gradually declines to $80/bbl real by June 2014, other commodity prices react endogenously 
2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015
World 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0
High income countries 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.1
Developing countries 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.3
Oil exporters
Developing countries -0.1 -0.4 0.1 -0.3 -1.4 -1.4 -0.2 -1.1 -1.1
East Asia and Pacific 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.3
Europe and Central Asia -0.2 -0.8 -0.3 -0.5 -2.3 -2.3 -0.4 -1.8 -1.8
Latin America and Caribbean -0.1 -0.3 0.4 -0.2 -0.8 -0.7 -0.1 -0.6 -0.5
Middle East and N. Africa -0.4 -1.4 0.1 -0.8 -3.5 -2.2 -0.4 -2.1 -2.3
South Asia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.3 -1.4 -0.8 -0.9 -4.5 -4.4 -0.6 -2.9 -3.3
Oil importers
Developing countries 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.1
East Asia and Pacific 0.2 0.8 -0.1 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.1
Europe and Central Asia 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.1
Latin America and Caribbean 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.2
Middle East and N. Africa 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.1
South Asia 0.2 0.9 0.8 0.3 1.4 1.5 0.1 0.7 0.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Real GDP Current Account (% of GDP) Fiscal Balance (% of GDP)
Scenario 2: Metal prices gradually decline by a cumulative 20% by June 2014 
Source: World Bank. 
2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015
World 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
High income countries 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Developing countries 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Metal exporters
Developing countries 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.3
East Asia and Pacific n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Europe and Central Asia 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.3
Latin America and Caribbean 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.2
Middle East and N. Africa n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
South Asia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.1 -0.7 -0.5 -0.2 -1.2 -1.2 -0.1 -0.8 -0.9
Metal importers
Developing countries 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
East Asia and Pacific 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
Europe and Central Asia 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Latin America and Caribbean 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.3
Middle East and N. Africa 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1
South Asia 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Real GDP Current Account (% of GDP) Fiscal Balance (% of GDP)
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Canadian tar sands) by mid-2014 rather than 
declining gradually to that price by 2025, as in the 
baseline. The faster decline is assumed to come 
from a shift in expectations about future prices 
brought about by increasing production and 
reserve discoveries in the United States and other 
nonmembers of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC). In this simulation, 
the price of other commodities react in line with 
historical cross-price and output elasticities (energy 
is a major cost factor in the production of both 
metals and agricultural commodities). As a result, 
metals and food prices also fall, by about 7 and 3½ 
percent, respectively, relative to the baseline.  
  
In this scenario, global GDP is positively affected 
(up 0.4 percentage point in 2014 relative to 
baseline), because the positive effects on oil-
importing economies outweigh the negative impact 
on oil-exporting countries. The GDP of 
developing-country oil exporters is projected to 
decline by a relative modest 0.4 percent in this 
scenario in 2014, but the effects on current account 
and fiscal balances are larger—-1.4 and -1.1 percent 
of GDP, respectively. The simulation assumes that 
exporters are able to finance the deterioration in 
these balances. If they were unable to do so, GDP 
impacts would be substantially larger. For the most 
part, developing-country oil exporters are still 
running current account surpluses, but fiscal 
deficits exceed 3 percent of GDP in 6 of 16 
countries for which data exist. If countries could 
not finance additional deficit, they could be forced 
into a procyclical tightening of policy that would 
exacerbate the cycle. 
  
The second simulation analyzes the impact of a 
more rapid decline in metals prices, which are 
assumed to fall by a further 20 percent by June 
2014 relative to the baseline, in response to 
additional capacity coming onstream following past 
investments (see earlier discussion). In this 
scenario, the effects on global and oil-importing 
country GDP are broadly unchanged, in part 
because, unlike oil, the share of metal and minerals 
in the imports of most countries is small (even in 
China, which consumes a disproportionate share of 
the world’s metals, metals and minerals represent 
only 16 percent of total imports). The impact on 
metals exporters is more severe. Among Sub-
Saharan African metal exporters, GDP could fall 
by as much as -0.7 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
balance of payments declining by 1.2 percent of 
GDP, and the fiscal balance by nearly 1 
percent.  
  
Unlike oil exporters, these impacts are more likely 
to be binding for developing metals exporters 
whose average government and current account 
deficits are equal to 2.7 and 6.3 percent of GDP. 
Assuming that increases in government deficits 
above the 3 percent level cannot be financed, GDP 
impacts would increase to -0.5 percent for the 
metal exporting countries facing financing 
constraints, versus –0.2 percent for countries 
where there are no financing constraints. 
  
Notwithstanding the 16 percent decline in oil 
prices between their March 2012 peak and May 
2013, commodity prices are much higher than they 
were at the turn of the century. For example, 
between their 2001 record lows and 2012, nominal 
oil prices are up more than 300 percent, while 
metals and agricultural prices are up 225 and 157 
percent, respectively.  
  
The eventual tightening of monetary 
policy in high-income countries may 
slow growth in developing countries 
 
Although much of the current debate in developing 
countries concerns the potential impacts of 
Japanese quantitative easing (see earlier discussion), 
the implication for developing countries of backing 
away from current levels of stimulus and even the 
withdrawal of stimulus are at least equally 
important. Although Japan has embarked on a new 
stimulus policy, there are increasing signs that the 
United States will soon either reduce the size of or 
stop its QE efforts. If that happens, not only will 
the net effect of Japanese easing likely be offset (at 
least partially) by tighter policies in the United 
States, but over the medium term, developing 
countries are likely to face tighter financial 
conditions, with potentially important real-side 
implications.FN9  
  
As monetary policy in high-income countries 
begins to be less accommodative, long-term 
interest rates can be expected to rise. Currently, 
U.S. long-term interest rates are some 110 basis 
points below their pre-crisis level and 140 basis 
points lower than their long-term average in real 
terms. Assuming that a relaxation of quantitative 
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easing leads U.S. long-term interest rates to rise to 
their long-term average in real terms, and that 
developing-country interest rate spreads remain 
constant, developing-country borrowing costs 
would rise by the same amount as long-term U.S. 
rates.  
  
Econometric evidence suggests, however, that 
developing-country spreads tend to rise when base 
rates increase. Work done for the 2010 edition of 
Global Economic Prospects suggests that a 100-basis-
point increase in high-income-country base rates is 
associated with a 110 to 157 basis point increase in 
developing-country yields (World Bank 2010; 
Kennedy and Palerm 2010, 2013and IMF 2013a). 
  
If real base rates return to their long-term averages, 
they would rise from about 188 basis points today 
to around 322 basis points (the mean level between 
1990 and 2007). Based on historical experience, 
that could cause developing-country yields to rise 
by between 150 and 270 basis points, with 
countries with relatively good credit histories and 
low spreads at the bottom end of the range and 
those with less good records toward the upper end 
of the range. This is broadly in line with recent 
IMF (2013a, 38–39) estimates that suggest that 
three-fourths of the 465 basis point decline in 
developing-country yields since December 2008 
has been caused by external rather than domestic 
factors.FN10 
  
Simulations suggest that the associated increase in 
the cost of capital would cause desired capital-to-
output ratios in developing countries to decline, 
resulting in slower investment growth for an 
extended period as well as a slower rate of growth 
of potential output of around 0.6 percentage points 
per annum after three years during the transition 
period to a lower capital-output ratio. Longer term, 
potential output could be lower by between 7 and 
12 percent unless measures are undertaken to 
reduce domestic factors that contribute to the high 
cost of capital in developing countries. Efforts in 
this regard could more than completely offset the 
impact of tighter global conditions. 
 
 
  
Higher interest rates could also 
expose risks in countries with high 
debt levels  
 
In addition to the longer-term effects that a return 
to higher capital costs would have, there is also the 
risk that the transition to higher rates occurs in an 
abrupt and disruptive fashion (IMF 2013d). In such 
a scenario, rather than a gradual increase in long-
term rates as monetary stimulus eases, markets 
react preemptively, causing rates to jump quickly, 
potentially trapping some participants in vulnerable 
positions that appeared manageable under low 
interest rates but proved not to be under suddenly 
higher interest rates. 
 
Developing countries that have run up private and 
public sector debt during the low-interest period 
could be particularly vulnerable. So too would be 
countries with relatively weak domestic financial 
sectors and elevated current account or 
government deficits that might make them 
vulnerable to either a sharp increase in capital costs 
or a reduction in flows. 
  
Although the majority of developing countries 
appear to be in good condition in this regard, 
public debt levels are high and proving difficult to 
manage in countries such as Cape Verde, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Jamaica, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and 
Sudan. IMF statistics suggest that gross general 
government debt exceeds 50 percent of GDP in 36 
low- and middle-income countries and increased in 
12 of these by 10 or more percentage points of 
GDP between 2007 and 2012 (figure 19).  
 
Several developing countries combining 
high and  rapidly rising government debt are 
at risk 
Source: IMF. 
Figure 19. 
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 Individual country exposure is not limited to 
general government debt. In several economies, 
private sector debt has been increasing rapidly as 
well. And private debt can rapidly become a public-
sector problem as the recent financial crisis 
illustrated for high-income countries and the East 
Asia crisis for developing countries. In this respect, 
18 developing countries have private external debt 
exposures in excess of 30 percent of GDP. Three-
quarters of these are in developing Europe and 
Central Asia reflecting strong banking and inter-
company linkages with high-income Europe. In the 
case of Seychelles and Papua New Guinea, the 
gross private sector debt reflects a thriving offshore
-banking system (figure 20). While that changes the 
nature of the associated risk, it does not eliminate 
it, as the recent experiences of Cyprus, Iceland, and 
Ireland illustrate. 
  
While external debt is sometimes more 
problematic, because exchange rate movements can 
affect domestic agents’ ability to service loans, local 
currency debt can also problematic — especially if 
problems with domestic debt provoke a local 
banking crisis.   
 
Data on domestic banking claims on the private 
sector (such data exclude debt associated with local 
bond markets) suggest a number of countries 
where debt levels are especially high (second panel 
of figure 20.) However, interpreting the data is 
difficult, because while debt to GDP levels  can 
reflect vulnerability, they also reflect the extent of 
intermediation — which is generally associated 
with stronger growth and higher incomes.   
 
Countries where debt levels are high, and have 
been rising rapidly, may represent the greatest risk. 
In East Asia for example, combined nonfinancial 
corporate and household debt has increased in 
several countries, reaching 130 percent of GDP in 
China and Malaysia in 2012. For the East Asia 
region as a whole, private debt has increased by 19 
percentage points of GDP since 2007, while in 
Latin America it has increased by 9 percentage 
points. Household debt (only by deposit-taking 
corporations) in Thailand has risen 15 percentage 
points since 2007 and now stands at 63.4 percent 
of GDP (see World Bank 2013 for more). Total 
household debt is estimated to be about 77 percent 
of GDP in Thailand and almost 80 percent of 
GDP in Malaysia. 
 
 
 
 
Private sector debt levels, as well, are elevated in some developing countries 
Source: World Bank; International Debt Statistics; World Development Indicators; IMF IFS. 
Note 1: External private debt include private nonguranted external debt with short- and long-term maturity.                        
Note 2: Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector, such as through loans, purchases of nonequity securi-
ties, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries these claims include credit to public enterprises. 
Note 3. Orange bars indicate low income countries. 
Figure 20. 
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Concluding remarks 
  
 
 
Overall, the global economy is moving into a new 
and hopefully less volatile phase. The extreme risks 
and swings in perceptions that have driven global 
capital and output markets have eased significantly, 
even as new risks and challenges have gained in 
prominence.  
  
The majority of developing countries have 
navigated the crisis and immediate post-crisis 
period very well. With the exception of some 
countries in developing Europe and the Middle 
East & North Africa, they recovered relatively 
quickly from the crisis and have enjoyed solid, if 
less rapid than boom period, growth rates. With 
the demand gaps opened up by the crisis largely 
filled, future growth will increasingly be determined 
by the success with which countries succeed in 
addressing supply-side bottlenecks, including gaps 
in physical, social, and regulatory infrastructure:   
 In many countries, policy attention is 
appropriately returning to simplifying 
regulations, opening up to trade and foreign 
investment, investing in infrastructure and 
human capital. These are the policies that have 
underpinned the acceleration in developing 
country growth over the past 20 years, and it is 
only through continued reform and progress in 
these policies that the strong productivity 
growth of the past 20 years can be maintained. 
 For the many countries operating at close to or 
even above full capacity, macroeconomic 
policy may need to be tightened—both to 
reestablish fiscal space that was used up in 
response to the crisis and to prevent 
inflationary pressures and asset bubbles from 
building up. 
  
The external risks facing developing countries have 
also evolved:  
 The recent decline in industrial commodity 
prices is, perhaps, signaling an end to the 
upward phase of the commodity cycle. Policy 
makers in commodity-exporting countries need 
to take a close look at the potential 
consequences of a sharper-than-anticipated 
decline in commodity prices for growth, 
government finances, and their external 
financing needs. 
 For countries in East Asia, the recent 
intensification of monetary easing in Japan 
could prompt strong and disruptive capital 
inflows, adding to already existing inflation and 
currency pressures.  
 Longer term, as high-income monetary policy 
becomes less accommodative, interest rates in 
developing countries will rise. Higher rates may 
generate difficult adjustments and possibly 
domestic crises, especially in countries where 
public and private sector indebtedness has 
been on the upswing.  
 Over the longer term, higher interest rates will 
translate into increased capital costs, potentially 
slowing developing-country growth by as 
much as 0.6 percentage points per annum after 
three years as firms reduce debt levels to more 
manageable levels.  
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1. Equity flows to the Middle-East & North Africa completely dried up in the first four months of 2013, with just one 
bond issue from Lebanon ($1.1 billion) and two syndicated bank deals worth about $643 million. 
2. Traditionally, risk premiums are measured as the difference between developing-country yields or CDS rates and 
those of similar U.S. assets, with the idea that the U.S. assets proxy for the risk-free rate of return. As the crisis hit, 
the riskiness of U.S. financial assets clearly went up, even if yields did not, either in the short run because of flight-
to-quality effects or later because of quantitative easing. At the same time, spreads on developing-country financial 
assets declined. Only part of that decline can be explained by improved credit quality (IMF 2013b), the rest being 
explained by the increased riskiness of the base rate and the reduced cost of credit. 
3. Since January 2013, 10 developing-country borrowers have been upgraded and only six downgraded. In addition, 
over the past 18 months, eight developing countries (or developing-country governments)—Angola, Bolivia, 
Honduras, Mongolia, Paraguay, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zambia—have issued bonds for the first time (in Bolivia’s 
case, for the first time in more than 90 years). Since 2010, 14 countries have entered international bond markets for the first time.  
4. The IMF (2013a) estimates an overall fiscal contraction for the Euro Area of 0.7 percent of GDP, compared with 
0.5 percent in 2012 and 2.1 percentage points in 2011. 
5. The measures of potential used here are based on a production function method and rely on estimates of trend total 
factor productivity growth as well as assumptions that the full capacity rate of employment (employment divided by 
working-age population) are constant over time and that all of the services of the capital stock are available—where 
the capital stock is estimated as equal to the sum of all past investments depreciated at a 7 percent rate.  
6. For instance, the South African Reserve Bank’s latest estimate of annual long-run potential output growth is 3.5 
percent. However the bank also notes that “our estimates for South Africa over the same period as the ECB study 
reflect a decline from an average of 3.9 per cent (2000–07) to 2.8 per cent (2008–10); more or less similar to the 
estimated magnitude of decline in the euro area and the United States” (Ehlers and others 2013, 10).  
7. For negative output gaps to close, growth must temporarily exceed the rate of growth of potential and vice versa.  
8. Heap (2005) argues that industrial commodities go through a super-cycle where prices are likely to stay high for an 
extended period of time. Jerrett and Cuddington 2008 have empirically visualized the hypothesis for a number of 
metals. Erten and Ocampo (2012) identify four super-cycles in real commodity prices during the period 1865-2009, 
ranging between 30-40 years with amplitudes 20-40 percent higher or lower than the long run trend (similar cycles 
have been identified by Cuddington and Zellou (2013) for metals).  
9. See World Bank 2010, chapter, 3 for a more detailed discussion of the impact of higher borrowing costs.  
10. The IMF work differs from the World Bank work in citing high-income-country stock market volatility as the main 
external factor underpinning the decline in spreads. The World Bank (2010) includes high-income stock-market 
volatility with a much wider range of risk appetite indicators to derive a synthetic price-of-risk indicator that 
simultaneously determines developing country and high-income country risk premiums. 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
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Overview  
 
 
 
Growth in industrial sectors in the post 2008-2009 
period has been unimpressive globally, with the 
exception of East Asia and Pacific, and China in 
particular. After bouncing back in the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis global industrial production 
growth weakened again in the second half of 2010, 
and after a short-lived acceleration dipped again in 
mid-2011 and in the second half of 2012. Financial 
turmoil in high-income countries, and uncertainties 
surrounding the course of policy actions in high-
income countries combined in some cases with 
policy-induced slowdowns in some of the larger 
developing countries and/or capacity constraints 
have restrained the pace of activity.  
 
Overall, more than four years after the financial 
crisis began, global industrial output is only 5.3 
percent higher than its pre-crisis peak. Output in 
high-income countries is still 6.5 below pre-crisis 
levels, with output in the Euro area and Japan 
sharply lower and output in the United States 
having almost regained pre-crisis levels. Output in 
developing countries outside China is 2.6 percent 
higher than its pre-crisis peak.  
 
Growth in developing countries has been most 
dynamic in East Asia and Pacific mainly reflecting 
double-digit IP growth in China, where output is 
67.9 percent higher than the pre-crisis high, versus 
12 percent in the remaining countries in the region. 
Industrial output in South Asia and Europe and 
Central Asia are 19.6 and 2 percent higher 
respectively than their pre-crisis peaks. Industrial 
output in Latin America and the Caribbean and 
Sub Saharan Africa is more or less in line with  the 
pre-crisis levels. Middle East and North Africa is 
the only developing region where industrial output 
is lower than four years ago, largely due to the fall 
in production associated with the socio-political 
unrest during the Arab Spring.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recent economic 
developments  
 
 
Industrial production growth 
strengthened to an above trend pace 
in early 2013 
 
Output strengthened in much of the world toward 
the end of 2012 and into the first quarter of 2013, 
with global output expanding at a close to 3.4 
percent annualized pace in the three month leading 
to March, supported by strengthening final demand 
and rising inventories (figure IP.1).  
 
Developing countries industrial output expanded at 
about a 5.1 percent annualized pace during the first 
quarter of 2013, with East Asia and Pacific’s 
industrial production growing at a 8.6 percent 
annualized pace and China’s industrial output 
expanding at a 9.7 percent annualized pace in the 
first quarter of 2013 (figure IP.2). Industrial output 
growth in other developing regions has varied 
markedly, but has been generally much softer. 
Growth has remained unimpressive in Latin 
America and the Caribbean as performance in 
Mexico has been softening and despite a modest 
improvement in growth in Brazil (figure IP.3). 
Output growth remained relatively flat in Europe 
& Central at 2.4 percent annualized pace in the first 
quarter of 2013, on account of relatively weak 
 
Global industrial production expands at 
an above-trend pace in Q1 2013  
Source:  World Bank; Datastream. 
Fig IP.1  
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performance in Russia and Turkey. Growth 
remained strong in the South Asian subcontinent 
despite a deceleration of growth in India expanding 
at an 7.7 percent annualized pace in the first 
quarter of 2013. Data for the Middle-East and 
North Africa and Sub Saharan Africa lags, but was 
still declining in both regions in the three months 
to February.  
 
Among high-income countries outside of the Euro 
Area industrial output also accelerated  – reaching 
3.5 percent up from 0.7 percent in the fourth 
quarter of 2012, mostly on rapid expansion in the 
United States and Japan. A recovering housing 
market and the creation of more than half a million 
payroll jobs in the first quarter of 2013 have 
supported the acceleration in activity, boosting 
consumer demand. Investment demand has also 
recovered with capital goods orders rising at a 20 
percent annualized pace in the first quarter of 2013. 
As a result industrial production in the U.S. 
expanded at a 4.4 percent annualized pace in the 
first quarter of 2013, up from the 2.6 percent 
annualized pace recorded in the final quarter of 
2012, despite a significant fiscal drag. In Japan, the 
relaxation of both monetary and fiscal policies, 
have prompted a sharp rebound in activity, with 
industrial production growth rebounding to 9 
percent annualized pace in the first quarter of 2013. 
 
In the Euro area industrial production stabilized, 
expanding 0.7 percent annualized in the first 
quarter of 2013 compared to a 8.1 percent 
annualized pace of decline in the fourth quarter of 
2012. An increase in energy and capital goods 
production was behind the improved outturns. 
Excluding Germany, where output performance 
has been more robust (up 1.2 percent annualized 
pace in the first quarter of 2013), the improvement 
in industrial sector performance is less dramatic as 
output declined most rapidly among the high-
spread economies that are enduring the harshest 
fiscal consolidations.  
 
Capital-goods orders point to increased global 
capital spending in early 2013, but momentum may 
be weakening. After a sharp decline in mid-2012, 
G3 capital goods orders recovered briskly in the 
latter part of 2012, with shipments following a 
similar path (figure IP.4). Capital- goods orders 
 
Industrial production growth recovers in 
Europe and Central Asia in Q1 2013  
Source:  World Bank; Datastream.  
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Strong industrial production growth in 
East Asia in Q1 2013  
Source:  World Bank; Datastream. 
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
Jan '10 Jul '10 Jan '11 Jul '11 Jan '12 Jul '12 Jan '13
South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa East Asia and Pacific
Percent, 3m/3m saar
Fig IP.2  
 
Capital goods orders are picking up in both 
high income and developing countries 
Source:  World Bank; Datastream. 
Note: US capital goods orders exclude defense and aircrafts orders. 
Capital goods import orders for developing countries.  
Fig IP.4  
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35 
rose at a rapid pace in the first quarter of 2013, 
with US capital goods orders rising at a 21.4 
percent annualized pace, up from a 13.8 percent 
expansion in the fourth quarter of 2012. In Japan, 
after a robust recovery in the last quarter of 2012 
(15.5 percent) capital goods orders growth 
accelerated markedly to 31.8 percent in the first 
quarter of 2013, while in Germany capital goods 
orders rose 3  percent over the same period, almost 
half the pace recorded in fourth quarter of 2012 
(8.3 percent). In developing countries, capital 
goods orders eased only slightly, rising at an 22 
percent annualized pace in the first quarter of 2013, 
down marginally from the 19 percent pace 
recorded in fourth quarter of 2012, pointing 
to sustained investment growth in these 
economies.  
 
Data for April suggest however that the pace 
of expansion of capital goods orders might be 
easing in the US in the second quarter of the 
year. Similarly capital import orders by 
developing countries are also showing signs 
of moderating. 
 
...but there are signs of moderation in 
the pace of expansion into the 
second quarter 
 
Forward-looking indicators like purchasing 
manager’s indexes suggest a slower pace of activity 
for the second quarter, as fiscal tightening in the 
US cuts into activity there and capacity constraints 
in many developing economies moderate growth – 
which should nevertheless continue to expand 
broadly in line with underlying potential. Indeed 
the step down in the global manufacturing Markit 
PMI in April to the lowest level since December 
(but still above the 50 mark that indicates 
expansion) followed by a marginal increase in May 
suggest that global manufacturing output growth is 
moderating into the second quarter of 2013. 
Sentiment regarding leading indicators components 
such as new orders and finished goods inventories 
improved only modestly.  
 
Notably high-income and developing countries 
PMIs moved in opposite directions in May, with 
sentiment improving in most high-income 
countries surveyed and deteriorating in three 
quarters of developing countries.  
Business sentiment in the U.S. is weighed down by 
the fiscal drag, with higher taxes likely to weigh on 
consumer spending, and budget sequestration 
further limiting domestic demand growth. The US 
manufacturing ISM index softened at the end of 
the first quarter and dropped below the 50 growth 
mark in May, on softer domestic demand and 
notwithstanding a boost in external demand. 
Meanwhile the business sentiment as gauged by the 
Markit PMI deteriorated to a six-month low in 
April, before inching up to 52.2 in May, remaining  
in growth territory.  
 
PMIs in major developing countries such as 
Brazil, China, India, Russia and Turkey all 
declined for two or more consecutive 
months.  
 
The moderation in output in East Asia is expected 
to be relatively broad, as suggested by PMI indexes.  
The May PMI has been weaker than expected in 
China, where the PMI retreated 1.2 points to 49.2. 
In China industrial output growth has decelerated 
further to 7.4 percent annualized pace in the three 
months leading to April.  Interpreting the trade and 
industrial output data for East Asia is made more 
difficult by the timing of the Lunar New Year 
which fell in February this year.    
 
Although PMIs improved in the Euro area in May, 
to the highest level since 2012, they continue to 
indicate contraction albeit at a slower pace. 
Sentiment improved in Germany, France, Italy, and 
Spain (albeit from depressed levels). Meanwhile 
sentiment in Japan improved for a fifth consecutive 
month, to its highest level in more than a year, as 
inventories are relatively low while orders are 
rising.  
 
Noteworthy is the fact that despite stabilizing at a 
higher level than the one recorded in the fourth 
quarter of 2012, business sentiment remains at 
historically low levels globally, suggesting business 
confidence remains fragile and is yet to return to 
pre-crisis levels.  
 
…nevertheless growth is expected to 
remain solid at a trend like pace 
 
Industrial production growth in developing 
countries is expected to moderate to a more 
sustainable pace over the short term, with growth 
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in China remaining in the low double-digit range, 
while output elsewhere in East Asia moderates. 
The continuation of supportive fiscal policy with a 
front-loading of infrastructure spending is expected 
to benefit China’s industrial production. In 
addition, according to recent surveys labor demand 
continues to outpace labor supply, especially 
in the service sector, and might lead to 
increased labor income in the months ahead, 
which should be supportive of private consumption.  
 
Some of the manufacturers in the region may be 
challenged by the large depreciation in the Japanese 
yen, induced by monetary easing, and may lose 
market share over the short-term, although other 
than China and Thailand, most countries in the 
region do not compete directly with Japan (see 
Main Text). Japanese output is expected to 
continue to post a robust recovery, following an 8 
percent annualized bounce back in the first quarter 
of 2013.  
 
Growth in industrial output is also expected to 
remain soft in countries with capacity constraints, 
including some of the larger developing economies. 
Industrial output performance will remain weak in 
Brazil, despite significant stimulus from the 
government, as high production costs, and capacity 
constraints continue to weigh on growth. 
Furthermore retail sales growth has decelerated 
markedly, as rising inflation has caused real wage 
growth to slow. Quarterly industrial production 
growth in South Asia is projected to 
moderate, as growth in India slows from 
unsustainable levels.  
 
In Latin America, the weakness in the Mexican 
industrial sector should be reversed in mid-2013, as 
the Mexican manufacturing sector growth will re-
link with the better performing U.S. manufacturing. 
However, performance in Argentina’s industrial 
sector is likely to be weak as a result of recent 
policies that restrict access to foreign currency for 
essential capital imports.  
 
Growth in industrial production is expected to 
strengthen in the second half of 2013 in Europe 
and Central Asia, supported by modestly stronger 
domestic and high-income European demand, 
which should help narrow the still wide output gap 
in the region. Still weak private credit growth will 
continue to weigh on industrial sector activity this 
year.   
Growth in Middle East and North Africa will 
recover but remain subdued despite large excess 
capacities, in part due to weak domestic demand.  
 
In the Euro Area output is projected to strengthen 
modestly in the second half of the year, as the pace 
of fiscal consolidation eases and pent-up demand 
forces should support growth.  
 
The recent declines in commodity prices, including 
oil and metals prices appear to mainly reflect higher 
supply (see commodity annex and main text). 
Lower input prices rather than suggesting slower 
demand going forward, should provide a fillip to 
activity, both by increasing real incomes and 
reducing production costs.  
 
In order for growth in global industrial production 
to return to its long time trend over the medium 
term the pace of growth in high-income economies 
needs to accelerate as they still account for a 
significant share of global industrial output, and 
lead in global innovation for local markets, which is 
expected to support growth in industries such as 
automobile, chemicals, machinery and 
pharmaceutical (McKinsey 2012).  
 
In terms of growth rates industrial sectors were 
much more dynamic in developing countries, 
expanding at an annual pace of 8.5 percent over the 
2002-2007 period compared to 2.6 percent in high-
income countries (figure IP.5). Among developing 
countries East Asia and Pacific was the most 
dynamic region (11.2 percent average annual pace), 
followed by South Asia (9.4 percent) and Europe 
 
Growth in major developing economies 
is weaker than in the pre-crisis period  
Source:  World Bank; Datastream. 
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and Central Asia (8.1 percent). Latin America and 
the Caribbean’ performance was less impressive 
(5.1 percent), expanding at the same pace as that of 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Middle East and North Africa 
expanded at a slowest pace among developing 
regions (4.1 percent). 
 
During the boom years (2002-2007) global 
industrial production expanded at an average pace 
of 4.1 percent a year, with developing countries 
accounting for about 54 percent of growth in 
global industrial production (figure IP.6). East Asia 
and Pacific contributed more than 36 percent to 
global growth, with China alone accounting for 
almost a third. Among developing regions the 
second largest contributor to growth in global 
industrial production was Latin America and the 
Caribbean (8.7 percent), followed by Europe and 
Central Asia (6.4 percent) and South Asia (5.4 
percent) (figure IP.7).  
 
A significant part of the expansion in the 
global industrial production came from rapid 
growth in the construction, mining, and 
utilities sectors in developing countries. 
These sectors together accounted for close to 
30 percent of overall global growth during 
the 2000-2010 period, with China accounting 
for more than half of that contribution (17 
percent). The expected slowdown in 
investment in China over the coming years, 
partly as the property market cools down, 
may subtract from the global industrial 
production trend growth if not supplemented 
by stronger growth in other major emerging 
economies with large infrastructure gaps such 
as India and Brazil, whose infrastructures are 
perceived as inadequate given their level of 
economic development (WEF 2012-2013).  
 
Overall growth in the industrial sector, and 
manufacturing in particular, stands to gain from the 
shift in demand towards developing economies. 
Output in industries that need to be close to 
consumers due to cost structures (high 
transportation costs) and that produce products 
that are not heavily traded (food processing) is 
likely to expand rapidly as income in developing 
countries continue to rise.   
 
Risks and 
vulnerabilities 
 
 
 
The downside risks of a further deterioration 
in performance in the Euro area, of steeper 
fiscal consolidation in the United States and 
Japan, persist although the probability 
associated with these risks has declined since 
our January 2013 edition. An additional risk 
is that of an abrupt slowdown in investment 
in China which would have significant 
consequences for exporters of capital goods 
in particular in East Asia but also Germany 
and the United States.  
 
Regional contributions to developing 
country industrial production  
Source:  World Bank. 
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Contribution to global industrial production 
growth  
Source:  World Bank. 
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If commodity prices decline markedly capital 
expenditures, which have risen sharply during the 
boom years especially in oil and metals markets, 
could slow significantly, affecting capital goods 
producing countries. Lower commodity prices and 
lower fuel prices in particular could boost real disposable 
incomes and bolster demand for other manufactures. 
 
There is also an upside risk associated with the 
performance of the U.S. economy and its resilience 
in the face of the fiscal drag. Similarly the 
performance in the Euro Area could be stronger 
than in our baseline.  
 
As policies in high-income countries become less 
accommodative the cost of capital is likely to rise 
over the medium term and costlier capital could 
limit investment and growth in industrial 
production. (GEP 2010). 
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Global inflation is subdued as cost 
pressures related to commodity 
prices continue to ease and demand 
factors in high income countries 
remain weak  
 
Despite loose global monetary conditions and an 
acceleration in economic activity, global consumer 
prices rose at a modest 2.7 percent annualized rate 
in the three months ending April of 2013 (figure 
INF.1).  
 
This was the slowest first quarter increase in 
global consumer prices since 2009, reflecting 
subdued high-income country growth and a 
moderation of global commodity prices 
(figure INF. 2).  
 
Core inflationFN1 eased insignificantly in the 
majority of countries for which consistent data 
series are available. For the OECD country group 
as a whole, quarterly core inflation declined to 1.6 
percent in 1Q2013 compared to 1.9 percent in 
1Q2012.   
 
Developing country inflation ticked 
down in April 2013 on declining 
commodity prices  
 
Developing country pricesFN2 rose at a 6.9 
percent annualized rate in the three months 
to April of 2013 showing some moderation 
from more accelerated growth over the past 
two quarters.  
 
The recent  down t ick in  developing 
country inf lat ion is  notable ,  presumably 
s ignal ing an end to the  gradual rise that 
began in the summer of 2012 — prompted by 
the upturn in international grain prices 
related to droughts in the US, Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia and shortage of 
grain supplies.  
 
Among developing countries, inflation in low 
income economies has shown the fastest 
declining trend throughout 2012, both on a 
year-over-year and a quarterly annualized 
basis.  
 
The year-over-year inflation in these 
economies is now about half of the 14 
percent rate recorded a year ago (figure INF.2 
and 3).  
 
Quarterly inflation on an annualized basis 
bottomed out in August of 2012 after slowing 
to a 5.5 percent rate with price acceleration 
partly reflecting the temporary increase in 
international food prices in Q42012 (see 
above).  
 
More recently, as commodity prices have 
eased and growth has weakened, quarterly 
inflation has also moderated falling back to a 
5.5 percent annualized rate in the three 
months ending April of 2013.   
 
Global inflation slowed in Q1 2013 
Source:  World Bank; Datastream.   
Fig INF.1  
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Inflation decline reflect easing  
commodity prices  
Source:  World Bank; Datastream; ILO.   
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High-income country inflation remains 
weak 
 
Year-over-year inflation in high-income 
countries has remained under 2 percent since 
April 2012, while quarterly inflation has 
displayed more volatility  partly  reflecting 
changes in energy prices (figure INF. 4).  
 
Quarterly core inflation on an annualized 
basis for the G-7 country group declined to 
1.4 percent in 2013Q1 compared to 1.7 
percent in 1Q2012. The low trend rate of 
inflation in high-income countries reflects 
still ample spare capacity, and the weakness 
of the recovery especially in the Euro Zone 
and Japan.  
In Japan, the sharp depreciation of the yen since 
September 2013 (see main text and exchange rate 
annex) has pushed quarterly inflation into a 
positive territory in January and February.  
 
More recently however, price pressures in Japan 
eased again reflecting moderating global 
commodity prices. Quarterly inflation on an annual 
basis dropped to a negative 0.6 percent in the three 
months to April and the year-over-year inflation 
stood at a negative 0.7 percent — well below the 
authorities new 2 percent annual inflation target.   
 
Global monetary conditions continue 
to be loose with Japan implementing 
aggressive monetary easing 
 
In high-income countries low interest rates are 
combined with the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open 
Market Committee’s continued monthly purchases 
of $85 billion of housing-market debt and 
Treasuries and quantitative easing in the UK and 
Japan and further policy easing in the Euro Area 
with the interest rate cut by another 25 basis points 
to 0.50 percent implemented in May.  
 
Developing country monetary policy 
has  loosening bias in general     
 
The majority of the developing country central 
banks continue to keep their interest rates on hold 
at historical low levels in their effort to stimulate 
domestic demand as global economic activity 
 
Low-income country inflation has shown  
the fastest decline 
Source:  World Bank and Datastream. 
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Unconventional monetary policy helped major high-income economies to avoid disinflation but Japan 
is still caught in disinflationary trap   
Source:  World Bank; Datastream.   
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remains weak and inflation pressures 
generally subdued. Some developing countries 
implemented additional rate cuts most 
recently following quite disappointing 
Q12013 growth outcomes in the overall 
context of moderating global price pressures.    
 
About twenty developing and seven high-
income countries and economic unions 
implemented policy rate cuts in the first 
months of 2013. This included a cumulative 
75 basis point rate cut implemented by the 
Reserve Bank of India and a 50 basis point 
rate cut in Mexico–first  easing since July 
2009. Other policy easing measures in LAC 
included a 100 basis point rate cut (to 3.25 
percent) by the Bank of Colombia in three 
monthly consecutive rate cuts and a 50 basis 
points rate cut by the Bank of Jamaica.  
 
In Sub-Saharan Africa Angola, Kenya, Sierra 
Leone and Uganda continued to ease policy 
and  Botswana and the West African States 
implemented their first rate cuts in few years. 
In ECA—where growth has weakened and 
price pressures have generally moderated—
policies have been eased in a number of 
developing countries, including Albania, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Macedonia and 
Turkey.  
 
In the EAP Mongolia cut its policy rate by 
175 basis points, Vietnam implemented a 100 
basis point cut this year and Thailand 
implemented a rate cut in May following a 
sharp output contraction in the first quarter 
of 2013.    
 
Monetary policy was tightened by about six 
developing central banks in 2013, including 
Brazil, Ghana, Gambia, SerbiaFN3, Tunisia and 
Egypt in an attempt to curtail inflationary 
pressures fueled by domestic factors, 
including rapid credit expansion and currency 
depreciation, particularly in Egypt. 
 
Monetary policy globally and in 
developing countries is increasingly 
embracing inflation targeting 
 
The Central Banks in most of the major countries 
are now following some type of inflation targeting 
regime.FN4 For the most part, inflation remains 
within inflation target (figure INF. 5) — with the 
notable exception of some large middle income 
countries, including Indonesia, Brazil, Russia, 
Turkey and South Africa, where headline inflation 
has tended to exceed targets due to recurring price 
pressures related to supply constraints.  
 
Loose policy stance in developing 
countries may be counterproductive 
in countries operating at full capacity 
 
In general, the central banks worldwide are keeping 
rates low with major focus still on downside risks 
in the global economy. Accommodative policy 
 
Developing country inflation outcomes are 
increasingly reflecting local conditions  
    Source: World Bank; Datastream.   
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With some exceptions inflation is  
anchored within the targeted rates  
Source: World Bank; Datastream.   
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stance may be adequate in the economies with 
remaining output gaps and subdued demand.  
 
Some developing regions continue to experience 
price pressures reflecting local conditions despite 
benign global inflationary pressures (figure INF.6). 
 
In the economies that are operating at full capacity 
the loose policy stance may be counterproductive 
contributing to domestic price pressures without 
much payoff in additional output.  
 
Moreover, a loose policy stance and low rates are 
encouraging risk taking attitude, fueling asset 
bubbles and pushing domestic debt to risky levels 
in the economies that are operating above their full 
capacity.FN5 
 
Headline inflation in East Asia and 
the Pacific region accelerated in early 
2013 reflecting a strong rebound in 
economic activity and 
accommodative policies   
 
Inflation has ticked up in a number of countries in 
the East Asia and the Pacific region in the first 
quarter of 2013 after declining through much of 
2012. Annualized quarterly inflation in the East 
Asia and the Pacific region accelerated to 3.5 
percent rate in the three months to March 2013 
compared with 2 percent a year earlier (figure  INF. 
7) reflecting price acceleration in China, Indonesia 
and Lao, PDR.   
In China, although the headline inflation rate 
remains under the central bank target of 3.5 
percent, price pressures are present. Quarterly 
inflation accelerated to a 3.7 percent annualized 
rate in the three months to February, the highest 
since October 2011, but eased in March in 
response to tightening of monetary conditions and 
administrative measures addressed toward curbing 
property prices.  
 
In Indonesia, inflation has been building up 
rapidly, with the quarterly inflation 
accelerating to a 9.5 percent annualized rate 
in the three months to April reflecting 
currency depreciation and hikes in food prices 
due to trade restrictions. Core inflation in 
Indonesia eased to 4.21 percent (year-over-year) in 
March from February's 4.29 percent but remains high.  
 
In Malaysia and Thailand currency appreciation 
combined with broadly stable commodity prices 
has helped curb inflationary pressures. Inflation 
also eased in Mongolia to 10.4 percent (year-on-
year) in April which was the lowest rate observed 
since July 2011 reflecting a slow-down in economic 
activity. 
 
Overall, the headline inflation remains within the 
central bank targeted range in the majority of the 
EAP countries, with the exception of Indonesia.  
Given limited spare capacity in the region, the 
generally loose stance of macroeconomic policy 
could stoke inflationary pressures and amplify the 
credit and asset price risks, especially in case of the 
volatile capital inflows including from Japan in 
relation to the latest quantitative easing.   
 
Price pressures are building up in 
EAP 
  Source: World Bank; Datastream.   
Fig INF.7  
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Inflation eased in ECA  
Source:  World Bank; Datastream.   
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Inflation has moderated in Europe and 
Central Asia but price pressures are high in 
large middle income countries 
 
In Europe and Central Asia, inflation has 
eased recently due to declines in food prices 
following last summer’s poor crop (figure 
INF. 8). Besides, in most economies, ample 
spare capacity and high unemployment is 
keeping inflationary pressures at bay.  
 
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia and Macedonia 
have been experiencing considerable easing in 
consumer price inflation since the end of 
2012 reflecting weak domestic demand and 
easing commodity prices with Georgia 
experiencing deflation since October 2012.   
 
The year-over-year inflation remains high in 
some large economies (notably Turkey and 
Russia), reflecting limited spare capacity. 
Quarterly inflation in those economies  eased 
most recently reflecting slowing growth and 
declining commodity prices, but the timing 
and the pace of easing price pressures diverge 
and reflect domestic policies.  
 
Quarterly inflation has slowed to 3.8 percent 
annualize rate in the three months to April in 
Russia where monetary policy remained tight 
despite slowing growth. The headline 
inflation at 7.2 percent in April was 
nevertheless above the central bank’s 5-6 
percent targeted  rate.FN6  
 
Policy easing in Turkey contributed to 
accelerating inflation to 9.7 percent 
annualized rate in the three months to March 
2013. Turkey’s quarterly core inflation eased 
to 6.5 percent in 1Q2013 compared to 9.6 
percent in 1Q2012. The headline inflation 
also dropped to 6.1 percent in April reflecting 
global decline in commodity prices, but 
remains above the central bank’s 5 percent 
annual inflation target.      
 
In Kazakhstan, adjustments in regulated 
prices put a temporary upward pressure on 
inflation with quarterly inflation increasing to 
7.9 percent annualized rate in the three 
months to November 2012. Tight policy and 
easing commodity prices contributed to 
moderating price pressures in 2013. Quarterly 
inflation slowed to 5.3 percent (q/q saar) and 
year-over-year at 6.4 percent (saar) in April 
2013 was at the lower point of the 6-8 
percent annual inflation target band.  
 
In Belarus, quarterly inflation remains high at 
35.8 percent (saar) in the three months to 
April 2013. Price pressures increased in the 
first quarter of 2013 following a significant 
decline to 10.3 percent annualized rate in the 
three months to November from the earlier 
hikes in response to stabilization measures. 
Belarus has been experiencing high level of 
inflation since 2011 following almost a 
threefold devaluation of the national currency 
against the US dollar implemented to correct 
external macroeconomic imbalances.  
 
Although inflation remains sticky in 
the largest countries of the region, 
price pressures moderated across 
the rest of the Latin America and the 
Caribbean    
 
Quarterly inflation in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (excluding Venezuela) eased to 5 
percent in 1Q2013 from 5.9 percent in 
4Q2012 indicating easing of price pressures, 
partly reflecting moderating commodity 
(notably food) prices (figure INF.9).  
 
 
Diverging inflation trends across LAC 
   Source: World Bank; Datastream.   
Fig INF.9  
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Inflation outcomes across countries mirror 
diverging policy stances, with Colombia, 
Chile, Peru and Mexico seeing strong growth 
combined with moderate consumer price 
inflation.  
 
Brazil has been on the other hand trapped in 
slow growth and high inflation equilibrium. 
Headline inflation was 6.5 percent in April 
2013—just at the upper limit of the central 
bank’s 4.5 percent +/-2 inflation targeting 
band.  
 
Till very recently monetary policy had been 
easing contributing to a cumulative 525 basis 
point cut between August 2011 and end of 
2012. Brazil was however one of the few 
developing countries that starts to tighten its 
policies in 2013 by implementing two 
consecutive rate cuts in April and May 
(cumulative 75 basis point rate increase).  
     
Currency devaluation has exacerbated local 
price pressures in Venezuela, where the year-
over-year inflation reached 35.2 percent in 
May—12.6 percentage points higher than last 
year.  
 
In Argentina, quarterly inflation on an 
annualized basis, which has accelerated in 
Q42012 eased most recently partly reflecting 
moderating commodity prices. However, the 
year-over-year inflation remains stubbornly 
high partly reflecting import restrictions 
combined with loose policies.  
In the Middle-East & North Africa high 
prices reflect both supply disruptions 
caused by civil and armed strife as 
well as the measures addressed at 
adjusting large macro-economic 
imbalances 
 
Average inflation in the Middle-East & North 
Africa exceeds 22 percent with quarterly 
inflation even higher. Prices pressures 
emanate from variety of sources, including 
high costs associated with importing food 
and fuel (Jordan and Tunisia) due to the 
region’s high dependence on internationally 
traded food commodities, supply shortages 
caused by political and armed conflict in 
some countries and international sanctions in 
others (Iran and Syria), and currency 
depreciation and administered price increases 
adding to pressures in some countries (e.g. 
Egypt) (figure INF.10).  
 
In South Asia consumer price based 
index remains high but the wholesale 
price index-based inflation moderated 
significantly, especially in India  
 
Year-over-year inflation ticked down in South 
Asia region in April on moderating 
commodity prices, but quarterly inflation still 
 
Inflation accelerated in MENA  
   Source: World Bank; Datastream.   
Fig INF.10  
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Inflation remains high in South Asia 
Source:  World Bank; Datastream.   
Fig INF.11  
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shows some acceleration. This mainly reflects 
an upward adjustments to domestic fuel 
prices (figure INF. 11) implemented over the 
past months.  
 
On a country level, in India, year-over-year 
consumer-based inflation declined below 10 
percent in April, and the wholesale price 
index-based inflation declined below 6 
percent for the first time in more than three 
years. However quarter-over-quarter 
consumer-price based inflation continued to 
rise and stood at 11.3 percent annualized rate 
in  the three months to April.  
 
Other countries in the region, including 
Bangladesh and Pakistan, and Sri-Lanka until 
most recently, have been experiencing 
moderating price pressures recently reflecting 
decline in commodity prices with both 
quarterly and annual inflations easing during 
the first quarter of 2013 in line with the 
global trends.  
 
Several countries in the region eased 
monetary policy between mid-2012 and 1Q 
2013 as they saw core inflation coming down. 
Those countries include Pakistan, which cut 
its key policy rate by a cumulative 250 basis 
points between August and December 2012, 
and Sri-Lanka and India where policy rates 
have been eased more  recently.  
 
Price pressures in South Asia continue to 
stem from growing demand for food and 
energy  reflecting raising household incomes 
combined with tight supplies related to 
bottlenecks and structural constraints in the 
production and distribution of food and 
utilities.  
 
Inflation experienced a steep decline 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, but price 
pressures prevail in a number of 
large countries reflecting capacity 
constraints and loose policies 
 
In Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South 
African republic) quarterly inflation eased by 
about 6 percentage points since last year 
reflecting commodity price moderation  and 
tight monetary conditions (see main text).  
 
But with many countries operating at little or 
no spare capacity, loose policies directly 
contribute to consumer price inflation. 
Ghana and Kenya, for example have seen 
their quarterly inflations accelerating in April 
to 15.4 percent annualized rate and 8.5 
percent respectively reflecting easing  
policies.  
 
In South Africa, year-over-year inflation has 
been around the upper limit of the Central 
Bank targeted rate since some time despite 
slow growth due to weakening of the rand 
and wage hikes. Core inflation also 
accelerated to 5 percent (y/y) in 1Q2013.   
 
In some countries of East Africa, notably 
Uganda and Tanzania, inflation remains 
contained following a massive decline in 2012 
(figure INF.12). In West Africa, moderating 
commodity prices and tight policies 
contributed to easing price pressures. In 
Nigeria, for example, the year-over-year 
inflation eased to 8.6 in March 2013—the 
lowest level in five years. Inflation also 
remained low in the countries of West 
African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU) (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, 
and Togo).    
 
Fig INF.11  
 
Inflation has recently eased in Sub-
Saharan Africa but selected countries 
are experiencing price pressures  
Source:  World Bank; Datastream.   
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Some developing countries continue 
to experience high inflation rates or 
severe disinflation due to country 
specific conditions  
 
Year-over-year inflation exceeded 15 percent in 
only seven developing countries in the first quarter 
of 2013 including Belarus (>20%), Iran (>40%), 
Malawi (>35%), South Sudan (>24%), Sudan 
(>40%), Syria (>49%), and Venezuela (>35%).   
 
Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Guinea all 
experienced sharp inflationary peaks in 2012, 
but managed to reduce price pressures 
containing inflation rate below 15 percent as 
of April of 2013.  
 
Outlook and risks  
 
 
The inflation outlook mirrors the growth outlook 
and remains uncertain. Under the baseline scenario, 
which assumes global economic recovery and 
moderating  commodity prices, inflation is 
projected to pick up only gradually with 
strengthening global demand as it remains to be 
predominantly anchored around the targeted rates. 
Moreover, the impact of accelerating inflation in 
developing countries will be counterbalanced by 
subdued price pressures in the high-income 
economies, reflecting a continued low consumer 
confidence and slow economic activity. Price 
pressures are likely to persist in a selected number 
of economies  such as Brazil, India, Russia, Turkey, 
South Africa with supply bottlenecks, especially in 
case of demand stimulating policies.  
 
In addition, many developing countries remain 
vulnerable to medium-term price pressures through 
excessive credit and debt build-up, feeding into 
asset prices. Moreover, with international reserves 
declining and/or deficit countries relying on 
foreign capital inflows, there is not only limited 
scope for monetary easing, but there is a medium-
term risk that a “normalization” of monetary policy 
in developed countries may encourage capital flight 
and put "unwanted pressure" on foreign exchange 
markets and potentially (further) erode reserves, 
while destabilizing currencies and exerting upward 
pressure on inflation. This risk is however unlikely 
to unfold over a short term period given the weak 
pace of recovery in high-income countries and in 
the context of the latest (May 2, 2013) interest rate 
cuts in Euro Area.  
 
In the near term, global inflation is likely to remain 
at around 3 percent (year-on-year) largely due to 
depressed price pressures in the high-income 
countries. Developing country inflation is projected 
to accelerate to 7 percent in the case of a continued 
loose monetary policy environment.  
 
The inflation outlook is subject to any supply-side 
shock related risk. Upside risks may entail a 
moderate acceleration – but even with this increase 
inflation is likely to remain below its 2011 levels. 
Global oil supply risk is related to a possible 
deterioration in political conditions in the Middle 
East but can also stem from the technical 
problems. A major supply cutoff could limit 
supplies and result in prices spiking well above US$ 
150/bbl depending on the severity, duration and 
response from OPEC, emergency reserves, and 
demand curtailment.  
 
Downside risks include further easing in inflation 
in high-income countries in case of continued low 
confidence and weak economic activity. There is 
also a downside risk related to slower economic 
growth, especially by emerging economies, 
including China.  
 
While the Fed and ECB’s interventions have 
helped to avoid the worst potential effects of 
banking-sector de-leveraging and liquidity 
constraints in high-income Europe, the ultra-loose 
monetary policy in high-income countries, 
including in Japan, could once again be sowing the 
seeds for the kinds of disruptive, inflationary, and 
asset-bubble creating capital inflows that 
characterized the second half of 2010.  
 
Moreover, in some developing countries monetary 
policy has also been very loose, while debt burdens 
have risen rapidly. Although global inflationary 
pressures remain benign, given the lags in monetary 
policy transmission, additional easing may add to a 
strengthening activity already underway resulting in 
additional inflationary pressures in countries 
operating close to full capacity, without much 
payoff in additional output.  
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Notes:  
 
1. Consumer prices, all items non-food, non-energy. OECD data and classification.  
2. Developing country inflation is calculated on a GDP weighted basis.  
3. Following earlier tightening Serbia has recently cut its policy rate by 25 basis points.  
4. The UK has a 2 per cent inflation target with no explicit upper bound. If inflation rises more than 1 percentage 
point above the target the Governor of the Bank must write an open letter to the Chancellor explaining the reasons 
for the deviation. 
5. EAP Update, April 2013,  WB, Philippine Economic Update, April 2013, WB, Global Financial Stability report, 
April 2013, IMF. 
6. Formally the Bank of Russia will finalize its move to inflation targeting by 2015. Currently, it is still using the 
currency corridor and uses interventions, although recently the Central Bank of Russia has largely refrained from 
using currency interventions allowing the ruble to float. 
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Recent developments 
in financial markets 
 
 
The “risk-off” phase in global financial 
markets has continued since the 
beginning of the year  
 
Global financial markets have been mostly calm 
since the beginning of the year following the 
substantial improvements during the second half of 
2012 (GEP 2012 January). Investor confidence, as 
proxied by risk premia and credit default swap 
(CDS) rates, has remained relatively strong despite 
negative developments in Euro Area (box FIN.1), 
including continued economic weakness, political 
gridlock in Italy that has stalled reforms, and the 
Cyprus crisis that culminated in the imposition of 
capital controls—a first in the Euro Area. 
Developing-country CDS rates have in general 
remained at low levels (figure FIN.1). Increases in 
Egyptian and Argentinean CDS rates were the 
main exceptions (figure FIN.2). Egyptian spreads 
rose due to the rising deficit and debt tied to the 
economic consequences of political turmoil, while 
Argentinean rates increased due to the uncertainty 
generated by a US court decision concerning the 
repayment to creditors that did not participate in 
the 2005 and 2010 restructuring of Argentinean 
debt.FN1 
 
Developed country stock markets 
have outperformed developing 
countries so far in 2013 
 
The developed country equity stock market indices  
gained value during the five months of 2013 but 
have declined since late May as the concerns about 
possible tapering of United States quantitative 
easing have increased. The total year to date gain 
was 11.1 percent (figure FIN.3). The benchmark 
S&P 500 index for the United States reached a new 
record level on May 19th as improving economic 
data reports seemed to confirm that the U.S. 
economy was gaining momentum (figure FIN.4).  
 
CDS rates for most developing regions re-
mained stable despite the events in March  
Source: World Bank; Bloomberg. 
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Argentina’s CDS rates surged in March 
from already very high levels  
Source: Bloomberg. 
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Developed country equities are outper-
forming developing country  
Source: Bloomberg. 
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Similarly, the Japanese Nikkei stock market 
index gained almost 50 percent in value 
between January and May reflecting the 
expectations related  to the monetary easing 
program announced by the Bank of Japan 
(box FIN.2). Nevertheless, the year to date 
gain for the index was only 23 percent after 
the sharp decline since late May. Investor 
appetite in Europe has been also positive but 
less robust due to the region’s weak economic 
outlook. After a similar adjustment since 
May, the year to date gain for European stock 
market index was only 5.4 percent.  
 
Recent developments in the Euro Area. 
 
A wide-range of significant steps taken over the past few years have calmed investors and led to a significant rebound in key 
markets. These steps and developments include: 
 ECB President Draghi’s forceful “whatever it takes” speech on July 26th 2012 
 The introduction of a new Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) facility 
 Wide-spread fiscal consolidation that has brought Euro Area government deficits down from 6.4 percent of GDP in 
2009 to an estimated 2.9 percent in 2012 (IMF, 2013), although the deficits of Ireland, Poland, and Spain still ex-
ceed 5 percent of GDP 
 Euro Area-wide agreements to establish a banking union; to reinforce monitoring and respect of budgetary rules; to 
require countries to enter into binding reform contracts; and proposals to increase democratic legitimacy through 
direct election of European Commission President in 2014. 
 Early repayment of more than 25 percent of ECB crisis loans by Euro Area banks during the first quarter of 2013 
(the loans were not due until 2014 and 2015).  
 
Other developments in 2013 have tested the resilience of this improved climate, including: 
 
 Inconclusive elections in Italy and weak polls for other leaders that underscore ongoing political risks.  
 Uncertainty about government’s willingness to accept conditionality if the OMT were activated.  
 Fears that the bailing in of depositors during the Cyprus rescue would lead deposit flight in other European jurisdic-
tions. 
While these developments led to some widening of CDS rates and yields on the debt of high-spread Euro Area debt, the 
increases were modest compared with earlier declines, and yields for high-spread countries other than Italy are down for the 
year to date. 
Box FIN.1  
Box Figure FIN 1.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank; Bloomberg 
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Performance in selected stock markets  
Source: Bloomberg. 
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Overall, equity markets in Europe and Japan have 
recovered more than 80 percent of their 2007 
value, versus a more than full recovery in the 
United States. 
 
In contrast with the strong performance in high-
income markets earlier in the year, the developing 
country stock market performance has been 
relatively weak since the beginning of the year. 
Stock market indeces declined in Brazil (-13.4 
percent) and Russia (-10 percent), whereas they 
remained more or less stable in China (0.1 percent) 
and India (0.7 percent). The weakness in 
developing country stock markets partly reflects 
weak corporate earnings and country specific 
factors. Recent curbs on property markets in 
China, for example have contributed to the 
weakness in share values, while easing in 
commodity prices have affected stock market 
performances in Brazil and Russia. Equity markets 
in several East Asian countries—Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand—reached record highs 
earlier in the year, helped by strong foreign private 
capital inflows. 
 
The earlier decoupling in the equity market 
performance of developed and developing 
countries also likely reflects a decline in the 
investors’ perceptions of the riskiness of high
-income country financial assets, and growing 
concerns about asset prices bubbles and 
growth prospects in some middle-income 
countries. Such a revaluation would likely 
induce investors to shift their portfolios away 
from developing to developed markets, and 
may help explain why yields on developing 
country debt are rising (see below).  
 
Developing country bond yields have 
risen since January despite the 
general “risk-off” phase in global 
financial markets…  
 
Indeed, the cost of international bond financing —
proxied by 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yield + 
EMBIG cash bond spread—has gone up this year 
after reaching a record low level in early January 
(figure FIN.5). Unlike previous episodes, the recent 
rise in the yields did not occur during a period of 
heightened global risk-aversion. Moreover, the 
widening in secondary-market bond spreads was 
not associated with a decline in benchmark US 
yields. US treasury yields tend to fall during the 
periods of heightened risk-aversion in global 
financial markets as they are considered safe assets. 
Over the past few years, developing country bond 
yields have tended to remain relatively constant, 
even as benchmark yields (US 10 year treasury 
yield) fluctuated—implying that spreads have risen 
as benchmark yields fell. During the first half of 
2013, however, developing-country spreads have 
increased amid rising benchmark US 10-year 
Treasury yields (figure FIN.6)—and despite the 
continued trend toward upgrading of developing 
country debt by rating agencies.FN2 
 
These developments could be consistent with the 
beginning of a new trend where the price of risk 
Fig FIN.5  
 
Cost of bond financing increased in Febru-
ary and March  
Source: World Bank; JP Morgan. 
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Bonds spreads widened despite “the risk-
off” phase  
Source: JP Morgan. 
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returns to levels that are more normal. The trend 
decline in spreads for developing countries over 
the last five years has been partly explained by their 
improved credit quality. Much of the improvement 
however reflects the very low policy rates and 
quantitative easing in high-income countries 
(World Bank, 2010; IMF, 2013), with easy 
monetary conditions having suppressed the price 
of risk in both developed and developing countries. 
Recent increases possibly reflect market 
expectations that the pace of quantitative easing in 
the United States may ease soon even though 
Fed policymakers have reassured the markets 
that they will remain accommodative.  
 
Despite the weak performance of the 
stock markets, gross capital flows to 
developing countries remained robust 
during the early months of 2013 
 
During the first five months of 2013, gross 
capital flows (international bond issuance, 
cross-border syndicated bank loans and 
equity placements) to developing countries 
rose by 63 percent year-on-year and reached a 
historic high at $306 billion (figure FIN.7). 
All types of flows posted around 60 percent 
increase, with record levels of international 
bond issuance by developing countries. Flows 
strengthened in every region except North 
Africa and Middle East (box FIN.2). The 
sharpest increase was in Europe and Central 
Asia, where the flows more than doubled.  
 
Syndicated bank lending to developing countries 
totaled $91 billion during the first five months of 
2013, 69 percent higher compared with a year ago. 
Despite the relative weakness in April, bank 
lending has been on a rebound since the second 
quarter of 2012 (figure FIN.8). While many factors 
were at play, an easing in the deleveraging process 
by European banks has been the key. As early as 
June 2012, three quarters of European banks had 
complied with the ECB’s capital ratio 
requirements. Moreover, according to the April 
ECB Bank Lending Survey, Euro Area banks have 
eased the pace of tightening of their credit 
standards.FN3 Euro Area banks have begun 
repaying ECB crisis loans and have already started 
to repay some of the loans well in advance (box 
FIN.1).  
 
Gross flows have remained robust since 
September 2012  
Source: World Bank; Dealogic. 
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0
15
30
45
60
75
Jan '12 Apr '12 Jul '12 Oct '12 Jan '13 Apr '13
Equity Issuance
Bond Issuance
Syndicated Bank Lending
$billion
 
Syndicated bank lending has risen since 
July 2012 due to less deleveraging  
Source: World Bank; Dealogic. 
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Both the average spread on bank loans and the 
average term of bank loans remained stable  
Source: World Bank; Dealogic. 
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Almost 70 percent of the bank lending during the 
first five months of 2013 went to resource-related 
companies, mostly for acquisition and trade  
finance purposes. The average cost of bank 
financing declined by 18 bps to 3.3 percent as the 
benchmark 6 month US libor rate has eased in 
2013, while average bank spreads have remained 
stable (figure FIN.9). The average maturity of the 
bank loans declined slightly to 5.4 years, with the 
share of long-term syndicated bank lending (at 
least five years of maturity) falling to 35 percent 
from 55 percent in 2012. Syndicated lending for 
trade finance declined by 11 percent during the 
first five months of 2013 compared with the same 
period last year, while the average maturity of the 
loans increased for one year. 
 
The increase in equity flows—initial public 
offering (IPO) and follow-on issuance—was due 
to the strong follow-on issuance from East Asia,  
Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America and 
the recovery of the overall IPO activity from last 
year’s low level. While China still dominates 
overall equity volume, equity issuance also 
 
Regional gross capital flows 
 
Gross capital flows to developing countries rebounded in all regions, except North Africa and Middle East. A surge in bank 
lending to firms in the Russia Federation helped to boost flows to the European and Central Asia region to about $105 bil-
lion during the first five months of 2013, more than twice their $46 billion level of last year. Bank lending to Russia increased 
more than threefold from last year with syndicated loans from European lenders more than doubling.  
 
All types of capital flows increased in the East Asia and Pacific region, where capital flows totaled $92 billion during the first 
five months of 2013 compared with $55 billion the same period in 2012. Syndicated bank lending in the region almost dou-
bled, reaching $27 billion compared with $14 billion in 2012. Flows to South Asia strengthened mainly due to strong bond 
issuance by India. Meanwhile, Sub-Saharan Africa saw a marked strengthening in bank lending (led by South Africa and 
Nigeria) and bond issuance which were more than enough to offset a decline in equity and bond flows. Notably, Rwanda 
came to the international bond market for the first time with the $400 million 10-year bonds, benefiting from growing inves-
tors’ appetite for riskier developing-country debt.  
 
In contrast, gross capital flows to the Latin America and Caribbean region increased by 23 percent from a year ago, reach-
ing about $79 billion in the first five months of 2013. Equity placement rose by 154 percent due to a strong issuance activity 
from Brazilian firms including the largest developing-country corporate bond issuance on the record ($11 billion) by the Bra-
zilian oil company Petrobras. In contrast, bank lending to the region fell by 34 percent.  
 
Capital flows to Middle East and North Africa have been weak so far in 2013, with only one syndicated loan deal for Jordan 
($288 million) and two bond issues for Lebanon and Morocco ($1.1 billion and $750 million, respectively). For equity issu-
ance, only Tunisia were able to raise $119 million through four transactions.  
Box FIN.2  
Box figure FIN 2.1    Regional gross capital flows ($billions) 
Source: World Bank; Dealogic. 
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increased in other countries, including Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Brazil, Russia, 
Chile, and Mexico.  
 
International bond flows to developing countries 
have been particularly robust, reaching a 
historically high level at $158 billion for the first 
five months of the year with the record monthly 
issuance of $45 billion in April. Developing 
countries have issued more than 20 billion per 
month since September 2012 with the exceptions 
of seasonally low December and  February  when 
the Chinese Lunar New Year was this year (figure 
FIN.10). The heavy issuance has been supported by 
investors’ robust risk appetite and low borrowing cost. 
 
The strong appetite for higher-yield developing-
country debt has been driven by low yields in high-
income countries because of quantitative easing. 
This has created an opportunity for several non-
investment-grade (non-IG) companies to tap into 
international bond markets. In fact, the share of 
non-investment grade corporate issuance rose to 
31 percent of the value of bonds issued by 
developing countries (compared with 18 percent in 
2012) and 46 percent of the number of bonds (34 
percent in 2012) (figure FIN.10). In addition, there 
has been a long line of first-time sovereign bonds 
issuers including Honduras ($500 million) and 
Rwanda ($400 million). Even Papua New Guinea is 
planning to tap the international debt market soon.  
 
Foreign direct investment inflows to 
developing countries remained robust 
in 2012 after the increased 
uncertainty in global financial markets 
earlier in the year. 
 
After slowing down during the first half of 2012, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to 
developing countries picked up strongly in the final 
quarter of the year. Nevertheless, flows  totaled 
$670 billion, 5 percent lower than $701 billion in 
2011 (figure FIN.11).FN4 The weakness in the flows 
earlier in the year was mostly the result of increased 
uncertainty in global financial markets due to Euro 
Area problems. The impact of the uncertainty was 
much more profound for high-income economies 
where FDI inflows declined by 32 percent (figure 
FIN.12). Most developed countries experienced 
 
Corporates dominated the bond flows  
Source: World Bank; Dealogic. 
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FDI inflows to developing countries  
Source: World Bank; Central banks of selected countries. 
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Almost half of the global FDI inflows in 
2012 went to developing countries  
Source: World Bank; Central banks of selected countries. 
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declines compared to 2011. While Finland, 
Netherlands and Belgium experienced net 
disinvestments in 2012, FDI inflows declined by 
almost 90 percent in Denmark and Germany. The 
relative resilience of FDI in developing countries 
mostly reflects stable re-invested earnings and 
intra-company loans. The share of developing 
countries in global FDI inflows reached its highest 
level at 45 percent in 2012.  
 
FDI inflows were weak in most of the developing 
regions. The largest contraction was in South Asia 
where flows declined around 20 percent due to 
slow growth and regulatory uncertainties in India 
and Pakistan. FDI inflows to the East Asia region 
also declined with China, Malaysia, and Thailand 
all experiencing contractions. Despite the 8 
percent drop in FDI inflows due to the ongoing 
structural changes in its economy, China was the 
top FDI recipient in the world in 2012. Similarly, FDI 
inflows declined in most Eastern European 
economies, reflecting economic weakness in high-
income Europe with largest drops in Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Serbia.   
 
In contrast, FDI inflows to Latin American 
economies rose by 10 percent supported by still 
high (if weakening) commodity prices and 
increased investment from the United States, 
especially to Argentina, Chile and Colombia.  
 
Limited high frequency data indicate a mixed 
picture so far in 2013: robust flows to Chile, India 
and Russia and easing in other developing 
countries. Flows to other developing countries will 
likely rebound in the second half of the year. 
Several countries in emerging Europe, including Russia 
and Serbia, have announced plans to accelerate 
privatization efforts this year. FDI flows are expected to 
increase by 7 percent reaching $719 billion in 2013. 
 
Hot money flows: a new heat wave 
from the East?  
 
The loose monetary policy run by high-income 
countries since the 2008/09 crisis has prompted 
investors to borrow cheaply and invest in high-
yielding markets. Investors have been attracted to 
developing country local currency assets (equity 
and bonds) because of their stronger growth 
potential, and interest rate differentials. This has 
led to significant levels of the flows to equity and 
local currency debt securities (also referred as hot 
money flows). Flows to a few large middle-income 
countries were particularly strong in 2010 (See 
GEP January 2011). Managing the fluctuations in 
these flows, which tend to be quite volatile, can be 
quite challenging and some countries have 
introduced special measures including capital controls.  
 
The data for these flows—portfolio investment 
with a breakdown of issuance in the country—are 
only available for few countries and exhibit a 
mixed picture for 2013 (figure FIN.13). Despite 
the current relatively low risk environment and 
high liquidity in the market, flows to local stock 
and bond markets have moderated for Turkey but 
have picked up in Brazil. While flows to Mexico 
surged in the last quarter of 2012 and were at 
record high levels in 2012, the data for 2013 are 
not available.  
 
Mixed picture for hot money flows 
Source: World Bank; Central banks of selected countries. 
Fig FIN.13  
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The flows to EM Mutual Funds declined 
sharply after January 
Source: World Bank; Haver. 
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Japan’s monetary easing and developing countries 
 
In November 2012, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) signaled that it would undertake monetary easing measures to 
fight against deflation. The BoJ announced the actual quantitative and qualitative easing measures on April 4 th 
this year. These measures include the monthly purchase of ¥7.5 trillion ($75 billion) of the Japanese govern-
ment bonds aiming to double its monetary base in two years. It will also expand the average maturity of bonds 
that it purchases from three to seven years. More importantly, the BoJ will continue these “as long as neces-
sary”.  
 
The BoJ’s quantitative easing (QE) program is similar to the QE3 program in the US. The $75 billion monthly 
purchase of government bonds is similar in size to the Fed’s monthly $85 billion purchase under QE3. Both 
programs seek to depress the return on low-risk assets, in order to push investors into riskier assets.  
 
While the immediate beneficiary of the program is domestic assets, spillover into international capital markets 
is inevitable. In the case of the Japanese program, the size of the outflows may be larger, in part because at 
$8.8 trillion for bonds and $3.3 trillion for equities, the Japanese market is only 22 and 8 percent the size of 
U.S. markets. The bulk of these flows are likely to go to other high -income countries, only 2.4 percent of Japa-
nese external holdings are in developing countries. However, Japanese investors have been actively investing 
in local currency bond and equity markets in some developing countries (box table).  
 
There are already indications that Japanese institutional investors have been recently increasing their expo-
sure to developing countries via Uridashi funds (typically foreign currency bonds) and larger Toshin invest-
ment trust funds (predominantly equity). According to the Investment Trusts Association of Japan, Japanese 
portfolio investment in local debt securities increased in Mexico (by 34 percent), Turkey (28 percent) and 
Thailand (17 percent) during the first two months of 2013. The increase was less pronounced in Philippines 
(5.9 percent) and South Africa (4.4 percent).  
 
Although the depreciation of yen will make the assets abroad relatively more expensive, the Japanese QE 
program might also increase direct investment by lowering the cost of capital for Japanese multinationals. 
Developing countries receive a larger 20 percent share of these outflows. Asian developing countries in turn 
receive two thirds of these flows. Rising outward FDI flows from Japan in recent years have been particularly 
important for Thailand, accounting for 40 percent of that country’s FDI inflows in 2012, up from 28 percent in 
2009.  
Box FIN.3  
Box table FIN 3.1    Japanese outward investment position by  
destination, 2011 ($ billion) 
Source: Bank of Japan. 
FDI
Total PI: Equity PI: Debt
Total 935.4 3,279           647              2,632           
Developed Countries 742.5 3,203.5        618.6           2,584.9        
Developing Countries 192.8 75.6 28.3 47.3
 P.R.China 73.5 10.3             9.8                0.5                
 Thailand 31.0 2.3                1.5                0.9                
 Indonesia 13.9 5.8                3.3                2.6                
 Malaysia 9.9 4.3                1.6                2.7                
 Philippines 9.0 2.7                0.3                2.5                
 Viet Nam 5.6 0.1                0.1                0.0                
 India 13.6 5.0                3.4                1.6                
 Mexico 2.6 11.6             0.5                11.1             
 Brazil 30.0 28.1             5.6                22.4             
 Russia 1.5 2.0                1.2                0.8                
 R.South Africa 2.2 3.2                0.9                2.3                
ASEAN 107.6 27.2 13.3 13.9
Portfolio Investment
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As an alternative measure, high-frequency data on 
flows to Emerging Market (EM) Mutual Funds—
which only represent a portion of such flows—
indicate a decline in recent months (figure FIN.14). 
The fall has been particularly sharp for EM equity 
funds with net outflows in March and May. The fall 
partly reflects weak corporate earnings and country 
specific factors (discussed earlier). In addition, 
downside risks for the returns on these assets have 
also risen, in particular if US Treasuries were to rise 
earlier and higher than expected.  
 
Looking forward, Japan’s decision to begin a 
quantitative easing program may reverse the trend 
in these flows (box FIN.3). The Bank of Japan’s 
(BoJ) commitment to purchase $75 billion of 
government bonds a month (just short of the Fed’s 
monthly purchase of $85 billion) is likely to weaken 
returns in Japanese markets, and make developing-
country assets more attractive than otherwise. 
While Japanese investors’ tend to have a stronger 
home-bias than US investors, the Japanese 
domestic market is smaller than the U.S. and as a 
result the impact on domestic asset prices is likely 
to be larger, and the incentive to invest abroad 
larger. How large of an impact on developing 
country assets will depend on whether investors 
turn to high-income country or developing assets.  
Here, Japanese investors tend to allocate a smaller 
share of their external assets to developing 
countries than American investors do, although 
they have been active in many developing country 
local currency debt markets. Their portfolio 
investment tends to be geographically diverse with 
a significant presence in Brazil, Mexico and 
Turkey.  
 
Expectations of policy actions have already 
bolstered portfolio outflows with an increase in 
flows to developing countries. For example, the 
flows to Toshin funds (investing in local and 
international equity and bond markets) and 
Uridashi funds (typically foreign currency bonds) 
have been very robust since the beginning of the 
year. According to the Investment Trusts 
Association of Japan, Japanese portfolio 
investment in local debt securities increased 
in Mexico (by 34 percent), Turkey (28 
percent) and Thailand (17 percent) during the 
first two months of 2013. The increase was 
less pronounced in Philippines (5.9 percent) 
and South Africa (4.4 percent).  
 
If the current trend gains momentum in coming 
months, some developing countries might face 
challenges in managing the impact of these flows 
on their economy.  
 
 
Prospects  
 
 
 
The level of net private capital inflows going to 
developing countries is set to rise in nominal terms 
but as a percent of  total developing country GDP, 
net inflows are forecast to ease by  2015. After the 
1.4 percent increase in 2012 reaching $1.2 trillion 
(4.9 percent of developing countries’ aggregate 
GDP), net capital inflows to the developing world 
had a strong start in 2013 (figure FIN.15 and table 
FIN.1). They are expected to increase to $1.3 
trillion (4.7 percent of GDP) with another record 
level of bond flows, rebounding bank lending and 
robust FDI inflows.  
 
While the prospects for capital flows to developing 
countries remain positive in the medium-term, some of 
the factors that have been in play over the last few years 
are expected to weaken. For example, while developing 
countries will continue to grow relatively faster than 
developed countries and their credit quality has improved, 
the growth differential is expected to narrow as growth in 
high-income countries picks up. Perceptions of the 
riskiness of high-income country investments have also 
declined, which should lead to a portfolio shift in their 
favor over the medium term.  
 
Net private capital flows are set to rise 
in nominal terms  
Source: World Bank. 
Fig FIN.15  
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In addition, the uniformly accommodative stance 
of monetary policy in high-income countries may 
become more diverse as the United States reduces 
the extent of quantitative easing and Japan expands 
it. A gradual transition toward monetary policy 
tightening in the US is likely to increase the cost of 
capital for developing countries and expectations  
of such a move may lead to an easing in flows even 
earlier. This may be partially offset by the 
quantitative easing in Japan, if investors there 
substantially increase their appetite for developing 
country asset. The overall effect is likely to tighter 
external financial conditions for developing 
countries.  
 
The impact of tighter external financial 
conditions will be evident for bond flows to 
developing countries—both international 
issuance and foreign investment into local 
currency bond markets. After reaching record 
highs in 2012 and 2013 bond flows are 
expected to fall gradually in 2014 and 2015.  
 
Bank lending on the other hand is expected 
to rise gradually particularly now that intense 
deleveraging pressures have eased—although 
the extent of the bounce back may be limited 
by a stricter regulatory environment.  
 
 
Net capital flows to developing countries ($ billions) Table FIN1. 
2
           2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e 2013f 2014f 2015f
Current account balance 409.4 233.0 173.3 129.6 -16.7 -74.9 -108.2 -126.3
Capital Inflows 812.7 701.0 1,218.8 1,175.0 1,192.4 1,260.9 1,297.4 1,394.8
Private inflows, net 782.3 620.0 1,145.6 1,145.1 1,178.3 1,250.2 1,290.7 1,391.7
  Equity Inflows, net 583.4 541.3 710.5 710.4 758.1 791.1 803.5 863.5
    Net FDI inflows 637.0 427.1 582.3 701.5 670.0 719.3 715.7 758.2
    Net portfolio equity inflows -53.6 114.2 128.2 8.9 88.1 71.8 87.8 105.3
  Private creditors. Net 198.8 78.7 435.1 434.6 420.2 459.1 487.2 528.2
      Bonds -8.6 61.0 129.7 123.8 190.3 187.3 164.4 151.9
      Banks 223.3 -11.9 37.2 108.2 82.0 104.7 125.3 146.9
      Short-term debt flows -17.1 17.8 257.6 189.3 141.0 158.5 188.2 221.1
      Other private 1.3 11.7 10.7 13.3 7.1 9.2 10.4 9.8
Official inflows, net 30.4 81.0 73.2 30.0 14.1 10.7 6.7 3.1
    World Bank 7.2 18.3 22.4 6.6 4.6
    IMF 10.8 26.8 13.8 0.5 -3.9
    Other official 12.4 35.9 36.9 22.8 13.4
Capital outflows -321.2 -175.2 -314.1 -284.7 -365.4 -371.3 -416.3 -464.4
    FDI outflows -211.8 -144.3 -213.9 -198.0 -238.0 -275.0 -325.0 -370.0
    Portfolio equity outflows -32.1 -75.9 -50.6 4.3 -12.4 -17.3 -24.3 -29.4
    Private debt outflows -78.3 50.7 -57.3 -81.0 -103.0 -72.0 -61.0 -56.0
    Other outflows 1.0 -5.7 7.7 -10.0 -12.0 -7.0 -6.0 -9.0
Net capital flows (inflows + outflows) 491.5 525.8 904.7 890.4 827.1 889.6 881.1 930.4
Net unidentified Flows/a -82.1 -292.8 -731.3 -760.8 -843.8 -964.5 -989.3 -1,056.7
Source: The World Bank
Note:  e = estimate, f = forecast
/a Combination of errors and omissions, unidentified capital inflows to and outflows from developing countries
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FDI inflows to developing countries are projected 
to increase through the forecast period, reaching 
$758 billion (2.4 percent of GDP) by 2015. 
Despite considerable real-side uncertainties in the 
short term, multinational corporations continue to 
be attracted to developing countries’ medium-term 
growth prospects, large and growing consumer 
base, natural resources, and still low labor costs. In 
addition, many developing countries are removing 
barriers to foreign investment. For example, 
following its recent World Trade Organization 
accession, Russia has committed to reducing 
restrictions on foreign investors in a number of 
service industries. Other countries in Eastern 
Europe have been pursuing privatization in their 
services sector. Similarly, India may attract an 
influx of investment in the coming years now that 
the cap on foreign ownership in multi-brand retail 
and aviation businesses has been raised. As long as 
Japanese monetary easing reduces the cost of 
capital for its multinationals, it should also support 
FDI flows to Asian economies, particularly 
Thailand and Vietnam in the short-term.  
 
While remaining the main FDI destination among 
developing countries, FDI inflows to China are 
expected to ease over the medium term. The 
Chinese economy has been going through 
structural adjustments with rising wages and 
production costs, which will continue to limit the 
efficiency-seeking FDI. The fall will be partly 
compensated, however, by the market-seeking 
FDI flows as multinationals would like to serve its 
growing middle-income population.  
Despite the expectation that private capital flows 
to developing countries will increase, the outlook 
is subject to significant downside risks. First, 
despite the recent progress towards a resolution 
for Euro Area debt crisis, considerable 
uncertainties remain and as highlighted by the 
Cyprus bailout, event risk persists. Any major 
setback could lead to a renewed crisis of 
confidence. Similarly, lack of progress in dealing 
with fiscal challenges in the United States has a 
similar potential to generate confidence issues.    
 
Another factor that might generate volatility in the 
global financial markets is the process of 
unwinding of monetary easing in the United 
States. As discussed earlier, the expectations 
related to a possible ease in the pace of 
quantitative easing have already led to the recent 
increase in US 10-year Treasury yields 
accompanied widening in spreads. Hence, any 
rapid shift in the expectations related to the 
process might generate sharp adjustments in the 
financial markets and capital flows to developing 
countries. 
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Notes 
 
1. Argentina defaulted a record $95 billion in sovereign debt in 2001. The country managed to restructure 92 percent 
of the debt in 2005 and 2010. Since then, Argentina has been in a long legal fight with bondholders who did not 
entered debt swaps. In the fall of 2012, a U.S. court ruled that Argentina had to repay the unrestructured debt, 
which prompted fears that the country would have to default once again on its unrestructured debt. As of yet the 
issue remains unresolved. According to a recent report published by the International Monetary Fund, ongoing 
litigation against Argentina could have pervasive implications for future sovereign debt restructurings by increasing 
leverage of holdout creditors. (http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/042613.pdf)  
2. Since January 2013, the sovereign ratings of 11 developing country borrowers have been up graded versus 5 
downgrades.  
3. According to the April ECB report, net tightening of credit standards declined for loans to businesses in the Euro 
area. Net tightening for firms is now below its historical average. Credit standards also declined for households, 
although they remain higher than the historical average.  
4. Historical FDI data have been revised  as several countries have started to report under Balance of Payments and 
International Investment Position Manual (BPM6).   
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Recent Developments   
 
 
After a cyclical rebound in global 
trade, the pace of trade expansion is 
decelerating once again  
 
Following the slump in Q2 2012, global trade 
began a cyclical rebound in Q3, led by an 
acceleration in developing country imports, which 
sparked an uptick in both high-income country and 
developing-country exports.FN1 As high-income 
country activity picked up, so too did their import 
demand helping to further boost overall trade in 
the fourth quarter and into the first quarter of 
2013. However, reflecting ongoing fragility in the 
global economic recovery, particularly in high-
income countries, the pace of trade expansion has 
slowed in recent months. Indeed, in the three 
months leading to April 2013, global trade 
expansion had decelerated to a below trend pace of 
0.8 percent (3m/3m saar) compared with 10.9 
percent in March (figure TRADE.1).  
 
The deceleration in import demand 
has been broad-based, impacting 
both developing and high-income 
countries 
 
The rebound in developing country import 
demand began almost as soon as the Euro Area  
financial market tensions of May-June 2012 began 
to ease. In both Q4 2012 and Q1 2013, this import 
rebound gained strength in part because of the 
firming derived demand it generated in high-
income and other developing countries. However, 
weaker growth momentum in some large 
developing countries (including Brazil, China, 
India, Russia and South Africa) is reflected in the 
slowing down of the aggregate developing country 
import demand, even if still remaining robust. 
Indeed, in the three months to April 2013, 
developing country import demand was expanding 
at a 10.9 percent pace (down from the 18.0 percent 
pace registered in March). Nonetheless, 
developments differ across developing regions (see 
box TRADE.1).  
 
Similar to the slowdown observed in developing 
countries, high-income country import demand 
also weakened in recent months. However, unlike 
the still positive import demand growth in  
developing countries (reflecting stronger domestic 
demand conditions there), high-income countries 
import demand growth contracted in the three 
months leading to April (-3.7%, 3m/3m saar). 
Although on aggregate import demand among high
-income countries decelerated in April,  
developments have not been uniform across 
individual economies (figure TRADE.2).  
 
US import demand growth 
decelerates, after earlier cyclical 
rebound.  
 
The ongoing steady strengthening of US private 
sector economic activity, (GDP grew at 2.4 percent 
in Q1 2013, q/q saar compared with 0.4 percent in 
Q4 2012) was supportive of the rebound in its 
import demand. After contracting for four 
consecutive months between August 2012 and 
November 2012, US import demand growth 
started expanding once again in December,  
peaking at 5.9 percent (3m/3m saar) in January  
Nonetheless, by March, business sentiment 
indicators for the US began declining. This decline 
in sentiment was reflected in real-side activity as 
both US industrial production and trade expansion 
slowed. Indeed, in March, US import demand 
growth contracted at a 2.5 percent (3m/3m saar) 
pace. And although there was an uptick in April 
(0.3 percent, 3m/3m saar), import demand is still 
expanding below trend. A strengthening US 
 
Divergence in import growth among 
high-income countries 
   Source: World Bank; Datastream. 
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Regional import developments 
 
Import demand in East Asia & the Pacific registered a solid rebound in both Q4 2012 and Q1 2013 (Box fig 
TRADE 1.1).  The robustness of trade in the region also reflects increasing trade and financial integration, alt-
hough concerns have been raised about the potential impact on regional trade of the decline in Sino -Japanese 
trade and from the sharp depreciation of the yen (see main text). Indeed, declining business sentiment for some 
of the larger economies in the region suggest a weakening of this expansion in Q2 2013. Available data for April 
shows that the pace of import momentum decelerated to 13.4 percent (3m/3m saar) from 25.4 percent in March.   
 
In Europe and Central Asia,  import demand in the two largest economies in the region, Russia and Turkey, 
has rebounded rapidly — rising at a 19.7 percent pace in Russia and at 12.1 percent in Turkey in Q1 2013— 
partly reflecting the advanced stage of recovery in these economies. In those developing European countries 
with closer ties to the Euro Area, output gaps remain elevated and the recovery in import demand has lagged, 
the expansion in import demand has been weaker. On aggregate import demand in the region expanded at 16.8 
percent rate in the three months ending March 2013.  
 
Strong domestic demand in Latin America’s largest economy (Brazil), supported by loose monetary policy and 
household tax incentives,  contributed to solid import demand in the region. Indeed in Q1 2013, import demand 
in Brazil grew at an above trend 21.3 percent pace. However, for the region as an aggregate import demand 
was 5.9 percent in Q1 2013. The weaker aggregate regional expansion in Q1 2013 reflects recent deceleration 
in import demand in both Argentina and Mexico.  In April Brazil’s import growth contracted, but strengthening 
import demand from other countries in the region supported the acceleration of the region’s import demand to  
6.1 percent (3m/3m saar).  
 
In South Asia where India, dominates trade activity, the replenishing of depleted stocks and earlier monetary 
policy easing, contributed to the robust expansion in South Asia’s imports. However, India’s export growth has 
not kept apace with its import demand, thus contributing to a growing trade balance and current account deficit.  
 
The latest available region wide data for Sub Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa is Febru-
ary 2013 (Box fig Trade 1.2). Fortunes for both regions however, diverge. As was the case for other developing 
regions, import demand in Sub Saharan Africa strengthened through February to a robust 17.5 percent pace 
(slightly higher than the developing country average of 16.6 percent at the time) from 13.1 percent in the previ-
ous month. However, in the Middle East and North Africa, the  contraction in import demand which commenced 
in August 2012 was sustained through February 2013 ( -4.8 percent, 3m/3m saar), even if at a weaker pace. The 
weakness in import demand in the region in part reflects the effects of political challenges on demand condi-
tions in some countries in the region.    
Box TRADE.1   
 
Box fig TRADE 1.1    Import volume growth among  
                                 selected developing regions 
Source: World Bank; Datastream. 
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Box fig TRADE 1.2    Import volume growth among  
                                  selected developing regions 
   Source: World Bank; Datastream. 
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economy  should be supportive of global trade as the US 
still remains the world’s largest importer, accounting for 
some 12.5 percent of global imports in 2011.  
 
After contracting for several months, 
import demand in high-income 
Europe begins expanding once 
again.  
 
Notwithstanding a steady trend decline in its 
market share, the European Union still remains the 
world’s largest trading bloc and customs union, 
hence developments in Europe are of significant 
importance in global trade. Euro Area import 
demand began expanding once again in February 
2013 (3.5 percent, 3m/3m saar) – the first 
expansion in  ten months— and has continued 
expanding through March (3.4 percent, 3m/3m 
saar).  The pick-up in Euro Area imports has 
occurred not with standing the weak domestic 
demand conditions there: rising and record high 
unemployment, tight lending conditions, ongoing 
fiscal uncertainty, and lingering uncertainty 
weighing down on investor confidence. The 
strengthening of import demand could reflect the 
rebuilding of inventories after several months of 
contracting imports demand, rather than 
strengthening of domestic demand conditions in 
the bloc.  
 
Overall, net exports demand in the Euro Area is 
contributing to mitigating the weakness in Euro 
Area demand. For instance, in 2012, net exports 
contributed 1.6 percentage points to Euro Area 
GDP growth, notwithstanding the overall 
contraction of 0.6 percent in output (figure 
TRADE.3). Since exports tend to have a large 
import component, the acceleration in imports in 
2013 Q1 likely reflects better exports as well as 
modest strengthening in the Euro Area economy.  
 
Japanese imports demand has 
rebounded in recent months.   
 
Japan accounts for 6.5 percent of global trade, 
hence developments there remain important, 
particularly so in the East Asia region where it is an 
important final market for several economies.  
 
After several months of contracting import 
demand (between August 2012 and February 
2013), import demand in Japan has begun 
accelerating once again, consistent with the 
strengthening of economic activity recorded in Q1 
2013 (3.5 percent, q/q saar up from 0.3 percent in 
Q4 2012) as the effects of strong government 
stimulus measures begin to impact real side activity. 
Indeed, in the three months to April import 
demand accelerated to 6.3 percent compared with a 
12.9 percent pace of contraction that occurred in 
December 2012.  
 
Exports have lagged imports but are 
growing rapidly — with all regions 
participating in the trade rebound 
 
Supported by the rebound in global economic 
activity (as observed by the pick-up in import 
 
External demand is mitigating the weak-
ness in Euro Area domestic demands 
Source: World Bank; Eurostat. 
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Import demand in selected high-income 
economies 
Source: World Bank; Eurostat. 
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demand), developing country exports  strengthened in 
Q4 2012 (14.8 percent, q/q saar), and this pick-up 
was sustained through Q1 2013 (15.5 percent, q/q 
saar), albeit at a different pace  across individual 
developing regions (table Trade.1). Nonetheless, 
along with the deceleration in global import 
demand, the pace of export growth is showing 
signs of deceleration, with developing country 
export growth expanding at an annualized pace of 
7.8 percent in the three months to April 2013 
compared with the 15.4 percent recorded in the 
previous month.  
 
During Q1 2013 the pace of export expansion was 
strongest in East Asia (26.1 percent, q/q  saar) led 
by China and also in South Asia (23.2 percent, q/q 
saar) led by India. Central and Eastern European 
countries are benefitting from the strengthening 
import demand in the Euro Area with exports 
from the region expanding by a solid 14.5 percent 
(3m/3m saar) annualized pace in Q1 2013. 
However stagnant export growth from Russia and 
the sharp decline in Turkey’s export growth 
weighed down on the overall Europe and Central 
Asia exports. Hence in Q1 2013 overall exports in 
the region expanded by only 1.8  percent—well 
below the developing country growth of 15.4 
percent. Latin America and the Caribbean region 
was the only developing region where export 
growth contracted in Q1 2013, mainly due to 
contracting export growth in Mexico (-7.4 
percent, q/q saar)  and Brazil (-4.4 percent, 
q/q saar). However, a pick-up in Brazil’s 
export volumes in   supported the rebound 
observed for the region in April (5.0 
percent , 3m/3m saar) 
 
Data for both Sub Saharan Africa and the Middle 
East lags behind other developing regions. Latest 
available for the region is February 2013. In both 
regions, export growth had rebounded from the 
contracting activity in the months prior to 
November 2012. Indeed, in the three months to 
February export growth was accelerating at 19.7 
percent in Sub Saharan Africa and 12.8 percent in 
the Middle East and North Africa.  
 
 
Medium Term 
Prospects for Global 
Trade  
 
 
 
After its slump in 2012 (2.8 percent growth), global 
trade growth is projected to pick-up in 2013 and 
gradually strengthen through 2015.  Underlying 
this pick-up in activity is the expected 
strengthening of the Euro Area economy (largest 
trading bloc) by Q3 2013, and the ongoing steady 
recovery in the US and robust developing country 
growth expected to continue through 2015.  
 
Global trade in goods and services is projected to 
increase by 4.0 percent in 2013, before 
strengthening to 5.0 percent in 2014 and reaching 
5.4 percent in 2015. Despite this relatively strong 
growth projection, global trade volumes  will 
remain below their pre-crisis trend — potentially 
suggesting a slowing in the long-term trend for 
 
     Export growth in developing regions 
        
Source: World Bank; Datastream. 
Table TRADE.1  
2013 (3m/3m, saar) 
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 April
East Asia & Pacific 23.2 -12.2 17.5 26.1 11
Europe & Central Asia 8.3 -10.5 9.2 1.8 -3
Latin America & Carribbean -6.1 -4.1 10.6 -7.5 5
Middle East & North Africa -21.5 -42.9 38.7
South Asia -6.4 -11.8 9.6 25.8 15.3
Sub Saharan Africa 48.4 -34.2 4.9
2012 (q/q, saar)
Export Volume Growth
Regions
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The Re-orientation of South-South Trading Partners in Recent Years 
 
Though accounting for about a third of global trade, the faster projected trade growth for developing countries (between 6.4 
percent to 8.4 percent annual growth over forecast horizon) compared to high-income countries (2.8 percent to 4.3 percent 
over forecast horizon) between 2013 and 2015 is expected to be a key driver in the expansion of global trade. As document-
ed in GEP 2013A, over the past decade, the most dynamic segment of global trade is trade among developing countries – 
so called “South-South” trade. Indeed, over the past decade the USD value of trade between developing countries has 
grown annually by an average of 19.3 percent (17.5 percent if trade with China is excluded) versus about 11 percent for 
developing country exports to high-income countries.  
 
This trend is expected to continue over the forecast horizon. One significant element that has driven this South-South trade 
has been the growing role of East Asia as a major global trading bloc. Together this region, accounts for about half of the re-
orientation towards South-South trade, with China, being the most dynamic trading partner. Indeed, without  exception, every 
single developing region has increased its trade with China, while contemporaneously reducing their trade dependency on 
high-income markets (Box Figure Trade 2.1). The developing regions to have most re-oriented and increased their trade with 
China over the past decade have been those with a comparative advantage in natural resources. Between 1999 to 2011 Sub 
Saharan Africa increased their exports to China from 2.23 percent of their total exports to 22.73 percent, Latin America in-
creased theirs from 1.0 percent to 11.5 percent and the Middle East and North Africa from 2.21 percent to 15.29 percent. 
Reflecting the strong integration of production networks in East Asia, the share of exports from other East Asian economies 
to China has increased from 4.5 percent in 1999 to 18.6 percent in 2011.     
 
The rapidly growing South-South trade has however not been driven by only China but also other developing regions, in 
particular the rest of the East Asia region. However, outside of China and East Asia Pacific region, in general, the diversif ica-
tion of trading partners towards other developing regions, though occurring, has been less dynamic compared to that with 
the East Asia region (see  Box Table TRADE 2.1).  
 
Indeed, outside of trade with the East Asia region, the most significant re-orientation has been increasing exports from both 
the Middle East and North Africa. Excluding this, the re-orientation of trade with other developing regions has been some-
what less dynamic (see  Box Table TRADE 2.1). More surprising however is the relatively slow progress towards increased 
integration among developing countries in the same region, with the exception of East Asia where regional trade integration 
(share of intra-regional imports) almost tripled since 1999. Indeed, excluding China which tends to export a greater share to 
high-income countries, the share of the other East Asian countries exports to the East Asia region increased by 20 percent-
age points (from 7.1 percent to 30.3 percent of their total exports). This is not the case in other developing regions. Although 
Europe and Central Asia remains the second most trade-integrated developing region (thanks to many countries benefitting 
from multiple trade agreements in the region, especially those associated with the European Union) part of the progress 
made in regional integration appears to have been eroded by the weak demand post crisis, as intra-regional trade having 
risen to 27.8 percent by 2008 (from 19.2 percent in 1999), has since declined to 25.5 percent in 2011 (see  Box Fig TRADE 
Box TRADE.2   
 
Box Fig TRADE 2.2   Intra-regional import shares among 
developing regions ( percent) 
Source:  UN COMTRADE. 
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Box Fig TRADE 2.1   Cumulative change in share of regions 
total exports going to China and high-
income countries, 2000—2011 (percent).  
 Source: UN COMTRADE. 
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rapidly growing developing country market shares.  
Nevertheless, trade is expected to continue 
reorienting itself toward developing countries (box 
Trade.2). Partly as a result of this trend, 
increasingly more of developing country trade is 
now with other developing countries — both 
reflecting increases in inter-regional and intra-
regional trade, especially the in the East Asian region.  
 
 
Risks  
 
 
 
Fragile global economy. Downside risks to the 
forecasted uptick in global trade activity have not 
changed over the past six months. 
Nonetheless, unlike earlier periods where the 
balance of risks were weighted on the 
downside, these are now more balanced (see 
main text). Downside risks continue to 
include a worsening of conditions in the Euro 
Area, the possibility that markets react badly 
to a failure of either the United States or 
Japan to map out a credible medium-term 
deficit reduction strategy, a rapid decline in 
Chinese growth and geopolitical concerns. To 
these may be added the possibility that high 
commodity prices, which have supported the 
value of global trade — if not the volume — 
could decline rapidly with deleterious 
consequences for incomes and imports of 
commodity exporting countries, but benefits 
for importers.  
2.2). For both Latin America  regional trade integration has steadied around 16 percent over the past decade. And in Sub 
Saharan Africa, after increasing by some 5 percentage points between 1999 and 2002, the share of regional trade has also 
steadied at around 12 percent of total trade, reflecting significant cross border barriers  as well as increased external com-
petition due in part to unilateral tariff liberalization. Among developing regions, the Middle East and North Africa and in 
South Asia remain regions with the least intra-regional trade, about 3 and 4 percent of their total trade is carried among 
regional neighbors. Not surprising several analytical studies (including those using gravity models) continue to point to the 
underperformance of intra-regional trade in the Middle East and North Africa (Dennis, 2006; Devlin and Yee, 2005; Zarrouk, 
2003 Al-Atrash and Yousef, 2000),  as well as in South Asia (Kumar etal 2009) and in Sub-Saharan Africa (Buys etal. 
2010).     
 
 While trade in natural resources, in particular ores and metals has been the fastest growing commodity category of imports 
among developing countries, the growth in trade in manufactured goods among developing countries has also been  solid - 
growing as fast as petroleum imports and faster than agricultural raw material imports.  The strength of importance of ores 
and metals is however accentuated by the inclusion of China. Excluding China, manufactured goods has been the fastest 
component of south-south trade, reflecting increased production chain interlinkages among developing countries, particu-
larly in the East Asian region. 
 
Box table TRADE 2.1     The diversification of trading partners between developing regions has been most dy-
namic  between all developing regions and the East Asia region 
Source: UN COMTRADE. 
EXPORT MARKET
IMPORT MARKET EAO EAP ECA LAC MENA SAS SSA
East Asia excl. China (EAO) 6.3 4.2 0.5 1.0 -0.2 2.2 0.5
East Asia & Pacific (EAP) 20.4 8.0 3.6 10.8 11.1 8.5 18.0
Europe Central Asia (ECA) 1.4 3.1 6.2 1.0 1.3 2.9 0.8
Latin America & Carribean (LAC) 1.3 4.1 0.0 1.3 -0.6 2.7 0.5
Middle East & North Africa (MENA) 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 1.4 -0.7
South Asia (SAS) 2.5 2.5 0.5 1.2 6.6 1.5 0.5
Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) 0.4 1.0 0.2 0.7 0.4 2.5 5.2
                                         (additional increase in exports share going to import market, in percentage points)
 ( e.g. an additional 18.0% of SSA share of its total exports was re-oriented towards the EAP region)
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However, outturns in the global economy, 
particularly from high-income countries could 
surprise on the upside, compared to the 
subdued uptick embedded in our current 
forecasts (high-income growth of 1.2 percent 
in 2013 strengthening to 2.3 percent by 2015 
– see main text for details). This could arise 
from another of reasons including the pent-
up demand in high-income countries, low 
levels of inventories, and improved credit 
flows to real economy in high-income 
countries. If this were to occur, this would 
lead to a rapid rise in not only high-income 
trade but also that of developing country 
trade than currently embedded in our 
forecasts.   
 
A rise in protectionism. With unemployment 
remaining at elevated levels, weak global demand 
and little progress in multilateral trade talks, the 
incidence of new restrictive trade measures, while 
slowing down compared to a year ago, still reveals 
some worrisome trends. The World Trade 
Organization reports that in the five months 
leading to mid-October 2012, an additional 71 new 
trade restricting or potentially distorting measures 
were introduced. The most frequent measure used 
was the initiation of anti-dumping investigations, 
followed by stringent customs procedures. This 
represents a decline from the 108 new measures 
introduced a year ago. Nonetheless, although the 
pace of imposition of new restrictions dropped, 
recent experience suggest that, once imposed it is 
difficult to remove such restrictions, inevitably due 
to the political constituencies that they build. For 
instance, only 21 percent of new trade-restricting 
measures introduced since October 2008 by G-20 
countries have been removed, thereby leading to a 
cumulative increase in the stock of trade 
restrictions. Indeed on a net basis (i.e. accounting 
from removal of restrictions), current existing 
measures imposed by G-20 countries since 
October 2008, is estimated to affect some 3.5 
percent of global trade (as of October 2012), up 
from 2.9 percent in May 2012.  
The resurgence in announced bilateral and 
regional trade agreements among high-
income countries could mitigate the 
acceleration of developing country trade.  
 
Notable among these are the US-EU free trade 
agreement and the Trans Pacific Partnership (US 
and nine other economies, including high-income 
countries such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand, 
Singapore and Chile). While bilateral and regional 
preferential trade agreements have proliferated in 
past decades, these new accords (if agreed to) are 
much larger in scope. A  trade agreement between 
the US and the EU alone would be unprecedented 
in size - accounting for some 40 percent of global 
trade! Hence were the preferences included in a 
potential deal between the US and the EU, not 
extended to other developing countries within the 
multilateral trading system this could disadvantage 
developing countries. 
 
A principle concern with agreements is the extent 
to which non-participant  third parties  will be 
affected by trade diversion, potentially  leading to a 
decline in global welfare, even if the agreement 
benefits the parties to it. Given the size of high-
income countries, these potential trade-diverting 
impacts from preferential trade agreements are 
further magnified and  developing countries are 
likely to be the loosers from such an agreement, 
were it to be trade-diverting. Hence, efforts to 
clinch a multilateral deal (Doha Round) will over 
the long-term maximize global welfare.  
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Notes 
 
1. The null hypothesis that developing country import volumes do not granger cause high-income export volumes is 
rejected at 1 percent level, after 3 lags. Similarly the null hypothesis that high-income import volumes do not 
granger cause developing country export volumes is rejected at 1 percent level, after 4 lags.  
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Recent developments  
 
 
 
Real exchange rates in high income 
countries since mid-2012 have been 
driven mainly by accommodative 
monetary policies  
 
Policy measures in high income countries 
designed to restore financial market 
confidence and support economic growth 
have played a significant role in movements 
of trade-weighted real effective exchange 
rates (REER) of both high income and 
developing countries in recent months.FN1 
Among the major high income currencies, the 
Japanese yen depreciated by a steep 21 
percent in real effective terms between 
September 2012 and April 2013 (figure 
ExR.1). This depreciation came about as 
markets reacted to initial announcements of 
macroeconomic policy changes to raise 
inflationary expectations and support Japan’s 
growth. These announcements were followed 
up by the introduction of an explicit 2 
percent inflation target in January 2013, and 
by a commitment in early April to aggressive 
monetary easing—including near-zero interest 
rates and an asset purchase program that 
would double Japan’s monetary base by the 
end of two years—in pursuit of that target. 
Although Japan’s expansionary policies were 
undertaken primarily for domestic goals, they 
have contributed to the abovementioned 
sharp depreciation of its currency. Some 
possible implications of the large yen 
depreciation are discussed in box ExR.1.     
 
The appreciation of the euro in trade-
weighted real effective terms since mid-2012 
(discussed in the January 2013 edition of the 
Global Economic Prospects report) continued into 
the first half of 2013, partly because of the 
Japanese depreciation and partly because 
financial market tensions remained subdued. 
By February 2013, the euro had appreciated 9 
percent in REER terms from its trough in 
July 2012.FN2 Since February, the continued 
economic weakness in the Euro Area and 
uncertainties surrounding Italian elections 
(February) and Cyprus’ banking sector 
problems (March) tempered the euro’s earlier 
appreciation, bringing the total rise since July 
2012 to 7.1 percent in REER terms by April 
2013.   
 
Despite these large fluctuations, the US dollar  
has remained broadly stable in real-effective  
terms — holding approximately the same 
level in April as in July 2012. In between 
times, it first depreciated during the second 
half of 2012, and then rebounded in early 
2013 as the yen declined. Since January, the 
US dollar is up by 2.5 percent in real effective 
terms.  
 
But recent swings in G3 currencies mask 
important medium term trends 
 
Notwithstanding its steep depreciation since 
September 2012, the yen was only 2.3 percent 
lower in REER terms in April compared with 
its level in mid-2008 prior to the global 
financial crisis. And despite its strong 
appreciation since mid-2012, the euro is 12.7 
percent lower (REER terms) than its pre-
financial crisis level. By contrast, the US 
dollar has appreciated 3.1 percent in REER 
terms since mid-2008. In addition to the 
effect of the recent yen depreciation, the 
relative strength of the dollar over the longer 
period partly reflects the status of the US 
dollar as a “safe haven” during times of 
market turmoil and heightened risk aversion, 
when investors sought the safety of US 
government bonds and other financial assets. 
 
Depreciation of the yen and appreciation of 
euro in trade-weighted real effective (REER) 
terms since mid-2012  
   Source: World Bank; IFS; JP Morgan.  
Fig ExR.1  
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Box ExR.1   
 
Yen depreciation: Some implications  
 
The yen weakened to a four-year low of 103 against the US dollar in May 2013, depreciating 25 percent from its 
level in September 2012, mainly in response to announcements of expansionary monetary  policies. In trade -
weighted real effective (REER) terms, the yen depreciated 21 percent between September and April. Together 
with gradually strengthening global demand, the weaker yen appears to have halted an earlier slide in Japan’s 
exports (Japanese exports fell by 24 percent in US dollar terms between June 2012 and January 2013 due to 
weak global growth and a territorial dispute with China, its largest trade partner). Between January and April, 
Japanese exports rose 9.5 percent in US dollar terms, while imports contracted 5.8 percent. Japanese GDP 
accelerated to a 4.1 percent annualized pace in Q1 2013, from 1.2 percent in Q4 2012. Sentiment improved 
among Japanese automobile manufacturers in the first quarter, in part due to improved prospects for exports.  
 
The above trends are broadly consistent with empirical studies which find that large real exchange rate 
depreciations tend to stimulate exports, and in turn, economic growth (see, for instance, Hausmann, Pritchett 
and Rodrik (2005) and Freund and Pierola (2012) for cross-country evidence, and Thorbecke and Kato (2012) 
for evidence from Japanese consumption exports). Conversely, Kappler et al. (2012) using a cross -country 
dataset find that large exchange rate appreciations result in a reduction in real exports and a deterioration of 
current account balances.  
 
The implications of the large yen depreciation for Japan's trade -partner countries need to be considered with 
some caveats. The unprecedented monetary easing in the current episode together with fiscal stimulus may 
raise Japan’s aggregate demand substantially. As income elasticities are typically larger than price sensitivities, 
in this particular instance, developing -country exporters’ gains from increased import demand from Japan might 
eventually outweigh the losses associated with the Yen’s (real) depreciation. The effect of the yen depreciation 
on exports of trade partner countries would also vary depending on the extent of their complementarities and 
competition with Japanese exports in world markets. For instance, using industry -level data, Li, Liu and Song 
(2010) find that Japan and China’s export structure tends to be complementary, while Japan and South Korea 
compete in exports of technology-intensive products. The study found that a real depreciation of the yen had a 
positive impact on China’s (relatively more labor -intensive) exports, but a negative impact on South Korea’s 
(relatively more high tech and capital intensive) exports.FN3  
 
Moreover, countries that import capital goods or intermediate products from Japan or those that are part of 
Japanese firms’ regional production chains (e.g., Thailand, Philippines, India) could benefit from a weaker yen 
through reduced costs of imported inputs. Outward investment flows resulting from Japanese monetary easing 
may also benefit developing countries (see GEP Finance Annex). Larger and higher productivity firms in trade-
partner countries may be able to absorb some of the exchange rate changes in their markups, reducing the 
sensitivity of their exports to exchange rate movements (see Berman, Martin and Mayer (2012) for evidence 
from French firm-level data).  
   
Over the longer term, however, the benefits for developing countries are contingent on Japan raising its longer -
term potential growth through structural and policy reforms. In the short -term, Japanese quantitative easing 
could add to the looseness of global monetary condition, through lower global interest rates and potentially 
strong and disruptive capital flows to developing countries, and could raise overheating pressures, particularly 
in East Asian countries.  
 
For Japan itself, studies suggest that competitiveness gains from REER depreciation may be temporary and 
difficult to sustain over time, and may even introduce costly distortions in the real and financial sectors of the 
economy (Haddad and Pancaro (2010)). Indeed, despite a rise in exports following depreciation episodes in the 
past, Japan’s share in global trade has declined almost steadily during the last two decades, from over 9 
percent in 1991 to 4.6 percent by 2012. Moreover, the eventual adjustment of prices of non -traded goods over 
time implies that a shift in the monetary policy stance alone cannot be used to sustain a particular real 
exchange rate that is misaligned with fundamentals (Eichengreen 2008). Overall, the evidence indicates that a 
real exchange rate depreciation may provide a temporary boost to exports, but structural reforms that bring 
about sustained improvements in productivity and reduce barriers to trade, investment and labor mobility are 
likely to play a larger role in a longer-term growth strategy.  
Box ExR.1  
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Given the protracted debt crisis in the Euro 
Area during this period and financial market 
uncertainties, unconventional monetary 
policies undertaken by the US Federal 
Reserve in the form of several rounds of 
quantitative easing may have possibly 
prevented an even stronger appreciation of 
the US dollar in REER terms compared with 
its pre-financial crisis level.FN4 
 
The trend appreciation of developing 
country currencies has  picked up 
pace  since mid-2012  
 
Together with easing of financial market 
tensions since mid-2012 and the large yen 
depreciation, the appreciation of developing 
country currencies picked pace in the second 
half of 2012 and early 2013. The GDP-
weighted average of trade-weighted real 
effective exchange rates (REER) for 
developing countries rose by 4.7 percent 
between September 2012 and April 2013—a 
significantly faster pace compared with the 
almost flat trend (0.7 percent  annual 
appreciation) during the previous 24 months 
(figure ExR.2). The steep appreciation during 
this recent 7-month period was also faster 
than the 5.4 percent annual REER 
appreciation of developing-country currencies 
observed prior to the financial crisis, between 
January 2005 and August 2008. The earlier 
strong appreciation had occurred during a 
boom in international commodity prices, 
sustained inflows of foreign capital into 
developing countries, and a faster pace of 
growth and higher rate of productivity 
increases  in developing countries compared 
with high income countries (see Global 
Economic Prospects July 2012 edition). And 
prior to that, the average REER for 
developing-country currencies was broadly 
unchanged in 2004 compared with its level in 
1995.   
 
Notwithstanding the overall REER 
appreciation in the group of developing 
countries since the second half of 2012, there 
was significant variation in the magnitude of, 
and factors contributing to, currency 
movements in individual countries. The 
internationally-traded currencies of typically 
middle-income emerging market economies 
were influenced by: movements in high 
income currencies (in particular, the large yen 
depreciation); a rebound in private capital 
inflows to developing countries; elevated 
international commodity prices; strengthening 
economic activity and exports in the group of 
developing countries; and country-specific 
differences in policies and performance.   
 
The 21 percent REER depreciation of the yen 
since September 2012 appears to have 
resulted in significant appreciation pressures 
in Japan’s trade partners, particularly among 
countries in the East Asia region. Simulations 
suggest that in the absence of the steep yen 
depreciation, on average trade-weighted real 
effective exchange rates in the East Asia and 
Pacific region would have appreciated 3.7 
percentage points less quickly during this 
seven-month period (compared to the actual 
6.1 percent appreciation), and the average 
REER for the group of developing-countries 
would have appreciated 1.7 percentage points 
less than that observed.  
 
In addition to the yen depreciation, a 
rebound in private capital flows since the 
third quarter of 2012 and elevated commodity 
prices appear to have contributed to 
 
A faster appreciation of developing-
country real effective exchange rates 
(REERs) since mid-2012  
Note: The four developing regions shown in the chart account for close 
to 90 percent of GDP of developing countries. Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions are not 
shown in the chart, but are included in the overall Developing Country 
aggregate.  
Source: World Bank; IFS; JP Morgan.  
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appreciation pressures in several emerging 
market countries. Private capital flows to 
countries in Europe and Central Asia, East 
Asia and Pacific, and South Asia have risen 
robustly since mid-2012 (see GEP Finance 
Annex). Some studies suggest that surges in 
capital inflows are likely to be associated with 
appreciation of real effective exchange rates 
of recipient countries (see Magud and Sosa 
(2010) for developing countries, and 
Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon (2013) for 
emerging Asia). The average REER 
appreciation of large emerging economies 
appears to be positively related with a decline 
in their sovereign credit default swap (CDS) 
rates, an indicator of financial risk (figure 
ExR.3).  
 
International commodity prices strengthened in 
early 2013 on an improving global outlook, but 
have eased in more recent months following an 
improvement in supply conditions (see GEP 
Commodity Annex). Notwithstanding these shorter-
term movements, industrial commodity prices in 
2012 and early 2013 were elevated compared to 
both the immediate post-financial crisis period and 
the period prior to 2007. Real effective exchange 
rates of commodity exporters have typically moved 
together with international commodity prices 
(figure ExR.4). But they have diverged in the most 
recent period, with real effective exchange rates 
appreciating despite the recent easing of  
commodity prices, suggesting that other factors 
may be playing a role in buoying these currencies in 
recent months.  
 
Strengthening global trade since the third quarter 
of 2012 and a recovery in developing-country 
exports have also contributed to increased foreign 
currency revenues in developing countries. 
However, in a few countries, country-specific 
factors seem to have been more significant 
contributors to movements in real effective 
exchange rates. The factors relevant for different 
developing countries and regions are discussed 
below.   
 
Both yen devaluation and robust capital inflows 
contributed to appreciation pressures in East 
Asia 
 
East Asian currencies faced significant appreciation 
pressures from both the large depreciation of the 
yen as well as from a surge in private capital 
inflows since the second half of 2012. In inflation-
adjusted terms, between September 2012 and April 
2013, bilateral real exchange rates of several 
countries in East Asia appreciated 25-30 percent 
relative to the Japanese yen, while Thailand’s 
currency appreciated a larger 34 percent (figure 
ExR.5).FN5  
 
Because of the relatively large weight 
(compared with other developing regions) of 
Japan in their trade, the average GDP-
 
Real effective exchange rates in emerging 
economies tend to appreciate with improvements 
in financial market conditions, and vice-versa 
Notes: GDP-weighted averages of CDS spreads and REERs for 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, Malaysia, Peru, Russia, 
Thailand and Turkey. China is excluded from the chart due its man-
aged exchange rate regime.  
Source: World Bank; IFS; JP Morgan.  
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Industrial commodity prices and real 
effective exchange rate of commodity 
exporters tend to move together, except 
in the most recent period 
   Source: World Bank; IFS; JP Morgan.  
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weighted REER for developing countries in 
the East Asia & Pacific region has 
appreciated strongly by 6.1 percent since 
September 2012, versus 3.7 percent for other 
developing regions. The Thai baht 
appreciated 12.5 percent in REER terms in 
this period—as strong capital inflows added 
to upward pressures from the yen 
depreciation—while currencies of China and 
Indonesia appreciated 5.9 and 5.4 percent, 
respectively. By contrast, the South Korean 
won appreciated a smaller 3.9 percent in 
REER terms, in part due to political tensions.  
Currencies in Latin America & Caribbean 
and Eastern Europe & Central Asia were 
influenced by capital inflows and international 
commodity prices 
In the Latin America & Caribbean region, despite 
an easing of commodity prices in recent months 
(although prices remain elevated relative to  recent 
years—see GEP Commodity Annex), several Latin 
American currencies have appreciated in REER 
terms since early or mid-2012 (figure ExR.6).FN6 
The Mexican peso rose 8.3 percent since 
September 2012 together with an upturn in the 
United States (Mexico’s largest trading partner) and 
rising demand for Mexican exports, and strong 
portfolio inflows into government bonds.  
 
Chile’s currency has risen 6 percent in REER terms 
since early 2012 as a result of robust commodity 
revenues and private capital inflows. The Brazilian 
real rose 7.4 percent in real effective terms since 
September 2012—after depreciating 12 percent 
during the previous 1½ years following imposition 
of capital control measures. The financial 
transactions tax (IOF) on foreign currency inflows 
into Brazil’s domestic debt markets was reduced to 
zero in early June 2013. The challenges that 
developing-country policymakers face when 
confronted with surges in capital inflows that result 
in appreciation of real effective exchange rates, and 
some of the measures that have been used to 
alleviate their impacts are discussed in box ExR.2.   
 
Real effective exchange rates in several emerging economies in Latin America & Caribbean and  
Europe & Central Asia have appreciated in recent months, building on earlier upward trends  
Source: World Bank; IFS; JP Morgan.  
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East Asian currencies appreciated in real 
effective (REER) terms since September 2012  
    Source: IFS, JP Morgan and World Bank. 
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How should developing countries react to capital flows-induced real exchange rate appreciation?  
 
The shifts in monetary policy stances in high income countries since the global financial crisis—although designed primarily to 
support their domestic goals of reviving domestic growth and raising inflationary expectations, rather than facilitate depreciation 
of their currencies or engage in “competitive devaluation”—have still raised concerns among developing country policymaker 
about their unintended consequences in the form of surges in private capital flows, real exchange rate appreciation and possi-
ble loss of export competitiveness (Eichengreen (2013) and Kappler et al. (2012)). Recent research finds that the direct contri-
bution of quantitative easing measures in the United States on capital flows into emerging market economies was relatively 
modest (see Fratzscher, Lo Duca, and Straub (2012) and Morgan (2011)). However, other studies suggest that the indirect 
impact of the extended period of unconventional monetary policies in high income countries in terms of reducing global risk 
aversion and lowering the cost of capital, together with stronger economic performance of emerging economies, may have 
been important factors behind surges in capital flows into developing countries in recent years (see, for instance, Ghosh et al. 
(2012) and Forbes and Warnock (2012)). Cross-country and country-specific studies indicate that these inflows have often 
been associated with appreciation of real effective exchange rates in recipient countries (see, for instance, Magud and Sosa 
(2010), Combes, Kinda and Plane (2011), Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon (2013), and Ibarra (2011)).  
 
The interrelated goals of maintaining exchange rate and financial stability and open capital accounts in a situation of unconven-
tional monetary policies in high income countries and abundant global liquidity complicates the task of developing country au-
thorities. For instance, lowering interest rates to discourage foreign inflows may exacerbate existing domestic credit and asset 
price bubbles and cause overheating in certain sectors. But raising interest rates to curb credit growth can risk attracting even 
more capital inflows and further appreciate the exchange rate (which, in turn, can attract even more short-term speculative in-
flows)—with potentially destabilizing consequences for sovereign and firm balance sheets if these flows were to reverse sud-
denly. Moreover, for countries that have relatively less flexible exchange rate regimes, this lack of exchange rate flexibili ty can 
create incentives for taking on foreign debt and thereby increase the share of foreign currency credit in overall credit (Magud, 
Reinhart, and Vesperoni (2012)). The “impossible trinity” of not being able to achieve all three policy objectives of exchange 
rate stability, free capital mobility, and an independent monetary policy - and a fourth related objective of financial stability - has 
sometimes been cited as a reason for developing countries to impose some form of controls on capital flows (see Eizenman 
(2010)). 
 
Emerging economies faced with disruptive short-term foreign capital inflows (“hot money”) have resorted to various measures 
to correct the resulting temporary deviation of exchange rates from underlying fundamentals, and to alleviate the impact of the-
se flows on credit markets. These include direct foreign exchange interventions, interest rate policies, prudential regulations 
(e.g., restrictions on banks’ borrowing from abroad, limits on domestic lending to certain sectors), and various forms of capital 
controls—such as taxes and fees on capital inflows, minimum holding periods for government bonds, withholding taxes on capi-
tal gains, and minimum waiting periods to repatriate capital, among others (see Ostry et al. (2012)). Brazil’s earlier financial 
transactions tax (IOF) on foreign currency inflows into domestic debt markets is a well-known example (This tax was reduced to 
zero in early June). Earlier, Thailand had imposed withholding taxes on foreign holdings of government bonds in 2010, while 
Indonesia had imposed a six-month holding period for central bank bonds and limits on short-term foreign borrowing by banks 
in 2011 (IMF 2012). Peru’s central bank raised reserve requirements on dollar-denominated deposits several times in 2012 and 
in the first half of 2013, citing the need to moderate inflows of foreign capital and control credit growth; and intervened in foreign 
exchange markets in the first half of 2013 to stem appreciation of the sol. Turkey has also used prudential measures, including 
allowing banks to hold part of their required reserves in foreign exchange, which can alleviate pressures from the foreign ex-
change market when capital inflows are strong. Colombia intervened periodically in foreign exchange markets during 2012 to 
moderate the rise of its currency against the US dollar.  
 
The evidence on the effectiveness of controls on volumes of capital flows is however mixed (Magud, Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2011)), although these measures may alter the composition of inflows (Ostry et al. (2012)). Fratzscher (2012) finds that rather 
than being motivated by capital flows volatility, capital controls have typically been associated with significantly undervalued 
exchange rates, in addition to concerns about signs of overheating, such as high credit growth and rising inflation. Neverthe-
less, when faced with a surge of capital inflows that threaten to overwhelm domestic financial markets and result in asset pr ice 
volatility and bubbles, credit booms, and real exchange rate appreciation, capital flow management (CFM) measures such as 
temporary controls on foreign capital, domestic prudential measures, and interventions in foreign exchange markets may re-
duce exchange rate volatility and provide space for the domestic economy to adjust to the changed external circumstances 
(IMF (2012)). But if these result in real exchange rates that are persistently out of line with underlying macroeconomic funda-
mentals in the medium-term, capital controls can cause distortions and suboptimal investment and production decisions across 
tradable and non-tradable sectors, and impose unnecessary economic costs.  
 
Box ExR.2   
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Among developing countries in the Europe & 
Central Asia region, the Russian ruble appreciated 
3.8 percent in REER terms since September 2012 
on the back of a surge in syndicated bank lending 
and buoyant crude oil revenues (figure ExR.6). 
Notwithstanding weakening GDP growth, the 
Turkish lira rose 7.1 percent in REER terms in the 
same period, partly reflecting robust capital inflows 
and an improvement in its export performance, as 
robust exports to the Middle East offset weakening 
demand from the Euro Area.  The Turkish lira has 
exhibited one of the largest appreciation among 
regional  currencies, strengthening by 17 percent in 
REER terms since January 2012, although it still 
remains 3 percent below its level in early 2008 prior 
to the global financial crisis. The Romanian leu 
appreciated by a strong 10.4 percent in REER 
terms between September 2012 and April 2013, 
also reflecting robust inflows into local currency 
bond markets (see GEP Finance Annex).  
 
Commodity exporting developing countries in the 
Europe & Central Asia region and in Latin 
America & Caribbean typically have weaker trade 
linkages with Japan compared to that of East Asian 
countries, and were therefore less affected by the 
yen depreciation.     
 
Domestic developments played a more 
significant role in South Africa and India  
 
Some notable exceptions to the general 
appreciation trend among developing countries 
include countries with growth concerns, in 
particular, South Africa and India (figure ExR.7). 
Until recently, movements of the rand tended to 
track closely South Africa’s terms of trade, 
adjusting flexibly to international commodity price 
movements (see Global Economic Prospects June 2012 
edition), and in turn, facilitating internal economic 
adjustment. This historical link appears to have 
been broken in the most recent period, as the rand 
weakened in REER terms in the second half of 
2012 despite a rally in international commodity 
prices. The rand’s performance was adversely 
affected by mining sector tensions, a downgrade of 
South Africa’s sovereign rating, and weak  growth 
in 2012; and by further weakening of activity in the 
first quarter of 2013. The Indian rupee has also 
been weak due to slower growth and a widening 
current account deficit, but stabilized somewhat in 
REER terms in the second half of 2012 and early 
2013, mostly due to robust portfolio inflows after 
announcement of a number of reforms, including  
raising limits on foreign direct investment in the 
retail, broadcasting and aviation sectors.   
 
Current account balances of 
developing countries deteriorated and 
international reserves as a share of 
imports have fallen  
 
The weak global economy and decline in the pace 
of expansion in international trade in 2012, 
together with rebalancing of China towards 
domestic sources of growth in recent years, have 
sharply reduced the overall current account balance 
of developing countries (figure ExR.8). Oil 
exporters among developing countries gained from 
 
Domestic factors played a role in weakening of 
REERs in India and South Africa  
Source: World Bank; IFS; JP Morgan.  
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sustained high international oil prices during 2011-
2012 and in early 2013, although a modest 2.5 
percent decline in crude prices is projected for the 
whole year (see GEP Commodity Annex). By 
contrast, robust domestic demand and high crude 
oil prices in recent years (up until early 2013) 
contributed to strains on oil importers’ trade and 
current accounts balances.  
 
At the same time, developing countries’ holdings 
of international reserves have declined as a share 
of imports since 2010 (figure ExR.9). Reserves 
have fallen the most among oil importers in the 
Middle East and North Africa region (a decline 
equivalent to 3.5 months of imports) and in South 
Asia (decline equivalent to 3.9 months of imports). 
Reserves in Europe and Central Asia declined to 
2.3 months of imports as regional trade and 
investment was adversely affected by the weakness 
in Western Europe. The decline in average reserve 
coverage of imports in other regions is smaller: by 
1 month in East Asia and Pacific excluding China, 
and by 0.3 month in Sub-Saharan Africa. By 
contrast, international reserves in months of 
imports remained broadly stable in the Latin 
America and Caribbean region in this period 
(rising by 1 month of imports), mainly on the back 
of  strong commodity revenues and robust capital 
inflows.  
 
Notwithstanding declining import cover across 
developing regions, reserves still stand well above 
the critical 3 months of imports in the vast 
majority of developing countries, with a few 
exceptions. However, the number of developing 
countries with reserves equivalent to less than 3 
months of imports rose to 17 countries as of April 
2013 from 11 in January 2010 (figure ExR.10). For 
instance, in Egypt and Pakistan, international 
reserves have fallen below 3 months of imports.  
 
Smaller reserves relative to imports may increase 
the risk of sudden depreciation of real exchange 
rates due to shifts in investor sentiment or other 
external shocks. It should be noted, however, that 
reserves in months of import cover are a relatively 
crude measure of reserve adequacy and may need 
to be complemented with other measures that take 
into account a country’s overall external financing 
needs. Moreover, reserve adequacy depends, 
among other factors, on the exchange rate regime: 
countries with flexible exchange rates and without 
the need to defend a particular exchange rate may 
require a lower reserve coverage of imports.   
Capital flow management measures and exchange rate restrictions should ideally be transparent, targeted, temporary and non
-discriminatory (IMF (2012)). For instance, prudential measures such as restrictions on bank lending to reduce overheating in 
certain sectors may be preferable to direct capital controls that discriminate on the basis of residency. Macro-prudential 
measures may, however, raise implementation issues and conflict with other domestic policy objectives. Moreover, for coun-
tries with weak financial systems and limited capacity to manage volatile capital flows, controls on short-term capital move-
ments may need to be part of their policy toolkit over the medium-term. Overall, such measures should not aim to maintain a 
real exchange rate that is persistently out of line with underlying macroeconomic fundamentals, and not be seen as a substi-
tute for structural and labor market reforms that are needed for improving productivity and longer-term competitiveness.   
 
Import cover has fallen across developing 
regions except in Latin America & Caribbean 
Source: World Bank; IFS; Datastream.  
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Conclusions  
 
 
 
The weaker current account and reserve position of 
developing countries can imply increased vulnerability to 
shifts in investor sentiment. The trade balances and 
reserve positions of developing countries have 
started to improve in line with a pickup in exports 
and easing of international commodity prices. But 
as discussed, these indicators remain significantly 
weaker compared with the levels in 2010. Although 
buoyant private capital flows have helped to 
finance the larger current account deficits of the 
group of developing countries excluding China and 
crude oil exporters, they also render their balance 
of payments and real exchange rates vulnerable to 
sudden shifts in investor sentiment and reversal of 
capital inflows. This can happen, for instance, in 
response to domestic problems (e.g., weaker than 
expected growth, recognition of asset price 
bubbles); increased risk aversion resulting from 
renewed fiscal and debt tensions in high income 
countries; or from an unanticipated move towards 
a tighter monetary policy stance in some high 
income countries.  
 
Increased coordination on policies affecting currencies can 
help to mitigate the spillovers of domestic policies across 
borders. Given that domestic policies of large 
countries aimed at boosting their own growth can 
have significant unintended spillovers on currencies 
of other countries, greater international 
coordination on policies that affect currencies may 
prove mutually beneficial (Eichengreen (2013), 
IMF (2012), Ostry, Ghosh and Korinek (2012), 
Hoekman (2013); see also the G-7 Statement 
(2013) and G-20 Communiqué (2013)). For 
instance, coordination in monetary policies across 
large economies can ensure that spillovers of 
domestic policies on other countries and effects on 
exchange rates are minimized (Basu (2013)).    
 
Developing countries should try to adjust to persistent foreign 
currency inflows and maintain real exchange rates that are 
consistent with macroeconomic fundamentals. Maintaining 
flexible market-determined exchange rates can 
facilitate adjustment of the domestic economy to 
changes in capital inflows, commodity revenues, 
and other external shocks. However, in the shorter 
term, as discussed earlier, developing countries 
(including those with sound macroeconomic 
fundamentals) may face destabilizing currency 
pressures resulting from surges in capital inflows. 
In specific circumstances, temporary controls on 
capital flows and macro-prudential measures may 
help in reducing exchange rate volatility caused by 
external events (IMF 2012). But over the longer-
term, such controls can cause unnecessary 
distortions and suboptimal investment and 
production decisions, especially if they result in real 
exchange rates that are persistently out of line with 
underlying macroeconomic fundamentals. 
Therefore, exchange rate policies and related 
capital flow management measures should not be 
seen as a substitute for structural and labor market 
reforms, and investments in infrastructure and 
human capital that are necessary to raise 
productivity and growth over the longer term. 
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Notes 
 
1. Since the global financial crisis of 2008-09, central banks in the G3 economies (United States, Euro Area, and 
Japan) have maintained a highly accommodative policy stance—reducing short-term policy interest rates to below 1 
percent and implementing unconventional monetary policies, including large-scale financial asset purchases—in 
order to restore financial market confidence and support economic growth (see GEP Finance and Inflation Annexes). 
2. In late July 2012, the head of the European Central Bank Mario Draghi promised to stand behind the currency 
union after financial market tensions intensified during mid-year. Subsequent measures taken by Euro Area 
authorities to restore financial market confidence—including, among others, the Outright Monetary Transactions 
bond purchase program announced in September 2012 and extension of Greek debt in November 2012—resulted 
in an easing of financial market tensions and reduced the tail risk of exit of periphery countries from the Eurozone. 
Despite fiscal contraction, accommodative monetary policies in general appear to have contributed to increased 
market confidence in the ability of the Euro Area currency union to weather negative shocks (see GEP Finance 
Annex for more details).   
3. The extent of complementarity, however, may have declined since the 1997-2004 period covered by the study as 
China has moved towards production of higher value-added products in recent years. See also Auboin and Ruta 
(2013) on other studies on the relationship between exchange rates and trade.  
4. The US Federal Reserve has undertaken three rounds of quantitative easing (QE) since November 2008. Recent 
research finds that the dollar weakened significantly in real trade-weighted terms following QE announcements 
(Glick and Leduc 2013). An unanticipated QE announcement equivalent to a 1 percentage point reduction in 
federal funds interest rate futures resulted in a 0.5 percentage point depreciation of the dollar in REER terms 
following the announcement.  Fratzscher, Lo Duca, and Straub (2012), however, find that QE1 and QE2 had 
opposite effects on the US dollar. QE1 measures undertaken in the immediate aftermath of the global financial 
crisis in late 2008 were associated with inflows into US financial assets, which, in turn, appreciated the US dollar. 
But QE2 measures implemented from August 2010 onwards triggered a portfolio rebalancing from US financial 
assets toward emerging market equities, resulting in a marked depreciation of the US dollar  
5. South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong SAR, China which are part of geographic East Asia, are considered high 
income countries according to the World Bank’s income classification, and are therefore not included in the East 
Asia and Pacific (EAP) regional aggregates. 
6. The evidence suggests that the effect of capital flows and commodity revenues on real effective exchange rates of 
commodity-exporters tends to be larger in countries that are relatively more integrated with international financial 
markets (see January 2013 edition of the Global Economic Prospects). 
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Overview 
 
 
After strengthening in early 2013 due to improved 
economic outlook, most industrial commodity pric-
es retreated below their end-2012 levels (figure 
COMM.1). Food prices have been declining as 
well, mainly a reflection of improved supply condi-
tions (figure COMM.2). The price of crude oil 
(World Bank average) dropped to US$ 99/bbl in 
April, 8 percent below its February peak. The metal 
price index is down 13 percent since its February 
2013 peak. Precious metals are down as well, 15 
percent since February and more than 25 percent 
since the all time high of August 2011. 
 
In the baseline scenario, which assumes no 
major macroeconomic shocks or supply dis-
ruptions, oil prices are expected to average 
US$ 102/bbl in 2013, down from US$ 105/
bbl in 2012 (table COMM.1). Agricultural 
prices are projected to decline almost 6 per-
cent in 2013 (food, beverages, and raw mate-
rials down by 5.5, 8.9, and 5.8 percent, re-
spectively), under the assumption of average 
crops. Metal prices will to decline marginally (a lit-
tle more than 1 percent) and therefore will remain 
17 percent lower than their 2011 average. Fertilizer 
prices are expected to decline more than 7 percent, 
mainly reflecting low natural gas prices in the Unit-
ed States. Precious metals prices are expected to 
decline more than 10 percent as institutional inves-
tors are increasingly considering them less attrac-
tive “safe haven” alternatives, which comes on top 
of weak physical demand. 
There are a number of risks to the baseline 
forecasts. Downside risks include weak oil 
demand if growth prospects deteriorate 
sharply, especially in emerging economies 
where most of the demand growth is taking 
place. Over the longer term, oil demand 
could be dampened further if the substitution 
between crude oil and other types of energy 
accelerates. On the upside, a major oil supply 
disruption due to political turmoil in the Mid-
dle-East could result in prices spiking by $50 
or more. The severity of the outcome would 
depend on numerous factors, including the 
severity and duration of the cutoff, policy 
actions regarding emergency oil reserves, de-
mand curtailment, and OPEC’s response.  
 
A key uncertainty in the outlook is how 
OPEC (notably, Saudi Arabia) reacts to 
changing global demand and non-OPEC sup-
ply conditions. Since 2004 when crude oil 
prices started rising, OPEC has responded to 
subsequent price weakness by cutting supply, 
but has not been as willing to intervene when 
prices increase. However, as non-OPEC sup-
plies continue to come on stream and demand 
moderates in response to higher prices, the 
sustainability of this approach may come un-
der pressure. 
 
OPEC’s spare capacity has averaged 4.6 mb/d dur-
ing the first four months of 2013, almost 30 per-
cent higher than a year ago but only marginally 
higher than average of the past decade—it had 
dropped below 2 mb/d in the middle of 2008 
when oil prices reached US$ 140/bbl. OECD in-
 
Commodity price indices 
    Source: World Bank.  
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94 
ventories averaged 2.7 mbd during the first five 
months of 2013, remarkably similar to the corre-
sponding period in 2012. 
 
Price risks on raw materials, especially metals, de-
pend both on the speed at which new supply 
comes on stream and on China’s growth prospects. 
Metal prices have declined 30 percent since their 
early 2011 highs, and by 8 percent between Febru-
ary and May 2013. The price weakness reflects both 
moderate demand growth and strong supply re-
sponse, in turn a result of increased investments of 
the past few years, induced by high prices. For 
some metals, stocks have increased considerably as 
well. For example, combined copper stocks at the 
major metals exchanges are up 46 percent since 
2012. Aluminum stocks, which have been rising 
since end-2010, increased 8 during the past 12 
months. 
 
The prospects for the metal market depend im-
portantly on Chinese demand, as the country ac-
counts for almost 45 percent of global metal con-
sumption. However, if robust supply trends contin-
ue and weaker than anticipated demand growth 
materializes, metal prices could follow a path con-
siderably lower than our baseline, with significant 
consequences for metal exporters (see simulations 
in main text). 
 
In agricultural commodity markets, the key risk is 
weather. According the global crop outlook assess-
ment released by the US Department of Agricul-
ture in May 2013, the global maize market will be 
better supplied in the coming, 2013/14, season. 
However, because stocks are still low by historical 
standards, any adverse weather event could induce 
sharp increases in maize prices—as it did in the 
summer of 2012 when maize prices rallied almost 
40 percent in less than two months. The wheat 
market, which is currently better supplied than 
maize, could also come under pressure either due 
to a bad crop or in sympathy with higher maize 
prices—as the crops are competing for the same 
land. In contrast, price risks for rice are on the 
downside, especially in view of the large public 
stocks held by Thailand. Edible oil and oilseed 
markets have limited upside price risks as well due 
to well supplied oilseed (mostly soybeans in South 
America) and edible oil (primarily palm oil in East 
Asia) markets. Global supplies of the major 8 edi-
ble oils are expected to reach a record 155 million 
tons this season, up from last season’s 152 million 
tons. Global oilseed supplies will experience similar 
growth. 
 
Trade policy risks (similar to 2008 and 2010) ap-
pear to be low as evidenced by the virtual absence 
of export restrictions since the summer of 2012, 
despite sharp increases in grain prices. Finally, 
growth in the production of biofuels is slowing as 
policy makers increasingly realize that the environ-
mental and energy independence benefits from 
biofuels are not as large as initially believed. 
    
Nominal price indices-actual and forecasts (2005 = 100) 
    Source: World Bank. 
Table COMM.1  
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14
Energy 182 114 145 188 187 183 181 -0.4 -2.1 -1.2
Non-Energy 182 142 174 210 190 181 179 -9.5 -4.7 -1.1
  Metals 180 120 180 205 174 172 173 -15.3 -1.3 0.8
  Agriculture 171 149 170 209 194 182 179 -7.2 -5.9 -1.8
    Food 186 156 170 210 212 200 192 0.7 -5.5 -4.0
       Grains 223 169 172 239 244 242 226 2.4 -1.0 -6.4
       Fats and oils 209 165 184 223 230 209 202 3.3 -9.0 -3.2
       Other food 124 131 148 168 158 150 147 -5.9 -5.0 -2.1
    Beverages 152 157 182 208 166 151 153 -20.2 -8.9 0.8
    Raw Materials 143 129 166 207 165 156 162 -20.0 -5.8 4.1
  Fertilizers 399 204 187 267 259 241 229 -2.9 -7.1 -4.8
Precious metals 197 212 272 372 378  338 328 1.7 -10.7 -3.0
Memorandum items   
  Crude oil ($/bbl) 97 62 79 104 105  102 101 1.0 -2.5 -1.3
  Gold ($/toz) 872 973 1,225 1,569 1,670  1,500 1,450 6.4 -10.2 -3.3
ACTUAL FORECAST CHANGE (%)
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Crude oil 
 
 
Oil prices have fluctuated within a remarkably tight 
band around US$ 105/bbl (figure COMM.3) over 
the past 18 months. Fluctuations have been driven 
mainly by the geopolitical concerns in the Middle 
East on the supply side and European debt issues 
along with changing developing-country growth 
prospects on the demand side. Price increases earli-
er in 2013 reflected some geopolitical tensions in 
the Middle East and improving global outlook pro-
spects. However, as supply conditions improved 
and market concerns over the Euro Area eased 
once again, crude prices began weakening. And 
they are now 5 percent lower than at the beginning 
of the year. 
 
Recent Developments 
 
Large supplies of Canadian crude oil (especially 
from tar sands) to the United States, combined 
with rapidly rising U.S. shale liquids production 
have contributed to a build-up of stocks at a time 
when U.S. oil consumption is dropping and natural 
gas supplies are increasing rapidly. 
 
Although the price of Brent crude (the internation-
al marker) topped US$ 117/bbl in February, West 
Texas Intermediate (WTI, the U.S. mid-continent 
price) averaged US$ 21/bbl less due to the large 
built up of stocks at Cushing, Oklahoma, the deliv-
ery point of WTI. The Brent-WTI price differential 
declined to less than 10 percent in May, nine per-
centage points lower compared to the January 2011
-May 2013 average of 17.7 percent and the lowest 
since January 2011 (figure COMM. 4). 
 
Downward pressures on mid-continental prices 
have eased, partly in response to some 760 thou-
sand barrels a day in rail shipments in 2013Q1 
from oil producing regions to refineries—an 8-fold 
increase from 90,000 barrels per day in 2011Q1— 
according to the June 2013 assessment by the As-
sociation of American Railroads. Downward pres-
sures on West-Texas crude will abate further when 
the new pipelines to the U.S. Gulf become opera-
tional or reversal of existing pipelines that carry oil 
from the East Coast to Mid-Continent U.S. are 
completed—currently expected some time in late 
2014 or early 2015. 
 
The decline in non-OPEC output growth in 
2011 appears to have reversed. Non-OPEC 
producers added 0.7 mb/d to global supplies 
in 2012 and an additional 0.5 mb/d in 
2013Q1, mainly reflecting earlier large-scale 
investments. In the United States horizontal 
drilling and hydraulic fracturing have contrib-
uted almost 1.5 mb/d of crude oil production 
during the two years since 2011Q1 (figure 
COMM.5). Currently, the U.S. States of Texas 
and North Dakota, where most of shale oil 
production takes place account for almost 45 
percent of total U.S. crude oil supplies, up 
from 33 percent a year earlier. Indeed, the 
IEA projects that global crude oil supply will 
increase by 8.4 mb/d by 2018 up 5 percent 
from the 91 mb/d in 2012. The increase 
mainly reflects surging North American crude 
 
Oil prices and OECD oil stocks 
    Source: World Bank; International Energy Agency (IEA).  
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96 
output (2.3 mb/d from US “light tight oil”, 
which includes production from shale, and 
1.3 mb/d from Canada’s oil sands).  
 
Although shale liquid (also referred to as tight oil) 
and shale gas techniques have great potential to be 
applied worldwide, there are public concerns re-
garding the ecological impacts of such technolo-
gies. In addition, several countries that are believed 
to have similar reserves to those in the United 
States may be slow to utilize that potential due to 
difficulties in accessing drilling rights, poor regula-
tory frameworks, and limited “know-how” in ex-
ploring and developing the resources. 
 
Oil production among OPEC member countries 
averaged 36.9 mb/d in 2013Q1, down from previ-
ous quarter’s 37.2 mb/d. Yet, this is 10 mb/d high-
er than 2002Q2, the lowest of the Organization’s 
recent history but still higher than the official 30 
mb/d quota. Iraq—still outside OPEC’s quota—
has reached pre-war levels of production, currently 
standing slightly over 3 mb/d. Libya’s oil output is 
about 80 percent of pre-war levels of 1.4 mb/d. 
Iran’s oil exports were 0.8 mb/d in April, a decline 
of 60 percent since June 2011 when sanctions took 
effect, and may tumble even further as new sanc-
tions take effect from July 2013. 
 
The post-2010 net growth in OPEC oil production 
reduced spare capacity among its member coun-
tries from to 6.3 mb/d in 2009Q4 to 3.1 mb/d in 
2012Q2, a 50 percent decline (figure COMM.6). 
However, OPEC’s spare capacity reversed the 
downward trend, standing at 4.6 mb/d during the 
first 4 months of 2013, of which nearly two thirds 
is in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government has 
promised to keep the global market well supplied 
(and has the ability to do so), but also deems US$ 
100/bbl to be a fair price. 
 
According to IEA, spare capacity in the global oil 
market is expected to rise to more than 7 mb/d in 
2014, almost three times higher than the 1.5-3.0 
mb/d range between 2004 and 2008. It should then 
begin to decline by 2016 as growth in the United 
States will slow while demand growth remains firm. 
 
World oil demand increased modestly, a little 
more than 1 percent, or 0.9 mb/d in 2012 
(figure COMM.7). Japan is the only OECD 
economy for which crude oil consumption 
increased (by 1 mb/d) in 2012. Most of that 
 
World oil demand growth 
Source: World Bank; IEA. 
Fig COMM.7  
-4
-2
0
2
4
2001
Q1
2002
Q1
2003
Q1
2004
Q1
2005
Q1
2006
Q1
2007
Q1
2008
Q1
2009
Q1
2010
Q1
2011
Q1
2012
Q1
2013
Q1
mb/d, year over year growth
OILDEMGRO_OECD
China Non-OECD, ex China
 
US crude oil production 
        Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
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increase was to fill the loss of nuclear power 
generation capacity as a result of the Tohoku 
earthquake. Oil consumption among OECD 
countries has fallen by almost 5 mb/d, or 10 
percent, from its 2005 peak. Non-OECD de-
mand remains robust. In fact, non-OECD 
economies are expected to consume more oil 
than OECD economies during 2013Q2, for 
the first time in history (44.5 mb/d the for-
mer versus 45 mb/d the latter). IEA expects 
non-OECD demand to reach 54 percent of 
global demand by 2018. 
 
Outlook and Risks in the Oil Market 
 
Nominal oil prices are expected to average 
US$ 102/bbl during 2013 and decline to US$ 
101/bbl in 2014. Over the longer term, oil 
prices are projected to fall in real terms, due 
to growing supplies of conventional and 
(especially) unconventional oil, efficiency 
gains, and substitution away from oil (box 
COMM.1 discusses the substitution possibili-
ties between oil and other types of energy). 
The assumptions underpinning these projec-
tions reflect the upper-end cost of developing 
additional oil capacity, notably from oil sands 
in Canada, currently assessed by the industry 
at about US$ 80/bbl in constant 2013 dollars. 
While it is expected that OPEC will continue 
to limit production to keep prices relatively 
high, the Organization is also sensitive to let-
ting prices rise too high, for fear of inducing 
innovations that would alter fundamentally 
the long term path of oil prices. 
World demand is expected to grow at less 
than 1.5 percent annually over the projection 
period, with all the growth coming from non-
OECD countries as has been the case in re-
cent years (figure COMM.8). Growth in oil 
consumption among OECD countries is ex-
pected to continue to be subdued due to low 
growth, and efficiency improvements in vehi-
cle transport induced by high prices—
including a gradual switch to hybrid, natural 
gas and electrically powered transport. Pres-
sures to reduce emissions due to environmen-
tal concerns are expected to further dampen 
oil growth demand at global level.  
 
Growth in oil consumption in developing coun-
tries, on the other hand, is expected to remain rela-
tively strong in the near and medium term. In the 
longer-term, however, it is expected to moderate as 
the share of low-energy using services in these 
economies grow, subsidies are phased out, and (as 
noted above) other fuels become incorporated into 
the energy mix. 
 
On the supply side, non-OPEC oil produc-
tion is expected to continue its upward climb, 
as high prices have prompted higher levels of 
exploration (including deep water offshore 
and shale liquids) and the implementation of 
new extractive technologies to increase the 
output from existing wells (figure COMM.9). 
Significant production increases are expected 
in Brazil, the Caspian, and West Africa, which 
together with the United States and Canada 
are likely to more than offset declines in ma-
ture areas such as the North Sea. 
 
Crude oil consumption 
    Source: IEA.  
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Until the mid-2000s, the prices of the world’s key natural 
gas markets (U.S., Europe, and Japan) had been tied to 
oil prices. Thus, in addition to moving in a synchronous 
manner with each other and with oil, both natural gas and 
oil were priced the similar levels in terms of energy con-
tent. In other words, natural gas and crude oil markets 
were integrated—though due to administered pricing 
mechanisms, not market forces. Coal, which has been 
priced independently, was traded about one third the price 
of oil, in energy equivalent terms (figure Box COMM. 1.1). 
 
The energy price boom of the early 2000s changed all 
that. First, it delinked U.S. natural gas prices from oil pric-
es and from European and Japanese natural gas prices. 
Second, it generated a gap between WTI (the mid-
Continent US price) and Brent (the international marker). 
Third, it linked US natural gas and coal prices. This box 
elaborates on the reasons behind such changing patterns 
and concludes the following. The WTI-Brent gap will close 
soon, perhaps as early as 2014 or 2015 at the latest. The 
coupling of U.S. natural gas and coal prices is likely to re-
main (and, perhaps, strengthen). Natural gas price con-
vergence will depend on various investment and policy 
factors, thus it may take some time before it materializes. 
Yet, the future relationship between natural gas and oil 
prices is more complex to analyze. It will depend on 
whether induced innovation takes place—something that 
cannot be evaluated or projected. 
 
Induced innovation in the extraction of natural gas through 
fracking and horizontal drilling techniques (often referred 
to as “unconventional” gas), primarily in the U.S. was fol-
lowed by supply increases in turn lowering US natural gas 
prices. Low gas prices made it an attractive alternative to 
some U.S. energy intensive industries, especially electrici-
ty generation, which are gradually switching from coal to 
natural gas. Indeed, the US has experienced a marked re-
duction in coal use, 10.5 percent down from 2006-08 to 
2009-11, when global consumption increased 9 percent. 
As a result, beginning in 2009 US natural gas and coal 
have been traded at similar price levels in energy equiva-
lent terms but they diverged from European natural gas 
and Japanese liquefied natural gas (LNG) prices (figure 
Box COMM 1.2). 
 
Will natural gas prices converge? There are numerous 
market (both demand and supply) and policy constraints, 
the removal of which is likely to induce coupling of natural 
gas prices in the longer term. 
  Supply—Increased unconventional gas supplies 
outside the U.S. Unconventional gas production has tak-
en place almost exclusively in the United States. Yet, un-
conventional natural gas reserves, are plentiful in many 
regions, including North America, Latin America, and most 
importantly Asia Pacific. Industry estimates show that 
more than 40 percent of known global natural gas re-
serves recoverable at current prices and technology are 
unconventional. Reasons for the slow technology adoption 
include poor property rights, limited know-how, and envi-
ronmental concerns. 
  Trade—Construction of LNG facilities and gas pipe-
lines. Currently, 31 percent of natural gas crosses interna-
tional borders—21 percent through pipelines and 10 per-
cent in LNG form (by comparison, nearly two thirds of 
crude oil is traded internationally, 46 percent as oil and 20 
percent as products.) As more LNG facilities come on 
board and new gas pipelines are constructed, trade of nat-
ural gas will increase, thus exerting upward (downward) 
price pressure in producing (consuming) regions. Never-
theless, it should be noted that regardless of how much 
natural gas trade increases, LNG will be traded at much 
higher prices than gas through pipelines because of the 
high costs of liquefying and transporting. 
  Demand—Relocation of energy intensive industries. 
In addition to the substitution from coal to natural gas by 
the energy intensive industries in the U.S., there is evi-
dence that industries are moving to the United States to 
take advantage of the “natural gas dividend”, in a way re-
versing the long standing trend of U.S. industries moving 
to Asia (and elsewhere) in response to the “labor cost divi-
dend.” Four energy-intensive industries that are taking (or 
 A Global Energy market? Box COMM.1   
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will take) advantage of lower energy prices in the U.S. are 
paper, aluminum, steel, and chemicals, whose energy 
costs as a share of total material costs ranges between 5 
and 9 percent (the share for total US manufacturing is 3 
percent, 4-5 times more energy intensive than agriculture, 
see box COMM.3). 
  Substitute product—Coal. More trade in coal is likely 
to take place, thus further facilitating convergence of natu-
ral gas prices and also strengthening the convergence of 
coal and natural gas prices, already underway. Indeed, 
between 2005 and 2012 global coal exports almost tripled 
(from 258 to 758 million tons) pushing coal traded as a 
share of production to almost 15 percent. Furthermore, an-
ecdotal evidence points to even further increases. For ex-
ample, a recent article (“Tata Eyes Coal Assets Freed by 
Global Fracking Boom”, Bloomberg, April 30, 2013) noted 
that Tata Power, India’s second largest electricity produc-
er, is seeking coal supplies from the U.S., Colombia, and 
Canada (they account for 13.9, 1.5, and 0.9 percent of 
global coal production; China’s share is 50 percent). 
  Policies—US energy exports, nuclear energy, prop-
erty rights. Three types of policies are expected to in-
crease trade in natural gas and, consequently, price con-
vergence. First, the U.S. is gradually removing re-
strictions on energy exports, most of which were intro-
duced after the oil crisis of the 1970s in response to ener-
gy security concerns. Second, several countries are re-
considering nuclear energy policies, especially after the 
Tohoku accident; some plan not to replace aging nuclear 
power units while others contemplate early decommission-
ing. Thus, nuclear power’s diminishing contribution to glob-
al energy consumption —which has already declined from 
its  2001 peak of 6.4 percent to 4.9 percent in 2011—will 
be substituted by coal, natural gas, and to a lesser extent 
renewables (see table COMM 1.1 for historical and current 
energy consumption shares). Third, countries with large 
unconventional reserves are likely to introduce policies to 
strengthen property rights, a key reason for not devel-
oping them. 
 
Subsequent to the natural gas boom, fracking and hori-
zontal drilling were applied to the US oil sector, which, as 
expected, induced similar supply response. These oil sup-
plies along with increasing crude inflows from Canadian oil 
sands caused decoupling of WTI from Brent with the latter 
being traded 18 percent above the former after January 
2011 (figure Box COMM. 1.3). Historically (1983-2005), 
WTI was traded with a 6 percent premium over Brent, be-
cause the mid-Continent US was a “deficit” region. Follow-
ing increased imports from Canadian oil sands during 
2006-10, WTI and Brent were traded in par. After January 
2011, however, Brent has been traded with a premium 
over WTI following increased domestic shale oil supplies—
it averaged 18 percent between January 2011 and May 
2013. The premium may persist for another two years, un-
til a new pipeline begins transferring surplus oil from Cush-
ing, Oklahoma to the US Gulf (some oil is currently moving 
by truck and rail). The WTI discount is likely to stabilize 
around 5 percent, (a mirror image of the pre-2006 premi-
um) when the market reaches equilibrium—oil supply in 
the mid-Continent US exceeds demand and the surplus 
moves to the Gulf at the lowest possible cost. 
 
What about convergence of natural gas and oil prices? 
Because more than half of global crude oil supplies go to 
the transportation industry, the prospects of substitutability 
between crude oil and other types of energy will depend 
on the degree to which vehicles can switch from crude oil-
base fuels to natural gas or electricity. As discussed in the 
January 2013 edition of Global Economic Prospects: Com-
modity Market Outlook (p. 7, box 1), contrary to natural 
gas, crude oil products have convenient distribution net-
works and refueling stations that can be reached by cars 
virtually everywhere in the world. Thus, in order for the 
transport industry to utilize natural gas at a scale large 
enough to make a dent in the crude oil market, innovations 
must take place such that the distribution and refueling 
costs of natural gas become comparable to those of crude 
oil. The second alternative, electricity, has its own draw-
backs, namely, storage capacity and refueling time. Con-
sider that a truck with a net weight capacity of 40,000 
pounds were to be powered by lithium-sulphur batteries 
for a 500-mile range, the batteries would occupy almost 85 
percent of the truck’s net capacity, leaving only 6,000 
pounds of commercial space. Hence, as was the case in 
natural gas, for large scale electricity use by vehicles, in-
novation in battery technology must take place. 
Box figure COMM. 1.3  Brent and WTI prices 
Source: World Bank. 
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Box table COMM 1.1  Shares of global primary energy 
consumption (percent) 
Source: BP Statistical Review. 
Note (1): “Other” includes biofuels, solar, wind, geothermal, and bio-
mass 
Note (2): The shares were calculated in oil equivalent terms 
Oil Gas Coal Nuclear Hydro Other 
1965-69 42.6 16.8 34.7 0.2 5.6 0.0
1970-74 47.3 18.6 27.7 0.9 5.4 0.1
1975-79 46.5 18.9 27.0 2.1 5.5 0.1
1980-84 41.4 20.3 28.3 3.7 6.2 0.1
1985-89 39.0 21.2 28.2 5.3 6.1 0.2
1990-94 38.7 22.3 26.3 6.0 6.3 0.4
1995-99 38.4 22.9 25.5 6.2 6.5 0.5
2000-04 37.3 23.4 26.4 6.1 6.1 0.7
2005-09 34.7 23.4 29.0 5.4 6.3 1.1
2010-11 33.1 23.7 30.3 4.9 6.4 1.6
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Metals 
 
 
Following the post-2008 financial crisis collapse, 
metal prices regained strength and increased almost 
continuously to reach new highs in February 2011 
when the World Bank price index reached 229 
(2005 = 100), up 164 percent since its December 
2008 low (figure COMM.10). This increase (along 
with the sustained increases prior to the financial 
crisis) generated large new investments inducing a 
strong supply response. 
 
Most of the additional metal supply went to meet 
demand from China, whose consumption share of 
world refined metals reached 44.2 percent at the 
end of 2012, up from 42 percent in the previous 
year (figure COMM.11). Metal prices, however, 
have been weakening since 2011. This decline 
along with the drop in energy prices and (an even 
sharper) decline in precious metal prices has 
prompted economists and analysts to argue that 
that the so-called commodity super cycle may be 
coming to an end (see box COMM.2 for a discus-
sion on super-cycle and how it relates to global 
metals reserves). 
 
Recent Developments 
 
Aluminum demand increased by 6.8 percent in 
2012 according to World Bureau of Metal Statistics 
(WBMS), led for the second year by double digit 
demand growth in China (15 percent) and a 7.5 
percent increase in Indian demand. Consumption 
contracted in European Union (7.7 percent) and 
Brazil (5.2 percent) on the back of continued eco-
nomic weakness. Aluminum consumption contin-
ues to benefit from substitution away from copper, 
mainly in the wiring and cable sectors (copper pric-
es are now more than four times higher than alumi-
num prices, whereas the two were similar prior to 
the 2005 boom). Substitution is expected to contin-
ue for as long as the aluminum prices remain twice 
as high as copper prices, according to industry analysts. 
 
Aluminum supply was up marginally by 3.2 per-
cent, down from 7.5 percent growth in 2011. Out-
put was constrained by high energy costs, which 
account for nearly 40 percent of total production 
costs. Supply growth is coming from countries with 
abundant (or, often, subsidized) energy, including 
China (up 12 percent), United States (up 4.4 per-
cent), and United Arab Emirates (up 6.2  percent). 
Nevertheless, aluminum production has declined 
sharply in the European Union (down 19 percent) 
on environmental pressures and adverse economic 
developments, Canada (down 6.9 percent) due to 
labor disputes. Brazil and Russia have experienced 
marginal declines as well. Aluminum stocks at the 
London and Shanghai exchanges (combined) are 
up 8 percent for the year (end-May 2013/end-May 
2012). Stocks have been rising for some time, and 
are currently (May 2013) 20 percent higher than 
their end-2010 levels. However, significant amount 
of aluminum inventories are tied up in warehouse 
financing deals and unavailable to the market. 
 
Copper demand expanded by 4.7 percent in 
2012, up from 1.4 percent the year before, accord-
ing to WMBS data with China’s apparent demand  
 
Metal Prices 
    Source: World Bank. 
Fig COMM.10  
0
15
30
45
60
0
2
4
6
8
10
Jan '01 Jan '03 Jan '05 Jan '07 Jan '09 Jan '11 Jan '13
$'000/ton$'000/ton
Nickel (left axis)
Copper (right axis)
Aluminum (right axis)
Nickel (left axis)
Copper (right axis)
Aluminum (right axis)
 
Consumption of key metals 
   Source: World Bureau of Metal Statistics. 
Fig COMM.11  
0
10
20
30
40
50
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
millions tons
China
OECD
OtherChina
OECD
Other
GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS  |  June 2013   Commodity Annex   
101 
increasing 11.7 percent, up from 7.2 in 2011. How-
ever, it is unclear how much of this demand in-
crease was due to stock build-up and how much 
was actually consumed. Estimates of stock build-up 
in Chinese bonded warehouses indicate an increase 
of more than 160 percent in 2012 to some 850,000 
tons. Elsewhere, demand for copper has recovered, 
including Brazil (up 8.6 percent) after declining the 
previous year, Mexico (up 20 percent), and the 
United States (up 3.3 percent). Demand was espe-
cially weak in the European Union (down 7.7 per-
cent) and Japan (down 1.3 percent). 
 
Supply of refined copper continued to expand at a 
modest 2.9 percent pace in 2012, down from 3.2 
percent increase in 2011. However, output of 
mined copper rose 4.4 percent in 2012, up from 1.2 
percent growth during 2009-2011. High copper 
prices have induced a wave of new mines and ex-
pansions of existing ones that are expected to come 
on-stream soon. For example, Escondida in Chile, 
the world’s largest copper mine, is on track to in-
crease its production by 20 percent in 2013. Mined 
copper output rose 7.1 percent in Africa in 2012, 
with several mines coming on stream in Zambia 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Oyu 
Tolgoi mine in Mongolia began production in 2013 
and is expected to be one of the top five producing 
copper mines in the World and increase that coun-
try’s production capacity four-fold. Copper stocks 
at the London, New York and Shanghai exchanges 
(combined) are up 95 percent in May 2013 com-
pared to the year ago. 
 
Nickel demand expanded 6.1 percent in 2012, 
down from 17 percent growth in 2011. The sharp-
est decline was in China, where apparent demand 
rose 17.4 percent, versus 46 percent in 2011. China 
now accounts for 40 percent of global stainless 
steel production (a major source of nickel demand), 
up from 4 percent a decade ago. Demand contract-
ed in most high income countries, including the 
EU (down 8 percent) and Japan (down 8.3 percent) 
and the US (down 6.2 percent). 
 
Nickel supply grew by 13 percent in 2012, a second 
year of double digit growth, slightly down from 16 
percent growth in 2013. A wave of new nickel mine 
capacity is likely to keep nickel prices close to mar-
ginal production costs. Several new projects will 
soon ramp up production, including Australia, Bra-
zil, Madagascar, New Caledonia, and Papua New 
Guinea. Another major global source of nickel is 
Nickel Pig Iron (NPI) in China, which sources low-
grade nickel ore from Indonesia and the Philip-
pines. China’s production capacity may soon be 
constrained, though, given that Indonesia has an-
nounced that it will develop its own NPI industry 
and has introduced export quotas and may ban 
nickel ore exports by end-2013. Nickel stock were 
built up during 2012 as supplies exceeded the con-
sumption—LME stocks were 68 percent in May 
2013 compared to a year ago. 
 
Outlook and Risks in Metal Markets 
 
Metal prices are expected to experience a modest 
decline in 2013, which will come on the top of the 
15 percent decline experienced last year. Aluminum 
prices are expected to decline marginally in 2013 
and following and upward trend thereafter in re-
sponse to rising power costs and the fact that cur-
rent prices have pushed some producers at or be-
low production costs. Nickel prices are expected to 
decline 3 percent in 2013, and to follow a slightly 
upward trend thereafter. Although there are no 
physical constraints in these metal markets, there 
are a number of factors that could push prices even 
higher over the forecast period, including declining 
ore grades, environmental issues, and rising energy 
costs. On the contrary, copper prices are expected 
to decline almost 7 percent in 2013 with more de-
clines in the subsequent years, mostly due to substi-
tution pressures and slowing demand. Over the 
medium term, stainless steel demand is expected to 
remain robust, growing by more than 6 percent 
annually, mainly driven by high-grade consumer 
applications, as emerging economies are increasing-
ly mimicking consumption patterns of high income 
countries. 
 
Most of the risks on metal prices are on the down-
side, especially weakening of China. As discussed in 
the main text, if metal prices decline sharply (say, 
20 percent over the course of next year, relative to 
the baseline), while it will not have much of an im-
pact of global GDP, the decline will impact metal 
exporting countries, especially Sub-Saharan African 
metal exporters, whose GDP and fiscal balance 
may decline as much as 0.7 and 1 percent, respec-
tively, compared to the baseline. 
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In 1990, the world consumed less than 43 million tons 
metals. In 2012 it consumed 91 million tons. All this 
growth was driven by China—in 1990 China accounted for 
a mere 4 percent of global consumption; today it accounts 
for almost 45 percent. In 1990, the world consumed 66 
million barrels of oil per day (mb/d), 37 percent of which 
was consumed by OECD economies. In 2012, it exceeded 
90 mb/d, half of which is consumed by non-OECD econo-
mies. Despite these strong consumption growth patterns, 
this box shows that the assumed resource depletion that 
has occupied headlines often is less of an issue now than 
it used to be. Nevertheless, problems exist, including envi-
ronmental concerns, concentration of resources, and the 
high cost of extracting such resources. 
 
Metal consumption by China during the past decade has 
been so strong that it reversed the downward trend of 
global metal intensity (that is, metal consumption per unit 
of GDP), a turnaround that continues today. Thus, metal 
intensity now is the same as it was the early 1970s—on 
the contrary, food and energy intensities have continued 
their long term downward trend. On the other hand, de-
spite the strong demand growth of oil by non-OECD econ-
omies, they still consume 2.6 barrels per year on a per 
capita basis, as opposed to 13.7 by OECD economies. 
 
The strong growth in consumption of industrial commodi-
ties by emerging economies along with the likelihood that 
they will sustain high growth rates, inevitably raises the 
issue of resource depletion. The issue of non-adequacy of 
resources to sustain projected population and income 
growth rates has been debated frequently, especially in 
periods of high prices. Examples include the peak oil hy-
pothesis for crude oil reserves and the Club of Rome ar-
guments regarding food supplies (Meadows and others 
1972). 
 
Based on US Geological Survey data, figure COMM 2.1 
reports global reserves for two ores (bauxite, iron ore), 
five base metals (nickel, copper, zinc, lead, tin), and two 
precious metals (gold, silver). The reserves are expressed 
in terms of years of current production (the so-called re-
serves-to-production ratio, R/P), evaluated at two 2-year 
periods (2000-01 and 2010-11) spanning the recent price 
and consumption boom. (According to the U.S. Geological 
Survey, reserves refer to the part of the reserve base 
which could be economically extracted or produced at the 
time of determination but does not imply that extraction 
facilities are in place and operative). 
 
Numerous stylized facts emerge from the analysis. First, 
the R/P ratios for various metals paint a mixed picture 
regarding resource scarcity. Specifically, the ratio in-
creased in three of the nine cases: nickel (from 43 to 46 
years), copper (from 26 to 41), and silver (from 16 to 22). 
It did not experience any appreciable change for gold and 
zinc but declined marginally for lead (from 21 to 19 years). 
Yet, three metals exhibited significant declines: Tin (from 
34 to 19 years), iron ore (from 136 to 65 years), and baux-
ite (from 180 to 133). Second, the declines in the R/P 
ratios reflect increased production, not declining reserves. 
In fact, with the single exception of tin (whose reserves 
declined nearly 40 percent during the 10-year period un-
der consideration) and gold (where reserves increased 
only 4 percent), reserves increased between 16 percent 
(bauxite) and 94 percent (copper). Third, the two largest 
declines in the R/P ratio—iron ore, down by 71 years, and 
bauxite, down by 47 years—took place in markets where 
the respective metals are relatively abundant, hence less 
of a need to invest in exploration and development activi-
ties. Thus, of the nine metals examined here, tin appears 
to be the only reserve-constrained commodity. 
 
What about energy? Figure COMM. 2.2 depicts R/P ratios 
for natural gas and crude oil between 1980 and 2011. In 
both markets the ratios have been increasing, a significant 
3.1 percent per annum for crude oil and a marginal 0.4 
percent for natural gas. In fact, the R/P ratio for crude oil 
exceeded 54 years  in 2011 for the first time. (According 
to BP, “[reserves] are generally taken to be those quanti-
ties that geological and engineering information indicates 
with reasonable certainty can be  recovered in the future 
Box Fig COMM 2.1   Global metal reserves 
Source: US Geological Survey. 
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from known reservoirs under existing economic and oper-
ating conditions.”) 
 
The increases of crude oil reserves during the 1980s is 
due to additions by OPEC members. The 1999 uptick 
reflects the addition of 120 billion barrels from Canada’s oil 
sands (equivalent to 4 years of current global  consump-
tion) while during the mid-2000s global reserves increased 
due to Venezuela’s Orinoco Belt oil, currently estimated at 
220 billion barrels (7 years of global consumption). The R/
P ratios for both crude oil and natural gas are likely to 
increase enormously when the unconventional reserves 
are added in the economically recoverable resource pool. 
Indeed, industry experts have noted that when all global 
recoverable reserves are considered, the world may have 
as much as 2 centuries worth of natural gas, evaluated at 
current consumption rates, prices, and technology. 
 
While adequacy of reserves per se does not seem to be a 
problem, at least in the foreseeable future, there are sev-
eral issues of concern, including environmental issues, 
concentration of ownership, further demand strengthening, 
and increasing extractions costs. First, by their very na-
ture, extraction of these resources may be associated with 
environmental issues, such as contamination of ground 
water resources or concerns that excessive fracking may 
be linked to increasing frequency of earthquake activity. 
 
Second, as we move forward, the reserves will become 
more concentrated. For example, currently OPEC ac-
counts for more than 72 percent of oil reserves, nearly half 
of which are located in Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Natu-
ral gas reserves are concentrated as well, with the Rus-
sian Federation and Turkmenistan accounting for over one 
third and Iran and Qatar accounting for nearly 28 percent. 
(The Herfindahl concentration indices for crude oil and 
natural gas reserves were 9.8 and 10.7 percent in 2011.) 
 
Third, extracting these resources is becoming increasingly 
costly. For example, the marginal cost of oil is currently 
estimated at US$80/bbl for Canadian oil sands (this cost 
forms the basis for the World Bank’s long term oil price 
assumptions). 
 
Last, a key issue on resource adequacy and prices will be 
the strength of demand. The future of metal markets will 
depend on the metal intensity of Chinese economy. Oil 
consumption will depend on demand by emerging econo-
mies and whether their energy intensities emulate that of 
high income countries. Consider, for example, that in per 
capita terms, OECD countries consume 5 times more crude 
oil than non-OECD countries or more strikingly, the U.S. 
consumes 23 times more oil than India (figure COMM 2.3). 
 
Many observers (see, for example, Heap 2005) looking at 
the extremely robust demand for metals, and the rapidly 
rising metals intensity of the Chinese economy, as well as 
the strong oil demand by emerging economies, argued that 
these commodities go through a super cycle where prices 
are likely to stay high for an extended period of time. The 
so-called “super cycle hypothesis” has been empirically 
verified for a number of metals (Jerrett and Cuddington 
2008). Super-cycles of this nature, especially for extractive 
commodities, have taken place in the past rather infre-
quently (for example, during the industrial revolution in the 
United Kingdom, and the westward expansion of the late 
1800s/early 1900s in the United States). Erten and Ocampo 
(2012) identified four such super cycles in real prices of 
agriculture, metals, and crude oil during 1865-2009; the 
length of the cycles ranged between 30-40 years with am-
plitudes 20-40 percent higher or lower than the long run 
trend (similar estimates have been given by Cuddington 
and Zellou (2013) for metals.) Furthermore, the mean of 
each super-cycle was lower than for the previous cycle, 
thus supporting the view that nominal prices of primary 
commodities grow at a lower rate than nominal prices of 
manufacturing commodities (Prebisch-Singer hypothesis). 
 
Indeed, energy and metal prices (expressed as ratio to 
manufacturing prices) experienced the largest and longest 
boom since WWII (figure COMM 2.4). While most of the 
conditions behind the post-2004 price boom are still in 
place, there are signs that some conditions may be easing. 
Perhaps, the 2008 and 2011 twin peaks of commodity pric-
es marked the beginning of the end of the current super 
cycle. If so, the current super-cycle will be much shorter 
than previous ones. But, it is too early to tell. 
Box Fig COMM 2.3   Per capita oil consumption 
Source:  BP Statistical Review; UN; OECD; Eurostat. 
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Precious Metals 
 
 
 
Following 18 months of relative stability, precious 
metals prices declined sharply during 2013Q2—the 
World Bank metal price index declined 20 percent 
in the past 6 months (figure COMM.12). The de-
cline marked a reversal of eleven straight years of 
increasing prices precious metal prices. The price 
drop reflects changing perceptions of global risk, 
given gold’s status as a “safe-haven” investment 
asset. Holdings of gold by EFTs are down more 
than 18 percent for the year. In contrast, holdings 
of silver and platinum are up, 12 and  32 percent 
respectively by end-May 2013. 
 
High gold prices have attracted considerable invest-
ment in the gold mining industry, for both existing 
and new mines. China has announced a new pro-
duction target of 450 tons per year by 2015, up 
from 400 tons in 2012 when output grew12 per-
cent. Production in South Africa declined 13 per-
cent in 2012, in what might signal a long-term de-
cline as it was a fourth consecutive annual de-
cline—although it also reflected very serious labor 
disputes in late 2012, which disrupted production 
of both gold and platinum. 
 
The precious metal index is expected to decline 
almost 11 percent in 2013 (gold, silver, and plati-
num down by 10, 13, and 3 percent). Most risks are 
on the downside due to supply improvements, 
even as the pace of global recovery improves, in-
cluding easing of financial tensions in Europe. 
Fertilizers 
 
 
 
Fertilizers prices, a key input to the production of 
most agricultural commodities especially grains and 
oilseeds, experienced a 5-fold increase between 
2003 and 2008, the largest increase among all key 
commodity groups (figure COMM.13). In addition 
to strong demand, the price hikes reflected increas-
es in energy prices, especially natural gas—some 
fertilizers are made directly out of natural gas. In-
deed, fertilizer prices are now three time higher 
than a decade ago, remarkably similar to the 3-forld 
increase in energy prices. 
 
Most recently fertilizer prices have been easing. 
The World Bank’s fertilizer index declined 4 per-
cent in 2013Q1 after declining 3 percent in 2012. 
The declines were more pronounced in potassium 
and phosphate, each 8 percent down. Other types 
of fertilizers changed only marginally. Weak de-
mand, especially by India and China has been the 
key factor behind the weakness (demand by the US 
and Latina America has been strong). 
 
Fertilizer prices are expected to ease consid-
erably in the medium term; more than 7 per-
cent in 2013 and another 5 percent in the 
next two years—primarily reflecting lower 
production costs due to the projected moder-
ation of natural gas prices as well a number 
of projects coming on-stream, especially in 
the United Arab Emirates and the Former 
Soviet Union, both important natural gas producers. 
 
Precious metal prices 
    Source: World Bank. 
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   Source: World Bank. 
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Agriculture 
 
 
 
With the exception of grains, most agricultur-
al prices have been declining almost continu-
ously since their early 2011 peaks (figure 
COMM.14). Beverages and raw materials are 
down 32 and 35 percent, respectively between 
their February 2011 peaks and May 2013. 
Non-grain food prices are down as well—
edible oils down 16 percent and other food 
prices down 17 percent. Initially, grain prices 
followed a similar (declining) path, but they re-
versed course sharply after the heat wave in sum-
mer of 2012 caused considerable damage in maize-
producing areas in the Midwestern United States, 
while severe drought conditions in Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia affected wheat production. The 
World Bank food price index gained almost 11 per-
cent in just one month—from June to July 2012. 
Since then supply conditions have improved con-
siderably across most food groups. For example, 
both the edible oil and oilseed markets are well 
supplied, with the global edible oil production ex-
pected to reach new record. Grain supplies are im-
proving as well. In its May 2013 assessment (the 
first for next season’s crop), the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture projected a marked improvement in 
maize conditions for 2013/14, a comfortable wheat 
crop, and a well-supplied rice market. In response 
to this outlook most food prices have receded—
the food price index has lost most of its summer 
2012 gains. Yet, upside risks exists, especially in maize, as 
any adverse weather event to upset global markets. 
Recent developments in agricultural 
markets 
 
Grain prices have been declining steadily since 
the spike in the summer of 2012 as news for a bet-
ter supplied 2013/14 season were gradually emerg-
ing (figure COMM.15). Between July 2012 and May 
2013, maize and wheat prices have declined 11 
and 8 percent, respectively, partly eliminating the 
gains during July and August of 2012. In its May 
2013 update (the first for the 2013/14 crop sea-
son), the U.S. Department of Agriculture, placed its 
global maize production assessment at 966 million 
tons, up from 2012/13 season’s 857 million tons, 
in turn increasing the stock-to-use ratio from 14.4 
percent to 16.6 percent. Similarly, the global wheat 
production assessment for 2013/14 stands at 
slightly over 700 million tons, up from current sea-
son’s 655 million tons, inducing a marginal increas-
ing in the stock-to-use ratio as well. 
 
After dropping below the US$ 600/ton mark in 
November 2011, rice prices have fluctuated within 
a very tight band around US$ 540/ton. They ex-
ceeded US$ 600/ton only twice: towards the end of 
2011 when there were some reports of flood dam-
age to the Thai crop and last year when the Thai 
government introduced its purchase program—a 
public stock-holding mechanism. According to 
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s May 2013 assess-
ment, global rice production is expected to reach 
almost 480 million tons in 2013/14, 9 million tons 
above the 2012/13 record. The stocks-to-use ratio 
is expected to reach almost 27 percent, remarkably 
similar to that of 2012/13 and well within historical 
 
Agriculture price indices 
    Source: World Bank. 
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norms. Trade in rice has improved as well reaching 
a new record of 38.6 million tons during last calen-
dar year, aided in part by a surge in Chinese im-
ports (2.9 million in 2012, up from 0.5 million tons 
a year earlier). And, early reports indicate that his 
year may be another record for rice trade, perhaps 
as high as 40 million tons. 
 
Edible oil prices have declined almost 20 per-
cent since their summer 2012 peak, as measured by 
the World Bank’s edible oil price index, effectively 
eliminating all the gains during the first half of last 
year. The decline reflects an improved South 
American soybean crop as well as a better reas-
sessment of the U.S. soybean crop, for which yields 
turned out to be higher than originally thought. 
Palm oil supplies from Indonesia and Malaysia 
have improved as well—these two countries ac-
count for 80 percent of global palm oil supplies. 
Soybean prices have weakened as well during the 
past 9 months, down almost 28 percent from their 
September 2012 highs (figure COMM.16). The 
extended soybean price spike during 2012 also re-
flects the overall tightness in the animal feed indus-
try. Soybean meal and white maize (the latter pro-
duced primarily in the United States) are close sub-
stitutes as they both are key inputs to the animal 
industry. 
 
Edible oils experienced the fastest production (and 
consumption) growth rates of agricultural com-
modities during recent decades, and this is likely to 
be the case for the future. Table COMM.2 reports 
production growth rates for 8 commodities and 
shows that in all four sub-periods since 1960, palm 
oil and soybeans exhibited growth rates that are 
two to three times higher than food commodities 
as well as cotton (key raw material) and coffee, 
whose growth is  roughly aligned with population 
growth. The main exception is maize, which during 
2004-12 grew by an annual average of 3.7%, a re-
flection of biofuel demand. The four periods cap-
ture different price regimes, namely, increasing 
commodity prices up to the first oil crisis (1960-
73), declining prices (1974-85), stable and low pric-
es (1986-2003), and high prices during the recent 
boom (2004-12). 
 
Edible oils are, perhaps, the only commodity group 
whose income elasticity is high not only for low 
and middle income countries but also for high in-
come countries. This reflects the fact that as in-
come increases, people tend to eat more in profes-
sional establishments and consume more pre-
packaged food items, both of which are utilizing 
more edible oil than otherwise. 
 
Beverage prices have declined as well. The 
World Bank’s beverage price index (comprised of 
coffee, cocoa, and tea) is down 32 percent since its 
February 2011 record high. The earlier surge (and 
recent decline) in beverages reflects mostly coffee 
prices—specifically arabica—which reached a US$ 
6.00/kg during 2011, the highest nominal level ever 
(figure COMM.17). The increase in arabica reflect-
ed a shortfall in Colombia production (the world’s 
second arabica supplier after Brazil). However, as 
Colombian production recovered partially, and cof-
fee companies began using more robusta in their 
blends, arabica prices declined and they are now 
traded at half their early 2011 highs. Global coffee 
output reached 145 million bags in 2012, up from 
 
Edible oil prices 
    Source: World Bank. 
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   Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
Table COMM.2 
1960-73 1974-85 1986-2003 2004-12
Maize 4.1% 3.9% 1.8% 3.7%
Rice 3.3% 2.9% 1.2% 2.0%
Wheat 3.9% 2.8% 0.8% 2.1%
Coffee 3.4% 2.2% 2.5% 1.8%
Cotton 2.7% 2.8% 1.4% 2.9%
Sugar 2.2% 2.6% 2.3% 1.9%
Palm oil 8.6% 10.1% 7.8% 6.8%
Soybeans 7.5% 6.8% 4.0% 4.7%
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137 million bags in 2011. Furthermore, Brazil, 
world’s top coffee supplier, is expected to have a 
bumper crop in 2013/14 (April-March), currently 
estimated at almost 47 million bags. Coffee sup-
plies from Vietnam (world’s largest robusta suppli-
er), Colombia, and Indonesia are also expected to 
be large as well. After declining nearly 35 percent 
during 2011, cocoa has been traded at around US$ 
2.35/kg. The weakness of cocoa prices reflects 
partly weak demand in Europe, traditionally a key 
consumer of cocoa for chocolate manufacturing. 
Global cocoa production is expected to reach 3.96 
million tons in 2012/13, down from last season’s 
4.06 million tons. Declined by Central and South 
America will offset increases by West Africa. Last, 
sugar prices (not part of World Bank’s beverage 
price index) have been weakening as well, down 22 
percent since a year ago and 40 percent lower than 
their 2011 peak. The sugar market is faced with a 
large surplus. Global sugar production exceeded 
182 million tons in 2012, up from 173 million tons 
in 2011 while consumption in both years averaged 
163 million tons. Good crops in both South Amer-
ica (especially Brazil) and Asia have contributed to 
the surplus. Brazil, world’s top sugar supplier, in an 
attempt to boost prices, announced a tax credit to 
ethanol producers; yet, the announcement failed to 
support prices. 
 
Raw material prices have been relatively sta-
ble during the past two quarters after declining 
sharply from their early 2011 peaks—down 35 per-
cent from February 2011 to August 2012 (figure 
COMM.18). Cotton prices have found some 
strength recently—they have gained 8 percent since 
January 2013. The cotton market is well supplied 
by historical standards; global production is ex-
pected to be 25.1 million tons in 2013/14, and con-
sumption at 24.3 million tons. An estimated 1 mil-
lion tons will be added to global stocks, pushing 
the stocks-to-use ratio to 77 percent, the highest 
since the end of World War II. Approximately 9 
million tons of cotton have gone to the state re-
serves of China during the past two seasons, ex-
plaining the relative strength of cotton prices 
(International Cotton Advisory Committee 2013). 
Nevertheless, cotton prices increased the least dur-
ing the post-2004 commodity price boom—up 37 
percent between 1997-2004 and 2005-12 as op-
posed to a 75 percent increase of the overall agri-
cultural price index—primarily because of the in-
crease in yields by China and India following the 
adoption of biotechnology (Baffes 2011). 
 
Natural rubber prices have been remarkably sta-
ble during the past two quarters, following their 
sharp decline from their early 2011 peak (similar to 
cotton). The decline in rubber prices reflected both 
increased supplies and fears of demand deteriora-
tion, especially from China—most natural rubber 
goes towards tire production, and China is the fast-
est-growing market for tires. Crude oil prices play a 
key role in the price of natural rubber as well, be-
cause synthetic rubber, a close substitute to natural 
rubber, is a crude oil by-product. Global natural 
rubber production reached 11.3 million tons during 
the 12-month period ending May 2013, 60 percent 
of which is supplied by Thailand and Indonesia. 
Almost 40 percent of global rubber consumption is 
accounted by China, which has been growing at 
more than 5 percent during the past few years. 
That makes the longer term prospects of the rub-
 
Coffee prices 
   Source: World Bank. 
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    Source: World Bank. 
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ber market sensitive to China’s growth outlook, as 
is the case with most metals and mineral commodi-
ties. Timber prices have been remarkably stable as 
well during the past two quarters. Initial expecta-
tion for a boom in timber demand (and prices) for 
post-Tohoku earthquake reconstruction did not 
materialize while global demand for timber prod-
ucts has weakened considerably. 
 
Outlook and risks for agricultural 
commodities 
 
Agricultural prices are projected to decline 5.9 per-
cent in 2013 with most of the decline to be ac-
counted by beverages (–8.9 percent), followed by . 
Raw material (-5.8 percent), and food commodities 
(-5.5 percent). Within the food group, edible oils 
are expected to decline the most (-9.0 percent), 
followed by other food (-5.0 percent), and grains (-
1.0 percent). The largest declines among key food 
commodities will be experienced by soybeans (-8.7 
percent), palm oil (-13.9 percent), followed by oth-
er edible oils. Grains will change marginally (maize 
and rice down by about 1 percent and wheat mar-
ginally up). The decline in beverages will be led by 
arabica coffee (-18.5 percent) and less so cocoa (-
5.9 percent), while Malaysian longs and rubber will 
account for most of the weakening in raw materials 
(-11.2 and -9.7 percent, respectively). A number of 
assumptions (along with associated risks) underpin 
the outlook for agricultural commodities, namely, 
crop conditions, energy prices, biofuels, macroeco-
nomic environment, and trade policies. A detailed 
assessment of these risks is given below. 
 
Crop conditions 
 
It is assumed that crop production in the Southern 
Hemisphere will not experience any adverse weath-
er conditions, and next season’s outlook will return 
to normal trends. In its May 2013 outlook assess-
ment (the first for next season), the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture estimated the 2013/14 crop 
season’s global grain supplies (production plus 
starting stocks) at 2.56 billion tons, up 5.7 percent 
from 2012/13, thus replenishing most of the losses 
due to the 2012 summer heat wave. If history is 
any guide, when markets experience negative sup-
ply shocks similar to the 2012 drought, production 
comes back within one (or, perhaps two) seasons 
through resource shifting, as has been the case in 
previous episodes (for example, maize in 2004/05, 
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Source: US Department of Agriculture, May 2013 update. 
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wheat in 2002/03, and rice in 2001/02, see figure 
COMM.19a-c). However, it may take up to three 
seasons before stocks are fully replenished—
subjecting the maize and (less so) wheat prices to 
upside risks. As discussed earlier, the rice market is 
well supplied also reflected in the remarkable stabil-
ity of rice prices. 
 
Oil prices 
 
The outlook assumes that in 2013 crude oil prices 
will ease marginally and fertilizer prices will experi-
ence a 7 percent (both fertilizer and crude oil are 
key inputs to agriculture, especially grains and 
oilseeds). However, because of the energy intensive 
nature of agriculture—the industry has been esti-
mated to be four to five times more energy inten-
sive than manufacturing—an energy price spike 
could trigger proportional food price increases. The 
energy price cross-price elasticity of agriculture 
goods ranges from 0.2 to 0.3 (depending on the 
commodity), implying that a 10 percent increase in 
energy prices will induce a 2-3 percent increase in 
agricultural prices. 
 
Biofuels 
 
Despite an only marginal increase in global 
biofuel production in 2011 and 2012, the out-
look assumes biofuels will continue to play a 
key role in the behavior of agricultural com-
modity markets. Currently, biofuels produc-
tion represents about the equivalent of 1.3 
mbd crude oil production and are projected 
to grow moderately over the projection period. 
 
In the longer-term there is much uncertainty about 
biofuel production. If biofuel production increases 
at the rates suggested by some forecasts (more than 
5 percent annually), as much as 10 percent of glob-
al land area allocated to grains and oilseeds could 
be producing biofuel crops (evaluated at world av-
erage yields) within the next two decades. Such 
assumptions are supported by the baselines of the 
joint OECD/FAO Agricultural Outlook as well as the 
IEA Energy Outlook, published in May 2013. How-
ever, policy makers are increasingly realizing that 
the environmental and energy security benefits of 
biofuels may not outweigh their costs, thus biofuels 
policies are likely to ease. Indeed, biofuels grew 
very little during the past two years with similar 
expectation for this and next year (figure COMM.20). 
 
Yet, the likely long-term impact of biofuels on 
food prices is complex, as it goes far beyond land 
diversion, subsidies, and mandates. The impact is 
likely to depend more on the following factors: (i) 
the level at which oil prices make biofuels profita-
ble and (ii) whether technological developments of 
biofuel crops (or even new crops) could increase 
the energy content of the respective plants, thus, 
making them more attractive sources of energy. 
Thus, high energy prices along with likely techno-
logical innovations could pose large upside risks for 
agricultural prices in the longer term (box COMM 
3 elaborates further on this issue). 
 
Macroeconomic environment 
 
The last assumption is associated with the risk of a 
sharp reversal to the loose macroeconomic envi-
ronment, including low policy rates and quantita-
 
Biofuel production 
   Source: BP statistical Review of World Energy; OECD. 
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tive easing. There are two channels through which 
interest rates affect commodity prices—all com-
modities, not just agriculture. The first operates 
through physical demand and supply: Low interest 
rates may affect stock-holding behavior because of 
the lower cost of capital, they may induce right-
ward shift in demand because of expansion in cur-
rent consumption, and they may increase invest-
ment lower borrowing costs and hence a rightward 
shift of future supply. Thus, the effect of interest 
rates can be either positive, negative, or, even zero, 
depending on the relative elasticities. The interest 
rate elasticity for food commodities appears to be 
near-zero (see Baffes and Dennis (2013) for elastic-
ity estimates and a literature review). Research at 
the World Bank (currently under way) shows 
that the interest rate elasticity for metal pric-
es may be positive, implying that the shift of 
supply schedule due to the lower cost of capi-
tal overwhelms shifts in demand (the impact 
through stockholding is not as important in 
metals and minerals). 
 
The second channel operates through invest-
ment fund activity, the so-called financializa-
tion of commodities—a controversial and 
hotly-debated topic. Investment fund activity 
which has been increasing over the course of 
the last ten years, exceeded US$ 330 billion 
during 2012, according to BarclayHedge, 
which tracks developments in the hedge fund 
industry (figure COMM.21). Most of the 
funds have been invested in energy and agri-
cultural commodity markets. The relationship 
between investment fund activity and com-
modity prices is a highly debated topic. Some 
have argued that these funds have sufficiently 
large weight to unbalance the market, thus 
impairing the price discovery mechanism. 
Others have praised these investment vehi-
cles claiming that they inject liquidity in com-
modity markets. Despite some contrasting 
views, the empirical evidence is, at best, 
weak. While it is unlikely that these invest-
ments affect long term price trends, most 
likely they have affected price variability.  
 
Trade policies 
 
Given the 2008 (and less so 2010) experience, 
the outlook assumes that policy responses 
will not upset agricultural markets, an as-
sumption that relies on markets remaining 
well-supplied. If the baseline outlook materi-
alizes, policy actions are unlikely and, if they 
take place, will be isolated with only limited 
impact. For example, when the market condi-
tions for rice and cotton were tight (in 2008 
and 2010, respectively), export bans induced 
price spikes. However, last year’s Thai rice 
purchase program and India’s export ban on 
cotton did not have any discernable impact 
on the respective prices. Interestingly, cotton 
prices declined more the day after Indian ex-
port ban on cotton was announced (March 
2012) than they gained the day of the an-
nouncement. In fact, there may be a down-
side price risk for rice if Thailand releases 
some (or all) of the stocks it accumulated 
through the purchase program, not an unlike-
ly scenario given that the costs of the pro-
gram account for as much as 1 percent of the 
country’s total GDP (World Bank 2012).  
 
Recent trends in domestic food prices 
 
The discussion thus far has focused on price move-
ments in U.S. dollar terms. However, what matters 
most to consumers is the price they pay for food in 
their home countries. It is not uncommon for pric-
es paid by consumers in an individual country to 
differ considerably from international prices, at 
least in the short run. Reasons for this include ex-
change rate movements, trade policies intended to 
insulate domestic markets, the long distance of domestic 
trading centers from domestic markets (adding considera-
bly to marketing costs), quality differences, and differ-
ences in the composition of food baskets across 
countries. 
 
Table COMM.3 reports changes in domestic 
wholesale prices of three commodities 
(maize, wheat, and rice) for a set of low- and 
middle-income countries—the selection of 
countries was driven, in part, by data availa-
bility. These changes are compared to the 
corresponding world price changes (reported 
in the top row of each panel). The periods 
chosen are 2013Q1 against 2012Q4 
(capturing short run responses) and 2013Q1 
against 2012Q1 (intended to capture longer 
term effects). The table also reports price 
changes between 2006-07 and 2011-12, effec-
tively capturing the entire food price boom 
period. 
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World prices of all three grains changed little 
between 2012Q4 and 2013Q1 (maize and 
wheat down 3.8 and 9.6 percent, respectively 
and rice up 0.7 percent); the US dollar did 
not change much either. The corresponding 
median domestic price changes were –0.6, 
5.8, and 0.2 percent. Focusing at the variabil-
ity of price changes, however, a different pic-
ture emerges. The relative calm in world pric-
es was reflected in the domestic prices of 
rice, less so  in wheat, but not in maize where 
5 countries experienced double digit increases 
despite the moderate decline in world price. 
A mixed picture emerges as well when 
2013Q1 is compared to 2012Q1.  
 
Again, the median domestic price increases 
are somewhat similar to those of world pric-
es, but there is high variability around these 
medians for maize and wheat (but not for 
rice). For example, the world and the domes-
tic median price of maize increased 9.8 and 
2.5 percent, respectively. Yet, six of the 17 
countries in the sample experienced price de-
clines while seven countries experienced in-
creases exceeding 20 percent. 
 
The last column reports price changes be-
tween 2006-07 and 2011-12, periods long 
enough not be affected by the presence of 
lags in any significant way. During these two 
2-year periods, the world price of maize, 
wheat, and rice went up by 107, 41, and 75 
percent. Not surprisingly, all countries expe-
rienced large domestic price increases in all 
three commodities, with corresponding medi-
an increases at 74, 66, and 48 percent. As was 
the case with the shorter periods, there is 
considerable variation across countries. For 
example, rice prices increased by 130 percent 
in East Africa (average of Tanzania and 
Uganda) but only 44 percent in West Africa 
(average of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso).  
 
The tentative conclusion from this brief anal-
ysis is that in the short term, domestic prices 
move, for the most part, independently of 
world prices. A stronger link is present in the 
longer term but large differences across coun-
tries are present, implying that domestic fac-
tors play a dominant and persistent role in 
the food price determination process of local 
markets. 
 
Wholesale grain prices in (nominal 
local currencies, percent changes) 
Source: World Bank; FAO (http://www.fao.org/giews/pricetool/). 
Table COMM.3  
2013Q1/
2012Q4 
2013Q1/
2012Q1
2006-07/
2011-12
World (US$) -3.8 9.8 106.7
Uganda 20.9 31.4 153.3
Nicaragua 18.6 20.6 73.8
Tanzania 17.7 46.6 130.9
Honduras 11.0 24.3 26.8
Mozambique 10.7 23.5 77.4
Dominican Republic 8.4 0.9 70.0
Bolivia 7.6 -6.9 49.3
Ukraine 4.7 23.1 131.9
Costa Rica -0.6 4.4 109.3
Thailand -0.8 1.2 42.6
Rwanda -1.3 10.4 68.4
El Salvador -3.7 -23.8 48.4
Panama -3.8 -9.5 94.4
Peru -4.0 -7.5 40.9
Guatemala -4.2 -8.1 51.9
Ethiopia -6.6 2.5 196.7
Kenya -15.4 -2.2 128.2
Median -0.6 2.5 73.8
World (US$) -9.6 15.3 40.8
Bolivia 9.9 -4.9 88.5
Sudan 8.9 31.5 132.1
India 7.8 38.3 34.3
Ukraine 5.8 30.9 124.4
Peru 2.6 2.6 25.3
El Salvador 2.5 70.5 43.6
Ethiopia -1.3 6.0 154.3
Bangladesh n/a 20.1 20.7
Median 5.8 25.5 66.0
World (US$) 0.7 3.6 75.2
Bangladesh 11.8 4.2 50.1
Tanzania 11.2 -1.1 120.9
Dominican Republic 7.2 1.5 19.5
Niger 6.7 -1.5 40.4
India 4.6 14.9 67.1
Guatemala 2.2 5.2 47.8
Panama 1.4 2.7 51.1
Uganda 1.2 -4.7 140.6
Mali 0.5 -5.8 35.2
Honduras 0.2 9.2 21.4
Burkina Faso 0.0 2.7 57.0
Nicaragua -0.3 6.7 68.7
Philippines -0.6 -2.6 39.5
Peru -0.7 -6.4 32.8
Thailand -1.8 4.9 47.4
Cambodia -1.9 0.0 74.1
El Salvador -3.6 -8.0 33.5
Bolivia -4.8 0.9 28.6
Rwanda -12.4 0.1 60.9
Median 0.2 0.9 47.8
Maize (17 countries)
Wheat (8 countries)
Rice (19 countries)
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The interaction between food and energy commodities is 
an important, complex, (sometimes) misunderstood, and 
hotly debated subject. This box identifies some of the key 
interaction channels between energy and food markets 
(figure COMM 3.1). It argues that high energy prices may 
affect food prices through four channels, namely, higher 
cost of producing food, biofuel policies, profitable biofuels, 
and increasing biofuel profitability through induced innova-
tion. The box concludes that, in the longer term, energy 
could play an even more important role in the determina-
tion of food prices. 
 
The Cost Link (A and B/C). The strong relationship be-
tween energy and non-energy prices was established long 
before the post-2004 price boom. Gilbert (1989) estimated 
transmission elasticity from energy to non-energy com-
modities of 0.12 and from energy to food commodities of 
0.25. Hanson, Robinson, and Schluter (1993) based on a 
General Equilibrium Model found a significant effect of oil 
price changes to agricultural producer prices in the United 
States. Borensztein and Reinhart (1994) estimated trans-
mission elasticity to non-energy commodities of 0.11. A 
strong relationship between energy and non-energy prices 
was found by Chaudhuri (2001) as well. Baffes (2007) 
estimated transmission elasticities of 0.16 and 0.18 for 
non-energy and food commodities, respectively. Moss, 
Livanis, and Schmitz (2010) found that U.S. agriculture’s 
energy demand is more sensitive to price changes than 
any other input. Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990) concluded 
that various unrelated primary commodity prices not only 
co-move, but also co-moved in excess of what the macro-
economic fundamentals could explain. The strong ener-
food price link is also evidenced by the input-output values 
of the GTAP database, which show that the direct energy 
component of agriculture is four to five times higher than 
manufacturing sectors (figure COMM 3.2). 
 
The Policy-Driven Biofuel Link (D/F): In addition to be-
ing a key cost component, energy plays an important role 
on the demand side through the diversion of some food 
commodities to the production of biofuels. The role of bio-
fuels is not new. Kovarick (2012) identified four periods of 
biofuel use. The first went up to the mid-19th century, when 
the chief uses of biofuels were cooking and lighting. The 
second period, the early 20th century, saw the expanded 
use of biofuels in the internal combustion engines. The 
third, covering the mid- to late-20th century, includes main-
ly the oil crises of the 1970s. The fourth period, the 21st 
century, reflects environmental and energy independence 
concerns. Indeed, biofuels constituted the largest demand 
growth component of grains and oilseeds during the past 
decade. Currently, they account for about 2-3 percent of 
area allocated to grains and oilseed and represent the 
equivalent of 1.2 million barrels of crude oil per day. Most 
of biofuel production comes from maize-based ethanol in 
the United States (48 percent share), followed by sugar-
cane-based ethanol from Brazil (22 percent), and edible oil
-based biodiesel in Europe (17 percent). Numerous stud-
ies have examined the impact of biofuels on food prices, 
and give a wide range of estimates. Mitchell (2008) found 
that the expansion of biofuels and the policy reactions that 
higher prices induced, were responsible for almost three 
quarters of the food price increases during 2000-08. Gil-
bert (2010) finds that at most one-quarter to one third of 
the rise in food prices over 2006–2008 can be directly 
attributed to biofuels.  Roberts and Schlenker (2010) con-
clude that U.S. biofuel mandates increase maize prices 
roughly 20 percent. 
 
More recently, the impact of biofuels on food prices has 
been studied through the link between energy and non-
energy prices. Serra (2011) found a long run linkage be-
tween ethanol and sugarcane prices in Brazil and also that 
crude oil and sugarcane prices lead ethanol prices but not 
vice versa. Saghaian (2010) established strong correlation 
among oil and other commodity prices (including food) but 
the evidence for a causal link from oil to other commodi-
ties was mixed. Gilbert (2010) found correlation between 
the oil price and food prices both in terms of levels and 
changes, but also noted that it is the result of common 
causation and not a direct causal link. Zhang and others 
(2010) found no direct long-run relationship between fuel 
and agricultural commodity prices and only a limited short-
run relationship. Reboredo (2012) concluded that the pric-
Box Fig COMM 3.2  Energy Intensities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank; GTAP database. 
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es of maize, wheat, and soybeans are not driven by oil 
price fluctuations. 
 
Overall, despite a nearly 6-fold increase in biofuel produc-
tion during the first decade of the millennium, the price link 
between energy and food commodities is not as clear-cut 
as some would have expected. This may partly be ex-
plained by the non-market influence of mandates, which 
caused biofuel production to rise (and perhaps influence 
food prices) independently of what was happening to oil 
prices. Consider an exogenous shock which pushes crude 
oil prices up, in turn, lowering fuel consumption. Under a 
mandated ethanol/gasoline mixture ethanol and maize 
prices will decline, ceteris paribus, leading to a negative 
food-oil price relationship (de Gorter and Just 2009). 
 
The Link through Profitable Biofuels (G1): A more im-
portant issue is the level at which energy prices provide a 
floor to food prices. If biofuels are profitable at current 
energy prices, the income elasticity of food will rise toward 
the higher elasticity of the larger (figure COMM 3.3) ener-
gy market, a point highlighted by numerous authors, in-
cluding Lustig (2008), Heady and Fan (2010), and Baffes 
and Dennis (2013). Various rules of thumb to determine 
when biofuel production becomes profitable have been 
posited. One such rule suggests profitability is reached 
when the US$ barrel price of crude oil is 50 percent or 
more than the US$ price of a ton of maize. Another places 
it at US$ 3/gallon of gasoline at the pump (in the U.S.). A 
World Bank (2009) report argued that because of the 
strong correlation between the maize and crude oil prices 
above US$ 50/barrel, crude oil dictate maize prices. The 
US Government Accountability Office (2009) noted that oil 
above the $80-$120/barrel range may make biofuels prof-
itable (depending on the circumstances). Babcock (2011) 
noted that high crude oil prices would have created market
-driven investment incentives in the US ethanol industry 
even in the absence of policies. 
 
Induced Innovation Link (G2): Profitable biofuels may 
induce innovations by increasing the energy content of 
biofuel crops hence increasing food prices even further. 
To see the likely impact of biofuels-related induced inno-
vation on food prices consider the following illustrative 
example. One hectare of land produces 10 tons of maize 
generating US$ 2,500 in farmgate revenue either by sup-
plying maize to the food and feed industry at US$ 250/ton 
or selling it to ethanol industry at US$ 0.63/liter (assuming 
4,000 liters maize-to-ethanol conversion). If an improved 
maize variety were to increase the ethanol content by 10 
percent, it would generate US$ 2,750/hectare in farmgate 
revenue, raising the cost of maize to the food and feed 
industries to $275/ton, since this is how much the ethanol 
industry would pay. Furthermore, the innovation in the 
energy content of maize would induce proportional price 
increases in all crops that could be grown on that land. 
While the above example is hypothetical, it does illustrate 
how innovations in the energy content (or in the efficiency 
of extracting ethanol) of existing or new crops could trigger 
food price increases, even in the absence of changes in 
energy prices or demand and supply conditions of food 
commodities. 
 
The food-fuel-biofuel link can be summarized within two oil 
price scenarios (figure COMM 3.4). Though less likely, the 
“Low” oil price scenario could materialize if a sharp slow-
down in emerging economy growth takes place. It could 
also materialize in response to innovation in battery tech-
nology and/or large scale utilization of natural gas that 
could unleash substitution away from crude oil to electrici-
ty and natural gas by the transportation industry. Under 
low oil prices, the energy costs to agriculture will decline 
leading to lower food prices—scenario I(b). Furthermore, 
low oil prices may ease biofuel policies, lowering food 
prices even further—scenario I(a). Interestingly, while 
scenario I(a) is consistent with a strong link between oil 
and food prices (through production costs), scenario I(b) 
weakens the link (because of the mandated nature of bio-
fuels). Now consider the “High” oil price scenario. As not-
ed above, high oil prices are likely to make biofuels profita-
ble, in which case food and oil prices will move in a syn-
chronous manner—scenario II(a). Moreover, profitable 
biofuels may induce innovation in the energy content of 
crops, in which case food prices could increase even fur-
ther—scenario II(b). Under scenario II(b), the oil-food price 
link may weaken since food prices may increase even if 
demand and supply conditions for food and energy mar-
kets do not change. 
Box Fig COMM 3.3  Global Energy Shares 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank; BP Statistical Review. 
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Overview 
 
 
Growth in the East Asia & the Pacific region 
slowed to 7.5 percent in 2012, which nevertheless 
represented 40 percent of global growth. The 
slowdown was due to slower growth in China, 
which has started to shift away its economy 
from excessive reliance on investment and 
net exports.  
 
Growth in the rest of the region accelerated to 6.2 
percent, 1.6 percentage points faster than the 
average of the preceding decade and comparable to 
growth during the boom and bounce-back years of 
2007 and 2010.  
 
With virtually all countries in the region having 
recovered from the 2008 crisis—largely thanks to 
domestic stimulus—rising debt levels and asset 
bubbles are increasingly a source of concern 
especially in the context of strong capital flows and 
weak external demand environment.     
 
Economic outlook: GDP growth in the 
region is projected to slow to 7.3 percent in 2013 
reflecting weak global conditions and waning 
effects of stimulus measures. China is projected to 
slow to 7.7 percent rate in 2013 but accelerate to 
about 8 percent in 2014 and 2015 as global 
conditions improve.  
 
Growth in the rest of the region is expected to 
slow to 5.7 percent in 2013 due to fiscal tightening, 
capacity constraints and a negative contribution 
from net exports reflecting exchange rate 
movements and weak external demand. Growth is 
projected to firm up to about 6 percent in 2014 
and 2015 as external conditions improve.  
 
Risks and vulnerabilities: The risk of a 
serious crisis emanating from high-income 
countries has declined, but the strength and timing 
of recovery in Europe remains uncertain.  
 
Developments throughout the region will remain 
sensitive to outturns in China and Japan. The main 
risk related to China remains the possibility that 
high investment rates prove unsustainable, 
provoking a disorderly unwinding and sharp 
economic slowdown.  
 
The depreciation of the Japanese yen in response 
to loose monetary policy is likely to affect some 
developing-country exports and growth in the 
short-term. The effects are expected to be balanced 
overall due to potential gains through supplies of 
inputs, including parts and components as well as 
imports of competitive technology, machinery and 
equipment.  
 
Japanese quantitative easing is likely to exacerbate 
capital inflows, potentially contributing to demand 
price pressures, asset price inflation and a further 
rise in domestic debt encouraged by low borrowing 
costs. Although net capital flows are not expected 
to generate sustained pressures on regional 
exchange rates, low Japanese interest rates could 
increase capital flows and exchange rate volatility. 
 
The recent decline in global commodity prices may 
reflect a turning point as past investments came on 
stream. Should this easing accelerate, fiscal and 
current accounts, and incomes and growth in 
commodity exporters like Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Mongolia, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Timor Leste 
and Solomon Islands could come under pressure, 
even as lower prices would benefit importers. The 
negative impact is expected to be muted in 
Malaysia and Indonesia where the decline in oil 
prices will contribute to an improvement of budget 
balances through a reduction in fuel subsidies.   
 
Policy recommendations: With most of 
the region having fully recovered from the financial 
crisis, and many countries growing at historically 
high rates, policies could become less 
accommodative. Should capital flows make 
adjusting monetary policy difficult a larger share of 
the burden may have to be borne by fiscal 
tightening, while macro-prudential measures would 
gain in importance to safeguard financial stability. 
Fiscal consolidation can perhaps be achieved by 
rationalizing current spending, which would allow 
structural reforms and growth enhancing 
infrastructure investment programs to continue.  
 
Rebuilding buffers to absorb future shocks, 
remains a priority in Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
Vietnam, the Pacific islands and Mongolia where 
gradual global and regional integration has 
benefitted growth, but also made these economies 
more vulnerable to global and regional business 
cycles and commodity price fluctuations. 
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Recent developments 
 
 
Although growth in the East Asia and 
the Pacific region slowed to 7.5 
percent in 2012, its contribution to 
global growth was still an impressive 
40 percent  
 
The growth slowdown was largely due to slower 
growth in China as it started to reduce its reliance 
on net-exports and investment. China’s growth declined to 
7.8 percent in 2012—the weakest rate since 1999. 
 
Outside China, regional growth accelerated from 
4.6 percent in 2011 to 6.2 percent in 2012. This 
was 1.6 percentage points faster than the annual 
average growth rate attained over the preceding 
decade and comparable only to the growth rates 
observed during the boom and bounce-back years 
of 2007 and 2010. 
 
This acceleration partly reflected Thailand’s 
recovery from the devastating floods in 2011(figure 
EAP. 1). GDP grew 6.5 percent in 2012 versus 
only 0.1 percent in 2011. But the acceleration was 
more widespread, if less spectacular elsewhere. Sixty 
percent of countries in the region grew faster in 2012 than 
in 2011, and more than two thirds grew faster than 6 
percent.   
This strong annual performance came despite a 
mid-year slowdown, caused by slower growth in 
China and the mid-year ramp-up in Euro Area 
financial market tensions. After slumping sharply mid-
year, real-side activity (industrial production, and exports) 
picked up pace in the fourth quarter (figure EAP.2). 
 
Many countries swiftly reacted to the 
mid-year slowdown and to the weak 
external demand by loosening 
macroeconomic policy  
 
Monetary policy was relaxed, with the   majority of 
the central banks—Malaysia being a notable 
exception—cutting policy rates during 2012. 
Vietnam implemented the most aggressive easing, 
cutting interest rates by 600 basis points, 
unwinding a tightening of equal magnitude 
implemented the year before. 
 
Fiscal policy was broadly accommodative with 
many countries in the region, including  Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand accelerating public-sector 
investment programs through budget and state-
owned enterprise activity, and local government 
investments, particularly China. Malaysia stepped-
up its cash transfers and civil service bonuses, 
Thailand enlarged its rice subvention scheme and 
implemented the significant car buyer incentive programs.   
 
Partly as a result, real credit growth in the region 
accelerated sharply, reaching 20 percent rate in 
Indonesia, 14.6 percent in China and 10 percent in 
Malaysia and Thailand (figure EAP. 3).  
 
Diverging trends in industrial output 
growth across the region 
Source: World Bank; Datastream. 
Fig EAP.2  
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Economic rebound of the East Asia and 
the Pacific region has been impressive    
Source: World Bank; Datastream. 
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-7
-2
3
8
13
18
11Q111Q211Q311Q412Q112Q212Q312Q413Q1
ASEAN 4 China
Developing excl. EAP World excl. EAP
GDP, % change, quarter-over-quarter, saar
 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS  |  June 2013   East Asia and the Pacific Annex   
121 
 
The stimulus measures coincided with a 
revival in global capital flows and demand 
(see capital flow section below), partly 
because of the lags involved with macro 
policy, and contributing to a sharp 
acceleration in economic activity, with 
regional quarterly GDP rebounding at a 8.4 
percent annualized rate in 4Q2012. 
 
Reflecting the stimuli, central budget deficits 
deteriorated across the region exceeding 3 
percent of GDP in all countries except 
China, Indonesia, PNG and the Philippines.  
Consolidated budget deficits, including local 
budget financing had exceed 3 percent of 
GDP in China.  
The combination of the loose macro 
policy and fast growth has 
contributed to a significant rise in 
private and public-sector debt levels 
in the region 
 
Government debt remains well below high-income 
levels (it exceed 100 percent of GDP in some 
European countries, including Greece, Italy and 
Portugal, the United States and Japan), but have 
continued to rise despite high rates of GDP 
growth in Thailand, Malaysia and China.  
 
Non-government debt has also been rising in 
China, Malaysia and Thailand and now exceeds 
150 percent of GDP in China and Malaysia and is 
above 100 percent of GDP in Thailand (figures 
EAP. 4 & 5).  
 
Household debt represents the larger share of that 
total, at around 77 percent of GDP in Thailand 
(consolidated debt to deposit taking corporations 
and other financial corporations), and is estimated 
at around 80 percent of GDP in Malaysia.  
 
Rapid growth of household debt resulted from a 
combined effect of low interest rates and strong 
demand. Present levels of household debt are 
about 2-3 times higher of their pre-1997 crisis 
levels in China, Malaysia and Thailand.  
 
In China, non-Government sector debt is 
concentrated in the corporate sector (about 2/3s 
 
Household debt in Malaysia and       
Thailand is high and expanding 
Note: Decomposition of Malaysia’s debt is an estimate. For Thailand, 
deposit taking corporations only.  
Source: World Bank; BIS. 
Fig EAP.5  
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Credit growth accelerated across the 
region during 2012    
Source: World Bank; IFS; IMF.    
Fig EAP.3  
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Non-financial corporate debt is the 
largest portion of China’s total debt  
Source: World Bank; BIS; IMF.    
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of total non-Government sector debt). The 
composition of non-Government debt is more 
balanced and corporate debt is lower than its pre-
1995-1997 crisis levels in Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand.   
 
At the same time, the overall external 
position of the key Asian economies has been 
significantly strengthened over the past 
decades through build-up of foreign asset and 
strengthening of reserve base. The East Asia 
economies are also better prepared to cope 
with external headwinds in the context of the 
flexible exchange rate regimes that they have 
been increasingly adopting.      
 
While fast growing Asian economies still have 
fiscal room to counter-act a possible financial 
crisis, the rapid build-up of debt during the 
low-interest rate period increased the 
exposure of the major regional developing 
economies and raises certain concerns. It is 
recommended that favorable growth period 
could be used to strengthen buffers to 
counteract future external shocks and reduce 
vulnerabilities.   
 
Robust, policy-fueled demand 
conditions boosted import demand 
across the region while exports 
remained weak  
 
This increased demand for imports was primarily 
driven by high rates of investment, which led to a 
surge in imports, including for capital goods. At the 
same time, the terms of trade of commodity 
exporting countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia 
and Papua New Guinea) deteriorated on weaker 
commodity prices (figure EAP. 6).  
 
Regional exports meanwhile came under pressure 
from global weakness. A combined effect of those 
developments put further pressure on net-exports 
(exports-imports) which have been an increasingly 
large drag on growth (figure EAP. 7).  
 
Net-exports subtracted 4 percentage points from 
overall GDP growth in Malaysia and about 1.5 
percentage points in Indonesia and Thailand in 
2012. In the Philippines, on the other hand the net-
export contribution to growth was positive partly 
reflecting the post-Tokohu earthquake reconstruction 
related exports to Japan.     
 
The bulk of developing countries in 
East Asia & the Pacific region have 
completed their recovery from the 
crisis  
 
The relatively small hit to regional output in the 
immediate wake of the crisis and the strong growth 
since, means that the output gaps (the difference 
between demand levels and underlying supply 
potential) either only slightly negative or positive in 
three quarters of countries in the region in 2012. 
Less than 1/5th of the countries in the region have 
been operating at or above their potential since 
2011.  
 
Imports expanded at double digit 
rates across the region  
 Source:  World Bank; Datastream.  
Fig EAP.6  
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Exporter landscape changes partly reflect-
ing the REER moves, but China retains its 
lead exporter position despite renminbi  
appreciation  
Source:  World Bank; Datastream.  
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Strong growth in the last part of 2012 
has contributed to some overheating 
pressures in a number of countries in 
the region  
 
The overheating pressures manifested themselves 
in growing current account deficits (as domestic 
supply was unable to meet rapidly rising demand), 
in rising inflation, asset price pressures and high 
property prices depending on specific country 
circumstances and policy context. 
 
Strong domestic demand, partly due 
to high investment rates has 
contributed to a deterioration in 
regional current account  positions  
 
This deterioration happened despite falling 
commodity prices, which should have worked in 
the other direction for the majority of countries in 
the region. For the ASEAN-4 countries, the 
deterioration was particularly marked (2.2 percent 
of GDP), although the group’s current account 
remained in surplus.  
 
Most of this decline was due to an $26 billion, or 
3.0 percent of GDP adjustment in Indonesia’s 
current account position reflecting a record trade 
deficit of $1.7 billion (figure EAP. 8).  
 
In China, the current account surplus seem to have 
stabilized at around 2.6 percent of GDP, consistent 
with the earlier sharp adjustments from a peak level 
of 10.1 percent of GDP in 2007.  
 
Along the region’s smaller economies, 
Mongolia’s current account deficit expanded 
further reaching about 1/3rd of the country's 
GDP reflecting both weaker commodity 
prices and increased investment (with high 
import content) in the mining sector. Lao and 
Cambodia continued to record large current 
account deficits (16 percent and 11.5 percent 
of GDP respectively). 
 
Inflation in the region as a whole 
picked up  in the first quarter of 2013, 
but at a 3.1 percent annualized pace 
remains relatively modest  
 
This aggregate situation masks significant 
intra-regional variation and mainly reflects 
relatively modest inflation of 2.7 percent in 
China (3m/3m saar) versus the rest of the 
region where it has climbed to 5.1 percent 
(3m/3m saar) in the three months to April 
(figure EAP. 9).  
 
In Indonesia, the quarterly inflation rate accelerated 
to 9 percent (3m/3m saar) rate in the first quarter 
reflecting capacity constraints, but also currency 
depreciation and a rise in food prices due to trade 
restrictions. Inflation has also accelerated strongly 
in Lao, PDR and core inflation remains high and 
the headline inflation extremely volatile in Vietnam 
despite a slowing of  growth.  
 
Current account positions have general-
ly deteriorated especially for the com-
modity exporters  
Source: World Bank; Datastream.  
Fig EAP.8  
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Malaysia Thailand Indonesia
Philippines China (RHS)
USD billions USD billions
 
Selected countries in the region experi-
ence price pressures   
Source: World Bank; IMF; IFS; Datastream.  
Fig EAP.9  
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In China, where growth has been slowing, inflation 
pressures are less of a concern and the headline 
inflation rate remains anchored around the central 
bank’s revised 3.5 percent inflation target. However 
price pressures are present in certain rapidly 
growing segments of the economy, including 
real estate.  
 
Excess demand pressures and loose 
monetary conditions may also be 
contributing to asset price bubbles in 
the region  
 
Overall, the region’s stock market performance 
has been mixed. The regional stock market 
composite, the MSCI EMF Asia Index, up 
only about 10 percent since June 2012 and 
dropped by about 2 percent in the first four 
months of 2013. Nevertheless, it 
outperformed the global emerging market 
benchmark indicator which registered an 
overall 4 percent loss so far this year.   
 
The modest performance of the regional index 
masks diverging trends i.e. underperformance of 
Chinese stocks and record highs reached by 
some ASEAN country stocks. ASEAN 
markets boomed with some markets 
(Indonesia, Thailand, Lao, PDR and The 
Philippines) advancing by 30-50 percent since 
last May (table EAP. 1).   
 
The rapid increase in stock prices combined 
with high price-earnings ratios (between 17 
and 22 still below those in high-income 
countries) are raising concerns about 
overvaluation of stocks. In fact, the top 
performing East Asian developing market 
stocks (Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Thailand) have seen about a 7-8 percent 
decline in past few weeks from this year —
around mid-May—picks.     
 
Property prices continued to increase with 
the average square meter prime property 
price about two times more than the average 
per capita income in Cambodia,FN1 1.3 
times—of that in China and about 60 percent 
of the average per capita income in Indonesia 
and Thailand (compared with about 10 to 30 
percent of the average per capita income in 
high income and developing countries).  
 
Asian stock performance Table EAP.1 
Value
Year To 
Date: 1-Year: Value
Year To 
Date: 1-Year:
MSCI EMF Asia 651.267 -1.91% 9.70% 679.07 0.84% 10.00%
Philippines Stock Exchange PSEi Index 6,875.60 19.95% 38.43% 7,310.94 27.35% 53.84%
Vietnam Ho Chi Minh Stock Index / VN-Index 524.56 28.92% 25.81% 490.34 20.05% 13.21%
Jakarta Stock Exchange Composite Index 4,777.37 12.00% 26.28% 5,078.68 18.40% 30.62%
Stock Exchange of Thailand SET Index 1,528.55 11.81% 36.18% 1,617.89 18.32% 42.52%
Laos Securities Exchange Composite Index 1,338.82 10.21% 31.87% 1,376.45 13.31% 33.35%
FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI Index 1,787.80 7.71% 17.43% 1,766.72 5.94% 19.23%
Hong Kong Hang Seng Index 21,615.09 -3.01% 17.67% 23,082.68 2.43% 24.08%
Korea Stock Exchange KOSPI Index 1,932.70 -3.11% 4.75% 1,986.81 -0.51% 7.97%
Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index 2,210.90 -2.03% -1.83% 2,251.81 -0.69% -1.57%
Mongolia Stock Exchange Top 20 Index 14,998.14 -14.83% -20.45% 13,543.99 -23.09% -33.32%
Tokyo Stock Exchange Tokyo Price Index TOPIX 1,111.97 30.64% 55.80% 1,245.23 46.16% 72.01%
S&P 500 Index 1,642.81 16.30% 26.86% 1,654.90 16.96% 27.73%
NASDAQ Composite Index 3,473.77 15.68% 23.49% 3,479.36 15.84% 23.11%
Dow Jones Industrial Average 15,238.59 17.67% 24.69% 15,260.43 17.71% 24.45%
Source: Bloomberg. 
 as of June 10, 2013  as of May 16, 2013
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Gross rental yields increased to 9 percent in 
IndonesiaFN2 and 6-7 percent in the 
Philippines and Thailand, which is  two-three 
times higher than high income and 
developing country average.   
 
 
Capital flows 
 
The improvement in global financial market 
conditions during the second half of 2012 (see 
GEP January 2013) combined with the strong 
growth in the East Asia and the Pacific region attracted 
increased capital flows to the region towards year-end. 
Overall net flows reached $457.8 billion—
about 10 percent lower than in 2011 or about 
4.6 percent of regional GDP (figure EAP. 
10). The composition of the net capital flows 
to the region has changed reflecting local 
conditions. Equity flows, reached about 74 
percent of the total inflows to the region 
reflecting a US$54.8 billion (about 38 percent 
y/y reduction) decline of short-term debt 
flows due to lower trade financing (table 
EAP.2).  
 
FDI inflows, which represent the bulk (more 
than 90 percent) of total equity inflows 
declined by 8.3 percent (by US$ 27.9 billion 
in nominal terms), while net portfolio equity 
inflows quadrupled (from US$ 8.4 billion in 
2011 to US$31 billion in 2012) recovering to 
their pre-2011 level in nominal terms. The 
Bond issuance in the region, rose 
 
Net capital flows to East Asia and the Pacific ($ billions) 
           2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e 2013f 2014f 2015f
Capital Inflows 206.9 255.1 516.5 510.1 457.8 471.8 481.9 515.3
Private inflows, net 207.3 251.2 513.5 508.7 457.6 471.9 483.2 517.2
  Equity Inflows, net 203.8 183.9 329.5 343.2 337.9 325.6 327.7 331.6
    Net FDI inflows 211.3 153.7 289.7 334.9 306.9 302.9 300.3 298.2
    Net portfolio equity inflows -7.6 30.2 39.8 8.4 31.0 22.7 27.4 33.4
  Private creditors. Net 3.6 67.3 184.0 165.4 119.7 146.3 155.5 185.6
      Bonds 1.2 8.4 20.8 18.9 35.4 39.6 33.7 29.6
      Banks 17.9 -6.1 13.2 1.8 -2.4 8.1 10.3 12.3
      Short-term debt flows -13.3 65.0 148.9 144.9 90.1 98.3 111.3 143.2
      Other private -2.3 0.03 1.1 -0.2 -3.4 0.3 0.2 0.5
Official inflows, net -0.4 3.9 3.0 1.4 0.2 -0.1 -1.3 -1.9
    World Bank 1.2 2.2 2.7 0.9 0.3
    IMF -0.05 0.1 -0.02 -0.03 -0.2
    Other official -1.5 1.6 0.3 0.6 0.1
Source: The World Bank
Note :  e = estimate, f = forecast
Table EAP.2 
 
Net capital flows  recovered to their 
2011 levels in nominal terms, but fell 
short of average levels as share of GDP 
observed over the past decade 
Source:  World Bank; Datastream.  
Fig EAP.10  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
USD billions Share of GDP (RHS)
Share of GDP Billions of US Dollars
Decade avarage (% of GDP)
 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS  |  June 2013   East Asia and the Pacific Annex   
126 
insignificantly to $35.4 billion in 2012 (a 16.5 
percent increase) from what was a robust 
pace of issuance ($18.9 billion) in 2011.  
 
 
Economic outlook 
 
 
While signs of overheating appeared 
in several economies in 2012, the 
pace of expansion has eased in 
2013Q1 reflecting fiscal tightening, 
and slow recovery of external 
demand  
 
Output growth slowed in China and in the other 
fast growing ASEAN-4 economies, particularly in 
Malaysia and Thailand following a sharp 
acceleration in the second half of 2012. In 
Malaysia, first quarter GDP growth came at a  
negative 2.5 percent saar, slowing from 8 percent 
rate in 2012Q4 mainly reflecting fiscal 
consolidation but also negative contribution from 
net-exports. Thailand’s output has contracted 
sharply in Q12013 following a revised 11.7 percent 
quarter-on-quarter saar growth in 2012Q4.  
 
In China and Indonesia, the slowing was less 
pronounced. China’s first quarter GDP 
growth  declined to a 6.6 percent quarter-
over-quarter saar, from 8.7 percent in 
2012Q4. In Indonesia, GDP expanded at an 
estimated 5.3 percent (q/q saar) in the first 
quarter of 2013, after a brisk 6.9 percent  
increase in 2012Q4 (figure EAP. 11).  
 
Regional industrial production activity also slowed 
to 6.0 percent (q/q, saar) in the first quarter, 
reflecting modest slowdown in China and a much 
sharper correction among ASEAN economies.  
 
Prospects for the region going 
forward point to a  modest 
acceleration in activity during the rest 
of 2013, but annual growth is 
projected to be lower than in 2012  
 
Forward looking indicators suggest positive and 
broadly-based, if somewhat weaker, growth going 
forward. For instance, Purchasing Managers’ 
Indexes (PMI) for all countries in the region 
recovered above the 50 threshold in April, but 
remain volatile showing some recent strengthening 
for Indonesia and weakening for Vietnam (figure 
EAP. 12).  
 
The projected pick up in activity will nevertheless 
deliver somewhat slower growth in the region with 
China estimated to growth at 7.7 percent in 2013 
slightly below a 7.8 percent rate of 2012.  
 
This will be combined with some quite 
significant easing in ASEAN economies (5.7 
 
East Asia & Pacific PMIs signal eco-
nomic expansion 
Source: World Bank; Datastream. 
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Quarterly growth eased in Malaysia and 
Thailand 
Source: World Bank; Datastream.  
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percent in 2013 versus 6.2 percent in 2012) 
(table EAP.3). Output growth pattern in 
ASEAN reflects a combination of continued 
strong growth in Indonesia and certain easing 
in Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines 
from record high levels achieved in 2012.  
 
Regional growth is projected to 
recover to 7.5 percent in 2014 and 
2015 on improved external 
conditions, but the dramatic change 
in Japanese policy introduces 
significant uncertainty into the 
forecast for developing East Asian 
and the Pacific region  
 
The projected slowdown of economic growth in 
these three countries is reflecting capacity 
constraints and an expected fiscal tightening of 
policy in response to inflationary and asset price 
pressures and growing debt levels, but also weak 
recovery of global demand, including a projected 
decline in demand for imports from Japan due to 
yen depreciation.  
 
Monetary conditions remain relatively loose with 
the majority of the central banks on hold or easing, 
including recent rate cuts in  Mongolia, Vietnam 
and Thailand.  
Cambodia, Lao, Mongolia and Myanmar are 
projected to continue to deliver strong growth 
benefiting from a dynamic economic transformation, 
although the prospects for the region’s small(er) 
economies are mixed.  
 
Output gains from the completion of a new 
gold mine in Lao PDR have already been 
realized and so growth is projected to slow. 
In Cambodia, a rebound in global trade 
should support further improvements in 
garment production and exports.  
 
East Asia and Pacific forecast summary  
 
Table EAP.3 
    Est. Forecast
 00-09
a
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
GDP at market prices   b 8.1 9.6 8.3 7.5 7.3 7.5 7.5
(Sub-region totals-- countries with full NIA + BOP data)
c
GDP at market prices  c 8.1 9.7 8.4 7.5 7.3 7.6 7.5
     GDP per capita (units in US$) 7.3 8.9 7.6 6.8 6.7 6.9 6.9
     PPP GDP 8.0 9.6 8.3 7.5 7.3 7.5 7.5
  Private consumption 6.0 7.3 8.0 8.2 8.0 8.0 7.9
  Public consumption 7.4 9.7 9.0 8.4 8.2 8.1 7.5
  Fixed investment 10.8 11.4 8.8 8.2 6.8 6.4 5.6
  Exports, GNFS d 10.3 23.7 8.6 4.4 8.7 9.5 10.1
  Imports, GNFS d 9.6 19.5 6.2 5.4 8.4 8.9 9.3
Net exports, contribution to growth 0.8 2.7 1.5 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.1
Current account bal/GDP (%) 4.6 3.8 2.7 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.9
GDP deflator (median, LCU) 5.4 5.3 5.6 4.4 3.9 5.1 4.0
Fiscal balance/GDP (%) -1.8 -1.6 -1.4 -1.9 -2.3 -2.5 -2.4
Memo items: GDP                                                 
 East Asia excluding China                                            4.4 6.9 4.6 6.2 5.7 5.9 6.0
 China 9.4 10.4 9.3 7.8 7.7 8.0 7.9
 Indonesia 4.6 6.2 6.5 6.2 6.2 6.5 6.2
 Thailand 3.5 7.8 0.1 6.5 5.0 5.0 5.5
(annual percent change unless indicated otherwise)
Source : World Bank.
a. Growth rates over intervals are compound weighted averages; average growth contributions, ratios 
and deflators are calculated as simple averages of the annual weighted averages for the region.
b. GDP at market prices and expenditure components are measured in constant 2005 U.S. dollars.  
c. Sub-region aggregate excludes Fiji, Myanmar and Timor-Leste, for which data limitations prevent the 
forecasting of GDP components or Balance of Payments details.
d. Exports and imports of goods and non-factor services (GNFS).
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Source:  World Bank.     
 
Table EAP.4 
    Est. Forecast
 00-09
a
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Cambodia
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 7.2 6.0 7.1 7.3 7.0 7.0 6.2
Current account bal/GDP (%) -10.7 -10.1 -8.7 -11.5 -10.1 -9.3 -9.0
China
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 9.4 10.4 9.3 7.8 7.7 8.0 7.9
Current account bal/GDP (%) 5.0 4.1 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.4
Fiji
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 1.3 0.1 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3
Current account bal/GDP (%) -7.7 -7.7 -7.8 -7.5 -22.5 -7.8 -7.5
Indonesia
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.6 6.2 6.5 6.2 6.2 6.5 6.2
Current account bal/GDP (%) 2.5 0.7 0.2 -2.4 -2.5 -1.9 -1.9
Lao PDR
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 6.2 8.5 8.0 8.3 8.0 7.7 8.3
Current account bal/GDP (%) -2.5 -6.4 -10.6 -16.0 -21.8 -20.9 -20.2
Malaysia
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.9 7.2 5.1 5.6 5.1 5.1 5.3
Current account bal/GDP (%) 12.6 11.1 11.1 7.7 4.6 3.1 2.4
Mongolia
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 5.8 6.4 17.5 12.3 13.0 11.5 9.9
Current account bal/GDP (%) -6.3 -14.3 -30.3 -30.5 -22.8 -19.4 -19.4
Myanmar
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 9.7 5.3 5.5 6.3 6.5 6.6 6.7
Current account bal/GDP (%) -0.7 -1.3 -2.6 -4.1 -4.2 -4.8 -5.1
Papua New Guineac
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.0 7.6 9.0 9.0 4.0 7.4 20.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) -0.1 -25.6 -36.4 -28.4 -20.2 -13.0 9.0
Philippines
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.0 7.6 3.6 6.8 6.2 6.4 6.4
Current account bal/GDP (%) 1.5 4.5 3.1 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.6
Solomon Islands
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.3 7.8 10.5 4.8 4.0 4.0 5.1
Current account bal/GDP (%) -19.8 -30.8 -6.0 -5.8 -10.6 -8.7 -8.5
Thailand
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.5 7.8 0.1 6.5 5.0 5.0 5.5
Current account bal/GDP (%) 3.3 3.1 1.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.1
Timor-Leste
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.3 9.5 10.6 10.6 10.4 10.2 9.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) 18.4 48.1 55.0 43.5 36.2 25.0 24.0
Vietnam
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 6.6 6.4 6.2 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.4
Current account bal/GDP (%) -8.8 -3.8 0.2 5.9 5.6 3.3 1.0
Source : World Bank.
World Bank forecasts are frequently updated based on new information and changing (global) 
circumstances. Consequently, projections presented here may differ from those contained in other 
Bank documents, even if basic assessments of countries’ prospects do not significantly differ at any 
given moment in time.
Samoa; Tuvalu; Kiribati; Democratic People's Republic of Korea; Marshall Islands; Micronesia, 
Federated States; N. Mariana Islands; Palau; and Tonga are not forecast owing to data limitations.
a. GDP growth rates over intervals are compound average; current account balance shares are simple 
averages over the period.
b. GDP measured in constant 2005 U.S. dollars.
c. The start of production at Papua-New-Guinea-Liquefied Natural Gas (PNG-LNG) is expected to 
boost PNG's GDP growth to 20 percent and shift the current account to a 9 percent surplus in 2015.  
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Projections for Mongolia have been revised 
downwards, due to delays in major mining projects 
and lower commodity prices. In Myanmar, the 
reform momentum and continued improvements 
in the international environment are projected to 
drive growth gradually toward 6.5 percent in 
2013/14 and 6.6 percent in 2014/15.  
The outlook for the Pacific Islands is positive, but 
given the small size of  many economies, the 
precise shape of the forecast will depend on the 
timing with which ongoing and planned investment 
projects in the extractive sector come on stream 
(table EAP.4).   
 
Countries in East Asia and the Pacific 
region which have close direct trade 
ties with Japan have seen their 
currencies hit harder by yen’s 
depreciation than other developing 
economies  
 
Thailand experienced a sharp 13.4 percent 
real-effective appreciation of its currency 
since July 2012 as the yen depreciated in real 
effective terms by over 22 percent (figure 
EAP. 13). In the short-term, exchange rate 
depreciation is likely to hurt the exports of 
countries that compete in the same kinds of 
markets as Japan (South Korea, Singapore, 
Taiwan, China) and those linked to those 
economies through supply chains, especially 
in generally weak demand environment.  
 
Those negative impacts are expected to be 
balanced by potential gains through supplies 
of parts and components. The economies, 
such as the Philippines, and Thailand that are 
important suppliers of parts and components 
to Japan in regional production networks, 
could benefit from gains by Japanese 
exporters in global markets.  In addition, 
increased demand for a number of key 
regional export commodities (e.g. gas from 
Malaysia) despite the overall deceleration of 
Japan’s import demand, are also expected to 
benefit the region. Additional benefits are 
expected through competitive imports, which 
would allow the regional firms and businesses  
to benefit from the ability to import Japanese 
technology, machinery and equipment at 
lower costs.    
 
If sustained over time, the depreciation of the 
yen could eventually alter the dynamics of 
trade in the region. It would help cut the 
region‘s trade deficits even further, especially 
between the EAP region and Japan, as Japan 
is EAP‘s largest source of imports and fourth 
largest export destination. In the medium-
term and assuming that Japan’s growth 
accelerates and imports eventually pick-up, 
trade partners in the region would benefit 
from an increase in Japan‘s demand for 
regional imports.  
 
In general, Japan’s recovery as well as 
recovery of its exports will depend on depth 
of the structural reforms and its ability to 
boost productivity (figure EAP. 14). Overall, 
as competitive pressures increase, the 
developing economies in the East Asia and 
the Pacific region should continue to focus 
on financial stability and accelerate structural 
reforms to alter their productivity and 
competitiveness.  
 
Less certain is the likely impact of Japanese 
quantitative easing on Japanese capital flows 
toward regional economies.  For countries 
already operating at close to full capacity, 
additional capital inflows can be expected to 
increase upward pressure on currencies, or if 
monetary authorities intervene upward 
 
East Asia & Pacific regional REER 
moves   
Source: World Bank; Datastream.  
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pressure on money supply, credit and 
inflation. How large these effects may be will 
depend on the extent to which outward flows 
increase and the extent to which developing 
countries are destinations for these flows (see 
discussion in main text and for more detail in 
the exchange rate annex). 
 
 
Risks and 
vulnerabilities  
 
 
 
Uncertainties related to economic recovery in high 
income countries have subsided, but are still 
present. Regional risks have gained importance.  
 
The regional outlook remains sensitive to outturns 
in China, with the main risk stemming from the 
possibility of an abrupt decline in China’s high 
investment rates (see World Bank, 2013a for more).  
 
In addition, as discussed above, there are 
considerable uncertainties surrounding the impact 
of Japan’s shift in macroeconomic policy. Overall, 
weak yen could affect the dynamics of trade in 
manufactures in the region in the short-term. By 
extending periods of low interest rates and 
boosting capital flows, Japanese QE could also 
contribute to further pressures on asset prices and 
may encourage further risk taking and credit 
growth. Rising debt levels and asset prices in the 
emerging East Asia & Pacific economies are 
already the  growing source of vulnerability (see 
discussion on page 4-5). Should these trends 
intensify, a disorderly unwinding of these pressures, 
including perhaps a domestic banking-sector crisis, 
cannot be ruled out, potentially.  In ordered to 
reduce the likelihood of such an outturn fiscal 
policy likely needs to be tightened already in 2013 
and monetary policy focus should be shifted to 
financial stability and tail risk considerations. In the 
medium-term, if Japan manages to escape its 
deflation and rekindle growth with the measures 
taken, all developing economies in the region 
would benefit through various channels, including 
through an increase in Japan’s demand for imports 
(see also EAP Economic Update and Main text). 
 
A strong supply increase in extractive commodity 
markets following a quintupling in capital 
expenditures globally has already put downward 
pressure on prices. If these were to intensify, 
commodity exporting countries, including 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, PNG could see 
government revenues and current account 
balances, which are in some cases already very high 
(e.g. more than 30 percent of GDP in Mongolia) 
come under significant pressure — even as lower 
prices would benefit importers. In such a lower 
price scenario, if investment projects are cancelled 
and  anticipated increases in output not 
materialized, countries could find themselves in 
financial difficulty. External debt is especially high 
in Mongolia (more than 130 percent of GDP), and 
in Papua New Guinea (about 100 percent of 
GDP).  
 
 
Policy 
recommendations 
 
 
 
Ensuring strong and stable consumption through 
raising household incomes to sustain growth is a 
priority in China along with the reorientation of 
investments toward agriculture, human capital and 
services and increased efficiency of investment. 
The process of rebalancing also involves a gradual 
 
Selected country shares of global  
exports over the past two decades 
Source: World Bank; Datastream.  
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shift in the structure of China’s debt toward a 
reduction of corporate sector debt, including 
through reduction of non-performing assets 
accumulated during the years of investment-led 
growth.  
 
Policymakers in fast-growing-close to (or above) 
full capacity ASEAN economies where policies 
have been relaxed in recent years, including 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines 
should be focusing their actions on avoiding 
overheating and rebuilding fiscal and monetary 
buffers which will be challenging in a continued 
weak external demand environment. Slower growth 
in conditions of overheating may be desirable.  
 
However, while there are clear costs associated 
with overheating, especially when fast growth has 
been accompanied by rapid credit expansion, there 
are equally clear opportunity costs associated with 
prematurely slowing an economy and potentially 
forgoing fast growth and rising incomes. Countries 
that are too quick to respond to changes in the 
global environment, risk the of inadvertently 
running pro-cyclical policies. A balanced approach 
in implementing policy tightening is recommended. 
Macroeconomic policy  needs to be more closely 
driven by local economic conditions, including the 
level of activity, building on the previous efforts 
toward de-coupling the economies from external 
demand.  
Over the medium-term, the East Asia & Pacific 
economies will benefit from continued efforts to 
deepen structural reforms and to keep their global 
competitive edge in the context of intensifying 
global and regional competition. Countries need to 
place greater emphasis on ensuring that market 
forces are given sway to incite investment flows 
into the most productive assets, including human 
capital which will over time boost potential output.  
 
Rebuilding buffers to deal with future shocks, 
including with commodity shocks remains a 
priority in Lao PDR, Vietnam, the Pacific islands 
and Mongolia where gradual global and regional 
integration has benefitted growth, but also made 
these economies more vulnerable to global and 
regional business cycles and commodity price 
fluctuations. The effectiveness of the on-going 
economic transformation in Myanmar, establishing 
a track record of reforms under the WTO 
accession framework by Lao, and progress in 
implementing market oriented reforms in 
Cambodia and Vietnam are also important 
elements of ensuring sustainable growth. 
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Notes: 
 
1     Footnote 1 (Price per square meter / GDP per capita)*100 
2. The gross annual rental income, expressed as a percentage of property purchase price. This is what a landlord can 
expect as return on his investment before taxes, maintenance fees and other costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____World Bank, 2013a, January 2013 Global Economic Prospects 
 
_____World Bank East Asia and the Pacific regional Economic Update, April 2013 
 
_____World Bank, China 2030 study,  2012 
 
_____World Bank, Regional Economic Updates for Indonesia and for The Philippines),  2013 
 
_____IMF, World Economic Outlook, April, 2013 
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Overview 
 
 
 
The Europe and Central Asia region suffered a 
significant economic slowdown in 2012 as the 
region faced significant headwinds, including weak 
external demand, deleveraging by European banks, 
poor harvest and inflationary pressures. As a result, 
growth fell to 2.7 percent in 2012, compared with 
5.6 percent in 2011 with a sharp slowdown in  
developing Europe and less severe adjustments 
among Commonwealth of Independent States.   
 
External conditions have significantly improved in 
2013 with calmer financial markets and the 
recovery in global trade. As a result, capital flows to 
the  region have increased with the sharpest 
improvement in cross-border syndicated bank 
lending. The pick-up in bank-lending partly reflects 
the moderation in the pace of Euro Area bank 
deleveraging and going forward, this should ease 
the supply-side credit constraints. In addition,  
several sovereigns and corporates successfully 
tapped international bond markets. Similarly, 
following the sharp decline in 2012, FDI in the 
region is expected to rebound this year. Despite the 
recovery in global trade, the region’s export 
performance has been mixed. Export growth has 
been weak in Russia and Latvia but considerably 
strong in Romania, Lithuania and Turkey. Several 
countries have benefited from the increased 
diversification in terms of export destination in 
recent years.  
 
Outlook for 2013-2015: GDP growth in 
Europe and Central Asia is projected to rise 
only slightly in 2013 to 2.8 percent. While 
growth in the region will be supported by better 
harvest and improved external conditions, the 
rebound will be constrained by the weak carry-over 
from last year, ongoing fiscal adjustments, and high 
unemployment in several countries, particularly in 
developing Europe. Growth in the two biggest 
economies in the region—Russia and Turkey—has 
been held back by supply bottlenecks. While 
growth in Russia is projected to slow to 2.3 percent 
in 2013, from 3.4 percent in 2012, growth  in 
Turkey is expected to increase to 3.6 percent from 
2.2 percent, supported by relatively loose 
macroeconomic policies. As a result, Turkey’s 
current account deficit is expected to widen further 
to 6.9 percent in 2013. 
 
Going forward, growth in the region should firm  
to 3.8 percent in 2014 and 4.2 percent in 2015 as 
the fiscal and financial restructuring that has been a 
drag on growth within the region and in the Euro 
Area loses intensity. Several domestic factors, 
including fiscal and monetary policies and policies 
addressing structural issues, are expected to 
generate differentiation in economic performance 
among countries in the region.  
 
Risks and vulnerabilities: While overall 
risks are less pronounced than a year ago, the 
region’s economic outlook is still subject to 
various challenges. First, although the risk of 
a serious Euro Area crisis has diminished, 
outturns in developing Europe will remain 
sensitive to the speed of the recovery in the 
region’s high-income neighbors. Another risk 
is related with commodity prices.  The growing 
supply and demand substitution brought on by 
high prices have recently weakened commodity 
prices. A sharper decline in commodity prices 
would have potentially important adverse 
consequences for commodity exporting countries  
in the region.  
 
Developments in the global financial markets 
remain important for the region. A sudden 
reversal of global financial conditions—due 
to unexpected developments in Euro-area or 
in the United States—might affect significantly 
those countries with high external financing 
needs (current account deficits and 
amortization of external debt). In the longer 
term, the cost of capital is likely to rise as 
high-income countries step back from 
quantitative easing. Initially this could expose 
vulnerabilities in the region that have built up 
during periods of sustained low borrowing 
costs. In the long-term, it will reduce growth, 
capital flows and FDI to the region. 
Country coverage  
 
For the purpose of this note, the Europe and Central Asia 
region includes 21 low– and middle-income countries 
with income of less than $12,276 GNI  per capita in 
2010. These countries are listed in the table ECA.3 at the 
end of this note. This classification excludes Croatia, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia. The list of countries for the region may dif-
fer from those contained in other World Bank documents. 
 
Box ECA.1   
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Recent Developments  
 
 
After the significant headwinds of the 
past two years, there are signs of a 
rebound during the first quarter of this 
year  
 
Hit hard by the weakness in high-income Europe, 
the Europe and Central Asia region suffered a 
significant economic slowdown in 2012 (box 
ECA.1). The region’s growth fell to 2.7 percent in 
2012 compared with 5.6 percent the year before. 
The slowdown was particularly severe in Eastern 
European countries, whose GDP grew less than 1 
percent and actually declined in the case of Serbia. 
While the adjustment among Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) countries was less severe, 
they also grew less quickly in 2012 than in 2011.   
 
The early months of 2013 suggest that economic 
activity may have bottomed out for the Eastern 
European countries. While first quarter GDP data 
is available for only a few countries, they point to a 
rebound in economic activity. In Lithuania, for 
example, the real GDP grew 3.5 percent (y/y saar) 
in 2013Q1, up from 3 percent in the 2012Q4. The 
acceleration was boosted by strong export growth 
at 14.9 percent (3m/3m saar), which helped offset 
slowing retail sales. In Serbia, GDP growth 
rebounded strongly to about 1.7 percent (y/y saar) 
in the first quarter, mainly due to Fiat production, 
exports and base effects. Ukraine’s growth 
remained negative at -0.7 percent (y/y saar), but the 
pace of decline was significantly slower than the 2.5 
percent (y/y saar) fall in the final quarter of 2012, 
suggesting that output picked up in the fourth quarter.  
 
Higher frequency data for industrial production 
also point to strengthening activity in the region, 
with annualized growth of 2.4 percent rate in 
2013Q1 (figure ECA.1). Industrial output grew 
particularly strongly in Serbia (rising at a 19 percent 
annualized pace). Other countries also reported 
positive growth including Romania (8.1 percent, 
3m/3m saar), Turkey (3.8 percent),  Kazakhstan 
(3.4 percent), Bulgaria (3 percent),  Lithuania (1.8 
percent) and Russia (1.4 percent). The strong 
rebound mostly reflects base effects, especially for 
Bulgaria and Serbia, following the contraction 
during the second half of 2012. The acceleration in 
economic activity in these countries was more than 
offsetting a 10.6 percent decline in Ukraine.  
 
The USD value of imports in the region 
accelerated sharply during the first quarter, rising at 
a 25.2 percent annualized pace (3m/3m saar) in 
March suggesting significant firming of domestic 
demand. The rebound was particularly evident in 
Romania where the USD value of imports grew at a 
3 percent pace (3m/3m saar) after a strong contractions in 
2012Q4. That said there has been some easing in import 
value growth in Latvia during the same time.   
 
While remaining above the expansion/ contraction 
level of 50, business confidence indicators such as 
Markit’s Purchasing Manager Index (PMI) suggest 
a slight easing in economic activity for Russia and 
Turkey in April. 
 
Despite the recent pick-up in global 
trade, the region’s exports have 
contracted so far in 2013 
 
As discussed in the main text, much of volatility 
that characterized the period from 2008 until June 
2012 appears to have eased, and after declining 
sharply in mid-2012 global trade is recovering, 
driven by developing countries import demand (see 
trade annex).  Even in the Euro Area, import demand 
growth has turned positive during the first few 
months of 2013.  
 
Rebound in economic activity in most 
economies  
Source: World Bank; Datastream; Haver. 
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The recovery in import demand, particularly 
developing-country import demand has led a 
recovery in high-income and developing-country 
exports (see main text), but these benefits have not 
been shared by developing countries in Europe & 
Central Asia (figure ECA.2). In contrast, the USD 
value of their export contracted at a 0.4 percent 
(3m/3m saar) annualized rate in the three-months 
ending in March, with weak foreign sales in Russia 
and Latvia the main explanation. A 11.3 percent 
annualized decline in the value of Russian exports 
mainly reflected weaker commodities sales, 
particularly natural gas, which were hit by a slump 
in the European market where Russian natural gas 
is facing newfound competition.  
 
For several other countries, the USD value of 
exports did surge, by an annualized 14.5 percent in 
the case of Romania and 9.4 percent in the case of 
Lithuania. The growth in Romania's exports 
reflected steady improvement in the share of the 
car parts industry and transport equipment in total 
foreign sales. Lithuania’s exports were supported 
by robust oil exports—the country's biggest traded 
commodity, while exports in manufacturing also 
picked up due to improved competitiveness 
following a large devaluation.  
 
Similarly, Turkey’s exports bounced back in March 
by 4.8 percent annualized rate after declining 
sharply earlier in the year. The earlier sharp 
contraction  was because of a decline in gold 
exports (and prices) with no sale to Iran in January 
and weakening exports to Europe—mainly to 
Germany, UK and Italy. That said gold exports to 
Iran (as payment for natural gas import) resumed in 
February but at a much slower pace than in 2012.FN1  
 
All three countries benefited from their rising sales 
to countries outside high-income Europe. In fact, 
many countries in the region have managed to 
diversify their export destinations in recent years, 
which should benefit the export performance of 
the region in coming months (see box ECA.2). 
 
Improved access to international debt 
markets… 
 
Global financial markets have been significantly 
calmer since July 2012, including during the first 
four months of 2013 (see the Finance Annex for 
details). Market risk perceptions have remained 
relatively stable, despite continued economic 
weakness in the Euro Area, political gridlock in 
Italy that has stalled reforms, and the Cyprus crisis 
that culminated in the imposition of capital 
controls—a first in the Euro Area.  
 
In this improved environment, gross cross-
border capital flows (international bond 
issuance, cross-border syndicated bank loans 
and equity issuance) to the Europe and 
Central Asia region strengthened in the 
second half of 2012 and into 2013, with 
inflows in during the first four months of 
2013 reaching $88.5 billion, more than double  
their year earlier levels of $37.4 billion (figure 
ECA.3). While equity issuance remained 
subdued, both bank lending and bond issuance 
 
Export from the region slowed exports  
Source: World Bank; Datastream; Haver. 
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Improved access to international debt 
markets  
Source: World Bank; Dealogic. 
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rebounded. Despite these improvements, inflows into 
the region remain low relative to pre-crisis flows. 
 
Syndicated bank lending to the region, at $37 
billion, showed the sharpest improvement, 
increasing three folds from its level a year-
ago. Even excluding the mega loans to the 
Russian company Rosnefte Gaz for their 
large acquisition in 2012, bank lending to the 
region was still more than twice as high as in 
during the first four months of 2012. The 
rebound in syndicated bank lending reflected 
a global phenomenon as the acute phase of 
Euro Area deleveraging appears to have 
passedFN2. The moderation in its pace has 
been easing lending conditions in the region 
(see the discussion later). 
Bond flows to the region were also robust. Several 
sovereigns and corporates successfully tapped 
international bond markets taking advantage of 
strong appetite for higher-yield developing-country 
debt, encouraged by low yields in high-income 
countries because of quantitative easing. For 
example, despite the downgrading of Ukraine’s 
sovereign credit rating by Moody’s and S&P in 
December 2012, the government and several 
companies issued $5.7 billion of combined 
international bonds. Regular regional emitters 
included Russia ($26 billion), Turkey ($8.7 billion), 
Kazakhstan ($3.5 billion) and Romania ($1.5 
billion), while infrequent issuers such as Azerbaijan 
($1 billion), and Serbia ($1.5 billion) also took 
advantage of conditions. Improved access to 
international bond markets is particularly important 
 
Increased diversification of exports  
 
Trade has been a central mechanism through which the high-income country debt crisis has affected developing countries in 
the Europe and Central Asia region. High-income European countries are particularly important export destinations for Ro-
mania, Lithuania and Latvia, with Albania, Macedonia FYR, and Bulgaria having close trade ties with some of the hardest-hit 
high-spread Euro Area economies. 
 
Several countries in the region have managed to diversify their export destinations in recent years. As discussed in the main 
text, South-South trade has grown rapidly since 2000, although Europe and Central Asia region exports to other developing 
regions has grown at 16 percent per annum on average slightly less rapidly than the 19 percent for all developing countries. 
As a result, the share of exports to other developing-countries in total exports of the region rose to 39.8 percent in 2011 from 
31 percent in 2000 (box figure).  
 
Today China is the second largest export destination for Russia after the European Union. Turkey has successfully diversi-
fied its export markets over the last two years, exporting more to Middle Eastern economies including Iran, Iraq and the Unit-
ed Arab Emirates, with Iraq share in Turkey’s exports having increased to 9 percent so far in 2013 from 2 percent in 2004. 
Similarly, according to estimates in 2013, Romanian exports to other developing countries including to Mexico (mostly tires, 
carpets, steel products, optical instruments, accessories), Brazil (cars and car parts, rolling stock, oil equipment) and Turkey 
has been growing rapidly. Romania’s exports to Russia increased at a 42.8 percent annualized pace and to Ukraine by more 
than 10 percent in the first two months of the year. Similarly, both Latvia and Lithuania have been increasing is exports to 
Russia and other CIS economies. Turkey continues to be a major destination for exports from the South Caucus region as is 
China for countries in Central Asia.  
 
 
 
Box ECA.2   
Box figure ECA 1.1  
Source:  World Bank; Comtrade. 
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for countries with large external financing needs 
(current account deficit and amortization of debt). 
This year, this includes Ukraine with financing 
needs totaling 42.6 percent of GDP, Bulgaria (39.5 
percent of GDP), Turkey (30.8 percent of GDP) 
and Romania (27.1 percent of GDP). 
 
…with portfolio investments coming 
with their challenges 
 
Several countries in the region also received large 
portfolio investment flows (foreign investment in 
local stock markets and local currency debt 
securities). During the first three months of this 
year, flows to local bond markets were particularly 
strong in Turkey ($7.3 billion), Romania ($4.7 
billion), and Serbia ($1.9 billion) putting upward 
pressure on their currencies. As these flows tend to 
be volatile, managing the fluctuations can be quite 
challenging, and to the extent that countries rely on 
these flows to finance current account deficits they 
constitute a source of vulnerability. 
 
After the sharp decline in 2012, FDI 
inflows to Europe and Central Asia 
are expected to rebound this year 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to Europe 
& Central Asia region totaled only $109 billion in 
2012, a 9 percent decline compared with 2011 
(figure ECA.4). The sharp fall in FDI mostly 
reflects a 25 percent contraction in direct 
investment flows from high-income European 
economies— traditionally the region’s main source 
of FDI. In a process somewhat akin to the earlier 
episode of banking-sector deleveraging, 
multinationals from Greece, and the Netherlands 
repatriated substantial sums from their foreign 
holdings, including investments in the region. In 
addition, in contrast to other years, reinvested 
earnings were limited due to weak profitability and 
intercompany loans slowed down sharply. 
 
Serbia experienced the sharpest (86 percent) 
decline in FDI inflows, followed by Macedonia, 
FYR (71 percent), Moldova (43 percent), Lithuania 
(32 percent) and Turkey (22 percent). In contrast, 
FDI increased in oil-exporting economies 
Azerbaijan (18.5 percent) and remained high at its 
2011 level in Kazakhstan.  
 
Limited high frequency data suggest a mixed 
picture so far in 2013. While FDI inflows to Russia 
surged in the first quarter because of a special 
acquisition deal (for $15 billion) and 
methodological changes, flows to other countries 
have been weak.FN3 Nevertheless, FDI inflows are 
projected to rebound in the second half of the year 
for other economies as well. Several countries 
including  Romania, and Serbia might accelerate 
privatization efforts this year. With the sharp 
increase in FDI to Russia, FDI inflows to the 
region are forecast to increase by 20 percent—
reaching $132 billion in 2013. In 2014, FDI flows 
to the region is expected to slow down mainly on 
the account of Russia following an adjustment for 
the 2013 mega deal. Excluding Russia, FDI flows 
are expected to rebound by 6 percent in the region 
in 2014. The recovery in FDI, may be particularly 
important for countries such as Georgia and 
Albania, where FDI accounts more than 30 percent 
of gross domestic capital formation.  
 
With strong bond flows, rebounds in bank lending 
and FDI flows, net private capital flows (debt flows 
net of disbursements and equity flows net of 
disinvestments) to the Europe and Central Asia 
region are forecast to rebound to $255 billion (6.5 
percent of the region’s GDP) in 2013 from an 
estimated $208 billion (5.7 percent) in 2012 (table 
ECA.1). Going forward, assuming there is no 
major set-back in financial markets confidence, net 
capital flows to the region are expected to 
strengthen along with global growth to reach $279 
billion in 2015—around 5.9 percent of region’s 
 
FDI inflows are estimated to have risen 
in 2013Q1  
Source: World Bank; Haver. 
Fig ECA.4 
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GDP. By 2015, all flows are expected to increase, 
with bond issuance expected to level off slightly as 
bank-lending picks up the pace, with the latter 
supported by increased South-South flows. 
 
Supply-side credit constraints in the 
region have eased along with 
improved global financial conditions  
 
As discussed in the January edition of GEP 2013, 
credit growth in the region was very weak during 
the second half of 2012. Real domestic credit 
growth has been negative for Latvia and Lithuania 
since early 2009, and sharply declined in Albania, 
Bulgaria, Macedonia FYR, and Romania. The 
intense deleveraging by European banks over the 
last two years has contributed to the tight credit 
conditions and weak credit growth, especially in 
countries with strong European bank presence 
(BIS December 2012). The recent pick up in 
international bank flows to the region, likely signals 
the end to the most intense phase of Euro Area 
deleveraging. While expected to continue, the 
slower pace of deleveraging should ease the supply 
side constraints when demand for loans picks up 
with the economic activity.  
 
Recent data show a modest increase in real credit in 
Bulgaria (0.5 percent year-over-year in February) 
and Macedonia (2.2 percent) after contacting in 
2012, and less rapid declines in Latvia and 
Lithuania. The rebound has been more robust for 
Turkey, where after slowing due to domestic 
monetary policy tightening, real credit growth rose 
7.8 percent in the 12 months ending February. A 
large part of the increase was funded by foreign 
loans, with Turkish banks aggressively seeking 
wholesale financing abroad. Although the credit 
growth (nominal annualized growth of 20 percent) 
is much higher than its central bank’s official target 
at 15 percent, the central bank has not yet acted to 
restrain it as inflation pressures have subsided.  
 
Remittances flows to Europe and 
Central Asia are also expected to 
bounce back this year 
 
Remittances are an importance source of foreign 
currency and income for several countries in 
developing Europe and Central Asia. Remittance 
flows to the region are estimated to have fallen by 
3.9 percent in US dollar terms to about $40 billion 
(1.1 percent of GDP) in 2012 (table ECA.1). The 
fall partly reflects the Euro depreciation against the 
dollar as remittances declined by a smaller 2 
percent in Euro terms. Remittances flows declined 
in most countries in the region in USD terms
(Migration and Development Brief 20). The 
exceptions were Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Moldova and Armenia, where flows increased by 
28 percent, 14 percent, 10 percent and 8.5 percent, 
respectively as flows were supported by strong 
growth in Russia and high oil prices (Migration and 
Development Brief 17).  
 
The weakness of the flows in the rest of the region 
mainly reflects that the preponderance of their 
migrants are in Western Europe, where economic 
growth has been weak and unemployment rising. 
Remittances to Romania have gyrated in recent 
years. They surged after accession into the EU in 
2004 but dropped significantly after the crisis in 
2008, partly due to increasing numbers of migrants 
returning home. Still, migrants are showing 
resilience in the face of these dampening effects, 
and are nearly sustaining remittances in euro terms.  
 
As economic conditions improve in the European 
Union, officially recorded remittances to the region 
are expected to keep up with the region’s nominal 
GDP growth in 2013-2015, reaching $52 billion 
(1.1 percent of GDP) in 2015. Despite the 
projected slowdown in Russia (see the discussion 
later), still high oil price should continue to support 
remittance outflows.  
 
Output gaps and unemployment 
represent persistent problems in 
many countries with limited policy 
space 
 
Since the 2008/09 and European crises, several 
countries in the region—particularly developing 
Europe, had to deal with declining exports, 
European bank deleveraging, and high levels of 
external debt. As growth rates sharply declined, 
unemployment soared to record levels, as banks 
deleveraged and households and firms cut into 
spending in an effort to repair damaged balance 
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sheets. Fiscal conditions deteriorated throughout 
the region, with severe consequences in a few 
countries where public debt levels had risen during the 
boom years.   
 
The good news is that growth rate for many of the 
hardest-hit countries have recovered to levels close 
to their underlying potential output. Unfortunately, 
growth so far has not been strong enough to make 
significant inroads into existing unemployment and 
spare capacity in many countries (figure ECA.5). 
Several countries including Romania, Ukraine and 
Bulgaria have still large economy-wide output gaps 
(3 to 4 percent of their GDP). Several economies 
continue to suffer from high levels of 
unemployment. The unemployment rate is still in 
excess of 10 percent in Albania, Bulgaria, Latvia 
and Lithuania. More than 20 percent of the labor 
force remain unemployed in Serbia, Kosovo, and 
Macedonia FYR. Arguably, these economies have 
been caught in a high unemployment equilibrium. 
In the short run, policy options have been limited. 
Many of these economies are already constrained 
by high fiscal deficits. Inflationary pressures of last 
year’s bad crop and necessity of restoring banking-
sector balance sheets have constrained the scope of 
monetary policies to stimulate growth.  
 
On the contrary, Russia, Turkey and Kazakhstan 
remain among the exceptions in the region as their 
output gaps are relatively small (or positive). Russia 
 
Net capital and workers’ remittances flows to Europe and Central Asia*  Table ECA.1 
           2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e 2013f 2014f 2015f
Capital Inflows (official+private) 288.0 98.5 180.9 200.1 206.2 253.9 255.0 277.6
Private inflows, net 276.0 62.9 157.3 194.6 207.9 255.2 257.2 278.8
  Equity inflows, net 153.8 96.7 87.2 108.6 113.3 139.0 130.7 143.0
    Net FDI inflows 169.0 90.4 88.0 118.7 108.8 132.8 121.3 131.3
    Net portfolio equity inflows -15.3 6.4 -0.8 -10.1 4.5 6.2 9.4 11.7
  Private creditors, net 122.2 -33.9 70.1 86.0 94.6 116.2 126.5 135.8
      Bonds -18.0 2.9 21.3 13.6 34.4 46.4 38.2 30.4
      Banks 151.6 -14.3 -5.8 33.2 26.7 37.2 49.4 59.7
      Short-term debt flows -16.9 -34.9 45.9 24.5 23.1 25.2 29.7 40.0
      Other private 5.5 12.4 8.8 14.7 10.4 7.4 9.2 5.7
Official inflows, net 12.0 35.6 23.5 5.5 -1.7 -1.3 -2.2 -1.2
    World Bank 0.7 3.0 3.5 2.4 -0.1
    IMF 7.0 20.5 9.4 -1.0 -5.0
    Other official 4.3 12.1 10.7 4.1 3.4
Memo item:
Migrant remittance inflows 37.0 38.0 39.0 40.0 43.0 47.0 52.0
Central and Eastern Europe & Turkey 19.8 18.9 16.1 16.7
Commonwealth of Independent States 17.2 19.1 22.9 23.3
Source: The World Bank
Note:  e = estimate, f = forecast.                                                                                                                                                                        
*The regional FDI numbers have been revised historically since some countries including Russia have started to report 
their balance of payment data under BMP6 methodology.
 
Developing Europe grows at potential rate but 
output gap remains  
Source: World Bank; Datastream; Haver. 
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has been growing at or above its potential growth 
rate indicated by its tight labor market and high 
capacity utilization. Similarly, Turkey’s current 
acceleration in growth has been generating 
inflationary pressures, and increasing current 
account deficits. For these economies, efforts to 
increase growth through monetary and fiscal 
stimulus risk being ineffective while adding to debt 
or inflationary pressures without any sustained 
progress in terms of increased output.  
 
Inflationary pressures have recently 
moderated in most economies 
 
Inflation has moderated in most economies due to 
declines in food prices following last summer’s 
poor crop, and the passing through of earlier 
administrative tariff and tax increases (figure ECA.6)
FN4. Further inflation declines are expected among 
countries that suffered the biggest food price shocks.  
That said inflation remains at high levels in several 
middle-income countries. In Russia, inflation 
although down was 7.2 percent year-over-year in 
April, well above the central bank’s target of 5-6 
percent. However, inflation is expected to decline 
to within this range as the adverse base effect from 
last year’s drought disappears and a better crop 
could even cause food prices to decline. In Turkey, 
despite the recent easing, pressures are likely to 
build in the later part of the year due to robust 
domestic demand and supply-side capacity 
constraints. In the absence of any significant relief 
from global commodity prices (Turkey is an energy 
importer) or any local food prices as it did last year, 
inflation is expected to rise beyond the central 
bank’s target of around 5 percent. Inflation in 
Romania remained at 5.7 percent year over year in 
February (5.8 percent in January) driven mainly by 
foods and services (due to regulatory tariff hikes), 
but is expected to go down toward the central 
bank’s target rate in the second half of the year. 
Inflationary pressures have eased slightly in 
Belarus, but inflation remains in double-digits. 
  
In contrast, consumer prices fell in Azerbaijan and 
Georgia towards the end of 2012 due to weak 
domestic demand; decline in food prices; and due 
to the earlier nominal appreciation of Georgian lari 
against currencies of its main trading partners. 
While inflation has picked up in Azerbaijan, 
Georgia's deflation continued in April, the sixth 
month in a row with falling prices, with prices 
down by 1.7 percent due to the weak economic 
activity.  
 
…allowed central banks cut their 
policy rates 
 
Against the backdrop of easing inflation, spare 
capacity, high unemployment and moderate 
growth, several central banks in the region 
including Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia 
have cut their policy rates (figure ECA.7). Turkey’s 
central bank has been narrowing its interest rate 
corridor since last year and recently cut its main 
policy rate in April. The rate was cut despite a small 
output gap, the acceleration in credit growth, and 
persistent inflation in part to support growth and 
discourage the inflow of portfolio investment (see 
the discussion earlier). 
 
Several countries cut their policy rates  
Source: World Bank; Haver. 
Fig ECA.7 
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The regional inflation momentum has 
subsided in recent months*  
*Excluding Belarus 
Source: World Bank; Datastream; Haver. 
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In contrast, the Russian central bank has kept its 
main policy rates unchanged since December 2012 
despite weakening growth. Similarly, the monetary 
policy in Ukraine remains restricted by its de-facto 
currency peg to the dollar. Maintaining the peg 
might be increasingly challenging with economic 
contraction. 
 
 
Outlook: A rebound with 
increasing differentiation 
among countries  
 
 
Despite the improved global 
environment, growth in the region is 
expected to rebound only slightly in 
2013  
 
Although the global environment has become 
less volatile and growth appears to be 
strengthening, GDP growth in Europe and 
Central Asia is projected to rise only 
gradually in 2013 to 2.8 percent from 2.7 
percent in 2012 (table ECA.2). Growth 
should firm further to 3.8 percent in 2014 
and 4.2 percent in 2015 as the fiscal and 
financial restructuring that has been a drag on 
growth within the region and in the Euro 
Area loses intensity. Several domestic factors 
including fiscal and monetary policies and 
structural issues will generate differentiation 
in economic performance among countries.  
 
The apparently anemic acceleration in 2013 
mainly reflects the weakness of growth at the 
end of 2012. The quarterly profile of growth 
during 2013 is stronger than the annual growth rate 
because growth in the final quarters of 2012 was 
so weak (figure ECA.8). This low base effect 
reduces carryoverFN5 into 2013, resulting in 
weak annual growth even if quarterly growth 
rates are relatively strong.  While carry-over 
from 2012 is generally low in many economies 
in the region, it is negative for Ukraine and 
Georgia, and weak for Turkey and Bulgaria.  
On the plus side, agricultural production is 
expected to be better this year in several countries. 
The summer and winter droughts in 2012 cut the 
growth rates significantly and generated inflationary 
pressures in several countries. Countries including 
Albania, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Romania, Russia, 
Serbia, and Ukraine will benefit from a higher 
contribution of agriculture this year. 
 
Growth in developing Central and Eastern Europe is 
expected increase only slightly to 1.9 percent in 
2013 from 1.5 percent as most of the factors that 
weighed down the growth last year continue to 
hinder the economic growth this year, but less 
intensively in some countries (see the table ECA.2 
for the list of countries; table ECA.3 for individual 
country forecast). Monetary policy remains 
accommodative in most countries, while the pace 
of fiscal consolidation has eased in Romania, Latvia 
and Lithuania, reducing the drag on overall 
growthFN6. However, major fiscal adjustments are 
still needed  in several others, including Serbia and 
Montenegro. In addition, although there are signs 
of improvement, economic growth in high-income 
Europe still remains weak and is expected to pick 
up only gradually toward the end of the year. Thus 
although developing European economies will 
benefit from a gradual improvement in high-
income countries and are therefore expected to see 
a firming in quarterly growth rates, this will have 
only a modest impact on whole-year growth in 
2013. As a result, growth is expected slightly 
increase in almost all Central and Eastern 
European countries. The only exceptions are Latvia 
and Lithuania where economic growth is expected 
to ease in Latvia after more than 5 percent growth 
 
Growth was weak in 2012Q4   
Source: World Bank; Datastream; Haver. 
Fig ECA.8  
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over the last two years, and in Lithuania mainly due 
to the base effect from 2012’s exceptionally good 
harvest and projected weak growth in main trading 
partners including Russia and Latvia.  
 
Going forward, growth in developing Europe is 
expected to rise in the medium-term to 3.1 percent 
by 2015 but will remain below their 2000-2009 
average (table ECA.2). As discussed earlier, several 
economies still suffer from high unemployment 
rates and spare capacity. Prospects for the region 
critically depend on the progress in addressing 
external (large current account deficits) and 
domestic (large fiscal deficit, unemployment, and 
inflation) imbalances. Serbia has the widest twin 
deficits in the region. While spare capacity remains 
in the region, countries must focus on redressing 
structural weaknesses if they wish to return to the 
relatively robust growth rates of the pre-crisis 
period. Areas of focus should include increasing 
labor market flexibility, strengthening the business 
environment and financial market efficiency.  
 
After the sharper than expected slowdown in 2012, 
growth is likely to pick up in Turkey on rising 
domestic demand, supported by robust domestic 
 
Europe and Central Asia forecast summary  Table ECA.2 
    Est.
 00-09
a
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
GDP at market prices b 4.2 5.3 5.7 2.7 2.8 3.8 4.2
(Sub-region totals-- countries with full NIA + BOP data)c
 GDP at market prices  c 4.1 5.4 5.7 2.8 2.8 3.8 4.1
     GDP per capita (units in US$) 4.0 4.9 5.2 2.3 2.4 3.4 3.7
     PPP GDP 4.3 5.1 5.4 2.8 2.7 3.8 4.1
  Private consumption 5.9 4.7 6.9 4.3 4.9 4.5 4.9
  Public consumption 2.3 -0.1 2.6 2.3 3.0 2.4 2.2
  Fixed investment 6.5 13.6 9.0 2.2 3.0 6.8 6.5
  Exports, GNFS d 5.2 7.5 4.7 3.9 2.8 4.6 5.5
  Imports, GNFS d 7.0 17.3 15.0 4.7 5.5 6.2 6.6
Net exports, contribution to growth -0.3 -2.7 -3.4 -0.4 -1.0 -0.8 -0.7
Current account bal/GDP (%) 2.3 0.6 0.7 0.6 -0.3 -1.1 -1.7
GDP deflator (median, LCU) 9.2 10.0 8.4 3.9 5.1 5.1 5.3
Fiscal balance/GDP (%) -0.6 -3.0 0.9 -0.3 -1.1 -0.1 -0.7
Memo items: GDP                                                 
 Transition countries e                                         4.6 3.9 4.4 3.0 2.5 3.5 3.9
    Central and Eastern Europe f                                    4.1 -0.4 3.1 1.5 1.9 2.5 3.1
    Commonwealth of Independent States g 4.7 4.7 4.6 3.2 2.6 3.7 4.0
 Russia 4.4 4.3 4.3 3.4 2.3 3.5 3.9
 Turkey 3.0 9.2 8.8 2.2 3.6 4.5 4.7
 Romania 4.2 -1.6 2.5 0.7 1.7 2.2 2.7
Forecast(annual percent change unless indicated otherwise)
Source: World Bank.
a. Growth rates over intervals are compound weighted averages; average growth contributions, ratios and 
deflators are calculated as simple averages of the annual weighted averages for the region.
b. GDP at market prices and expenditure components are measured in constant 2005 U.S. dollars.  
c. Sub-region aggregate excludes Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan. Data limitations prevent the forecasting of GDP components or Balance of Payments details 
for these countries.
d. Exports and imports of goods and non-factor services (GNFS).
e. Transition countries: CEE and CIS (f + g below).
f. Central and Eastern Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kosovo, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, FYR, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia.
g. Commonwealth of Independent States: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
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credit growth and relatively loose macroeconomic 
policies. Nevertheless, the growth in 2013 will be 
constrained by the weak carryover from 2012. The 
growth rate is expected to rebound to 3.6 percent 
from 2.2 percent in 2012. With the economy 
operating very close to its potential output growth, 
the rising domestic demand and declining tourism 
receipts will widen the current account deficit to 
6.9 percent of GDP in 2013 from 6 percent in 
2012. While access to external financing has been 
comfortable so far  2013 with the recent upgrade 
of its credit rating to investment grade, the heavy 
reliance on portfolio and short-term debt flows is 
an important vulnerability. Monetary policy is 
expected to remain active in balancing external and 
domestic demand while growth picks up with the 
forecasted global recovery, reaching 4.7 percent by 
2015.   
 
Growth in Russia is expected to slow down to 2.3 
percent in 2013 from 3.4 percent in 2012 after 
continuously weakening over the last five quarters 
(on a year-over-year basis). In addition to 
disappointing export growth, domestic demand has 
been weak—partly due to increasing prices and 
easing in oil prices, which has constrained incomes, 
corporate profits and investment. At the same 
time, despite the increased capital flows, 
investment has not picked considerably. Similar to 
Turkey, Russia’s economy is operating close to its 
potential and faces high inflation, a tight labor 
market, and capacity constraints. But unlike 
Turkey, the Russian central bank has pursued a less 
accommodative stance keeping its main policy rates 
unchanged. However, this stance might change if 
inflationary pressures start to ease in the second 
half of the year with adverse base effect 
disappearing. In addition, starting this year fiscal 
policy will be constrained by a newly accepted 
budget rule. The rule implies that spending cannot 
exceed revenues more 1 percent of GDP, while 
revenues are calculated as a function of past long-
term average oil price. Growth is expected to 
pick up together with the global economy 
only modestly to 3.9 percent by 2015 as the 
pace of expansion will be held back by 
potential output growth.  
 
Growth in Kazakhstan is expected to remain stable 
at 5 percent in 2013 following the weak  first 
quarter growth. Government consumption is 
expected to compensate for moderating private 
consumption and the economic slowdown in 
Russia. While expected to pick up by 2014 after a 
new oilfield becomes operational, medium-term 
growth in Kazakhstan will be held back by supply-
side constraints.  
 
Growth in Ukraine is forecast to remain weak at 1.0 
percent in 2013, up from 0.2 percent in 2012. The  
increase will be supported by robust consumer 
demand with increasing retail sales, while industry 
continues to contract and global steel prices remain 
weak. The overall outlook remains challenging, 
with a high fiscal deficit, persistent current account 
deficit, high external debt, and the currencies de-
facto peg to the dollar and declining foreign 
reserves all sources of concern. Reforms that may 
stem from ongoing discussions with the EU/IMF 
and Russia will be crucial factors determining the 
shape of growth going forward.   
 
Growth rates in Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan are 
forecast to be higher in 2013 as high public 
investment spending boosts domestic demand and 
a recovery in Kyrgyzstan’s gold production. On the 
other hand, Armenia’s growth is expected to 
moderate after the strong growth in 2012, as 
prudent fiscal and monetary policies permit the 
economy to avoid overheating.  
 
 
Risks and 
vulnerabilities 
 
 
While risks are less pronounced, the region’s 
economic outlook is still subject to various challenges.  
 
Although the risk of a serious Euro Area crisis has 
diminished, outturns in developing Europe will 
remain sensitive to the speed of the recovery in its 
high-income neighbor. Both a significantly stronger 
and weaker recovery in high-income Europe would 
have significant knock on effects for the region, 
including through the financial channel.  
 
The recent easing in commodity prices in response 
to growing supply and demand substitution 
brought on by high prices, is a further source of 
uncertainty as to the pace of decline toward long-
term equilibrium prices. As discussed in the main 
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text and the Commodity Annex, if prices ease more 
quickly than the baseline, government revenues, 
incomes and current account positions in exporting 
countries could come under pressure, even as 
lower prices benefitted importing nations. 
According to the simulations highlighted in table 5 
in the main text, a rapid decline in oil prices might 
reduce the growth rate by 0.8 percentage points, 
the current account balance by 2.3 percentage 
points, and the fiscal balance by 1.8 percentage 
points in 2014 from the baseline scenario for oil-
exporters in the region. The impact will be positive 
for oil-importers with increasing growth by 0.4 
percentage points and improving both the current 
account and fiscal balance by 0.8 and 0.2 
percentage points, respectively from the baseline 
scenario. The scenario for the metal price declines 
show smaller impact for the region.  
 
Several countries have accessed international 
capital markets this year as cost of bond financing 
fell. Nevertheless, a sharp drop in confidence in 
financial markets—due to unexpected 
developments in Euro Area debt resolution and US 
fiscal situation—can lead to a sudden reversal of 
global financial conditions and adversely affect 
significantly the countries with high external 
financing needs (current account deficits and 
amortization of external debt).  
 
In the longer term, developing country financial 
conditions may become more difficult as high-
income countries step back from quantitative 
easing and base interest rates and spreads rise.  The 
cost of capital in developing countries is likely to 
rise amid rising long-term yields in high-income 
countries. Initially this could expose vulnerabilities 
that have built up during periods of sustained low 
borrowing costs, intensifying financial market 
pressures in the region and even in a worst case 
scenario provoking local crises. Longer-term, 
higher borrowing costs would raise the cost of 
capital and cause firms and foreign investors to 
reduce investment levels with negative 
consequences for growth (see main text), capital 
flows and FDI (see World Bank, 2010 for an in 
depth discussion of channels) 
 
Aside from these global risks for the region’s 
economies, banking systems in several countries 
have been under pressure by sharp slowdown in 
economic activity, weak credit demand and 
increase cost of foreign funding have increased 
pressures on profits. Non-performing loans (NPL) 
remain higher than 10 percent in several countries 
including Kazakhstan, Albania, Ukraine, and 
Serbia. The high levels of NPL in region’s banking 
system may constrain credit growth going forward, 
which has already been weak. Nevertheless, there is 
some level of resilience in most banks in the region 
with their capital adequacy ratios in excess of 10 
percent by the end of 2012.  
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Europe and Central Asia Country forecasts Table ECA.3 
    Est.
 00-09
a
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Albania
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.9 3.5 3.0 1.6 1.8 2.0 3.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) -8.6 -11.4 -12.0 -10.7 -9.5 -8.3 -7.1
Armenia
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 7.7 2.2 4.7 7.2 5.0 5.0 5.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) -7.4 -14.8 -10.9 -10.6 -9.6 -9.4 -9.4
Azerbaijan
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 14.4 5.0 0.1 2.2 4.8 4.8 2.9
Current account bal/GDP (%) 2.9 28.4 26.5 21.7 13.6 11.9 9.4
Belarus
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 6.6 7.7 5.5 1.5 2.5 2.8 3.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) -4.6 -15.0 -8.5 -2.9 -4.7 -5.6 -6.1
Bulgaria
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.0 0.4 1.8 0.8 1.2 2.1 3.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) -11.3 -1.5 0.1 -1.0 -1.6 -1.6 -2.5
Georgia
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 5.6 6.3 7.2 6.1 4.0 6.3 6.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) -12.6 -10.2 -12.8 -11.5 -9.0 -7.8 -7.4
Kazakhstan
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 7.5 7.3 7.5 5.0 5.0 5.3 5.5
Current account bal/GDP (%) -2.0 0.9 6.5 3.8 3.2 3.2 3.1
Kosovo
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 5.8 3.9 5.0 2.3 3.1 4.0 4.2
Current account bal/GDP (%) -18.2 -25.9 -26.2 -21.3 -21.0 -18.8 -16.0
Kyrgyz Republic
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.8 -0.5 6.0 -0.9 7.4 7.5 5.3
Current account bal/GDP (%) -6.0 -6.4 -6.5 -15.3 -8.0 -6.0 -5.6
Latvia
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.7 -0.3 5.5 5.6 3.6 4.1 3.7
Current account bal/GDP (%) -10.2 3.0 -2.1 -1.7 -2.8 -2.8 -3.6
Lithuania
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.2 1.3 5.9 3.7 3.0 3.5 4.2
Current account bal/GDP (%) -7.1 1.6 -1.8 -0.9 -1.4 -1.7 -2.0
Moldova
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.4 7.1 6.8 -0.8 3.0 4.0 5.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) -8.4 -7.7 -11.3 -7.0 -7.4 -7.9 -8.9
Macedonia, FYR
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 2.3 1.8 3.0 -0.3 1.4 2.5 3.5
Current account bal/GDP (%) -6.1 -2.2 -3.0 -3.9 -5.0 -5.5 -5.2
Montenegro
GDP at market prices (2005 US$) b - 2.5 3.2 -0.5 0.8 1.8 2.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) -11.4 -22.9 -17.7 -17.9 -19.0 -18.3 -17.0
Romania
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.2 -1.6 2.5 0.7 1.7 2.2 2.7
Current account bal/GDP (%) -7.6 -4.5 -4.6 -3.8 -3.7 -3.6 -3.6
Russian Federation
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.4 4.3 4.3 3.4 2.3 3.5 3.9
Current account bal/GDP (%) 9.3 4.8 5.3 3.9 3.0 1.6 0.6
Serbia
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.6 1.0 1.6 -1.7 2.0 3.1 3.6
Current account bal/GDP (%) -9.7 -6.7 -9.2 -10.9 -9.9 -9.0 -8.8
Tajikistan
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 7.7 6.5 7.4 7.5 7.0 6.0 6.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) -4.8 -1.2 -4.7 -1.9 -2.2 -2.4 -2.5
Turkey
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.0 9.2 8.8 2.2 3.6 4.5 4.7
Current account bal/GDP (%) -3.3 -6.4 -9.7 -6.0 -6.9 -7.1 -7.2
Ukraine
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.9 4.2 5.2 0.2 1.0 3.0 4.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) 2.2 -2.2 -5.5 -8.4 -7.4 -6.8 -6.2
Uzbekistan
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 6.1 8.5 8.3 8.2 7.4 7.1 6.7
Current account bal/GDP (%) 7.5 6.2 5.8 1.0 1.1 1.3 2.2
Source: World Bank.
World Bank forecasts are frequently updated based on new information and changing (global) 
circumstances. Consequently, projections presented here may differ from those contained in other Bank 
documents, even if basic assessments of countries’ prospects do not significantly differ at any given 
moment in time.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkmenistan  are not forecast owing to data limitations.
a. GDP growth rates over intervals are compound average; current account balance shares are simple 
averages over the period.
b. GDP measured in constant 2005 U.S. dollars.
Forecast
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Notes 
1. Turkey did not sell any gold to Iran in January as banks and dealers waited until early February for the 
implementation of U.S. sanctions that tightened control over precious metal sales. The trade has resumed in 
February as the United States has given Turkey a six-month waiver exempting it from sanctions on trade with Iran, 
which is now due to expire in July  
2. By June 2012, three quarters of European banks had complied with the ECB’s capital ratio requirements. 
Moreover, according to the April ECB Bank Lending Survey, Euro Area banks are beginning to loosen credit 
standards. Euro Area banks have begun repaying ECB crisis loans and have already started to repay some of the 
loans well in advance (See Finance Annex).  
3. The regional FDI numbers have been revised up historically since several countries including Russia have started 
to report their balance of payment data under BMP6 methodology. FDI flows to Russia surged in the first quarter 
of 2013 as the deal between Rosneft and BP around the TNK-BP sale that eventually resulted in the acquisition of 
18.5 percent of Rosneft, worth almost $15 billon. Adjusted for this one-off deal, the FDI remained fairly stable 
during the first quarter of 2013. 
4. The figure excludes Belarus because of its outlier status in terms of 2011 inflation, which reached 108.7 percent, 
after almost threefold devaluation of the national currency. 
5. Carry over (or statistical overhang) is defined as the rate of growth that would be observed if quarterly GDP in 
year t remained unchanged from the level of the fourth quarter of the previous year. It therefore measures the 
contribution to annual growth in year t, of the quarterly expansion during the previous year (GEP 2012 June).  
6. The EU required adjustment has been completed in Romania, Latvia and Lithuania to reach the 3 percent deficit 
target.    
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Overview 
 
 
 
After a sharp recovery from the global 
economic crisis in 2010, when regional output 
expanded by 6 percent, growth in the Latin 
America and the Caribbean decelerated 
markedly, to an estimated 3 percent by 2012.  
Supply side constraints have become apparent 
in some of the larger economies, where 
output was near or above potential during the 
recovery phase, and which contributed to 
relatively high inflation and deterioration of 
current account balances.  Despite a sharp 
deceleration in growth, regional output is 
only now in line with potential GDP. Cyclical 
factors such as lower commodity prices and 
generally subdued global activity, in particular 
in high-income countries, have also weighed 
on growth. Private consumption remained 
relatively robust, while the contribution to 
growth from investment and exports 
weakened considerably.  
 
Outlook for 2013-2015: The factors that 
have contributed to the deceleration in 
growth in the post-recovery period will 
continue to weigh on economic activity over 
the short-to-medium term. Growth in the 
region is expected to accelerate only modestly 
to 3.3 percent in 2013, and to about 3.9 
percent over the medium terms. Growth is 
expected to firm somewhat from a very weak 
pace in Brazil and Argentina, while slowing 
down in most of the commodity exporters, 
largely on account of weaker commodity 
prices. Growth in Venezuela is expected to 
decelerate markedly as highly expansionary 
policies are reversed. Meanwhile Paraguay 
will see one of the sharpest accelerations in 
growth this year, on account of normalization 
in agriculture output. Growth in Central 
America will benefit over the medium term 
from firmer growth in the United States and 
improvements in terms of trade. Growth in 
the Caribbean will be held back by large fiscal 
adjustments necessary to bring fiscal deficits 
to sustainable levels and help reduce public 
debt burdens.  
 
Risks and vulnerabilities: The severe  
downside risks to the global economy have 
eased significantly compared to last year, 
reflecting progress in Euro-area economies 
towards reducing fiscal and banking solvency 
risks and an easing in fiscal-cliff related risks 
in the United States. However, little progress 
has been made in setting the US fiscal policy 
on a sustainable path and by Japan to reduce 
its large general government debt to 
sustainable levels, and these continue to 
represent sources of risk for the global 
economy.  
 
For the Latin America and the Caribbean the 
risks stem in part from the challenges of 
finding the optimal balance between 
macroeconomic policies to st imulate 
domestic demand in the short term and 
structural reforms to enable faster growth 
over the longer run. In addition ample global 
liquidity and higher and more volatile capital 
flows are complicating the task of conducting 
monetary policy and could, if interest rates 
are low, lead to rapid credit expansion and 
goods and asset price inflation.  For 
commodity exporters, large fluctuations of 
export prices represent a major risk to the 
outlook.   
 
Over the longer term as external financial 
conditions are likely to become tighter, 
higher financing costs could result in reduced 
investment spending and growth in the 
countries in the region and may also expose 
unsustainable positions. If greater progress is 
made to implement a wide range of structural 
reforms and address supply-side constraints 
to growth, economic expansion over the 
medium term could be more robust.  
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Recent economic 
developments 
 
 
With growth decelerating to slightly 
below potential, the positive output 
gap nearly closed in 2012…  
 
Growth in the Latin America and the Caribbean region 
decelerated an estimated 1.4 percentage points to 3 percent 
in 2012 (table LAC.1).  In per capita terms growth has 
fallen below 2 percent for the first time since the 
global crisis. The growth slowdown was partly due to 
bottlenecks that constrained growth in some of the larger 
economies in the region, partly because of softening in 
global activity mid-year due to Euro Area 
uncertainty, and partly because of a decline in non-
oil commodity prices. Even with GDP growth 
below potential in 2012, the positive output gaps 
that opened during the recovery from the 2009 
crisis still persist or have only now closed.  GDP in 
Brazil expanded only 0.9 percent, despite accommodative 
monetary and fiscal policies, held back by increasingly 
apparent supply side bottlenecks. Despite slow growth, 
unemployment remains low and inflation high. 
World Bank estimates suggest that the slowdown 
has only now opened up a negative output gap of 
0.8 percent of potential GDP. Although potential 
growth has slowed due to a decline in investment 
and slower growth in total factor productivity, at 
3.2 percent potential growth was still much higher 
than actual GDP.FN1  
 
In other South American commodity exporting 
countries growth remained robust, including 
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. In 
these economies, growth in private consumption 
contributed half or more of the total GDP 
expansion supported by still high commodity 
revenues. In Venezuela very expansionary policies 
contributed to a marked acceleration in growth to 
5.6 percent and a wide positive output gap with 
respect to potential. Growth decelerated markedly only in 
Argentina to 1.9 percent from 8.9 percent, as exports 
underperformed and investment plunged, subtracting 0.01 
and 1.2 percentage points from growth, respectively. 
Paraguay is one of only a couple of countries in 
Latin America to have recorded a decline in GDP, 
due to the impact of a severe drought, and slower 
growth in its major trading partners. Mexico 
continued to outperform the regional average for a 
second consecutive year, expanding close to 4 
percent and contributing 1.1 percentage points to the 
regional growth, compared to a 0.3 percentage point 
contribution by Brazil and Chile. Mexico’s growth 
continued to be well balanced, with positive 
contributions from all demand components.  
 
In Central America output expanded at a robust 
pace of close to 5 percent in 2012, the second 
consecutive year of above trend growth. Growth 
accelerated in Costa Rica to above 5 percent 
boosted by exports and private consumption and 
remained very robust in Panama, where exports 
and investment have made significant contributions 
to growth (in excess of 4 percentage points), 
supported by the Panama Canal expansion and 
several other large investment projects.   
 
Growth in the Caribbean continued to disappoint, 
decelerating to 3 percent in 2012 as growth 
decelerated in the Dominican Republic and in 
Haiti, while Jamaica’s economy fell into recession. 
In most other economies in the region growth fell 
below 1 percent, with the notable exception of 
Belize’s economy, which expanded more than 5 percent.  
 
Data from the first quarter of 2013 
suggests that growth is easing 
 
Growth had decelerated from 3.2 percent 
seasonally adjusted annualized (or saar) in the first 
quarter of 2012 to 1.6 percent by the third quarter, 
before reaccelerating markedly in the last quarter to 
a 3.5 pace in line with potential growth, as growth 
in the largest economies in the region accelerated 
into the year’s end. On an annualized basis fourth 
quarter GDP expanded 2.6 percent in Brazil, 4.5 
percent in Peru, 2.7 percent in Mexico, more than 
7.0 percent in Chile and Colombia. Among the 
countries that bucked the regional acceleration 
trend in the final quarter of 2012 were Paraguay, 
Peru, with GDP contracting in the former and 
decelerating in the latter.  With relatively strong growth 
in the second half of 2012 and/or the fourth quarter of 
2012, Chile, Peru, Colombia have strong carryovers for 
2013, in excess of 1.3 percentage points, while Brazil’s 
carry over is relatively weak at 0.65 percentage points. For 
the region the carryover for 2013 growth is about 1 
percentage points.  
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Regional growth in the first quarter as 
approximated by industrial production softened, 
with industrial production remaining relatively flat, 
after a slight contraction in the fourth quarter 
(figure LAC.1). Slower domestic consumption in 
conjunction with weak external demand caused 
economic activity to slow in many countries in the 
region. In Mexico GDP growth eased to a 1.8 
percent seasonally adjusted annualized pace as 
domestic consumption and external demand 
showed signs of weakness. In addition government 
spending eased in line with past trends at the 
beginning of a new presidential administration. 
Similarly in Brazil growth eased to a 2.2 percent 
annualized pace in the first quarter of 2013, as 
exports contracted and both private and public 
consumption showed signs of weakening and 
despite an acceleration in investment growth. 
Growth decelerated markedly in Chile  in the first 
quarter, to 2.1 percent quarter-on-quarter 
annualized pace, down from 8 percent in the fourth 
quarter of 2012 on account of a slowdown in 
investment, consumption, and sluggish exports. 
Meanwhile economic activity in Venezuela 
contracted 2.5 percent quarter-on-quarter (or 9.7 
percent annualized pace) as private consumption 
slowed dramatically, while exports contracted, and 
inventories tumbled.  
 
Similarly, export performance has weakened in the 
first months of 2013, with export revenues 
declining close to 12 percent annualized rate in the 
first quarter of 2013, after a robust performance in 
the fourth quarter of 2012 (14.8 percent). The 
decline comes even as world imports continued to 
expand at a solid pace over this period (10 percent). 
The quarterly decline was particularly pronounced 
in commodity exporters like Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, and Peru. Export revenues also 
declined in manufactures exporters like Mexico 
(10.7 percent saar).  
 
Meanwhile imports expanded at slower pace of 8.4 
percent annualized pace in the first quarter of 2013, 
after a strong recovery in the fourth quarter (31.6 
percent), pointing to a possible moderation in 
domestic demand and rapidly deteriorating trade 
balances. Imports continued to rise at a rapid pace 
in Argentina, Brazil, and bounced back in 
Colombia, while import growth eased in Mexico in 
line with weaker exports.  
 
Inflation remains contained  
 
Inflation rates in the region have remained 
relatively anchored for the most part, especially 
core inflation, although they have remained 
stubbornly high or even accelerated in countries 
where economic output is at or near potential (e.g. 
Brazil, Uruguay). Currency devaluation has 
exacerbated local price pressures in Venezuela, 
while import restrictions and loose policies 
contribute to stubborn inflation in Argentina that 
continues to erode real incomes. Inflation 
decelerated in Chile, Colombia, and Peru on 
account of deceleration in food and energy 
inflation, but in some cases also on account of 
moderation in domestic demand. Lower food and 
energy inflation also contributed to the decline in 
inflation in Central American economies, while 
inflation in some of the Caribbean economies was 
low on account of weak domestic demand.  
 
Monetary policy guided by both 
domestic conditions as well as global 
liquidity  
 
Conducting monetary policy during the post-crisis 
period has been complicated by the very loose 
monetary policies pursued by several high-income 
countries, most recently Japan. 
 
The benign inflation environment and very easy 
policy stances in high-income countries have 
 
Industrial production below trend levels 
since the second half of 2012 
Source: Datastream and the World Bank staff calculations 
Fig LAC.1  
60
72
84
96
108
120
Jan '95 Jan '98 Jan '01 Jan '04 Jan '07 Jan '10 Jan '13
Industrial production Trend (HP filter)
Index, August 2008=100
GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS  |  June 2013   Latin America and the Caribbean Annex   
154 
prompted some central banks in the region to cut 
policy rates. The Bank of Colombia cut its policy 
rate 200 basis points, as growth slowed since mid-
2012, while Banxico, Mexico’s central bank cut the 
overnight rate 50 basis points in March 2013, the 
first cut since July 2009. In contrast Brazil’s central 
bank raised the Selic rate a cumulative 75 basis 
points to 8  percent embarking on what is expected 
to be a gradual normalization in its monetary policy 
(figure LAC.2).  
 
Sluggish growth in some of the larger economies 
has  prompted  more  accommodat ive 
macroeconomic policies despite becoming 
increasingly apparent that supply potential is lower 
than during the recovery from the global crisis in 
these economies.  
 
Strong domestic demand in many countries in 
the region and in some cases small or positive 
output gaps have resulted in a worsening in 
current account positions in 2012. For 
commodity exporters the decline in non-oil 
commodity prices in 2012 has also played a 
role, with this group of countries recording 
some of the largest deteriorations in current 
account positions. One notable exception is 
Argentina, where compression in imports due 
to tough import controls, made possible an 
improvement in the current account balance. 
For the region as a whole the current account 
deficit deteriorated 0.4 percentage points, 
with a median deterioration of 0.1 percentage 
points of GDP.  
Foreign currency earnings from remittances 
increased slightly to an estimated $62 billion, still 
below the 2008 peak of $64.5 billion. Remittances 
to Mexico (which accounts for 55 per cent of 
regional inflows) and Ecuador declined in absolute 
terms, while they rose relatively quickly in Brazil, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Peru. 
 
Expressed as a share of recipient countries’ GDP 
they remained flat at 5.3 percent of GDPFN2 in 
2012.  The weak performance reflected still weak 
labor markets in the United States, and 
unemployment in Spain (another major destination 
for regional migrants) in excess of 25 percent of 
the labor force. Indeed, the very high 
unemployment rate in Spain and improved growth 
prospects in home countries forced many migrants 
to return home. 
 
Capital flows  
 
Very loose monetary policies pursued by several 
high-income countries, most recently Japan have 
contributed to ample global liquidity. With 
dramatic shifts in perceptions of risk in high-
income countries there have been episodes of 
strong inflows and outflows of capital to 
developing countries, putting currencies under 
pressure (figure LAC.3). While data for annual 
flows do not suggest that capital flows have been 
unusually high, several countries have taken 
unusual measures – including lowering interest 
rates to dissuade foreign capital inflows.  
 
Monetary policy rates 
Percentage Points 
Source: National central banks and Datastream  
Fig LAC.2  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Jan '08 Jan '10 Jan '12
Brazil Colombia Chile Mexico Peru
 
Real effective exchange rates 
June 2008=100  
Source: World Bank. 
Fig LAC.3  
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Net capital inflows rose 19.3 percent in 2012 
to about 6.5 percent of GDP, up from 5.5 
percent of GDP in 2011, on stronger equity 
inflows. Net FDI flows increased by 
$17.3billion and net portfolio inflows were up 
$16.8 billion in 2012 (table LAC.1). Together 
the equity inflows accounted for more than 
half of the increase in net capital flows to the 
Latin America and the Caribbean region. Net 
bond flows increased by an estimated $26.8 
billion in 2012, while bank lending declined 
$10.3 billion.   
 
Gross capital flows to countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean region were 23 
percent higher year-on-year in the first five 
months of 2013 (see Finance Annex and 
figure LAC.4). Equity placements jumped 154 
percent on account of strong issuance by 
Brazilian firms, including a record developing 
country bond issuance of $11 billion by 
Petrobras. Meanwhile bank lending fell more 
than 30 percent year-on-year.  
 
Reflecting ample global liquidity and despite 
increased costs, frontier-market sovereigns in 
the region like Honduras ($500 million) were 
able to successfully issue bonds. Bolivia ($500 
million), Dominican Republic, El Salvador 
($800 million), and Guatemala ($700 million)  
also came to the market last year to take 
advantage of investors’ search for higher 
yields. Costa Rica has managed to issue a 
$500-million 12-year bond and a $500-million 
30-year bond while Panama issued a $750 
 
Net capital flows to Latin America Table LAC.1 
USD, billions
           2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e 2013f 2014f 2015f
Capital Inflows 186.0 179.6 328.5 303.9 362.6 358.5 364.1 379.2
Private inflows, net 179.3 161.6 306.1 299.1 360.7 359.4 364.8 381.6
  Equity Inflows, net 127.5 126.5 166.6 165.6 199.8 209.8 212.4 232.0
    Net FDI inflows 137.2 84.9 125.3 158.3 175.6 192.2 191.0 206.4
    Net portfolio equity inflows -9.7 41.6 41.3 7.4 24.2 17.6 21.4 25.6
  Private creditors. Net 51.8 35.1 139.5 133.4 160.9 149.6 152.4 149.6
      Bonds 8.9 45.9 72.9 85.2 112.0 89.3 83.1 79.6
      Banks 40.8 -1.7 21.7 51.7 41.4 43.6 45.2 51.4
      Short-term debt flows 2.6 -8.6 43.8 -3.0 7.3 15.2 23.4 16.5
      Other private -0.5 -0.5 1.1 -0.4 0.2 1.5 0.7 2.1
Official inflows, net 6.7 18.0 22.5 4.8 1.9 -0.9 -0.7 -2.4
    World Bank 2.4 6.6 8.3 -2.9 0.4
    IMF 0.0 0.4 1.3 0.2 0.1
    Other official 4.3 11.0 12.9 7.5 1.4
Source: The World Bank
Note :  e = estimate, f = forecast
 
Gross capital flows to Latin America 
and the Caribbean 
Source: World Bank. 
Fig LAC.4  
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million 40-year bond. The long-term dated bonds 
issued at surprisingly low rates seem to indicate 
that investors’ are comfortable with longer-dated 
issuance. Many countries in the region are engaging 
in more active debt management to take advantage 
of investors’ willingness to buy longer-dated paper 
increasing the maturity of their debt, by pre-paying 
shorter-term debt. Furthermore the decline in cost 
of financing could help some countries in the 
region reduce the cost of debt servicing over the 
short to medium term.  
Economic outlook 
 
 
 
Growth is expected to firm gradually 
 
A gradual firming in the global economy, and still 
very easy external financing conditions will support 
a modest step-up in growth in the region to 3.3 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean forecast summary  Table LAC.2 
    Est. Forecast
 00-09
a
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
GDP at market prices  b 2.6 5.9 4.4 3.0 3.3 3.9 3.8
(Sub-region totals-- countries with full NIA + BOP data)
c
 GDP at market prices  c 2.6 6.0 4.4 3.0 3.3 3.9 3.8
     GDP per capita 1.4 4.8 3.2 1.8 2.2 2.8 2.7
     PPP GDP 2.7 6.1 4.6 3.0 3.4 3.9 3.8
  Private consumption 2.9 5.9 5.1 3.8 3.3 3.7 3.8
  Public consumption 2.6 4.2 3.2 3.7 2.8 3.1 3.4
  Fixed investment 3.6 10.5 8.9 2.9 5.4 5.9 5.1
  Exports, GNFS d 2.8 11.7 6.4 2.6 4.5 5.4 5.8
  Imports, GNFS d 3.7 22.0 10.4 3.9 5.3 5.6 6.1
Net exports, contribution to growth -0.2 -2.6 -1.3 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4
Current account bal/GDP (%) -0.3 -1.3 -1.3 -1.7 -1.9 -2.1 -2.1
GDP deflator (median, LCU) 6.3 5.2 7.0 5.7 5.7 5.1 5.2
Fiscal balance/GDP (%) -2.4 -3.0 -2.4 -2.8 -2.2 -2.2 -2.4
Memo items: GDP                                                 
 LAC excluding Argentina                                              2.5 5.7 4.0 3.1 3.3 4.0 3.9
    Developing Central & North America e                                               1.5 5.2 4.1 4.0 3.5 4.0 3.9
    Caribbean f                                                 3.4 4.7 3.8 3.0 2.2 3.3 3.9
 Brazil 2.9 7.5 2.7 0.9 2.9 4.0 3.8
 Mexico 1.2 5.3 3.9 3.9 3.3 3.9 3.8
 Argentina 3.4 9.2 8.9 1.9 3.1 3.0 3.0
(annual percent change unless indicated otherwise)
Source : World Bank.
a. Growth rates over intervals are compound weighted averages; average growth contributions, ratios and deflators are 
calculated as simple averages of the annual weighted averages for the region.
b. GDP at market prices and expenditure components are measured in constant 2005 U.S. dollars.  
c. Sub-region aggregate excludes Cuba and Grenada, for which data limitations prevent the forecasting of GDP 
components or Balance of Payments details.
d. Exports and imports of goods and non-factor services (GNFS).
e. Developing Central & North America: Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador.
f.  Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines, and Suriname.
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percent (slightly down from our January 2013 
projection) from 3.0 percent in 2012 (table LAC.2). 
Growth in selected resource exporting countries 
will be weaker due to recent declines in commodity 
prices. For commodity exporters, further declines 
in commodity prices will both reduce government 
revenues and foreign exchange revenues, placing 
pressure on currencies and government spending in 
those countries such as Argentina and Venezuela, 
where deficits are already high. 
 
The output gap for the region as a whole more or 
less closed in 2012, and with the expected uptick, 
GDP in 2013 is projected to expand at roughly the 
same rate as potential so there should be no 
significant exacerbation of overheating pressures 
(figure LAC.5 and 6). However, with growth 
expected to accelerate even further in 2014 and 
2015, partly due to relatively loose monetary and 
fiscal policies, inflationary pressures are expected to 
build and current account deficits to rise. 
 
Growth in Brazil is expected to accelerate to 2.9 
percent in 2013 and further to close to 4 percent 
over the 2014-2015 period, bolstered by spending 
on infrastructure and supportive private 
consumption. Monetary and fiscal policy are 
projected to remain expansionary (the public sector 
primary surplus declined below 2 percent of GDP 
in Q1 on a 12 months rolling basis). With the 
economy arguably operating at potential, the 
acceleration in growth will keep inflation near the 
upper limit of the targeted inflation range, while 
robust domestic demand in conjunction with 
relatively soft external demand and lower 
commodity prices will keep the current account 
balance in deficit at close to 3 percent of GDP by 
2015. Over the medium-to-long term efforts by the 
government to address the supply side constraints 
and reduce the custo Brasil are expected to lift 
potential output gradually.  
 
Growth in Argentina is also expected to accelerate 
to 3.1 percent in 2013, bolstered by a record 
harvest expected this season and by moderately 
stronger external demand from Brazil. However, 
growth is expected to underperform over the 
medium term remaining below potential growth, as 
distortions introduced by various policies aimed at 
holding back inflation cut into investment and total 
factor productivity growth.FN3 Fiscal policy is 
expected to tighten due to financing difficulties and softer 
commodity prices, which will further weaken growth.  
 
Paraguay will have the fastest growing economy in 
the region in 2013, due to appropriately 
accommodative monetary and fiscal policies and 
the normalization of agricultural output, following 
last year’s drought. In contrast, Venezuela will see 
one of the most pronounced decelerations in 
growth in the region (more than 4 percentage 
points to 1.4 percent) due to expected post-election 
cuts to government spending, and weak real-
income growth due to high inflation. Similarly 
growth in Ecuador is expected to decelerate by 
close to 1 percentage point to 3.8 percent. 
 
Growth in Latin America and the Carib-
bean is expected to accelerate only 
marginally through 2015 
Source: World Bank 
Note: 2009 data represents the average for the 2003-2007 period. 
Fig LAC.5  
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Output gaps to narrow in Latin America 
and the Caribbean in 2013  
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In Mexico growth momentum will ease only 
marginally to 3.3 percent in 2013, before 
reaccelerating to close to 4 percent over the 2014-
2015 period. Recent labor and telecommunication 
reforms are expected to lift growth in by increasing 
total factor productivity and by attracting more 
investment to the country.  Over the 2014-2015 
period the economic recovery in the United States, 
and in particular firmer private demand, will also 
support stronger Mexican export and remittances 
growth.  
 
Growth in Central America is projected to ease 
slightly to 4.3 percent as growth decelerates in 
almost all the countries in the region, despite terms 
of trade gains, as commodity prices, and oil prices 
in particular are expected to decline. Costa Rica 
remains one of the most competitive economies in 
the region, reflected in the strong export 
contribution to growth. Similarly export growth 
will remain robust in Panama.  
 
The Central American countries, which were 
among the most affected in the region by the 
2008/2009 global economic crisis, will continue to 
struggle to bring down fiscal deficits and public 
debt. Over the 2014-2015 period a more upbeat 
U.S. economy should help support growth in the 
region, boosting external demand for goods and 
services as well as remittances.  
 
Growth in the Caribbean will ease slightly to 2.5 
percent (table LAC.3), as growth in the Dominican 
Republic softens. Elsewhere growth is projected to 
remain restrained at around 2.4 percent due to very 
high debt levels, and relatively soft remittances and 
tourism revenues. Over the medium term large 
fiscal adjustments will be necessary to cut fiscal 
deficits to more sustainable levels and help reduce 
the public debt burden. These adjustments are 
likely to have negative consequences for growth in 
the short run.  
 
Monetary policies in the inflation targeting 
countries are projected to gradually move to a 
more neutral stance. The pace of adjustment may 
be slower than it would have been in the absence 
of very easy monetary conditions in high-income 
countries, (in particular in the United States and 
Japan) even if inflation rates remain close to the 
upper bound of the target range, as some of the 
countries in the region may be wary of attracting 
excessive capital flows and of appreciating currencies.  
Although some (IMF, 2013) argue that inflation 
expectations have become more anchored  -- 
inflation in the region remains and is projected to 
remain at or above the higher end of the target 
range in several of the inflation targeting countries 
that are once again running against capacity 
constraints. In countries with high inflation and 
exchange rate pressures the scope for monetary 
policy is very limited.  
 
Exchange rates are projected to appreciate only 
slightly in some of the financially integrated 
economies in the region, given very easy monetary 
policy in the major high-income economies and 
better fundamentals in the developing countries 
relative to high-income countries. There could also 
be an increase in volatility in exchange rates, as in 
the shorter term more volatile portfolio inflows are 
likely to affect exchange rates in these economies, 
as policy makers will be only partially successful in 
sterilizing these inflows. Macro prudential measures 
and/or capital controls will prove once again 
helpful in preserving healthy banking systems in 
the context of excessive global liquidity.  
 
 
Risks and 
Vulnerabilities 
 
 
 
The global economic environment has stabilized 
significantly since July of last year, and the 
likelihood and likely magnitude of external risks 
have declined and become more balanced, with 
upside risks more pronounced than even six 
months ago.  
 
A larger-than-expected deceleration in China’s 
economic growth, and in particular in investment, 
above and beyond the soft landing envisaged in our 
base line would undercut growth in the region as 
external demand would be much softer with both 
price and quantity effects, in particular for South 
American commodity exporters. Similarly a steeper 
than envisaged fiscal tightening in the United States 
would have negative spillovers for the economies 
in the region that have strong economic ties with 
the United States. The reverse of these situations 
represent the upside risks for the region. 
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Latin America and the Caribbean country forecasts  Table LAC.3 
    Est. Forecast
 00-09
a
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Argentina
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.4 9.2 8.9 1.9 3.1 3.0 3.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) 2.7 0.6 -0.4 0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3
Antigua and Barbuda
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.4 -8.5 -3.0 1.6 1.9 2.9 3.1
Current account bal/GDP (%) -14.8 -14.8 -10.8 -12.1 -12.1 -12.9 -13.0
Belize
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 5.0 2.7 2.0 5.3 2.6 3.0 3.1
Current account bal/GDP (%) -12.9 -2.8 -1.1 -2.6 -3.5 -3.8 -3.7
Bolivia
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.4 4.1 5.2 5.2 4.7 4.3 4.1
Current account bal/GDP (%) 3.9 3.9 1.4 7.4 6.4 5.6 5.0
Brazil
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 2.9 7.5 2.7 0.9 2.9 4.0 3.8
Current account bal/GDP (%) -0.7 -2.2 -2.1 -2.3 -2.7 -3.1 -3.3
Chile
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.2 5.8 5.9 5.6 4.9 4.5 4.7
Current account bal/GDP (%) 0.8 1.5 -1.3 -3.4 -3.8 -3.8 -4.1
Colombia
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.7 4.0 6.6 4.0 3.9 4.2 4.3
Current account bal/GDP (%) -1.4 -3.1 -2.9 -3.0 -3.4 -3.2 -2.9
Costa Rica
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.8 5.0 4.4 5.1 4.0 4.1 4.2
Current account bal/GDP (%) -5.0 -3.6 -5.4 -5.2 -4.4 -4.0 -3.7
Dominica
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 2.4 1.2 1.0 0.4 1.4 1.6 2.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) -18.2 -16.2 -12.9 -13.5 -12.4 -11.7 -11.1
Dominican Republic
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.5 7.8 4.5 3.9 2.5 3.7 4.4
Current account bal/GDP (%) -2.6 -8.4 -7.9 -7.0 -5.5 -4.5 -3.7
Ecuador
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.2 3.3 8.0 4.7 3.8 3.9 3.8
Current account bal/GDP (%) 1.0 -2.8 -0.2 -0.5 -1.3 -1.5 -1.7
El Salvador
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 2.0 1.4 2.0 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.5
Current account bal/GDP (%) -3.8 -2.7 -4.7 -5.2 -5.3 -5.1 -4.8
Guatemala
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.4 2.9 4.1 3.0 3.5 3.6 3.8
Current account bal/GDP (%) -4.8 -1.6 -3.3 -2.9 -2.9 -3.2 -3.4
Guyana
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 2.1 3.6 5.2 3.9 4.7 4.5 4.3
Current account bal/GDP (%) -9.0 -7.2 -8.6 -14.1 -14.3 -15.0 -15.2
Honduras
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.2
Current account bal/GDP (%) -6.7 -5.4 -8.5 -9.5 -11.2 -8.5 -8.4
Haiti
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 0.6 -5.4 5.6 2.8 3.4 4.2 3.9
Current account bal/GDP (%) -6.8 -9.5 -3.7 -4.0 -3.7 -4.0 -4.3
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    Est. Forecast
 00-09
a
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Jamaica
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 1.0 -1.5 1.3 -0.8 0.5 1.5 1.7
Current account bal/GDP (%) -10.2 -6.7 -13.5 -11.7 -11.1 -9.1 -6.7
Mexico
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 1.2 5.3 3.9 3.9 3.3 3.9 3.8
Current account bal/GDP (%) -1.5 -0.2 -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 -1.1 -1.2
Nicaragua
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 2.8 3.6 5.5 5.2 4.2 4.2 4.4
Current account bal/GDP (%) -17.3 -10.0 -13.2 -12.8 -13.6 -13.2 -12.3
Panama
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 5.6 7.5 10.6 10.0 7.5 7.0 6.5
Current account bal/GDP (%) -4.8 -9.9 -10.5 -9.2 -9.5 -9.2 -8.8
Peru
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.8 8.8 6.9 6.3 6.0 5.9 5.8
Current account bal/GDP (%) -0.7 -2.5 -1.9 -3.6 -2.9 -3.4 -3.6
Paraguay
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b c 2.3 15.0 4.0 -2.1 10.2 1.7 3.1
Current account bal/GDP (%) 0.1 -3.7 -1.3 -2.6 -1.4 -2.2 -2.8
St. Lucia
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 2.1 3.2 0.6 -0.2 1.2 1.7 2.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) -19.6 -17.1 -19.0 -18.1 -15.7 -13.5 -11.6
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 2.8 1.0 1.5 3.1 1.9 2.5 3.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) -18.8 -30.6 -28.7 -27.8 -26.7 -25.9 -25.0
Suriname
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.4 4.1 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) 9.8 6.5 5.6 6.2 5.2 3.8 2.1
Uruguay
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 2.1 8.9 6.5 3.9 3.8 4.1 4.3
Current account bal/GDP (%) -1.3 -1.9 -2.8 -5.3 -4.2 -4.5 -4.1
Venezuela, RB
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.3 -1.5 4.2 5.5 1.4 2.4 2.2
Current account bal/GDP (%) 10.0 2.9 7.9 3.0 4.1 4.0 3.8
Source : World Bank.
World Bank forecasts are frequently updated based on new information and changing (global) 
circumstances. Consequently, projections presented here may differ from those contained in other 
Bank documents, even if basic assessments of countries’ prospects do not significantly differ at any 
given moment in time.
Cuba, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, are not forecast owing to data limitations.
a. GDP growth rates over intervals are compound average; current account balance shares are simple 
averages over the period.
b. GDP measured in constant 2005 U.S. dollars.                                                                                   
c. GDP excluding binational corporations.
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Increasingly risks are domestic in nature, and stem 
in part from the challenges of getting the correct 
balance between macroeconomic policies to 
stimulate demand in the short-term and structural 
reforms to spur faster growth over the longer run. 
 
For those larger economies in the region where 
growth has slowed in the post-crisis period despite 
prolonged efforts at demand stimulus, the evidence 
seems to be accumulating that policies to boost 
domestic demand will not lead to higher growth if 
not accompanied by growth-enhancing policies 
that deal with supply side inefficiencies. Failure or 
delays in implementing such reforms could hold 
growth hostage over the medium term. 
  
Ample global liquidity and higher capital flows has 
complicated the task of conducting monetary 
policy and there is a risk that relatively low interest 
rates in some of the financially integrated 
economies might fuel rapid credit growth and 
contribute to inflation pressures. In some cases 
temporary and transparent capital controls may be 
warranted to help manage capital flows and prevent 
build up of vulnerabilities in financial systems.   
 
In so far as the overall international environment is 
less volatile countries may wish to give greater 
weight to the domestic inflationary pressures that 
these policies may be generating. 
 
A further risk stemming from the current 
environment of easy external financing conditions 
and increased search for yield by international 
investors is that countries and private agents in the 
region may take on too much debt or have large 
currency or maturity mismatches. Real credit 
growth has expanded rapidly in several countries in 
the region, including in Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, 
while several Caribbean countries are already 
burdened by very high debt levels.   
 
Over the longer term external financial conditions 
are likely to become tighter as high-income 
countries unwind their long-term positions and as 
base rates and spreads start to rise. Higher 
financing costs will likely reduce investment 
spending and growth in developing countries and 
may also expose unsustainable positions made 
possible by very easy external financing. Asset 
prices that have grown rapidly in the current 
environment may reverse course precipitously, 
stressing banking systems in the region.  
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Notes 
 
1. Potential output is estimated by the World Bank, based on a production function methodology, using an estimate 
of total factor product growth based on the average TFP growth between 1995 and 2005, and an estimate of the 
capital stock constructed using investment data, the perpetual inventory method and assumed depreciation rate of 
7 per cent, and the working-age population as the labor input (consistent with a constant labor force participation 
and natural unemployment rates). See Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) for an earlier attempt at using a similar meth-
odology.  
2. Weighted average of remittances as a share of recipient country’s GDP.  
3. Price controls in Argentina have helped contain inflation but could lead to shortages of certain goods.  
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Overview 
 
 
 
More than two years after the Arab Spring began, 
economic activity remains weighed down by 
elevated political tensions and continued civil strife 
in the region. Regional growth accelerated to 3.5 
percent in 2012 from minus 2.2 percent in 2011 
reflecting mainly a rebound in Libya’s crude oil 
production to pre-war levels that doubled real 
GDP and a weak growth recovery in Egypt (to 2.2 
percent in FY2012 from 1.8 percent in FY2011). 
Iran, the region’s largest economy, slipped into 
recession, with GDP falling by an estimated 1.9 
percent due to international sanctions and lower oil 
output while Algeria’s growth remained subdued at 
2.5 percent, supported by expansionary fiscal 
policy. Domestic demand and exports in Syria 
collapsed last year as the civil war intensified, with 
spillovers affecting activity in Jordan and Lebanon. 
Drought in Morocco reduced growth to 2.7 
percent from 5.0 percent in 2011.   
 
Outlook for 2013-15: Regional prospects 
depend critically on the evolution of domestic and 
cross-border political tensions. Aggregate regional 
growth is forecast to slow to 2.5 percent in 2013 
mainly due to weakness in the region’s three largest 
economies, before recovering to 4.2 percent in 
2015 as tensions ebb and the Euro Area, the 
region’s main trading partner, recovers.  
 
Within the region, Egypt’s GDP growth is forecast 
to slow to 1.6 percent in FY2013 on elevated 
political tensions and worsening macroeconomic 
imbalances, before recovering to about 4.8 percent 
in FY2015 as political tensions recede and reforms 
are undertaken, although there remain considerable 
downside risks to this forecast. GDP in Iran is 
forecast to contract for the second straight year  by 
1.1 percent due to sanctions and soaring inflation 
before recovering to about 1.9 percent in 2015. 
Growth in Algeria is expected to rise modestly to 
2.8 percent due in part to temporary disruptions to 
oil production, before firming to about 3.5 percent 
in 2015. Elsewhere, growth in Iraq and Libya is 
expected to remain relatively buoyant driven by 
their mineral sectors, although rising violence poses 
a risk to near term stability in Iraq. Meanwhile 
rising farm output in Morocco and strengthening 
external demand over the medium term should 
help lift growth towards potential in Morocco and 
Tunisia. Jordan’s and Lebanon’s GDP growth is 
expected to remain subdued in 2013 reflecting 
spillovers from Syria.  
 
Risks and vulnerabilities: Political 
uncertainty, polarization and 
conflict. Prolonged political crises and 
conflicts—elections are upcoming in several 
economies and conflicts are gaining intensity in 
Iraq and Syria—pose risks to near term recovery, 
and to long term potential growth rates by 
depressing investment and increasing the likelihood 
that urgent structural reforms are delayed. More 
generally the long term structural  challenges facing 
the region – which are a source of current volatility 
– remain the same as before the Arab Spring. A 
failure of political consensus needed to tackle these 
structural weaknesses will mean that they will likely 
contribute to low growth rates even when calm 
returns to the region. 
 
We a k e n i n g  m a c r o e c o n o m i c   
fundamentals and rising fiscal 
sustainability risks. Rising fiscal outlays to 
fund difficult-to-reform food and fuel subsidies are 
generating serious fiscal and current account 
imbalances among oil importers – a situation 
exacerbated by rising borrowing costs and 
exchange rate depreciation, although the recent 
moderation in global food prices could provide 
some respite in the near term.  
 
Euro Area and US recovery. Protracted 
weakness in the Euro zone would hurt economies 
with close trade, investment and financial ties to it. 
Any increase in global risk aversion would also 
reduce already depressed capital inflows into the 
region. On the upside, better-than-expected 
economic outcomes in the US and Euro Area 
should support growth, particularly in 
economies where political tensions are 
relatively muted.  
 
Commodity price and geo-political 
developments: Oil exporters in the region 
could be very vulnerable if the projected gradual 
decline in commodity prices occurs more sharply 
than in the baseline. While benefitting importers, it 
would cut into incomes, government revenues and 
foreign currency earnings of oil exporters – forcing 
potentially significant adjustments.    
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Recent Developments 
 
 
 
Aggregate regional growth picked up in 2012 in the 
developing Middle-East & North Africa region to 
3.5 percent in 2012, mainly reflecting a recovery 
from a 2.2 percent contraction in 2011 due to 
social and political unrest in Egypt, and armed 
conflict in Libya. Political (domestic and 
international) tensions continue to weigh on 
economic activity and investment across the region. 
International sanctions are contributing to rising 
inflation and negative growth in Iran, while 
spillovers from the intensifying civil conflict in 
Syria, including the disruption of land trading 
routes, have cut into economic activity in Lebanon 
and Jordan with the latter also affected by energy 
shortfalls in Egypt.  At the same time, weak 
economic conditions in European trading partners 
have acted as a drag on non-oil exports and 
tourism receipts. 
 
Among oil importers, growth remained subdued 
during 2012 reflecting spillovers from conflict 
within the region and weak external demand from 
Euro Area trading partners. The main exception to 
this trend was Tunisia, where GDP growth 
accelerated to 3.6 percent in 2012 from just below 
2 percent in 2011, supported by a recovery in 
tourism and increased domestic demand following 
an earlier relaxation of fiscal policy. Egypt’s 
economy grew by just 2.2 percent in 2012 in fiscal 
year terms, a modest recovery from the 1.8 percent 
outturn in 2011, supported by higher government 
spending and record remittance inflows. In 
calendar terms, the rebound was more substantial – 
4.6 percent versus 0.5 percent in 2011 – but 
reflected a recovery from a low base.  
 
Elsewhere, Lebanon’s GDP growth is estimated to 
have remained flat at 1.5 percent in 2012 as 
elevated domestic political uncertainty and 
spillovers from the conflict in Syria undermined 
tourism and scarce public resources came under 
pressure from growing numbers of refugees 
(estimated at 1  million plus in a total population of 
about 4.3 million). At an estimated 2.8 percent, 
Jordan’s growth was only slightly better than the 
2.6 percent outturn in 2011, as slower 
manufacturing growth reflecting a domestic energy 
crisis offset higher public and private sector 
spending. However, private consumption in both 
Jordan and Lebanon benefited from added demand 
associated with a  rising influx of Syrian refugees. 
Although Morocco has remained relatively free 
from political and social tensions, drought hurt 
agricultural output, while weak demand among 
Euro zone trading partners hit manufacturing and 
tourism, with growth slowing to just 2.7 percent 
from 5.0 percent in 2011 and the lowest since 2000. 
 
Among oil exporters, growth experiences have 
been mixed. Thanks to a post-conflict recovery in 
oil production, Libya’s GDP expanded by 105 
percent in 2012. Growth in Algeria was subdued at 
about 2.5 percent in 2012, supported mainly by 
rising government spending financed by relatively 
buoyant global energy prices. Post-war increases in 
crude oil production helped sustain an 8.4 percent 
increase in Iraqi GDP. Output in Iran, however, 
shrank an estimated 1.9 percent and inflation 
reached over 40 percent this year due to 
international sanctions and currency depreciations. 
Growth is showing signs of recovering in Yemen, 
but remains fragile with GDP barely expanding 0.1 
percent in 2012 after contracting 10.5 percent in 
2011. Although fraught with uncertainty, 
indications are that Syria’s conflict has caused 
GDP to shrink by nearly a third – reflecting a 
collapse in both domestic demand and exports. 
 
Nascent economic recoveries among 
oil importers have suffered repeated 
setbacks over the past year 
 
Periodic eruptions of political and social tensions 
or renewed weakness in the Euro Area have 
repeatedly set back nascent recoveries among 
developing oil importing economies in the Middle-
East & North Africa region, with growth turning 
increasingly volatile in Egypt and Tunisia. For 
instance, since 2011 Egypt has experienced three 
separate episodes of a sharp deceleration or 
contraction in activity as political and social 
tensions erupted, punctuating rebounds in activity. 
In Tunisia, a recovery in early 2012 led by tourism 
and service sector growth was interrupted by social 
unrest in the second quarter and lower demand in 
the Euro Area, the country’s main trading partner.  
 
Recent high frequency data up till March show a 
recovery in industrial output in Egypt from last 
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years trough, led by manufacturing and construction, 
although PMI surveys up till May indicate weak 
business conditions. Among other oil importers, 
momentum has held up in Jordan, but weakened in 
Morocco and Tunisia (figure MENA.1). 
 
Egypt and by extension Jordan, which has relied on 
cheap natural gas imports from the former to produce 
electricity, have faced severe energy shortfalls over the past 
year. In both countries – and indeed elsewhere in the 
region – energy demand has soared in recent years 
partly due to large subsidies in place. Energy 
shortages in Egypt, which is the second largest 
natural gas producer in North Africa after Algeria, 
reflect a longer term decline in supply, more 
conservative drilling plans by some major 
producers due to rising domestic uncertainty, and 
increasing reliance by Egypt on exports of crude oil to 
cover imports and debts, leaving less for refineries to 
process for domestic use. Egypt’s natural gas exports to 
Jordan have suffered, at first because of sabotage 
that targeted the Arab Gas Pipeline in 2011, then 
by a temporary suspension of exports last October 
in an effort to cover a spike in domestic energy 
demand; and most recently in January this year 
because of rising social unrest in Egypt.  
 
Export momentum weakened among 
some oil importers in the first quarter  
 
Recent seasonally adjusted export earnings data 
from Q1 (figure MENA.2) indicate that exports are 
stabilizing in Egypt and Lebanon after rebounding 
at the end of last year, but contracting sharply once 
again in Morocco in Q1. Jordan meanwhile has 
been hurt by the closure of land trading routes 
through Syria:  exports to other countries in the 
region – some 50 percent of total exports in 2012 
(figure MENA.3) – fell by an annualized 21.7 
percent seasonally adjusted pace in the three 
months through February. Tunisia’s exports 
remained buoyant in Q1 helped by a recovery in 
agricultural, textile and some manufacturing exports.   
 
Production in developing MENA oil 
exporters continues to contract 
 
Industrial output in the MENA region resumed its 
downward trend in the second half of last year as 
 
A recovery in industrial output at the 
end of 2012 lost momentum in Tuni-
sia and Morocco in Q1 
Source: World Bank; Datastream. 
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The recovery in exports among oil 
importers has lost momentum in Mo-
rocco and Jordan 
     Source: World Bank; Datastream. 
Fig MENA.2   
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Jordan, which trades heavily with oth-
er MENA economies, has been hurt by 
the closure of land trading routes 
through Syria 
Source: World Bank; IMF Direction  of Trade Statistics. 
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the boost from Libya faded.  Aggregate regional 
production volumes fell by 27.2 percent annualized 
in Q4 last year, led by sharp drops of close to 16 
percent in both Iran and Algeria.  
 
More recently, aggregate regional production 
volumes excluding Libya (figure MENA.4) picked 
up in Q1. However this reflected a stabilization in  
in output in Iran following sharp declines over the 
past year due to crippling US and EU sanctions 
that had led to oil production falling to 2.63 mbd in 
September  - the lowest in 23 years according to 
the International Energy Agency (IEA). As per 
latest IEA estimates, Iran’s production was about 
2.65mbd in May, with the country  likely to cut 
output going ahead as exports to Asian buyers 
dwindle due to a tightening of international 
sanctions. Japan for example bought only 8000bd 
of Iranian oil in April, down 97 percent from April 
2012. Prior to the sanctions, Iran used to produce 
about 3.5mbd and export about 2.5mbd of oil.  
 
There have been production setbacks in other 
countries too, notably Algeria in the aftermath of 
the militant attacks in mid-January on the Amenas 
gas plants which account for  about 10 percent of 
the country’s total gas output. Along with a slow 
recovery from these attacks, heightened security 
after the attacks also hurt crude oil production 
which temporarily fell to 1.14 million bpd in March 
from 1.16 mbd in February according to the IEA, 
although levels have since recovered.  
 
Iraq surpassed Iran as the second largest oil 
producer in OPEC at the end of 2012. However 
crude oil production and exports fell slightly at 
start of this year reflecting disputes between 
Baghdad and the semi- autonomous region of 
Kurdistan that led to a halt in exports from the 
Kirkuk Ceyhan pipeline and weather-related 
disruptions in southern Iraq. Libya’s production 
has also fallen in recent months—most recently by 
60,000 bpd in March— with reports 
suggesting that an ageing infrastructure is 
affecting output. 
 
Activity in Syria has collapsed as the conflict 
has intensified, and it is likely that the economy 
contracted by nearly a third during 2012, possibly 
even more. As of December 2012 industrial 
production volumes were half their level at end-
2011. Although difficult to gauge the true extent of 
economic damage from the conflict, mirror 
statistics from trading partners indicate that exports 
and imports fell by an unprecedented 85 and 79 
percent respectively in 2012.  
 
Current plans by developing oil 
exporters to significantly raise 
investment may prove optimistic 
 
Given stagnating or declining production levels and 
sharply increasing domestic demand, oil exporters 
will need to invest heavily in infrastructure, 
exploration and production to raise production 
levels. However private capital and FDI inflows 
may fail to materialize because of security risks, 
poor legal environments for investment and 
political uncertainty, and, in the case of Iran, 
international sanctions.  
 
In Iraq, government estimates count on capital 
expenditures of $30 billion per year in energy 
infrastructure to meet its production targets. But 
progress on this front is likely to be slow due to 
payment disputes with the Kurdish Regional 
Government, and delays in the passage of a law 
that would govern the development of Iraq's oil 
and gas wealth (the law was first announced in 
2008, but has yet to be passed). Algeria is also 
planning to invest significantly in hydrocarbon 
exploration, notably in shale gas, and in refineries. 
However raising private investment may prove 
challenging given political uncertainty generated by 
upcoming presidential elections in spring 2014 and 
earlier reversals in investor-friendly provisions in 
investment laws that may deter investors.  
 
Oil exporters ouput contracted for most of 
2011 and 2012, led by declines in Iran, and 
recently Algeria  
Source: World Bank. 
Fig MENA.4 
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Inflation pressures built up in 2012, 
and persist  
 
The latest CPI data show that price pressures 
have remained strong, with annual inflation 
rising close to or over 7 percent (y/y) in 
Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan and, to over 10 
percent (y/y) in Lebanon in  the first few 
months of 2013 (figure MENA.5). In part 
this reflects partial fuel and energy tariff 
reforms in some economies (Jordan, Tunisia, 
Egypt) to contain soaring fiscal burdens from 
subsidies. In Jordan and Egypt, shortfalls in 
energy provision slowed production in other 
sectors and contributed to inflation pressures, 
with the latter also affected by a 13 percent 
depreciation of the currency since December. 
Growing inflation pressures in Egypt also 
likely reflect the negative impact of 
prolonged political and social tensions on 
absorptive capacity and potential output in 
the face of continued sharp increase in 
government expenditures (up 30 percent y/y 
in the first half of FY 2013).   
 
Similar supply side constraints, combined 
with sanctions and a sharp fall in the value of 
the Iranian Rial have contributed to rising 
inflation in Iran, which (per official 
estimates) touched 38.5 percent in December. 
The market value of the Iranian currency 
dropped to 37,000 Rial per US Dollar in 
October from 25,000 in September compared 
to an official exchange rate of about 12,000 
Rial. With the currency dropping further 
since the start of the year, inflation touched 
40.7 percent (y/y) in March. 
 
However inflation pressures remain subdued 
in several economies, including Morocco and 
Iraq, helped by generous food and fuel 
subsidies.  Inflation in Yemen fell into single-
digits in 2012 to about 7 percent (but has 
since accelerated), from a peak of 24.6 
percent in October 2011, as improving 
security eased supply bottlenecks after the 
formation of transition government in early 
2012. Inflation in Algeria decelerated to 3.1 
percent in April on slower growth in (mostly 
imported) food prices.  
 
Tourism-related revenues and jobs 
improved slightly in 2012,  
 
Tourism inflows, a key source of foreign 
exchange and jobs (figure MENA.6) in the 
region, are recovering. According to the 
United Nations World Tourism Organization 
(UNWTO), aggregate tourist arrivals in North 
African economies rose 8.7 percent to 18.5 
million in 2012, only slightly below the peak 
of 18.8 million visitors in 2010. In Tunisia, 
tourism revenues in 2012 reached $2.1 
billion, up 30 percent from the previous year, 
supporting a strong recovery in the service 
sector. In Egypt, tourism revenues stabilized 
at around $10bn during 2012, although well 
below the $12.5 billion earned in 2010. As a 
result, the sector, which employs roughly one 
in every eight Egyptian workers (directly and 
 
Inflation remains persistently high in 
many economies          
Source: World Bank; Datastream. 
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A significant share of the workforce is 
employed by the tourism industry  
Source: World Bank; UNWTO; World Travel and Tourism Council. 
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indirectly), only shed 14,000 jobs per industry 
estimates, versus half a million or so tourism 
related losses during 2011 (figure MENA.7).  
 
The number of tourists to the Middle East 
economies (including high-income economies 
in the region) fell at a slightly slower pace in 
2012 (-4.9 percent vs -6.7 percent in 2011) to 
52.6 million. Jordan, which reported a 15.3 
percent increase in earnings in 2012, Morocco 
and Iran have benefited from instability in 
neighboring countries, attracting visitors 
from the GCC economies and Central and 
South Asia that otherwise would have headed 
to traditional tourist hotspots such as Egypt 
and Lebanon.  
 
Recent data however suggest that tourism 
related gains in Tunisia and Egypt are likely 
to have been lost in the wake of recent social 
unrest. Revenues from tourism fell 7.5 
percent from a year earlier in Q1 in Tunisia, 
hit by security concerns after a political 
assassination in February, although the unrest 
has since eased. Reports from Egypt indicate 
sharp drops in hotel occupancy.  
 
Unemployment rates have eased 
slightly, but remain high 
 
High levels of unemployment, one of the catalysts 
for the Arab Spring uprisings, have shown modest 
signs of improvement in some economies. In 
Tunisia, the official jobless rate fell from 18.9 
percent in 2011 to 16.7 percent in 2012 helped by a 
recovery in tourism. Growing tourism inflows have 
also supported a decline in official unemployment 
rates in Jordan, Morocco and Iran.   
 
Nonetheless, unemployment remains extremely 
high (figure MENA.8), particularly among the 
youth and in urban areas. In oil exporting 
economies, strong growth in capital-intensive 
hydrocarbon sectors has boosted overall growth, 
but failed to generate many jobs. For instance, in 
Iraq, the oil sector accounts for only 1 percent of 
total employment versus a contribution to GDP of 
about two-thirds. In addition, large commodity 
export inflows contribute to Dutch Disease 
pressures, undermining the development of non-oil 
sectors that could potentially provide jobs. More 
generally,  job creation across the region is being 
held back by a difficult business climate (figure 
MENA.9), and further hampered by political and 
economic uncertainty among oil importing 
economies.    
 
Remittance inflows rose during 2012 
 
With remittance inflows estimated at $49 billion in 
2012, the Middle East and North Africa region 
experienced the fastest expansion of remittances in 
the world, growing by 14.3 percent in 2012 
compared with 2011 (World Bank, 2013). Egypt 
received a record US$19 billion (8 percent of 
GDP), up from $14.3 billion in 2011, making it the 
sixth largest receiver of official remittances in the 
world. Although Egypt has a large stock of highly 
 
Unemployment rates have declined 
modestly in some countries, but  
generally remain high   
Source:  World Bank. 
* range for Yemen 
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A modest recovery in tourism during 
2012 has yet to reverse sharp job  
losses in the sector during 2011  
Source: World Bank; UNWTO; World Travel and Tourism Council. 
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skilled expatriates in the US, the UK and other 
OECD countries, about two-thirds of its migrants 
are working in oil rich countries within the MENA 
region, which benefitted from relatively buoyant oil 
prices last year. Inflows were up by 10 percent in 
Tunisia and 6 percent in Jordan but remained 
broadly stable at about US$7.4 billion in Lebanon. 
 
Public finances have deteriorated 
sharply raising fiscal sustainability 
concerns  
 
Broad structural public finance reforms are needed 
in developing MENA economies, to ensure fiscal 
sustainability, and to limit vulnerability to adverse 
economic shocks. Public expenditures as a share of 
GDP tend to be large, and dominated by relatively 
rigid wages and entrenched subsidies, with a 
narrow revenue base heavily dependent on 
revenues from a few key sectors. 
 
Deteriorating public finances during 2012 (figure 
MENA.10) in the region reflected a number of 
factors. These include:  slippage in revenues due to 
underlying economic weakness; rising costs of 
imported but heavily subsidized food and fuel 
commodities; and expansionary fiscal policies 
to shore up flagging economies and to 
contain social discontent. Government 
outlays were up 15 percent and 11 percent 
(y/y) in Algeria and Morocco during 2012 
and by 30 percent (y/y) in the first half of the 
current fiscal year in Egypt.  
Rising fiscal deficits and public sector debt have 
added to growing fiscal sustainability concerns, 
notably in Lebanon and Egypt where spending 
pressures exacerbated by rising borrowing costs 
have pushed interest expenditures to about 40 
percent and 25 percent of total revenues 
respectively in these economies. To finance its 
revenue shortfalls Egypt has relied heavily on 
borrowing from the domestic banking sector, and 
grant aid from the Gulf economies. Rising public-
sector borrowing is crowding out private sector 
borrowing and increasing the exposure of the 
banking sector to sovereign risk. Meanwhile, delays 
in tax reforms have  delayed the approval of a 
US$4.8billion loan from the IMF, and in turn,  
assistance from other multilateral and bilateral 
partners despite indications that the fiscal deficit 
will reach over 12 percent of GDP in FY2013.  
Among oil exporters, fiscal surpluses have 
shrunk as revenues, despite strong growth, 
have failed to keep pace with surging public 
expenditures.  
 
A number of economies are attempting fiscal 
consolidation in order to manage funding pressures 
and risks, with a focus on fuel and food subsidies 
given their significantly large share of total 
spending. Jordan liberalized fuel prices last year as 
part of an IMF $2billion loan program, and a 
gradual reform of electricity tariffs is planned this 
summer to curb contingent liabilities associated 
with rising indebtedness of the state owned 
electricity company (which has been forced to sell  
power at below cost). Tunisia raised fuel prices by 
nearly 7 percent in March, the second hike in six 
 
…In part reflecting a difficult busi-
ness climate made worse by political 
uncertainty and social unrest  
Source: World Bank. 
Fig MENA .9  
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Tu
ni
sia
Eu
ro
pe
 &
 C
. A
sia
Ea
st
 A
sia
 &
 P
ac
La
tin
 A
m
. &
 C
ar
.
M
or
oc
co
M
id
dl
e 
Ea
st
 &
 N
A
Jo
rd
an
Eg
yp
t
Le
ba
no
n
Ye
m
en
W
es
t B
an
k 
&
G
az
a
Su
b-
Sa
ha
ra
n 
Af
.
Sy
ria Ira
n
Al
ge
ria Ira
q
Dj
ib
ou
ti
Ranking in Doing Business Indicators, 2012
 
Fiscal balances have deteriorated in 
the region as have debt levels   
Source: World Bank; Datastream; IMF. 
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month, despite strong domestic opposition as 
inflation has increased.  Algeria’s 2013 budget plans 
support fiscal consolidation of about 2 percent of 
GDP in the overall balance led by a decline in 
public sector wage expenditures, but worryingly 
also predicated on continued buoyancy in 
commodity prices and strong external demand 
which may not materialize.  Lebanon, which posted 
a modest primary deficit of 0.4 percent in 2012, its 
first in several years, on rising public sector wage 
costs and weak revenue growth, is planning 3 
percent worth of GDP expenditure cuts during 
2013. 
 
However, fiscal reforms have slowed in Morocco, 
and Iran. Following a small hike in fuel prices in 
June and a cut in the subsidy of imported wheat 
last year, Morocco has shifted consolidation efforts 
towards cuts in public investment spending (of 
about 2 percent of GDP for 2013) despite a 
subsidy bill estimated at 6 percent of the GDP.  
Although subsidy reforms have been proposed 
they remain highly politically contentious. Iran’s 
parliament  has blocked the second phase of fuel 
subsidy reforms, with budget proposals for 2013 
projecting about a one-third increase in overall 
spending over 2012 levels. Recently Egypt has 
taken some tentative steps towards liberalizing fuel 
and energy subsidies and tax reforms are also in the 
works as the fiscal situation has deteriorated, but 
reforms remain difficult given lack of political 
consensus and elevated social tensions.  
 
External vulnerability has increased 
among oil importers  
 
Rising current account deficits and balance of 
payments pressures combined with managed or 
fixed exchange rates have resulted in external 
financing difficulties, falling foreign exchange 
reserves (figure MENA.11), and repeated sovereign 
credit rating downgrades in several oil importing 
economies in the region.  Higher current account 
deficits reflected an increasing cost of food imports 
compounded by weak European demand for 
North African exporters,  reaching over 16 percent 
of GDP in Jordan and Lebanon (despite 
remittances estimated at 18 percent of GDP in the 
latter), and 9.6 percent in Morocco and 8.1 percent 
in Tunisia. Egypt posted a 3.1 percent of GDP 
deficit, with the trade deficit rising to 10.4 percent 
led by a sharp drop in merchandise exports and 
surging imports.   
 
Trade deficits have shown signs of modest 
improvement entering 2013 in Jordan, Lebanon, 
Egypt and Tunisia. Foreign exchange reserves have 
also been partly bolstered in recent months 
reflecting external support from the IMF (Jordan), 
support from other regional economies (Jordan, 
Morocco and Tunisia),  a rebound in foreign direct 
investment in Tunisia (up 85 percent during 2012) 
and short term private capital inflows in Lebanon. 
That said, excepting Lebanon, reserves are down 
by roughly a quarter in Tunisia, Jordan and 
Morocco compared to January 2011, amounting to 
only slightly higher than the critical 3 month 
import cover threshold in Tunisia and Jordan.  
 
In Egypt, reserves are down by two-thirds from 
January 2011 (figure MENA.11), amounting to less 
than 2 months of import cover and the currency 
has fallen  some 12 percent since late December.  
Dwindling reserves have forced the central bank to 
hold weekly foreign exchange auctions since 
December, and to raise its benchmark rate to 10.25 
percent (up 75bp) in March to support the 
currency and combat inflation.  Reflecting Egypt’s 
precarious fiscal and external position, CDS 
spreads have widened substantially to close to 700 
basis points and the country has received 
substantial financing assistance from Qatar and 
Libya. 
 
Current account positions among oil importers 
improved last year, but are likely to face pressures 
this year reflecting lower oil prices, and growing 
 
Foreign exchange reserves have fall-
en sharply in some oil importing 
economies 
Source: World Bank, Datastream. 
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import needs as they invest in production and 
refining capacities.  Libya’s current account 
position has improved, buoyed by recovery in 
crude oil production and continued elevated 
international prices, but current account positions 
have deteriorated in Syria and Iran, with the latter 
facing difficulty in securing buyers for its oil in Asia 
as international sanctions have tightened. 
 
Financial flows to the region 
recovered slightly in 2012 but remain 
much lower than in 2010  
 
Capital flows to the developing MENA 
region recovered modestly in 2012 to an 
estimated $17.5 billion after almost halving to 
$15.8 billion in 2011. The improvement 
reflected an increase in net FDI flows (up 22 
percent) to Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, 
although overall levels remain well below pre-
Arab Spring inflows (table MENA.1). 
Morocco and Lebanon have also successfully 
issued sovereign debt over the last year worth 
$1.5billion (in December) and $1.1 billion (in 
April, 20 percent of which was bought by 
overseas investors) respectively.  Other 
sovereigns including Jordan and Egypt are 
considering debuting sukuk bonds later this 
year in international capital markets to 
finance fiscal deficits.  
Outlook 
 
 
 
The outlook for the region as a whole remains 
dominated by domestic political developments, 
with added risks from external demand, 
commodity price and geo-political developments.  
Output for the region as a whole is projected to 
rise by 2.5 percent in 2013 (table MENA.2), and 
gradually firm to 3.5 percent and 4.2 percent in 
2014 and 2015, buoyed on the one hand by 
stronger demand in the Euro Area and an assumed 
easing of regional political tensions, but held back 
on the other hand by declining oil prices and an 
assumed tightening of macroeconomic policies that 
begins to alleviate growing fiscal and inflation 
tensions.  
 
In Egypt, the near term outlook remains 
difficult reflecting weak investor and 
consumer confidence on account of 
upcoming elections in the fall, widening fiscal 
and current account imbalances and delays in 
negotiating an IMF program. Egypt is 
expected to import natural gas for the first 
time in decades which will further add to 
external financing pressures. Official 
estimates project a bumper wheat harvest this 
year in Egypt, which could reduce food 
imports, but these are regarded as too 
 
 Net Capital Flows to Middle East and North Africa 
 
 
Table MENA.1 
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optimistic by some observers. Absent any 
major fiscal or balance of payments crisis, 
growth is expected to slow to 1.6 percent in 
the current fiscal year from 2.2 percent last 
year. Conditional upon a subsiding in political 
tensions and reforms being undertaken, 
growth should firm to about 3.0 percent next 
year and to about 4.8 percent in 2015, 
although this forecast remains subject to 
substantial downside risks (table MENA.3).  
 
Growth is expected to pick up slowly in Tunisia. 
Although civil unrest experienced in February has 
receded, there remain tensions between 
conservative and secular forces. Exports showed 
signs of recovery in Q1, but a slow pace of 
recovery in Euro zone, its main trading partner, 
should temper gains in external demand and 
tourism inflows in 2013. Accordingly, growth is 
expected to rise to about 3.8 percent, only slightly 
higher than 3.6 percent in 2012, and to gradually 
pick up further to about 5 percent in 2015 as 
the external and internal environment 
improves. 
   
Growth in Jordan is forecast to pick up somewhat 
to 3.3 percent in 2013 (from 2.8 percent), as 
confidence in the economy improves due to 
reforms taken as part of the IMF program, and also 
reflecting the boost to sentiment and activity from 
 
Middle East and North Africa forecast summary Table MENA.2 
    Est. Forecast
 00-09
a
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
 GDP at market prices b 3.9 4.6 -2.2 3.5 2.5 3.5 4.2
(Sub-region totals-- countries with full NIA + BOP data)
c
GDP at market prices c 4.3 4.9 1.2 -0.3 1.2 2.6 3.5
     GDP per capita (units in US$) 2.8 3.3 -0.4 -1.8 -0.3 1.1 2.1
     PPP GDP d 4.3 5.2 1.0 -0.4 0.9 2.4 3.4
  Private consumption 4.1 4.2 2.8 0.7 2.2 3.0 3.9
  Public consumption 3.7 3.6 3.8 2.9 3.5 3.1 3.2
  Fixed investment 6.9 3.0 2.7 -0.6 1.3 2.5 3.3
  Exports, GNFS e 4.3 5.5 -3.5 -8.1 0.9 3.5 5.0
  Imports, GNFS e 7.5 4.8 0.2 0.6 4.8 6.2 5.4
Net exports, contribution to growth -0.6 0.2 -1.3 -3.0 -1.4 -1.2 -0.5
Current account bal/GDP (%) 5.2 1.6 1.5 -1.9 -3.3 -3.4 -3.1
GDP deflator (median, LCU) 5.9 8.4 6.4 4.2 4.2 3.7 3.3
Fiscal balance/GDP (%) -0.5 -2.4 -3.7 -6.5 -6.4 -5.3 -4.7
Memo items: GDP                                                 
MENA Geographic Region f 4.1 4.8 3.6 2.5 2.6 3.2 3.8
 Selected GCC Countries  g                                     3.8 4.6 6.1 5.3 3.8 3.8 4.0
 Developing Oil Exporters 3.6 4.5 -4.4 3.5 2.1 3.1 3.8
 Developing Oil Importers 4.5 4.8 1.6 3.5 3.1 4.1 4.7
 Egypt 4.4 6.0 0.5 4.6 2.3 3.9 4.9
   Fiscal Year Basis 4.3 5.3 1.8 2.2 1.6 3.0 4.8
 Iran 4.6 5.9 1.7 -1.9 -1.1 0.7 1.9
 Algeria 3.4 3.3 2.4 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.5
(annual percent change unless indicated otherwise)
Source : World Bank.
a. Growth rates over intervals are compound weighted averages; average growth contributions, ratios 
and deflators are calculated as simple averages of the annual weighted averages for the region.
b. GDP at market prices and expenditure components are measured in constant 2005 U.S. dollars.  
c. Sub-region aggregate excludes Iraq and Libya, for which data limitations prevent the forecasting of 
GDP components or Balance of Payments details.
d. GDP measured at PPP exchange rates.
e. Exports and imports of goods and non-factor services (GNFS).
f. Geographic region includes high-income countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, United Arab Emirates 
and Saudi Arabia.
g. Selected GCC Countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Oman and Saudi Arabia.
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Middle East and North Africa forecast summary 
 
 
Table MENA.3 
    Est. Forecast
 00-09
a
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Algeria
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.4 3.3 2.4 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.5
Current account bal/GDP (%) 22.3 7.3 10.5 7.7 5.4 4.5 3.9
Egypt, Arab Rep.
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.4 6.0 0.5 4.6 2.3 3.9 4.9
   Fiscal Year Basis 4.3 5.3 1.8 2.2 1.6 3.0 4.8
Current account bal/GDP (%) 1.1 -2.0 -2.3 -3.1 -3.5 -2.8 -2.1
Iran, Islamic Rep.
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.6 5.9 1.7 -1.9 -1.1 0.7 1.9
Current account bal/GDP (%) 6.4 7.1 5.9 -0.1 -2.5 -3.3 -3.0
Iraq
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b -1.0 0.8 8.5 8.4 9.0 8.0 8.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) 3.0 12.5 7.0 3.8 3.0 4.0
Jordan
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 6.1 2.3 2.6 2.8 3.3 3.4 4.5
Current account bal/GDP (%) -4.4 -7.1 -12.0 -17.3 -15.4 -14.2 -12.7
Lebanon
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.4 7.0 1.5 1.5 2.0 2.3 4.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) -16.8 -20.4 -12.5 -13.8 -14.7 -13.6 -13.2
Libya
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.8 3.5 -53.9 104.5 15.0 10.0 8.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) 19.5 9.1 35.8 24.0 18.0 9.0
Morocco
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.6 3.7 5.0 2.7 4.5 4.8 4.7
Current account bal/GDP (%) 0.2 -4.5 -7.9 -9.5 -9.7 -8.8 -8.0
Syrian Arab Republic
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b,c 4.6 3.2 -3.2 -30.0 -10.0 -2.0 3.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) 2.7 -0.6 -1.7 -8.2 -8.8 -7.5 -6.7
Tunisia
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.1 3.0 -1.8 3.6 3.8 4.8 5.1
Current account bal/GDP (%) -2.7 -4.8 -7.4 -8.1 -8.4 -7.4 -6.4
Yemen, Rep.
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.5 7.7 -10.5 0.1 4.3 4.5 4.6
Current account bal/GDP (%) 1.2 -3.7 -4.0 -1.4 -2.3 -2.8 -2.1
Source : World Bank.
World Bank forecasts are frequently updated based on new information and changing (global) 
circumstances. Consequently, projections presented here may differ from those contained in other 
Bank documents, even if basic assessments of countries’ prospects do not significantly differ at any 
given moment in time.
Djibouti, West Bank and Gaza are not forecast owing to data limitations.
a. GDP growth rates over intervals are compound average; current account balance shares are simple 
averages over the period.
b. GDP measured in constant 2005 U.S. dollars.
c. The estimate for GDP decline in Syria in 2012 is subject to significant uncertainty. 
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the signing of an $18bn deal with Iraq to build an 
oil pipeline from southern Iraq to Aqaba. The 
pipeline which is expected to be completed by 2017 
should help spur FDI and domestic activity and 
help lift growth to over 4 percent by 2015.  
However there remain downside risks from the 
conflict in Syria. Morocco’s economy should 
benefit from the recovery in agricultural sector 
output, which should lift growth to about 4.5 
percent in 2013 from 2.7 percent in 2012 and to 
remain buoyant at just under 5 percent in the 
medium term supported by the recovery in the 
Euro Area. 
 
Aggregate growth among oil exporters should slow 
in the near term reflecting a stabilization of 
production to a more sustainable pace in Libya, 
recession in Iran and production and export 
setbacks in Algeria and Iraq.  Algeria’s growth is 
expected to pick up modestly to about 2.8 percent 
in 2013 (from 2.5 percent) in 2013 and gradually 
firm thereafter. Iran’s economy is expected to 
remain weak until some sort of resolution with 
Western governments over its nuclear issues can be 
reached. Until then domestic investment and 
private consumption should remain subdued with  
growth projected at about 1.9 percent in 2015, well 
below its average growth of 4.5 percent between 
2000 and 2009.  
 
Although a tentative agreement on oil payments 
between the Iraqi government and the Kurdish 
semi-autonomous region was reached in early May, 
longer term plans to raise Iraq's oil output to about 
3.3 million bpd (from nearly 3 million bpd 
currently) may prove challenging given the recent 
history of tensions between the two and also given 
the scale of infrastructure investment needed to 
realize the higher output.  Accordingly medium 
term growth is projected to remain at close to last 
year’s outturns of about 8.5 percent. Near 
term risks have increased, however, given the 
escalation in conflict in recent months.  
 
Capital inflows are expected to recover gradually in 
the region, rising to about US$30 billion in 2015, 
led mainly by growing FDI inflows as political 
tensions ease and reflecting infrastructure 
investment opportunities in both oil importing and 
exporting economies, including Algeria, Iraq and 
Jordan.  Private capital flows to Egypt are likely to 
remain weak in the near term due to continued 
uncertainty there. However inflows should pick 
up, including inflows from GCC economies 
into construction and tourism sectors which 
have been diverted elsewhere into the region. 
For the region, equity inflows are also 
expected to recover but should remain 
modest compared to the pick up in bond 
inflows. 
 
  
Risks and Challenges 
 
 
 
 
The main risks and challenges facing the region are 
domestic.  While a weaker outturn in the Euro 
Area would certainly impact the region, its likely 
influence pales compared with the potential impact 
of increased social and political tensions, or 
compared with the likely impact of a failure to 
address growing macroeconomic imbalances, 
including fiscal deficits bloated to unsustainable 
levels by fuel and food subsidies that amount to 
over a fifth of government revenues in several 
economies (figure MENA.12)  and rising debt levels that 
threaten long-term fiscal sustainability, and for oil 
exporters the potential impact of a more pronounced 
than projected decline in commodity prices. 
 
Political tensions and security risks 
remain elevated and there are growing signs 
of domestic political polarization in several 
economies.  Elections are due in a number of 
countries this year or early next year, making 
for a challenging reform environment at a time of 
domestic unrest and persistently high levels of 
 
Subsidy reforms are crucially needed 
to improve fiscal sustainability  
Source: World Bank, IMF (2013). 
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unemployment. Already heightened tensions in 
Iraq and Lebanon could be further worsened by 
spillovers from Syria, with potentially destabilizing 
effects for these economies. 
 
Over the longer term, the structural challenges 
facing the region—and which are currently a 
source of ongoing social and political tensions—
remain much the same as before the onset of the 
Arab Spring. Consequently, unless progress is made 
on building political and social consensus needed 
to undertake the necessary structural reforms, then 
it is very likely that the developing Middle East and 
North Africa region will continue to lag other 
developing regions and that growth rates will 
remain relatively low even when calm is eventually 
restored to the region. 
 
Much of the region faces very real 
challenges on the fiscal front, due in 
part to increased social spending to assuage 
tensions that have arisen in the context of the Arab 
Spring, but also because of high fuel and food 
prices that have sharply increased the cost of 
subsidy programs (figure MENA.12).  Dealing with 
this would be difficult enough at the best of times, 
but is particularly challenging in the current slow 
growth and socially volatile period. Still, with such 
expenditures at some 6 percent of GDP in many 
countries, inaction does not appear to be an option.  
Experience from other countries suggests that 
explicitly combining a reduction in subsidies with a 
reinforcement of targeted assistance of the very 
poor can make such a reform more politically 
acceptable and minimize the negative poverty 
effects – while still reducing fiscal deficits.  
 
Inaction risks a fiscal crisis, where markets 
refuse to finance additional deficits forcing a 
much sharper, less acceptable and more 
damaging cut in government spending. This is 
particularly the case for economies running 
low on foreign exchange reserves, with 
slowing of domestic reform efforts further 
undermining fiscal solvency and investor 
confidence, both domestic and overseas. In 
Egypt, a delay or halt in future aid 
disbursements could spiral into serious 
balance of payments difficulties given its 
already low level of reserves and undermine 
confidence in the banking sector which has 
high levels of exposure to sovereign debt.  
 
Commodity price and demand/
supply risks: The economies of oil exporters 
are particularly vulnerable to a shift in the price of 
oil. As discussed in the main text, global supply has 
responded to the higher prices of the past 10 years, 
and as a result large gaps have been generated 
between hydrocarbons in North America and the 
rest of the world. As existing bottlenecks 
increasingly allow this new supply (and that coming 
from Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere) to reach 
global markets, prices could decline much more 
quickly than in the baseline. In such an instance 
government revenues and current account balances 
would come under pressure.  
 
Simulations discussed in the main text show the 
effects of a fall in real oil prices to $80 per barrel by 
mid-2014. They suggest that developing oil 
exporters in the Middle East and North Africa 
region (along with exporters in sub-Saharan Africa) 
would be hardest hit by such a decline, with GDP 
declining by 1.4 percent relative to the baseline, 
government balances deteriorating by as much as 
2.1  percent of GDP and current account balances 
by 3.5 percent in 2014.  For countries, like Algeria 
or Iran, where fiscal balances are already under 
pressure this could force sharp adjustments in 
demand, policy and exchange rates. Conversely, oil 
importers with stressed fiscal and balance of 
payments positions would benefit from such a 
decline, with GDP 0.5 percent higher relative to 
the baseline on average, and  current accounts and 
fiscal balances improving by 0.5 and 0.2 percent of 
GDP respectively in 2014.  
 
In the current environment, regional oil exporters 
will no longer be able to rely on high and rising 
prices, but will increasingly need to rely on 
increased output. This in turn necessitates reforms 
that would allow them to invest heavily in 
infrastructure, and exploration to raise current 
production levels which have stagnated or been 
steadily declining in recent years. However, private 
capital and FDI inflows may fail to materialize 
because of security risks, poor legal environments 
for investment and political uncertainty to varying 
degrees in Algeria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen and 
international sanctions in the case of Iran.   
 
Economic developments in the 
Eurozone: The Eurozone (and to a lesser 
extent the US) account for the bulk of the region’s 
manufacturing, service and hydrocarbon exports. 
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Any setback to the ongoing recovery there could 
undermine exports and tourism in oil importing 
economies and export and fiscal revenues in 
Algeria and Iraq. Heightened risk aversion could 
also reduce already depressed capital inflows into 
the region and dent confidence, particularly in 
countries with large macroeconomic imbalances, 
high levels of debt and severely depleted fiscal and 
reserve buffers. On the upside, a faster than 
expected recovery in the Euro Area could provide 
positive tailwinds to these economies, reducing 
balance of payment and exchange rate pressures. 
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Overview  
 
 
 
South Asia’s regional GDP growth slipped to 4.8 
percent in 2012, following a robust recovery in the 
years after the 2008 global financial crisis. A 
weakening global economy, coupled with domestic 
difficulties (including policy uncertainties, structural 
capacity constraints, and a poor harvest) 
contributed to weaker regional growth in 2012. The 
bulk of this regional slowdown reflects a continued 
deceleration in India (to 5 percent in the 2012 fiscal 
year ending in March 2013), but growth also 
slowed in other regional economies. Sri Lanka’s 
growth slowed sharply, by nearly 2 percentage 
points in 2012. Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Nepal are 
expected to experience less marked slowdowns in 
their respective 2012-13 fiscal years, although 
actual growth rates in Pakistan and Nepal are much 
lower than in other countries in the region. In 
contrast, Afghanistan experienced double digit 
growth in 2012.  
 
The regional trade balance deteriorated in 2012 due 
to weakening exports and rising demand for crude 
oil and other imports. India’s current account 
deficit widened sharply, but robust remittance 
inflows bolstered current account positions in 
Nepal, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.  
 
More recently, activity in South Asia has picked up 
from its mid-2012 slump, with industrial output 
rising at different paces in India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh in the second half of 2012 and in the 
first quarter  of 2013 - while in Sri Lanka industrial 
production stabilized in the fourth quarter of 2012. 
South Asia’s exports (and imports) are also increasing, in 
line with strengthening global trade and output.    
 
Inflation has moderated in several countries, 
helped in part by the easing of international 
commodity prices. But in general, consumer price 
inflation in the region remains higher than the 
average for the group of middle-income developing 
countries, and inflation expectations are still very 
high in India. In addition, some countries have 
stepped up the reform agenda, seeking to contain 
fiscal deficits (including reduction of subsidies, by 
raising end-user fuel and electricity prices), and in 
the case of India, opening the economy further to 
international investment.  
Outlook for 2013-15  
Economic activity in South Asia is projected to 
strengthen during the course of 2013, buoyed by a 
gradual strengthening of external demand; a less 
volatile external environment; lower crude oil 
prices; reduced fiscal pressures due to lower fuel 
prices and lower  subsidies; an improved crop 
(following last year’s weak monsoons); and 
continued remittance inflows. However, even as 
quarterly GDP accelerates, the sharp deceleration 
of growth in 2012 implies that whole year growth 
in 2013 will be a relatively weak 5.2 percent. 
Looking further ahead,  the stronger underlying 
momentum in 2013, coupled with firming external 
demand and improvement in investment spending 
(assuming policy and fiscal reforms are sustained), 
should help to accelerate the region’s growth to 6.0 
percent in 2014 and then 6.4 percent in 2015. 
Growth in India is projected to rise to 5.7 percent 
in the 2013 fiscal year, and accelerate to 6.5 percent 
and 6.7 percent in FY2014 and FY2015.   
 
Risks and vulnerabilities  
 
Risks to the outlook for the region are broadly 
balanced. 
 
External risks are diminishing but remain 
External risks from the Euro Area and of fiscal 
sustainability in the United States have diminished. 
But the region’s vulnerability to a deterioration in 
financial flows has picked up due to rising current 
account deficits, notably in India. A more rapid 
than expected decline in commodity prices would 
help outturns by reducing current account and 
fiscal deficits, and by easing inflationary pressures 
and boosting domestic incomes.  
 
Domestic challenges are gaining prominence 
Domestic issues, including continued progress in 
fiscal consolidation; the quality of this year’s rice 
crop; and success in reversing the earlier increase in 
inflationary expectations will contribute to 
determining the pace of recovery going forward. 
Perhaps most importantly, will be continued 
progress in implementing reforms that relieve 
supply-side constraints, such as reducing energy 
supply bottlenecks, labor market reforms, 
improving the business climate, and investing in 
education, health and infrastructure.  
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Recent economic 
developments 
 
 
 
GDP in South Asia decelerated sharply during 2012, 
extending a slowing trend  following the rapid recovery 
from the financial crisis in 2008. Regional growth 
slowed from 10 percent in 2010 to 7.3 percent in 
2011, and further to 4.8 percent in 2012 (figure SAR.1).  
 
The slowdown in 2012 mainly reflects a continuing 
steep deceleration in India, which represents about 
four-fifth of the region’s GDP, to 5.0 percent in 
the 2012 fiscal year (April 2012-March 2013) from 
6.2 percent in FY2011 and 9.3 percent in FY2010. 
But growth also slowed in other regional 
economies. Growth in Sri Lanka slowed sharply, by 
almost 2 percentage points in 2012. Fiscal year 
growth in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Nepal is 
estimated to have slowed less markedly in their 
respective 2012-13 fiscal years, although actual 
growth rates in Pakistan and Nepal are much lower 
than in other countries in the region. Afghanistan 
was unique among the larger economies in the 
region, recording double digit growth in 2012.   
A worsening external environment amid 
intensification of Euro Area debt tensions in mid-
2012 caused a severe weakening of exports across 
the region. Regional exports fell by 4 percent (y/y) 
in US dollar terms in 2012 (-4.1 percent y/y  
excluding India), after two consecutive years of 
more than 30 percent increases. The Euro Area 
economy, South Asia’s largest export market, 
contracted by 0.5 percent in 2012, and although 
policy actions in high income countries stabilized 
financial markets, global trade only began firming 
in the fourth quarter. South Asia’s US dollar 
imports continued to rise in 2012,  but at a much 
slower pace (4 percent y/y) compared with a 32 
percent increase the previous year.   
 
In consequence, trade balances as a share of GDP 
either deteriorated or trade deficits remained high 
in the region (figure SAR.2). India’s worsening 
trade deficit was reflected in a sharp widening of its  
current account deficit, which reached 6.7 percent 
of GDP in the fourth quarter of 2012. Sri Lanka’s 
current account deficit had widened even more 
earlier (to 7.8 percent of GDP in 2011) together 
with an overheating economy. Policy tightening 
measures curbed import demand, but weak exports 
meant that Sri Lanka’s trade deficit remained high, 
and its current account deficit declined only 
modestly to 6.6 percent of GDP in 2012. In 
Bangladesh, although exports declined in 2012 in 
line with the regional trend, imports fell even 
faster—in part due to a 10 percent depreciation of 
the taka relative to the US dollar, compared with 
the previous year—causing its trade deficit to 
narrow during the 2012 calendar year. Together 
 
A sharp slowdown in post-financial crisis 
GDP growth in South Asia, led by India 
Note: Fiscal years for Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan span almost 
equally across two calendar years, with data for FY2011-12 shown in 
2012 in the chart. For India, where the fiscal year runs from April to 
March, data for FY2012-13 is shown in 2012. GDP growth rates are 
shown in factor cost terms for India and Pakistan, and in market price 
terms for other countries. South Asia’s GDP growth rate for calendar 
years are based on country-level averages of fiscal year GDP growth 
rates (see Table.SAR.2). 
Source: World Bank; Datastream, Haver. 
Fig SAR.1  
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Trade deficits as share of GDP have  
widened in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka  
Source:  World Bank; Datastream. 
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Figure SAR.3 Industrial production is picking up, al-
beit at different paces in South Asian countries  
Source:  World Bank. 
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Figure SAR.2 Trade balances in India, Bangladesh 
and Sri Lanka deteriorated sharply in 2012 as exports 
slowed 
Source:  World Bank. 
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with increased remittances, this resulted in an 
improved current account position. Despite 
growing trade deficits in Pakistan and Nepal in the 
2012 calendar year, their current account positions 
were bolstered by robust migrant remittances 
inflows (see box SAR.1), and also by official 
transfers in the case of Pakistan.     
 
Below-average monsoon rains and a poor regional 
harvest in 2012 (agriculture constitutes about a fifth 
of South Asia’s GDP and over half of employment) also 
contributed to weaker growth  across the region. In 
addition, structural capacity constraints and domestic 
policy uncertainties, as well as security concerns and social 
unrest in some countries, played a significant role in the 
slowing of regional GDP growth. 
 
India’s GDP measured in factor-cost terms grew at 
a decade-low 5.0 percent in FY2012 (figure SAR.1). 
The aforementioned weakening of external 
demand and below-average monsoons exacerbated 
a domestic slowdown that was already underway, as 
building capacity constraints and bottlenecks kept 
growth in check despite sustained fiscal stimulus. 
This stimulus had helped the economy recover 
quickly after the financial crisis in 2008, and was 
gradually withdrawn in subsequent years. 
Uncertainty about the reform agenda, along with 
monetary policy tightening in 2010 and 2011 in 
response to rising inflationary pressures, led to a 
sharp slowing of investment growth and an 
increase in stalled projects (figure SAR.3). Weaker 
investment activity added to existing supply-side 
constraints and negatively impacted overall growth.FN1  
  
GDP growth in Pakistan and Nepal has remained 
well below the regional average in recent years. 
Pakistan, South Asia’s second-largest economy, 
appears to have settled into a relatively low-growth 
path of about 3-4 percent in recent years mainly 
due to unfavorable domestic factors, including  
security uncertainties, unreliable delivery of natural 
gas and electricity to firms, and weak investment 
rates. In Nepal, political uncertainties in recent 
years, and an adverse investment climate, played a 
role in its relatively poor economic performance. 
Nepal’s GDP growth had risen to 4.9 percent in 
the 2011-12 fiscal year (ending in mid-July 2012) on 
the back of a good harvest. However, a poor 
harvest in 2012, high inflation, weakening external 
demand, and slowing growth in India (its largest 
trade partner) weighed negatively on economic 
activity in Nepal during the 2012-13 fiscal year.  
GDP growth in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka has been 
around 6 percent or higher in recent years (figure 
SAR.1). Bangladesh’s exports  have benefited in 
part from preferential access to European Union 
and US markets, while domestic demand and its 
current account position were partly cushioned by 
remittances (see Box SAR.1). However, weakening 
external demand, domestic supply constraints 
(including unreliable electricity provision), and 
social unrest resulted in growth slowing to 6.2 
percent in FY2011-12 from 6.7 percent the 
previous fiscal year, with a further slowdown 
expected for FY2012-13. Bangladesh’s relatively 
fast growth during 2010-12, together with 
international commodity price increases and 
expansionary macroeconomic policies, resulted in 
inflationary pressu es. Subsequent macroeconomic 
tightening and intensified domestic constraints, 
combined with disruptions caused by political unrest, 
contributed to the projected slowdown in FY2012-13.  
 
Sri Lanka’s economy enjoyed a post-conflict 
rebound, growing at 8 or more percent in both 
2010 and 2011. Growth has since slowed to a more 
sustainable 6.4 percent in 2012, in response to 
policy efforts to reduce overheating (amid rising 
domestic supply constraints), a drought, and weaker 
global demand for Sri Lanka’s exports.  
 
Afghanistan’s robust 11.8 percent GDP growth  in 
2012, the highest in the region, was mainly due to 
an exceptionally good harvest and continued strong 
foreign aid inflows. In addition, mining activity  
also picked up. However, governance issues and an 
uncertain security situation present persistent challenges 
 
New investment project announcements 
in India declined and resources tied up in 
stalled projects rose sharply since 2011  
Source: Center for Monitoring Indian Economy.  
Fig SAR.3  
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for the economy. Bhutan’s economy grew strongly in 
recent years mainly due to hydropower generation and 
electricity sales to India—these revenues together with 
budgetary grants allowed it to finance a current account 
deficit exceeding a fifth of GDP. High credit growth 
and supply constraints resulted in an overheated 
economy and inflation rates rising to over 10 
percent (in line with cost of imports from India). 
But policy tightening in 2012 moderated  credit growth, 
while delays in new projects coming on-stream caused 
GDP growth to slow to an estimated 7.6 percent in  the 
2012-13 fiscal year from 9 percent in FY2011-12.  
 
The Maldives, however, experienced political 
uncertainty, double-digit fiscal deficits (the highest 
in the region - see below), current account deficit 
of over a quarter of GDP, falling reserves (well 
below the critical 3 months of imports), and a 
halving of GDP growth to 3.4 percent in 2012. 
Tourism, a mainstay of the economy, was also 
adversely affected by slower growth in high income 
countries, and was only partly compensated for by 
an increase in Asian tourist arrivals.   
Regional industrial production growth 
picked up in late 2012 and early 
2013, but business sentiment 
weakened in India 
 
Industrial activity has begun picking up from a mid
-2012 slump at different paces across South Asian 
countries. India dominates the regional trend, with 
industrial production expanding at a 4.1 percent 
annualized pace during the three months ending in 
March (3m/3m, saar) (figure SAR.4). Available data 
show industrial production rose even more 
decidedly in Pakistan and Bangladesh—at a 22.6 
percent annualized pace during the three months 
ending in March  2013 (3m/3m, saar) in Pakistan 
and at a 21.3 percent annualized pace in the three 
months ending in January in Bangladesh. 
Industrial production momentum in Sri 
Lanka stabilized by the end of 2012 after 
registering steep declines during the second 
half of the year (figure SAR.4).   
Box SAR.1  
Box figure SAR.1a Remittances have risen as a share 
of GDP in South Asian countries 
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Box figure SAR.1b Remittances inflows mostly offset 
trade deficits in Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan  
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Migrant remittances shielded current account positions in several South Asian countries  
  
Remittances to the South Asia region are estimated to have increased by 12.3 percent in 2012 (the second-highest growth 
among developing regions) to reach $109 billion. This follows growth averaging 14 percent in the previous two years. India is 
the largest recipient among developing countries ($69 billion), while Bangladesh, and Pakistan ($14 billion each) are among 
the top ten developing-country recipients of remittances. Remittance flows to Bangladesh and Pakistan have been particularly 
robust in US dollar terms, although Nepal and Sri Lanka recorded the largest increases as a share of GDP in 2012 (Box figure 
SAR.1a), helped in part by strong income growth in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. A steady increase in US 
dollar remittance inflows in recent years has helped to offset trade deficits in Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan, and to a small-
er extent in Sri Lanka and India (Box figure SAR.1b).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Source:  World Bank, Migration and Development Brief 20. 
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Business sentiment in India, however, weakened 
markedly between March and May, with the 
Purchasing Managers’ Index for manufacturing 
recording its lowest reading in four years in May - 
although still slightly above the 50 mark, indicating 
expansion. This in part reflects still difficult 
domestic and external demand conditions (despite 
recent strengthening) and persistent electricity 
shortages. In contrast, the services sector index 
picked up in May on stronger demand, with 
increased optimism about the future among 
services firms.  
 
South Asian exports have also 
started to recover from their 2012 
slump 
 
South Asia’s exports have also started to recover 
from their mid-2012 slump. Regional export 
volume growth picked up to a 12 percent  
annualized pace in the fourth quarter of 2012 from 
6.5 percent (annualized) in the third quarter, and 
further to a robust 15.7 percent annualized pace in 
the three months to April (3m/3m, saar) (figure 
SAR.5). While India dominates the regional trend, 
Bangladesh’s export volume growth accelerated as 
a result of strengthening demand for its garment 
exports (although recent factory accidents could 
moderate the pace of increase going forward).  
 
In Pakistan, following a relatively strong pickup in 
the second half of 2012, the momentum of export 
volume growth weakened in Q1 2013, in part as 
natural gas and electricity shortages cut into 
activity. The pace of decline, however, appears to 
have slowed in March and April. Available data 
suggest that the pace of earlier decline in Sri 
Lanka’s exports slowed in the second half of 2012 
and momentum of export volume growth 
improved in recent months (figure SAR.5), 
although on a year-on-year basis, exports in US 
dollar terms were still 2.8 percent lower in March 
compared to the same month in 2012.    
      
Inflation in South Asia shows signs of 
moderating, but price pressures remain 
 
Regional consumer price inflation accelerated in 
the three months to February partly due to a surge 
in food prices and upward adjustments to regulated 
fuel prices. However, inflation shows signs of 
moderating, helped in part by easing of 
international commodity prices. India’s benchmark 
wholesale price index (WPI) inflation fell to a 3-
year low of 4.9 percent (y/y) in April 2013—
although consumer price index (CPI) inflation and 
core inflation (CPI excluding food and energy) 
were both above 8 percent (y/y) in April. In Sri 
Lanka, inflation moderated to 6.4 percent (y/y) in 
April, its lowest in almost a year, but rose to 7.3 
percent in May.  
 
Year-on-year inflation rates can however be 
influenced by base effects. Quarterly inflation 
provides a better measure of recent movements 
 
Momentum of export volume growth  is 
rising across South Asia 
Source:  World Bank. 
Fig SAR.5 
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   Industrial production growth momen-
tum has picked up at different paces in 
South Asian countries 
Source:  World Bank. 
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(figure SAR.6). According to this measure, the 
momentum of CPI inflation remains strong in 
Bangladesh and India—although moderating 
slightly in Bangladesh—suggesting that price 
pressures continue to remain high in these 
countries. However, inflation has moderated 
markedly in Pakistan. Inflation momentum had 
been weakening earlier in Sri Lanka, but increase in 
regulated electricity prices caused inflation to rise in 
May.   
 
The generally high CPI inflation rates in South 
Asian countries compared with the average for 
middle-income developing countries reflect supply-
side production constraints, entrenched inflationary 
expectations, and the persistence of food inflation. 
Households’ inflation expectations in India remain 
stubbornly high, partly because of a steady upward 
trend in inflation over the past 7 years (figure 
SAR.7).  Food inflation has remained persistently 
high in the region, partly reflecting agricultural 
production constraints and logistics bottlenecks. 
Despite the moderation in overall consumer price 
inflation, food inflation in India was over 10 
percent (y/y) in April, and in Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka was 8.4 percent and 7.9 percent, 
respectively, in May. In Pakistan, despite a 
moderation in headline inflation to 5.1 percent (y/
y) in May, food inflation was a higher 6.5 percent. 
Moreover, core inflation (CPI excluding food and 
energy) in Pakistan remains above 8 percent, in 
part because of escalating costs due to energy 
bottlenecks and security concerns.  
 
Private capital flows to South Asia 
have picked up since mid-2012  
 
Private capital flows to South Asia have increased 
robustly since mid-2012 (figure SAR.8). Overall, 
net private capital inflows to the South Asia region 
rose from $73 billion in 2011 to $87 billion in 2012 
(table SAR.1).    
 
Following reform efforts in India since September 
2012, private capital flows to India grew robustly 
led by portfolio equity inflows and bank lending. 
The increase in private inflows since mid-2012 was 
also a consequence of abundant global liquidity 
that resulted from financial market stabilization and 
accommodative monetary policies in high income 
 
Gross capital flows to South Asia re-
bounded in the second half of 2012  
Source:  World Bank; Datastream. 
Fig SAR.8  
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Inflation momentum is moderating 
across South Asia, but still strong in 
India and Bangladesh  
Source:  World Bank. 
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Inflation expectations in India are still 
very high 
Source:  World Bank; RBI. 
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countries. Foreign direct investment (FDI) received 
by India, however, declined by 22 percent (y/y) 
during the 2012 calendar year. As part of reform 
efforts (and given the need to finance a larger 
current account deficit), India undertook several 
measures to boost private capital inflows. These 
included raising limits on FDI in retail, 
broadcasting and aviation sectors; reducing 
withholding taxes on interest earnings on foreign 
investment in domestic bonds; faster clearances for 
large investment projects (including those with 
foreign participation); and in general, efforts to 
clarify tax and other regulations relevant for foreign 
investors. Gross capital inflows, however, 
moderated in recent months, in part due to growth 
concerns and further deterioration of India’s 
current account position in the fourth quarter of 
2012.  
 
In Sri Lanka, private debt inflows have risen as the 
government successfully issued several sovereign 
bonds in international markets. By contrast, in 
Pakistan, foreign investment inflows have been  on 
a declining trend in recent years due to domestic 
uncertainties, an adverse investment climate, and 
energy shortages. This decline, together with 
repayment of official debt to the IMF, have added 
to pressures on Pakistan’s balance of payments 
position, with international reserves falling below 2 
months of imports. 
Medium-Term Outlook  
 
 
 
Following a steep deceleration in South Asia’s 
GDP growth to 4.8 percent in 2012, regional 
growth is projected to improve during 2013-15 
(Table SAR.2). This recovery in regional growth 
will be helped by gradual improvements in both 
external and domestic conditions.   
 
A stabilization of the global economic environment 
and a gradual recovery in global demand will 
provide something of a tailwind for South Asia’s 
GDP growth. However, output in the Euro Area 
economy, South Asia’s largest export market, is 
forecast to contract for the second year in a row in 
2013, and growth will remain subdued in 2014  and 
2015 (see GEP June 2013 main text). Economic 
activity in the United States, however, is more 
robust and projected to strengthen further. Much 
of the additional external demand for South Asia is 
projected to come from other developing countries, which 
have become increasingly important destinations of 
South Asian exports. South Asia’s exports to developing 
countries, including within the region, have risen from 19 
percent of overall exports in 2000 to 35 percent in 
2011 (14 percent and 26 percent for South Asia 
excluding India—see figure SAR.9).  
Table SAR.1  
 
Net capital flows to South Asia 
Source:  World Bank. 
           2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e 2013f 2014f 2015f
Capital Inflows 64.7 89.8 100.4 78.3 89.5 92.4 100.5 110.1
Private inflows, net 55.9 78.9 90.7 72.5 86.9 90.6 99.3 109.5
  Equity Inflows, net 35.0 63.4 60.3 30.9 47.8 52.8 57.2 67.5
    Net FDI inflows 50.8 39.3 30.4 35.7 27.7 36.7 40.0 48.2
    Net portfolio equity inflows -15.8 24.1 29.9 -4.8 20.1 16.1 17.2 19.3
  Private creditors. Net 20.8 15.5 30.4 41.6 39.1 37.8 42.1 42.0
      Bonds 1.7 1.9 10.1 0.7 2.8 4.3 2.5 3.4
      Banks 11.2 10.9 8.6 18.4 17.4 15.4 17.8 19.2
      Short-term debt flows 8.0 2.7 11.8 22.5 19.1 18.2 21.7 19.3
      Other private 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.1
Official inflows, net 8.8 11.0 9.6 5.8 2.6 1.8 1.2 0.6
    World Bank 1.4 2.4 3.3 2.0 0.9 .. .. ..
    IMF 3.2 3.6 2.0 0.0 -0.2 .. .. ..
    Other official 4.2 4.9 4.4 3.7 1.9 .. .. ..
Table SAR.1  
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An expected normal agricultural season and 
increase in rural disposable incomes, together with 
lower crude oil prices and moderation in inflation, 
and continued remittance inflows (in countries 
where they are important relative to GDP), will 
support an improvement in activity in the 
South Asia region from mid-2013 onwards.  
 
Although quarterly GDP is expected to pick 
up over the course of 2013, the sharp 
deceleration of growth in the previous year 
implies that whole year growth for the South 
Asia region in 2013 will be a relatively weak 
5.2 percent. In the subsequent two years, 
South Asia’s regional GDP growth is 
projected to accelerate to 6.0 percent in 2014 
and 6.4 in 2015, as a result of strengthening 
external demand and with gradual success in 
alleviating some of the domestic structural 
constraints that have held back growth.  
 
Regional growth will be driven mainly by a 
projected pickup in India, whose GDP in factor 
cost terms is projected to grow 5.7 percent in the 
2013 fiscal year (ending in March 2014), and then 
accelerate to 6.5 percent and 6.7 percent in FY2014 
and FY2015, respectively. Exports and private 
investment, which slowed sharply in 2012, are 
projected to strengthen during 2013-15 and 
provide a boost to growth. However, how robust 
 
South Asia regional forecasts  
 
Table SAR.2  
    Est. Forecast
 00-09
a
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
GDP at market prices   b,f - 10.0 7.3 4.8 5.2 6.0 6.4
     GDP per capita (units in US$) 4.4 8.5 5.8 3.3 3.8 4.6 5.0
     PPP GDP d 5.9 10.1 7.3 4.7 5.2 6.1 6.4
  Private consumption 5.4 7.4 7.3 6.6 5.7 6.0 6.2
  Public consumption 5.7 9.9 7.6 6.5 5.7 5.9 6.0
  Fixed investment 8.9 16.6 5.9 2.7 4.2 6.0 6.8
  Exports, GNFS e 11.5 14.5 15.9 1.4 5.6 8.6 9.8
  Imports, GNFS e 9.6 16.0 17.0 7.3 6.2 7.3 8.4
Net exports, contribution to growth -0.3 -1.3 -1.4 -2.0 -0.7 -0.4 -0.5
Current account bal/GDP (%) -0.6 -2.6 -3.1 -4.5 -3.5 -3.1 -2.8
GDP deflator (median, LCU) 6.5 9.2 8.0 6.1 7.2 6.9 6.7
Fiscal balance/GDP (%) -7.5 -8.4 -7.6 -7.0 -7.1 -6.9 -6.8
Memo items: GDP at market prices f                                                 
 South Asia excluding India                                           4.6 4.9 5.2 4.9 4.7 4.9 5.0
 India at factor cost 7.6 9.3 6.2 5.0 5.7 6.5 6.7
 Pakistan at factor cost 4.9 3.1 3.0 3.7 3.4 3.5 3.7
 Bangladesh 5.2 6.1 6.7 6.2 5.8 6.1 6.3
(annual percent change unless indicated otherwise)
Source: World Bank.
a. Growth rates over intervals are compound weighted averages; average growth contributions, ratios 
and deflators are calculated as simple averages of the annual weighted averages for the region.
b. GDP at market prices and expenditure components are measured in constant 2005 U.S. dollars.   
c. GDP figures presented in calendar years (CY) terms for Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, India and 
Pakistan are calculated taking the average growth over the two fiscal year periods to provide an 
approximation of CY activity.
d. GDP measured at PPP exchange rates.
e. Exports and imports of goods and non-factor services (GNFS).
f. National income and product account data refer to fiscal years (FY) for the South Asian countries, 
while aggregates are presented in calendar year (CY) terms. The fiscal year runs from July 1 through 
June 30 in Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Pakistan, from July 16 through July 15 in Nepal, and April 1 
through March 31 in India. Due to reporting practices, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and Pakistan 
report FY2010/11 data in CY2011, while India reports FY2010/11 in CY2010. 
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that recovery will be, will depend on the pace of 
policy and fiscal reforms, and remains subject to 
significant uncertainty and downside risks. Some 
upside risks to the outlook include a faster than 
projected pickup in global demand and a larger 
than expected decline in commodity prices (see 
Risks and Vulnerabilities section below).   
 
GDP growth in Pakistan is projected to only slowly 
accelerate from an estimated 3.4 percent in FY2012
-13 to 3.7 percent in FY2014-15,  with output 
being held back by a wide range of structural 
problems, including: weak investment (down a 
third since 2008 when expressed as a percent of 
GDP—see figure SAR.10), security uncertainties, 
unreliable energy inputs, and monetization of large 
fiscal deficits, among others. Balance of payments 
pressures have risen with reserves falling below 2 
months of imports, notwithstanding robust 
remittance inflows. Policy actions to address the 
underlying adverse structural factors are critical to 
raising Pakistan’s longer-term growth potential.  
 
Bangladesh’s growth slowed to an estimated 5.8 
percent in the 2012-13 fiscal year ending in June. 
But growth is projected to pick up modestly to 6.1 
percent in FY2013-14 and 6.3 percent in FY2014-
15, as external demand strengthens gradually, and 
agricultural output returns to more normal levels.  
Several domestic weaknesses, including 
infrastructure gaps (electricity, roads) and social 
unrest are expected to hold back a firmer recovery.  
  
In Sri Lanka, growth is expected to pick up to 6.5 
percent in 2013 and 6.7 percent in 2014, aided by 
normal agricultural harvests, strengthening demand 
for exports, robust capital inflows, increase in 
infrastructure and other investments, and a revival 
of tourism (Table SAR.3). The relatively modest 
pickup in growth represents a return to underlying 
potential growth rates after rapid demand-fueled 
growth in 2010-11 opened up positive output gaps 
and resulted in inflation and current account 
pressures.   
 
Some domestic uncertainties in Nepal appear to be 
easing and the political situation normalizing after 
formation of an interim government in March. 
This political normalization, expected timely 
monsoon rains, and continued increase in 
remittances should be favorable for economic 
activity in 2013 and beyond. However, private 
Fig SAR.10  
Fig SAR.9  
 
A sharp decline in investment-to-GDP 
ratio in Pakistan 
Source:  World Bank; Datastream; Haver. 
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South Asia country forecasts 
 
Table SAR.3  
    Est. Forecast
 00-09
a
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Calendar year basis b
Afghanistan
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) c - 8.4 7.0 11.8 3.1 4.9 6.3
Current account bal/GDP (%) -0.3 2.8 2.2 3.9 1.6 0.5 -0.3
Bangladesh
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) c 5.2 6.4 6.5 6.0 6.0 6.2 6.3
Current account bal/GDP (%) 0.6 1.8 0.2 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.9
Bhutan
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) c 7.7 9.6 9.5 8.3 7.9 8.4 8.6
Current account bal/GDP (%) -0.1 -19.1 -25.5 -20.7 -20.9 -19.2 -18.4
India
GDP at factor cost (% annual growth) c 7.4 9.1 7.0 5.3 5.5 6.3 6.6
Current account bal/GDP (%) -0.5 -3.2 -3.5 -5.4 -4.2 -3.7 -3.3
Maldives
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) c 6.3 7.1 7.0 3.4 3.7 3.9 4.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) -1.1 -9.2 -21.4 -26.5 -28.0 -26.0 -25.0
Nepal
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) c 3.4 4.1 4.2 4.3 3.8 3.9 4.1
Current account bal/GDP (%) -0.9 -2.5 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5
Pakistan
GDP at factor cost (% annual growth) c 4.9 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.7
Current account bal/GDP (%) -1.4 -0.7 -1.0 -0.9 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3
Sri Lanka
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) c 4.4 8.0 8.2 6.4 6.5 6.7 6.5
Current account bal/GDP (%) -3.7 -2.2 -7.8 -6.6 -5.9 -5.4 -4.8
Fiscal year basis b
Bangladesh
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) c 5.2 6.1 6.7 6.2 5.8 6.1 6.3
Bhutan
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) c 7.7 9.3 10.0 9.0 7.6 8.1 8.6
India
GDP at factor cost (% annual growth) c 7.6 9.3 6.2 5.0 5.7 6.5 6.7
Nepal
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) c 3.4 4.8 3.4 4.9 3.7 3.8 4.1
Pakistan
GDP at factor cost (% annual growth) c 4.9 3.1 3.0 3.7 3.4 3.5 3.7
Source: World Bank.
World Bank forecasts are frequently updated based on new information and changing (global) 
circumstances. Consequently, projections presented here may differ from those contained in other 
Bank documents, even if basic assessments of countries’ prospects do not significantly differ at any 
given moment in time.
a. GDP growth rates over intervals are compound average; current account balance shares are simple 
averages over the period.
b. National income and product account data refer to fiscal years (FY) for the South Asian countries 
with the exception of Sri Lanka, which reports in calendar year (CY). The fiscal year runs from July 1 
through  June 30 in Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Pakistan, from July 16 through July 15 in Nepal, and 
April 1 through March 31 in India. Due to reporting practices, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and 
Pakistan report FY2010/11 data in CY2011, while India reports FY2010/11 in CY2010. GDP figures 
presented in calendar years (CY) terms for Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, India and Pakistan are 
calculated taking the average growth over the two fiscal year periods to provide an approximation of 
CY activity.
c. GDP measured in constant 2005 U.S. dollars.
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sector industrial activity is likely to continue to 
remain lackluster. Overall, following an estimated 
3.7 percent GDP growth in FY2012-13, Nepal’s 
growth is projected to remain broadly stable  at 3.8 
percent in FY2013-14 and improve modestly to 4.1 
percent in FY2014-15. To do better, the 
government will need to make energy provision 
more reliable, invest further in the skills and quality 
of Nepal’s workforce, enhance the predictability 
and transparency of the regulatory and tax regimes, 
while also strengthening the overall business 
environment.  
 
Afghanistan’s economy remains dependent on 
agricultural performance and external aid. 
Moderate rainfall is projected to reduce growth to 
around 3 percent in 2013. The withdrawal of 
coalition forces, which have been a major source of 
demand, is likely to create challenges for sustaining 
growth. To assist in this transition, donors have 
pledged significant aid in the coming years. 
Although the security situation remains difficult, 
services and natural resource extraction are starting 
to contribute to economic activity. Growth will 
also be helped by continued rebuilding of 
infrastructure and essential services, foreign 
assistance, and foreign investment in natural 
resource sectors. Afghanistan’s GDP growth is 
forecast to accelerate to about 6 percent by 2015. 
 
In Bhutan, hydropower projects coming on steam 
in coming years are likely to keep overall GDP 
growth high at about 8-9 percent annually in 2013-
15. But lack of economic diversification poses 
challenges to generating employment and inclusive 
growth. In Maldives, in addition to deteriorating 
macroeconomic fundamentals discussed earlier, the 
country faces severe challenges in diversifying its 
economy beyond tourism. The economic outlook 
remains clouded by political uncertainty leading up 
elections in 2013/14 and by limited success in 
controlling fiscal outcomes.      
     
An easing in global fuel prices (Brent crude oil 
prices fell 15 percent between mid-February and 
early-June - see figure SAR.11), together with 
expected normal monsoon rains, will help to curb  
price pressures. Modestly lower crude prices in 
2013 and 2014 will also provide some relief to 
current account and fiscal positions. Lower crude 
oil prices will help regional governments in 
narrowing existing gaps between international 
prices and domestic administered prices, and lower 
the subsidy burden and reduce overall fiscal 
pressures. 
  
But inflation pressures will still remain in the 
region. Ongoing and planned increases in 
administered fuel and electricity prices will add to 
headline price pressures in the near term, but as 
long as the higher inflation does not get ingrained 
into expectations, this should not result in a 
permanent increase in inflation. More importantly, 
supply side constraints in agricultural, energy and 
other sectors will  continue to exert upward price 
pressures.   
 
 
Risks and 
vulnerabilities 
 
 
 
Global uncertainties have receded since mid-2012 
and both the severity and likelihood of downside 
risks from high income countries has diminished 
(see June 2013 GEP main text). Domestic policy 
and weather risks have now gained in importance 
for the South Asia  region.  
 
A key risk to the gradual acceleration in growth 
envisaged in the baseline scenario, is the success 
with which planned and announced reform policies 
are actually implemented during 2013-15. Based on 
backward looking indicators, growth could well be 
 
Sharp crude oil price declines have often  
corrected in the past, but on average, 
prices are forecast to be 2.5 percent 
lower in 2013 than in 2012 
Source:  World Bank; Datastream. 
Fig SAR.11  
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between 0.3 and 0.5 percentage points slower than 
in the baseline.  
 
Political obstacles to passing  and implementing 
reform legislation pose downside risks to the 
outlook. Reforms to the process of land acquisition 
for industrial projects and labor market reforms 
could prove contentious. In countries either exiting 
(Pakistan) or entering electoral cycles (Bangladesh, 
India, Nepal), spending pressures associated with 
elections could boost fiscal expenditure, adding to 
inflationary pressures and both internal and 
external imbalances. Risks in the post-election 
period include the possibility that past reforms are 
reversed or implementation delayed.   
 
Weaker than expected monsoon rains present 
another downside risk for South Asia. A second 
poor monsoon in a row would adversely affect 
rural incomes and employment, contribute to 
persistence of food inflation (and in turn, overall 
inflation) and could reduce overall GDP growth. 
by 0.5 percentage points or more. Moreover, 
weaker rural income growth would put 
greater demands on public spending (through 
automatic stabilizers and social welfare programs), 
which could make it difficult to achieve fiscal targets.    
 
A weakening of reserve coverage of imports in 
Pakistan and the Maldives to below 2 months of 
imports suggests that their balance of payments 
positions could come under stress from 
unanticipated shocks. However, the reserve 
position of Bangladesh has improved in the most 
recent period, from robust remittance inflows and 
a recent improvement in trade. Sri Lanka’s reserves 
have also risen in line with an increase in private 
capital inflows.     
 
A greater dependence on foreign investment 
inflows to finance India’s significantly larger 
current account deficit compared to the past has 
increased its vulnerability to a sudden reversal of 
investor sentiment. Several factors could result in a  
slowing or reversal of investment inflows—an 
unanticipated monetary tightening in some high 
income countries; resurgence of debt tensions; 
escalation of geopolitical conflict; and even 
disenchantment with the pace or nature of 
domestic reforms. Moreover, the sharply relaxed 
monetary policy in Japan could result in strong and 
disruptive private capital flows.   
 
Revival of business sentiment remains a key 
element for South Asia’s regional growth. As 
discussed earlier, business sentiment in the 
manufacturing sector in India weakened to a four-
year low in May (although the services sector index 
picked up). If business sentiment were to remain 
weak in coming months, this could adversely 
impact investment and growth.  
 
An upside risk to South Asia’s growth outlook 
includes a significant decline in commodity prices 
compared to the baseline. If crude oil prices were 
to fall to an average level of $80 per barrel by mid-
2014 due to additional supplies coming on stream 
in international markets, South Asia’s GDP would 
be 0.9 percent higher than in the baseline by 2014, 
current account deficit would be 1.4 percent of 
GDP lower, and fiscal deficit 0.7 percent of GDP 
lower (see table 5 in June 2013 GEP main text). 
Other upside risks include a more rapid resolution 
of structural constraints to growth than envisaged 
in the baseline, and faster than projected global 
growth during the forecast period.     
 
Despite recent efforts at fiscal 
consolidation, relaxation of monetary 
policies and still large fiscal deficits 
pose risks   
 
Central banks in South Asia cut interest rates 
sharply during the global financial crisis of 
2008/09, but rates were appropriately raised 
subsequently as inflationary pressures rose (figure 
SAR.12).  With the slowing of growth in 2012 and 
the recent moderation in year-on-year inflation, 
monetary policy in the region shifted toward a 
more accommodative stance. Policy rates in 
Pakistan were cut by 250 basis points in the second 
half of 2012, while Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka 
cut policy rates in the first half of 2013. Sri Lanka’s 
central bank cut its policy rate by 25 basis points in 
late 2012 and again by 50 basis points in May after 
inflation moderated in the previous two months. 
The Reserve Bank of India reduced its key policy 
interest rate by a cumulative 75 basis points 
between January and May of 2013 as its benchmark 
wholesale price inflation declined, notwithstanding 
high CPI inflation.  
 
Although inflation rates have moderated across 
several countries in the region, consumer price 
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inflation still remains high compared to the average 
for middle-income developing countries. India’s 
steep growth deceleration mostly closed a large 
positive output gap that had opened up in the post-
financial crisis period. And notwithstanding either 
slower or weak growth in 2012, several other South 
Asian countries also appear to be operating either 
close to or above full capacity. Given lags in 
monetary policy transmission, an easing of 
monetary policies (together with still large fiscal 
deficits) could add to strengthening activity already 
underway in the countries operating at full capacity, 
resulting in additional inflationary and current 
account pressures, without much payoff in 
additional GDP growth.        
  
The high fiscal deficits in the region also pose risks 
to the outlook, despite recent efforts at 
consolidation (see below). Large government 
borrowing programs can result in crowding out of 
private investment, and importantly, reduce 
available policy buffers to counter external or 
domestic shocks. Moreover, when underlying 
inflationary pressures are already high, the 
additional spending can further exacerbate 
inflation.  
 
General government deficits exceeded 6 percent of 
GDP on average in 2012 in the region (figure 
SAR.12). India’s  central government's fiscal deficit 
fell to 4.9 percent of GDP in the 2012 fiscal year, 
below the 5.2 percent initially estimated, and down 
from 5.8 percent in FY2011.FN2 The government 
has pledged to further reduce it to 4.8 percent in 
FY2013 and 4.2 percent in FY2014. Despite the 
recent consolidation, India’s general government 
deficit (including state government fiscal deficits) is 
more than 7 percent of GDP. Pakistan’s general 
government deficit is estimated to have risen 
sharply in recent years to above 7 percent of GDP 
(figure SAR.13). Maldives’ fiscal deficit is 
significantly higher than the regional average, and 
rose further in 2012.  
 
Several South Asian countries undertook fiscal 
reforms during the last year, particularly to their 
subsidy regimes. Fuel and  food subsidies typically 
account for the bulk of subsidies, with subsidies in 
India and Sri Lanka at more than 2 percent of 
GDP, and over 3.5 percent of GDP in Bangladesh. 
Reforms to subsidy regimes have involved 
introducing more frequent adjustments to 
administered fuel and electricity prices, and 
measures to improve targeting of government 
benefits to the poorest beneficiaries. For instance, 
administered diesel prices in India are being raised 
at close to monthly frequency to gradually narrow 
the gap between international and domestic prices, 
while quotas have been imposed on subsidized 
provision of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) for 
domestic use. Sri Lanka raised electricity prices in 
April 2013 in order to curb the (quasi-fiscal) losses 
of the state electricity company. India has also 
undertaken an ambitious direct cash transfer 
program (based on Aadhar digital unique 
national identification numbers, already 
provided to nearly 400 million Indians) in 
order to better target government benefits 
and services, and to reduce leakages from the 
public distribution system.  
 
South Asian central banks (with exception 
of Nepal) cut policy interest rates 
following a mid-2012 slump in activity 
and moderation of inflation  
Source:  World Bank; Datastream. 
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Fiscal deficits remain higher than pre-
financial crisis levels in general in 
South Asia 
Note: Only deficits shown in chart.  f = forecasts for 2013. 
Source:  IMF (2013a and 2013b).  
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Despite progress made in recent months, there are 
still challenges to moving towards market-based 
pricing of fuel and electricity tariffs in the region. 
Regulated fuel and electricity prices are often 
insufficient for energy producers to fully recover 
costs. These not only add to quasi-fiscal losses of 
public sector firms, but can also deter private 
investment in the critical energy sector.  
 
Mobilizing sufficient tax revenues to fund social 
development and infrastructure investment remains 
a major challenge for the region. Tax revenues as a 
share of GDP are in general lower in South Asian 
countries when compared with the average for 
middle and low income developing countries 
(figure SAR.14). For sustained deficit reduction, 
expenditure restraint and better targeting of 
subsidies has to be combined with revenue 
mobilization (including measures to simplify the 
tax code, broaden the tax base, and improve 
compliance), so that necessary expenditure on 
education, health, and infrastructure do not suffer 
and impair future growth.   
 
 
Conclusions  
 
 
The South Asia region faces a number of longer-
term economic challenges. Despite impressive 
gains in development outcomes in recent years (the 
region is on track to achieve three Millennium 
Development Goals  by 2015 – halving extreme 
poverty, reducing maternal mortality, and providing 
access to safe water), South Asia will still be home 
to almost 400 million of the developing world’s 
970 million poor in 2015, according to the World 
Bank’s Global Monitoring Report (see also Chen 
and Ravallion (2012) and Ravallion (2013)).  
 
The sharp economic slowdown experienced in the 
post-financial crisis period exposed structural 
vulnerabilities and has  made the task of reviving 
growth in a sustainable manner even more urgent. 
But with India’s positive output gap mostly closed 
after its steep growth deceleration, and given 
capacity constraints in most South Asian countries, 
policymakers need to remain vigilant against relying 
on short-term demand stimulus in order to avoid 
overheating (inflation and current account) 
pressures. South Asian countries should continue 
to rebuild their fiscal buffers to be able to deal with 
future crises.  
 
Deepening supply-side reforms is critical to 
improving the efficiency of investment and raising 
the longer-term growth potential of the region. 
These include eliminating bottlenecks in project 
implementation and easing energy input constraints 
for firms, as well as  labor market reforms, clarity in 
tax and business regulations for both foreign and 
domestic investors, and improving the overall 
business climate. Raising the quality of human 
capital through appropriate investments in 
education and health can boost productivity in 
South Asian countries over the longer term. 
Investment in infrastructure will help the formal 
private sector by reducing transportation and 
logistics costs, and also the poor in gaining access 
to markets and opportunities.  
 
Tax revenues are in general a smaller 
share of GDP than the average for 
middle- and low-income countries 
Source:  World Bank; IMF.  
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1 See GOI (2013), Rajan (2013), and Subbarao (2013) for some of the reasons behind India’s growth slowdown and 
the macroeconomic and structural challenges that the country faces in reviving growth.  
2 The World Bank’s estimates of India’s central government fiscal deficit are slightly higher at 6.0 percent in FY2011 
and 5.1 percent in FY2012. The difference is mostly accounted for by receipts from disinvestment in public sector 
enterprises. World Bank estimates excludes these (and any other one time receipts) from the government's revenue.  
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Overview 
 
 
 
Strong domestic demand allowed Sub Saharan 
African economies to continue their robust growth 
trajectory in 2012, despite subdued global demand 
conditions. On aggregate the region grew at 4.4 per 
cent in 2012 (this includes South Sudan whose 
GDP recorded a double digit contraction).FN1 
Excluding South Africa, the region’s largest 
economy, the rest of the region grew 5.4 percent, 
with close to a third of economies growing faster 
than 6 percent (figure SSA.1).   
 
Much of this growth was supported by investments 
in both the resource and non-resource sectors. Net 
foreign direct investment inflows to the region are 
expected to reach about $40 billion in 2013, up 
from $32.1 billion in 2012. Still high commodity 
prices (even if easing) is supporting investments in 
the natural resource sectors in several economies in 
the region. But the growth dynamism has not come 
only from the resource sector as investments (both 
domestic and foreign) have also flowed to the non-
resource sector, in particular the service sub-sectors 
such as finance and banking, telecommunication, 
transportation and retail trade. Indeed, in several 
economies growth in the non-resource sector was 
stronger than the resource sector.  
 
Better weather conditions and associated improved 
harvests, decelerating inflation, relaxation of earlier 
interest rate hikes and increased remittance inflows 
($33 billion in 2013, up from $32 billion in 2012) 
broadly supported the resilience in household 
spending, albeit with differences across countries in 
the region. Fiscal policy for most economies in the 
region remains expansive with several governments 
rightly emphasizing the need to address 
infrastructural weaknesses. Debt levels also remain 
low. However, compared to 2008 levels, fiscal 
buffers in the region are yet to be restored, and in a 
number of countries the expansionary fiscal policy 
may actually be hitting against capacity constraints.   
 
While the overall growth story for the region has 
been robust, not all countries are enjoying this 
robust growth. Indeed, growth in 2012 was weaker 
in countries that encountered conflict or political 
instability (e.g. South Sudan, Central Africa 
Republic, Mali, Guinea Bissau), major labor unrests 
(South Africa) sharp fiscal adjustments (Swaziland) 
and those impacted by severe adverse weather 
conditions . 
  
Medium-Term Outlook. Going forward, 
the robust domestic demand factors that have 
underpinned Sub-Saharan Africa’s growth 
performance in recent years and the projected 
strengthening of global demand are expected to 
support the region’s medium term growth 
trajectory. Regional GDP is projected to pick up to 
4.9 in 2013, 5.2 percent in 2014, and 5.4 percent in 
2015. Excluding, the region’s largest economy, 
South Africa, GDP growth for the rest of the 
region is expected to increase by 6.2 percent in 
2013 and 2014, and further strengthen to 6.4 
percent in 2015. Net private capital inflows are 
projected to reach $77.5 billion in 2015 from $48.3 
billion in 2012. Household spending will be 
supported by rising incomes, increased remittance 
flows, and a stable macroeconomic environment. 
Although the gradual strengthening of the global 
economy and increased capacity in mineral exports 
will support export growth over the medium term, 
the net exports contribution to growth is expected 
to be modest or even negative, on account of 
strong import demand (especially capital 
equipment).  
  
Risks to growth prospects. Nonetheless, 
there exist downside risks that could derail the 
projected robust growth outlook. While external 
risks to the outlook from the Euro Area crisis, or 
fiscal sustainability in the United States and Japan 
have diminished, new domestic and external risks 
and challenges have gained in prominence. Notable 
among these is the possibility that the recent easing 
in international commodity prices intensifies. Our 
simulations suggest that, while a 25 percent decline 
in oil prices will be beneficial to the oil importers in 
the region, oil exporters would experience a cut in 
growth by some 1.4 percentage points, with similar 
impacts for metal exporters in the event of a sharp 
decline in  industrial metal prices. Domestic risks 
include the possibility of overheating in economies 
operating close to capacity; adverse weather 
shocks; and political unrest. On the upside growth 
could be stronger if high-income countries recover 
more quickly than envisaged or if ongoing 
infrastructural investments improve competitiveness 
and help unlock new sources of growth.  
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Recent Developments    
 
 
 
Investment f lows continue to 
underpin growth in Sub Saharan 
Africa. Gross fixed capital formation in Sub 
Saharan Africa has steadily increased from about 
16.4 per cent of GDP in 2000 to about 20.4 per 
cent in 2011. The pick up in investment has not 
only contributed to growth directly, but it has also 
helped boost potential output in the region by 
raising the amount of capital  with which 
labor has to work, albeit concentrated in 
specific sectors.  
 
Data for 2012, suggest that this capital deepening 
process has continued. Imports of capital 
equipment, used as a proxy for domestic 
investment activity, have expanded at a robust 
33.6% annualized pace in value terms during the 
fourth quarter of 2012, although this follows a 
sharp slump (-38.2%) in Q3 2012, when global 
economic activity was weaker  (figure 
SSA.2).FN2 Fourth quarter capital goods 
imports were particularly strong in Angola, 
Cote D’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, 
Tanzania and Zambia - all economies where 
real GDP grew by an estimated 6.5 per cent 
or more in 2012.  
 
High commodity prices have 
supported investment flows to 
minerals sector. With the region’s vast 
potential of unexplored mineral and hydrocarbon 
reserves and still high commodity prices 
(notwithstanding recent declines) foreign direct 
investment continues to flow to the natural 
resource sectors across the breadth and length of 
the region’s economies (see table SSA.1). Net 
foreign direct investment inflows to the region 
reached an estimated $33.4 billion in 2012, and are 
projected to rise  a further 21% in 2013 (table SSA. 2)  
 
Fastest Growing Economies in Sub  
Saharan Africa (2012) 
Source:  World Bank. 
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Capital equipment imports picked up in 
Q4 following weakness in Q3 
Source:  World Bank; ITC. 
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Selected major ongoing explorations in the natural resource sector in Sub Saharan African  economies 
Source:  Africa Mining 
Table SSA.1  
Sub-regio n Oil and Gas M etal and M ineral
West A frica
Ghana, Cote d’ Ivoire, Sierra Leone,
Liberia, Chad 
Sierra Leone (iron ore), Guinea (iron ore) 
East A frica Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya Eritrea (gold), Ethiopia (gold) Tanzania (gold, uranium)
So uthern A frica Angola
M ozambique (coal, iron ore), Zambia (copper), Botswana (copper),
M adagascar (nickel), M alawi (uranium)
C entral A frica Cameroon
Gabon (manganese), Cameroon (iron ore), Democratic Republic of
Congo (copper, cobalt, gold)
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The non-minerals sector has also 
benefitted from increased investment 
flows, thereby supporting the 
dynamic growth of  that sector. 
Although the natural resources sector is the 
pre-eminent destination for foreign direct 
investment inflows, increasingly non-minerals 
sectors, notably the services sector, is 
attracting the interest of foreign investors. 
Sectoral breakdown of cross-border merger’s 
and acquisition for the Africa region shows 
that over the 2010-2011 period the services and 
manufacturing sectors attracted an average of 53.4 
per cent and 33.5 per cent respectively of all M&A 
purchases in the region.FN3 The primary sector 
accounted for only 13.2%. Similarly, the services 
and manufacturing sector attracted some 33.6 per 
cent and 41.2 per cent of all green field FDI into 
Africa.  
 
Rising disposable incomes, an increasing 
work force, and the fact that many economies 
are growing from a low base have spurred on 
investments in telecommunications, retail and 
banking. For instance, the International 
Telecommunications Union estimates that 
mobile subscriptions in Sub-Saharan Africa 
grew 14.4 per cent in 2012 (higher than the 
developing country average of 8.1%). Indeed,  
in the region services sector growth well 
exceeds that of resource sector growth, even 
in long-standing resource rich economies (see 
box SSA.1).  
 
The mining sector tends to require higher capital 
outlays and specialized technology than other 
sectors and therefore attracts a higher percentage 
of foreign investors. Domestic capital, on the other 
hand, plays a more significant role in service-sector 
growth. Thus, despite the increasing contribution 
of foreign direct investment flows to capital 
deepening in the region, FDI accounts for about 
only a fifth of the regions gross fixed capital 
formation (19.6 percent in 2010).  Domestic credit 
growth figures attest to the rising importance of 
domestic intermediation. Year-over-year real 
credit grew 23.4 percent in Botswana 
(February 2013); 31.4 percent in Ghana 
(September 2012); 16.6 percent in Kenya 
(January 2013); 12.9% in Uganda (February 
2013); 8.1 percent in Nigeria (March 2013); 
and 9.7 percent in South Africa (April 2013).  
 
Net capital flows to Sub-Saharan Africa ($ billions) Table SSA.2  
           2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e 2013f 2014f 2015f
Capital Inflows 43.4 47.0 61.1 66.9 58.8 67.5 73.8 82.6
Private inflows, net 38.4 37.1 47.8 55.4 48.3 58.0 66.5 77.5
  Equity Inflows, net 33.4 43.2 42.7 46.8 41.4 49.5 57.5 65.4
    Net FDI inflows 39.1 32.5 26.7 38.5 32.1 39.8 46.2 52.0
    Net portfolio equity inflows -5.7 10.7 16.0 8.4 9.3 9.7 11.3 13.4
  Private creditors. Net 5.0 -6.2 5.1 8.6 6.9 8.5 9.0 12.1
      Bonds -1.6 2.0 1.4 6.0 6.8 8.4 6.4 7.1
      Banks 2.3 0.5 0.5 3.1 0.9 1.2 1.8 2.9
      Short-term debt flows 4.4 -9.5 2.8 -0.5 -0.9 -1.2 0.6 1.2
      Other private -0.1 0.8 0.5 -0.05 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.9
Official inflows, net 5.0 9.9 13.3 11.4 10.5 9.5 7.3 5.1
    World Bank 1.9 3.1 4.0 3.2 3.3
    IMF 0.7 2.2 1.2 1.4 1.3
    Other official 2.4 4.6 8.2 6.8 5.9
Source: The World Bank
Note :  e = estimate, f = forecast
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But not all economies are benefitting 
from the investment flows. While 
strong on average, investment growth (both 
foreign and domestic) has been weaker in 
several other countries. Political instability is 
hurting investment, thereby curtailing 
economic growth in Central African 
Republic, Guinea Bissau, Madagascar, and 
Mali. Madagascar’s crisis for instance, is 
estimated to have cost it some $6.3 billion in 
lost growth over the 2009-2012 period, 
according to World Bank estimates. This 
contrasts with post-conflict economies such 
as Cote D’Ivoire and Comoros which are 
witnessing increased investment flows and a 
rebound in economic activity.  
 
Fiscal deficits deteriorated in 2012 
and fiscal policy is generally 
expansive in the region. In general, 
government expenditures in Sub Saharan Africa 
have been growing at par with GDP since 2009, 
and have stayed steady at about 30 per cent of 
GDP in the post-crisis period — about one 
percentage point higher than in 2008. Revenues, 
however, have not kept pace, and as a result, 
overall fiscal  balances have deteriorated by about 
2.6 percent of GDP since 2008.  
 
For the region as a whole, fiscal policy appears to 
have eased in 2012, with cyclically adjusted 
balances having deteriorated by about 0.3 
percentage points overall, with the largest 
deterioration occurring among oil exporters (figure 
SSA.3). Nevertheless, average structural (cyclically 
adjusted) deficits   remain low. Moreover, although 
the region’s government gross debt to GDP ratio is  
rising it remains relatively low at 33.4 percent of 
GDP in 2012 (versus 29% of GDP in 2008). 
Nonetheless, there remain significant differences 
among countries in the region, hence while debt 
profiles remain sustainable for most countries in 
the region, it is a rising concern for a few 
economies.  
 
Growth in the non-resource sector in several Sub Saharan African countries, including resource 
rich ones, was higher than that of the resource sector in 2012.  
 
In Botswana, where GDP expanded by 3.7 per cent in 2012, mining output contracted 8.1 per cent, whereas non-mining 
GDP growth was positive, with notable contributions from construction (14.4), financial and business services (9.7 per cent) 
and transport and communications (9.1 per cent).  
 
Ghana, one of the new oil exporting economies in the region, grew at an estimated 7.9 percent in 2012, with the mining 
and quarrying sector (including crude oil) growing at 5.0 percent, whereas the services sector grew at 10.2 per cent. The 
fastest growing sectors were the information and communication sector (23.4 per cent), financial and insurance activities 
(23.0 per cent), real estate and other professional services (13.1 percent) and hotel and restaurants (13.0 percent). 
 
In Kenya, where economic activity picked up to 4.7 per cent in Q3 2012, mining and quarrying picked up by 1.8 per cent, 
with much of the pick-up coming from a 6.9% expansion in the agriculture sector, a 6.8 percent increase in financial inter-
mediation, a 13.7 percent increase in electricity and water output and a 5.2 percent rise in transport and communication 
services.  
 
In Nigeria Q1 2013 GDP growth was 6.7 per cent with crude petroleum and natural gas contracting at 0.5 percent, while  
non-oil growth was at 7.9 percent. The lead growth sectors were telecommunications (24.5 percent), hotel and restaurants 
(13.6 percent) construction (15.7 percent) and real estate (13.6 per cent).  
 
In Rwanda, where GDP grew by 8.7 percent in Q4 2012, the agriculture sector grew by 3 percent and contributed 1.1 per-
centage points to the overall GDP growth; the industrial sector grew by 11 percent and contributed 1.7 percentage points to 
the GDP growth; and the services sector increased by 12 percent and contributed 5.4 percentage points to the GDP 
growth.     
 
In South Africa, where GDP increased by 1.9 per cent in Q1 2013  the mining and quarrying industry, finance and real 
estate and business services each contributed 0.7 percentage points (ppt). The growth in mining followed  two quarters of 
negative growth. Wholesale, retail & motor trade, and transport, storage & communication each contributed 0.2 percentage 
points to GDP growth.     
 
In Tanzania, where output expanded by an estimated 6.8 percent in 2012, the mining and quarrying sector expanded by 
1.2 per cent in the first three quarters of the year, whereas there was double digit expansion in the real estate (10.1 per-
cent), transport and communications (16.5 percent) and wholesale and retail sectors (16.1 percent).  
 
Box SSA.1  
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Most government spending plans for countries in 
the region (e.g. Uganda, Ethiopia, Zambia, Niger, 
Namibia,  Tanzania, South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria)  
are rightly targeting infrastructure spending 
(particularly power generation, transportation 
routes and port facilities), which remains a critical 
binding constraint to improving the 
competitiveness of economies in the region. 
Increasingly such infrastructure projects are being 
financed from new funding sources including from 
some large developing countries (in particular 
China but also India, Brazil and Russia) and from 
international capital markets.  
 
Indeed, over the past several years countries in the 
region have taken advantage of low interest rates 
and investor interest in the high-income world to 
tap international bond markets, sometimes for the 
first time. For example Rwanda raised $400 million 
in April 2013 in it’s maiden Eurobond issuance.FN4 
And, other Sub Saharan African sovereigns 
(Angola, Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania) have 
plans to borrow from international capital markets 
in coming months. A Bloomberg report estimates 
that excluding South Africa, sub Saharan African 
sovereigns will issue some $7 billion in 
international debt in 2013 – the highest level since 
2007.  
 
Large positive output gaps in a 
number of  economies suggest 
further expansionary fiscal policy 
could actually be counterproductive. 
Nonetheless, with demand in many Sub Saharan 
African countries closing in on their supply 
potential, output gaps (an estimate of the  
difference between demand and supply) are small 
or even positive (implying demand in excess of 
supply, figure SSA.4). For these countries, an expansion 
of fiscal policy could be counterproductive as it could 
induce macro instability, with negative impacts on 
the investment environment and growth.  
 
The challenge will be for policymakers to ensure 
that the hard earned gains of the past 15 years in 
terms of macroeconomic and fiscal stability are 
preserved, while at the same time continuing to lay 
the foundation for long-term growth by investing 
in areas of structural weakness, including 
infrastructure, education and health. A number of 
countries show signs of overheating, including 
rising inflationary pressures, increased current 
account deficits, suggesting that aggregate demand 
was pushing up  against capacity constraints. For 
these economies, some tightening of policy may be 
needed. In many countries, where overall tax rates 
are low and structural deficiencies high this might 
be most efficiently achieved by raising revenues, 
while maintaining growth enhancing investments in 
education, health and infrastructure. 
 
Consumer spending has in general 
been supportive of  growth, though 
differences exist among countries. 
Consumer spending accounts for some 60% of 
GDP in Sub Saharan Africa, and a major 
contributor to overall demand growth. With real 
per capita incomes increasing by 2.3 per cent per 
annum over the past decade, rising household 
incomes have supported consumer demand in the 
region and contributed to its resilient and robust 
growth in recent years.  
 
Fiscal deficits deteriorated in 2012  
 Source:  World Bank. 
Fig SSA.3  
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A number of  Sub Saharan African countries 
are operating with an output gap above 
1 percent of GDP 
Source:  World Bank. 
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More recent developments point to much 
heterogeneity in the strength of consumer demand 
across countries in the region. Where quarterly 
national accounts data exist, sectors with strong 
participation of consumers grew strong in Nigeria 
(9.6 per cent in retail sector in Q3 2012), Tanzania 
(16.1 per cent retail sector growth in first three 
quarters of 2012) and in Ghana  (real estate sector 
expanded at 13.1 per cent in 2012). However where 
growth was weaker whole sale and retail sales 
growth decelerated in South Africa to 1.9 per cent 
in Q1 2013 (from 3.2 per cent in Q1 2012) and in 
Kenya due to a credit squeeze at the time, the 
wholesale and retail sector expanded by 4.9 per 
cent in Q3 from 5.6 per cent the previous quarter). 
Affected by ongoing fiscal consolidation, in 
Botswana, household consumption grew at a below 
trend rate of 2.7 per cent in 2012. However, for the 
vast majority of countries in the region this data 
does not exist. Nonetheless, indirect measures 
point to steady outturns in private consumption, 
including: favorable weather conditions and 
decelerating inflation. In general weather 
conditions were particularly more favorable in the 
West African (Burkina Faso, Benin, Chad, Gambia, 
and Togo) and East African sub-regions (Kenya, 
Uganda) relative to a year earlier, thus supporting 
agricultural household incomes there. Nonetheless, 
flooding in selected parts of Nigeria and 
Mozambique impacted agricultural household 
incomes there. Although there was an up-tick in 
February, inflation for the region (on a GDP-
weighted basis) fell to 6.9 per cent in February 
2013 from 9.4 per cent (y/y) in January 2012 
(figure SSA.5). Further, remittance inflows to the 
region increased by $1 billion to $31 billion in 2012 
and are projected increase to $33 billion in 2013. 
Recent global developments 
impacted the various commodity 
exporter types in the region 
differently. Among oil exporters, export 
volumes for 2012 were some 3.2% higher 
than in 2011, mostly due to an increase in 
exports from Angola, as export volumes in 
Nigeria and Sudan contracted. Reflecting the 
coming on stream of past investments in 
existing and new mines in several countries in 
the region, including Sierra Leone, 
Mozambique, Niger, and Zambia, export 
volumes from the predominantly metal 
exporters in the region expanded by 5.2%, 
notwithstanding subdued demand in the 
global economy and a 15% decline in the 
World Bank metal prices index. Export 
volumes of agricultural exporters expanded 
the most in the region (12.8%), due to weak 
base effects, improved rains in East Africa 
compared to a year earlier, and the lower 
c y c l i c a l  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l 
commodities to global business cycles.  
 
However, in line with developments in the 
global economy, exports from Sub Saharan 
Africa have been volatile, in particular 
industrial metals and oil exporters, which are 
more sensitive to global business cycles. 
Indeed, in the Q3 2012, as global imports 
plunged, so did export volumes in the region, 
in particular that of the region’s metal (-43 
percent, 3m/3m saar) and oil (-36.8 percent, 
3m/3m saar) exporters (figure SSA.6).  
However, along with the recovery in global 
import demand by the Q4 2012  Sub Saharan 
African export volumes rebounded, with the 
 
 Inflation has decelerated in recent months 
Source:  World Bank; International Financial Statistics; IMF. 
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Growth in Sub Saharan African export-
ers by predominant export group 
Source:  World Bank. 
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expansion in exports being sustained through 
Q1 2013. Indeed, for the first two months of 
2013, export volumes are up 8.8 percent 
compared with the same period a year ago.   
 
Trends in services trade, particularly tourism, 
are an increasingly important driver of 
growth in several Sub Saharan African 
countries (including traditional destinations 
such as Cape-Verde, Kenya, Mauritius, 
Seychelles and newer destinations such as 
Rwanda). Data from the UN World Tourism 
Organization shows that the growth in tourist 
arrivals to the region picked up by some 5 
percent (y/y) in 2012, compared with a global 
average of 3.8 percent (figure SSA.7). Sub 
Saharan African countries that recorded 
strong growth in tourist arrivals included 
South Africa, Sierra Leone, Madagascar and 
Cape Verde.  
 
The growth of tourist arrivals to destinations 
in the region notwithstanding the economic 
weakness in Europe is encouraging and 
reflects a diversification of source countries. 
For instance, in Mauritius, arrivals from 
Europe in 2012 (largest source market) fell by 
2.6 percent, but arrivals from China rose 38.0 
percent, and those from Russia by 58.9 
percent. Further arrivals were up from 
elsewhere in Africa (13.2 percent), Australia 
(13.5 percent), Canada (18 percent) and South 
America (55.3 percent). Other countries fared 
less well, for instance the conflict in Mali led 
to a sharp decline in tourist arrivals there.  
Medium Term Growth 
Prospects 
 
 
 
Medium term GDP growth prospects for Sub 
Saharan Africa remain strong, with robust 
investment, resilient consumer demand, public 
investment in infrastructure and increased exports 
expected to continue to underpin the region’s 
growth performance, albeit with variations across 
countries. Regional GDP is projected to expand by 
5.2 percent per year on average during 2013 
through 2015, 4.9, 5.2, and 5.4 percent for 2013, 
2014 and 2015 respectively (table SSA.3). 
Excluding, the region’s largest economy, South 
Africa, GDP growth for the rest of the region will 
be stronger at 6.2 percent in 2013 and 2014 and 
further strengthening to 6.4 percent in 2015. This 
strong growth will not be uniform, with countries facing 
political instability and serious labor unrests expected to 
significantly underperform. (see  table SSA.4 for detailed 
country forecasts). 
 
Domestic demand will be the major 
driver of  growth.  Investments to the natural 
resources sector in the region will continue to 
remain an important growth driver, with FDI in 
the natural resource sector increasingly being 
buttressed by investment in other sectors, 
particularly, rapidly growing, and underserved, 
domestic market especially in those economies with 
a rising middle-class, relatively larger populations and 
political stability (Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania etc).  
 
Overall foreign direct investment flows to the 
region are projected to increase to $53.6 billion by 
2015, from $33.4 billion in 2012. However not all 
economies in the region will benefit from rising 
investment inflows. Lingering political uncertainty 
(Madagascar, Central African Republic, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau), persistent labor unrests (South 
Africa) and macroeconomic instability will sour the 
investment climate in a number of countries.  
 
Domestic demand (both domestic investment and 
consumption) is expected to continue to benefit 
from the low interest rate and inflation 
environment, while household incomes should 
benefit from an expected increase in remittance 
Fig SSA.7  
 
Growth in tourist arrivals in  SSA has 
been above average in recent years, 
albeit from a low base  
Source:  UN World Tourism Organization. 
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flows from $31 billion in 2012 to $39 billion in  
2015.   
 
Though exports are expected to rise 
over the forecast horizon, the 
contribution to growth from net 
exports will be marginal, on account 
of  strong import demand. Exports from 
Sub Saharan Africa, are expected to strengthen 
over the forecast horizon. The pickup is a result of 
strengthening global demand, particularly from the 
Euro Area (it’s largest trading partner), and a 
structural re-orientation of trade toward faster 
growing regions, notably Asia, and rising intra-
regional trade. Export volumes in the extractive 
industries sector are expected to rise due to 
significant investments in productive capacity in 
recent years that are expected ( Burkina Faso - 
gold, Mozambique - coal, Niger - uranium, 
Cameroon - oil, Sierra Leone – iron –ore etc.).  
Improving global conditions also bodes well for 
tourism to the particular benefit of the region’s 
main tourist markets (Gambia, Mauritius, Kenya, 
Tanzania, South Africa, Seychelles etc).  
 
Despite the strong projected export growth, the 
contribution of net exports (exports less imports) 
to growth is expected to be modest or even 
negative, due to strong demand for foreign capital 
goods to meet infrastructure and other investment 
needs, as well as consumer durables and imported 
oil.  
 
Overall, the regional current account deficit is 
projected to increase to about 2.8 percent of 
regional GDP in 2014 from 2.4 percent in 2012 
before improving to 2.5 percent in 2015, and net 
exports are expected to be a modest drag. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa forecast summary Table SSA.3  
    Est. Forecast
 00-09
a
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
GDP at market prices  b 4.3 5.0 4.7 4.4 4.9 5.2 5.4
(Sub-region totals-- countries with full NIA + BOP data)
c
  GDP at market prices  c 4.3 5.0 4.7 4.4 4.9 5.2 5.4
     GDP per capita (units in US$) 2.0 2.5 2.1 1.8 2.4 2.7 2.8
     PPP GDP c 4.6 5.3 4.9 3.8 5.7 5.5 5.7
  Private consumption 4.9 8.3 5.1 5.0 4.3 5.0 5.6
  Public consumption 5.3 5.2 4.9 9.3 3.6 2.4 4.5
  Fixed investment 8.9 -1.3 12.1 8.2 7.0 7.6 5.9
  Exports, GNFS d 4.4 7.1 8.2 1.3 6.6 7.9 7.6
  Imports, GNFS d 5.0 8.7 11.3 6.4 6.4 7.1 7.1
Net exports, contribution to growth -0.5 -0.7 -1.3 -2.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
Current account bal/GDP (%) 0.0 -2.5 -1.7 -3.8 -4.3 -4.2 -4.2
GDP deflator (median, LCU) 6.7 7.3 9.2 5.0 5.9 5.4 5.3
Fiscal balance/GDP (%) -0.5 -3.7 -1.6 -2.7 -2.9 -2.7 -2.4
Memo items: GDP                                                 
 SSA excluding South Africa                                           5.0 6.2 5.5 5.4 6.2 6.2 6.4
    Oil exporters e                                                 5.6 6.2 5.2 5.3 6.4 6.3 6.5
    CFA countries f                                            3.8 4.5 2.8 4.9 5.9 5.5 5.4
 South Africa 3.2 2.9 3.1 2.5 2.5 3.2 3.3
 Nigeria 5.6 8.0 7.4 6.5 6.7 6.7 7.0
 Angola 10.7 3.4 3.4 8.1 7.2 7.5 7.8
(annual percent change unless indicated otherwise)
Source : World Bank.
a. Growth rates over intervals are compound weighted averages; average growth contributions, ratios and deflators 
are calculated as simple averages of the annual weighted averages for the region.
b. GDP at market prices and expenditure components are measured in constant 2005 U.S. dollars.  
c. Sub-region aggregate excludes Liberia, Chad, Somalia and São Tomé and Principe. Data limitations prevent the 
forecasting of GDP components or Balance of Payments details for these countries.
d. Exports and imports of goods and non-factor services (GNFS).
e. Oil Exporters: Angola, Cote d Ivoire, Cameroon, Congo, Rep., Gabon, Nigeria, Sudan, Chad, Congo, Dem. Rep.
f. CFA Countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Cote d Ivoire, Cameroon, Congo, Rep., Gabon, 
Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Chad, Togo.
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However, for some oil exporters (Angola, Congo), 
net exports will continue to make a positive 
contribution to growth. 
 
Notwithstanding the robust growth 
outlook, significant development 
challenges remain. Though Sub Saharan 
Africa has made progress in alleviating poverty 
(poverty levels in the region are forecast to fall to 
42.3 per cent of the population by 2015 from 56.5 
per cent in 1990), it still remains the only 
developing region not on track to attain the 
millennium development goal of halving extreme 
poverty by 2015 (Global Monitoring Report, World 
Bank 2013).  
 
Part of the reason is because, most of the 
investment activity has created value in capital 
intensive sectors with limited backward linkages 
(e.g. mining),  while labor intensive sectors have 
not been able to attract sufficient capital 
investment to increase productivity and 
employment. Hence the relatively limited flow of 
investment to existing labor-intensive sectors such 
as the agriculture sector and or low-skilled 
manufacturing sectors serves as a limitation to 
translating the robust growth the region is 
benefitting from to rapid job creation. This is all 
the more important given that the region has the 
youngest and fastest growing working age population.  
 
 
Risks  
 
 
Risks to the forecast are more balanced than in the 
recent past, and are increasingly local rather than 
external in nature.  
 
External risks 
 
Fragile global economy. External risks to 
the outlook (Euro Area, fiscal sustainability in the 
United States and Japan) are familiar, but the 
likelihood of them materializing has diminished as 
has the likely severity of the impacts. Moreover, 
upside risks — potentially stemming from a firmer 
than projected recovery in the United States, a 
reversal or easing of the currently pervasive 
pessimism in Europe — are more pronounced.  
New or more prominent risks include 
overheating in some countries in the region, a more 
rapid easing in commodity prices than outlined in 
the baseline.  
 
End of  commodity price supercycle. 
The significant decline in global metals prices, in 
response to increased supply and substation on the 
demand side, raises the specter of an even more 
pronounced easing of prices over the projection 
period as market expectations about future demand 
and supply adjust.FN5 Commodity prices are cyclical 
by nature (Global Economic Prospects, World 
Bank,  2009, pg 55), and while specifying the timing 
of turning points is extremely difficult, it would be 
imprudent to assume that current high prices will 
remain indefinitely or that only a smooth 
adjustment to long-term prices as in the baseline is 
the only likely outturn. 
 
A more rapid adjustment which would see crude-
oil prices decline to their estimated long-term 
equilibrium level of 80 (2012 dollars) within a two 
year horizon and a 25 per cent decline in metal 
prices would have significant consequences for Sub 
Saharan African commodity exporters, most of 
whom have undoubtedly benefitted from the 
recent high commodity price levels.  
 
In the oil price decline simulation, Sub Saharan 
African would be the hardest hit of developing 
regions, with oil exporters in the region 
experiencing a deterioration of their current 
account balances by 4.5 per cent of GDP and fiscal 
balances by 2.9 percent of GDP by 2014 and real 
GDP growth would also be cut by some 1.4 
percentage points compared to the baseline 
 
Impact on Selected Sub Saharan African 
Countries of an oil price shock     
Source:  World Bank. 
Fig SSA.8  
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forecasts. Similarly, under the metal price scenario, 
where metal prices gradually decline by a 
cumulative 20% by June 2014,  GDP growth for  
the regions metal exporters deteriorates by 0.7 
percentage points in 2014 and an additional 0.5 
percentage points in 2015. Nonetheless there will 
be differentiated effects across countries in the 
region as non-exporters of these commodities  in 
the region could stand to benefit from positive 
terms of trade (especially the oil importers, when 
the price of oil declines, see figures SSA.8 and SSA.9).        
 
For those economies that would be adversely 
impacted from the negative terms of trade impacts, 
the weaker commodity prices could lead to rapid 
depreciation of currencies, higher inflation outturns 
and weaker growth in less diversified economies 
with weaker domestic policy and external buffers. 
With the appropriate policy space and 
diversification of economies a sharp adjustment 
needn’t occur. Indeed, as observed in the 2009 
period when commodity prices plunged, real GDP 
growth in sub Saharan Africa (excluding South 
Africa) expanded at a healthy 4.1 per cent, with the 
more economically diversified economies being hit 
less harder.      
 
However unlike in 2008 when fiscal balances in the 
region were in a relatively stronger position, fiscal 
buffers for several countries in the region have yet 
to be fully rebuilt, thus limiting the ability of 
governments in the region to respond in a 
countercyclical way were a sharp decline in 
commodity prices to lead to weakening of private 
demand (investment and consumption). Indeed, 
under this scenario, access to international capital 
markets would likely become more restricted, and  
raising domestic debt could be expensive (i.e. if 
inflation goes up on account of weaker currencies 
and higher costs of imports) and with the 
unlikelihood of increased aid inflows given fiscal 
challenges in high-income countries, governments 
in the region with limited fiscal space could be 
forced to cut spending in a procyclical fashion, 
thereby reducing short-term growth prospects.  
 
 
Domestic risks 
 
 
With the steady strengthening of the global 
economy expected over the forecast horizon, the 
risks to Sub Saharan Africa’s growth being derailed 
are increasingly shifting from global to domestic 
sources. 
 
Macroinstability. As noted in the recent 
development section, with rising inflation rates and 
deteriorating current account balances in a number 
of countries in the region, fiscal and monetary 
stimulus measures may fuel inflationary pressures, 
and add to debt levels without adding to output. 
The resulting macroinstability will inevitably be 
deleterious to long-term growth prospects.    
 
Nonetheless, a prudent line needs to be drawn 
between fiscal austerity (which, under certain 
circumstances could also prove to be 
counterproductive) and governments carrying out 
the needed investments (education, health and 
infrastructure) that lay the foundation for medium 
to long-term sustainable growth. To sustain a 
robust durable growth trajectory over the medium 
to long term, economies operating close to capacity 
(as characterized by high and rising inflation and 
twin deficits) would benefit from building their 
external and domestic policy buffers.  
 
This is all the more important given the possibility 
of exogenous shocks to government revenues from 
possible declines in commodity prices or even aid 
cuts (for more fragile economies in the region). 
Although of a different nature, the sharp fiscal 
consolidation in Swaziland (due to lower SACU 
revenue transfers) contributed to the contraction in 
that economy in 2012 (-1.5 per cent) and serves as 
a reminder of the importance of building policy 
buffers and diversifying economies. 
Fig SSA.7  
 
Impact of metal price shock on selected 
Sub Saharan Africa countries  
Source:  World Bank. 
Fig SSA.9  
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Other downside risks include weather-related and 
political risks. With the agricultural sector being 
the largest employer in most economies in the 
region, even if not the largest contributor to GDP, 
and with most of the sector remaining rain 
dependent, output and incomes in the sector 
remain vulnerable to drought, floods and other 
forms of inclement weather. Poor harvests also 
threaten macroeconomic stability as food accounts 
for over 40% of the consumer price index basket 
for many economies in the region. Thus far 
weather long-term projections suggest a “normal” 
crop year in 2013, but weather conditions are more 
of an unknown in the outer years of the forecast.   
 
While significant progress has been made on 
political stability over the past decade, there still 
remain elements of fragility in a few countries in 
the region that could compromise investment and 
growth, if not contained. These include the conflict 
in Mali as well as terrorist activity in certain parts of 
Nigeria; political paralysis in Madagascar; and 
political uncertainty in Guinea- Bissau. These and 
potentially new conflicts could hinder investment 
flows and derail growth prospects in these 
countries and their neighbors.  
 
 
Entering manufacturing global value 
chains. On the upside, however, the rising wage 
costs in China is providing opportunities for other 
developing countries (e.g. Vietnam) to become 
more competitive in the global light manufacturing 
production chains. Sub Saharan Africa may also 
have an opportunity to increase its involvement in 
these chains. Doing so would contribute to 
structural transformation, helping  create higher 
productivity jobs, improving incomes  and 
reducing poverty.  Hindered by ongoing high cost 
of doing business relative to other developing 
countries, we do not include this possibility in our 
medium-term projections.  
 
Nonetheless, isolated examples of this kind of 
development exist. For instance, in 2012, Huajian 
Group, a Chinese foot wear manufacturer set up 
shop in Ethiopia producing shoes for  exports and 
with plans to foster a new global shoe making hub, 
with an investment plan of $2 billion over the next 
decade. Further, in February 2013, Toyota 
announced that it would start assembling trucks 
and buses in Kenya.  These examples appear to be 
the exception rather than the norm. For these 
examples to become more widespread and a 
regional source of growth, significant additional 
efforts are needed to reduce existing impediments 
to investment in light manufacturing including:  
improving weak or absent infrastructure (especially 
power and transportation), unburdening 
cumbersome regulations that contribute to a high 
transactions cost environment, and eliminating 
trade barriers, in particular those stifling intra-
regional integration. 
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Sub-Saharan Africa Country forecasts Table SSA.4  
    Est. Forecast
 00-09
a
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Angola
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 10.7 3.4 3.4 8.1 7.2 7.5 7.8
Current account bal/GDP (%) 3.9 9.3 11.2 6.7 5.1 4.9 2.4
Benin
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.7 3.0 3.1 4.0 4.2 4.1 4.3
Current account bal/GDP (%) -8.4 -9.4 -9.2 -9.4 -9.7 -8.8 -7.9
Botswana
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.4 7.0 8.1 6.1 5.0 5.1 5.2
Current account bal/GDP (%) 8.3 0.3 8.6 4.8 4.9 3.8 3.9
Burkina Faso
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 5.2 7.9 4.2 9.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) -13.1 -7.4 -8.2 -8.6 -6.3 -4.2 -2.0
Burundi
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 2.9 3.8 4.2 4.1 4.3 4.6 4.9
Current account bal/GDP (%) -17.8 -15.9 -14.2 -16.0 -15.4 -14.5 -13.5
Cape Verde
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 5.5 5.2 5.0 4.3 4.0 5.0 5.4
Current account bal/GDP (%) -11.3 -13.0 -15.2 -14.2 -11.5 -9.6 -10.6
Cameroon
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.0 2.9 4.2 4.7 4.8 5.0 5.1
Current account bal/GDP (%) -2.4 -3.8 -3.6 -3.6 -3.1 -3.4 -3.5
Central African Republic
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 0.7 3.0 3.3 3.8 3.0 3.5 3.7
Current account bal/GDP (%) -8.6 -10.5 -7.8 -6.8 -6.4 -4.7 -4.1
Comoros
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.5 3.5 4.0 4.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) -11.8 -27.9 -16.7 -6.9 -7.5 -7.4 -6.8
Congo, Dem. Rep.
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.2 7.2 6.9 6.6 8.2 6.4 7.5
Current account bal/GDP (%) 0.6 -16.6 -4.7 -2.9 -3.6 0.6 36.1
Congo, Rep.
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.8 8.8 3.4 4.9 5.6 5.4 5.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) -2.0 -28.0 0.5 2.5 2.1 1.3 0.9
Cote d Ivoire
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 0.8 2.4 -4.7 9.8 8.0 8.0 8.1
Current account bal/GDP (%) 1.9 2.0 -5.6 -3.3 -3.0 -2.9 -3.4
Equatorial Guinea
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 17.0 -0.5 7.8 -2.1 6.6 3.6 3.4
Current account bal/GDP (%) 13.5 -22.0 6.9 2.4 9.1 9.9 14.1
Eritrea
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 1.8 2.2 8.7 7.5 6.0 3.5 3.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) -21.5 -5.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.8 2.5 4.2
Ethiopia
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 7.4 9.9 7.3 8.5 7.0 6.9 7.4
Current account bal/GDP (%) -5.8 -4.0 0.5 -5.9 -7.5 -6.5 -6.2
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    Est. Forecast
 00-09
a
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Gabon
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 1.6 6.6 7.0 6.1 5.5 5.1 4.8
Current account bal/GDP (%) 14.8 4.2 8.3 12.2 3.3 2.3 1.3
Gambia, The
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.2 6.5 -4.3 -3.9 10.7 5.5 5.3
Current account bal/GDP (%) -3.6 2.2 -1.9 -16.7 -18.4 -14.0 -12.1
Ghana
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 5.0 8.0 14.4 8.1 7.8 7.4 7.3
Current account bal/GDP (%) -6.5 -8.2 -8.5 -12.3 -13.0 -9.8 -6.6
Guinea
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 2.4 1.9 3.9 3.9 4.5 5.2 5.3
Current account bal/GDP (%) -7.2 -7.0 -19.5 -37.6 -28.9 -40.9 -41.5
Guinea-Bissau
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 0.9 3.5 5.3 -1.5 5.0 4.6 5.1
Current account bal/GDP (%) -9.0 -12.0 -6.2 -6.0 -7.1 -6.2 -6.0
Kenya
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.6 5.6 4.3 4.6 5.7 5.9 5.5
Current account bal/GDP (%) -2.4 -7.5 -10.0 -11.3 -10.0 -10.2 -9.8
Lesotho
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.2 5.6 5.8 4.0 5.2 5.3 5.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) 2.9 -20.2 -21.4 -23.0 -6.8 -5.8 -4.6
Madagascar
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 2.5 1.6 1.0 2.7 4.1 4.8 5.4
Current account bal/GDP (%) -12.4 -10.7 -6.3 -7.3 -5.0 -4.3 -3.5
Malawi
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.8 6.5 4.3 1.9 4.4 4.8 5.5
Current account bal/GDP (%) -10.8 -17.3 -13.0 -13.1 -11.7 -11.2 -10.4
Mali
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 5.1 5.8 2.7 -1.2 4.8 5.9 6.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) -8.1 -12.6 -6.2 -4.4 -5.4 -7.6 -8.7
Mauritania
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.5 5.2 3.9 6.4 5.2 4.9 4.8
Current account bal/GDP (%) -10.9 2.3 -6.5 -12.2 -9.3 -5.9 -7.0
Mauritius
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.4 4.1 3.8 3.2 3.4 4.0 4.2
Current account bal/GDP (%) -2.7 -10.4 -12.6 -10.6 -10.9 -10.4 -9.6
Mozambique
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 7.1 6.8 7.3 7.4 7.0 8.5 8.5
Current account bal/GDP (%) -14.0 -17.2 -24.3 -36.9 -39.8 -41.1 -41.5
Namibia
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.0 6.0 4.9 5.0 4.3 4.4 4.9
Current account bal/GDP (%) 3.5 -1.6 -2.5 -0.5 -4.7 -4.7 -4.1
Niger
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.7 8.0 2.3 11.2 6.2 6.1 5.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) -9.7 -21.0 -18.9 -25.3 -23.5 -20.7 -21.1
Nigeria
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 5.6 8.0 7.4 6.5 6.7 6.7 7.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) 14.4 1.5 5.8 3.5 2.0 1.6 1.4
Rwanda
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 7.2 7.2 8.3 8.0 7.0 7.5 7.2
Current account bal/GDP (%) -6.0 -7.5 -7.4 -11.4 -8.5 -8.4 -8.7
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    Est. Forecast
 00-09
a
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Senegal
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.6 4.1 2.6 3.7 4.0 4.6 4.7
Current account bal/GDP (%) -8.0 -4.7 -7.6 -9.3 -8.0 -7.1 -7.4
Seychelles
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 1.5 6.7 5.0 2.7 3.5 3.9 4.2
Current account bal/GDP (%) -14.1 -19.7 -22.4 -22.8 -22.9 -21.1 -19.2
Sierra Leone
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 9.0 4.9 6.0 18.2 17.1 14.1 12.1
Current account bal/GDP (%) -14.1 -34.2 -57.3 -20.2 -8.6 -8.4 -5.9
South Africa
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 3.2 2.9 3.1 2.5 2.5 3.2 3.3
Current account bal/GDP (%) -3.0 -2.8 -3.4 -6.2 -6.6 -6.7 -6.4
South Sudan
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.1 3.9 5.0 -20.0 24.0 7.0 8.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) 11.8 30.1 17.4 -4.7 4.3 7.6 11.2
Sudan
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 6.4 5.1 4.7 -1.0 1.0 3.0 2.5
Current account bal/GDP (%) -5.9 -0.5 -1.0 -7.8 -8.6 -7.9 -8.4
Swaziland
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 2.1 2.0 1.3 -1.5 0.8 0.1 0.5
Current account bal/GDP (%) -2.6 -10.5 -8.5 -2.1 6.5 3.3 1.0
Tanzania
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 6.2 7.0 6.4 6.7 7.0 7.1 7.4
Current account bal/GDP (%) -9.1 -12.8 -19.7 -19.6 -19.8 -19.9 -20.1
Togo
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 1.8 4.0 4.9 5.6 5.5 5.1 5.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) -9.2 -6.3 -4.6 -8.0 -10.2 -8.1 -6.7
Uganda
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 6.8 5.9 6.7 3.4 4.8 6.2 7.0
Current account bal/GDP (%) -5.2 -10.8 -12.4 -12.0 -12.4 -13.3 -13.7
Zambia
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b 4.8 7.6 6.8 7.3 7.0 7.2 6.8
Current account bal/GDP (%) -10.9 5.7 0.3 0.9 1.0 0.6 0.5
Zimbabwe
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) b -5.9 9.6 9.4 4.4 2.5 3.5 3.7
Current account bal/GDP (%) -12.2 -23.0 -39.7 -29.9 -24.8 -19.0 -15.8
Source : World Bank.
World Bank forecasts are frequently updated based on new information and changing (global) circumstances. 
Consequently, projections presented here may differ from those contained in other Bank documents, even if basic 
assessments of countries’ prospects do not significantly differ at any given moment in time .
Liberia, Somalia, Sao Tome and Principe are not forecast owing to data limitations.
a. GDP growth rates over intervals are compound average; current account balance shares are simple averages 
over the period.
b. GDP measured in constant 2005 U.S. dollars.
GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS  |  June 2013    Sub-Saharan Africa Annex   
215 
Notes: 
1. South Sudan’s contraction in GDP was due to the stoppage of oil exports arising from its dispute with Sudan. 
Previous editions of the  Global Economic Prospects did not include South Sudan. Excluding South Sudan, GDP 
growth in 2012 was 4.6 percent, and excluding South Africa as well as South Sudan, GDP growth was 5.8 percent 
for the rest of the region.  
2. The measure of capital equipment used is the aggregation of machinery and transport equipment imports . 
3. This includes North Africa hence distorts the picture. FDI flows to North Africa are about a-third of the total to 
the Africa region. 
4. The  bond was over subscribed some seven times, in part reflecting the loose monetary policy in high-income 
countries in search of higher yielding securities. 
5. Following a pattern where the supply responds to a lag in current prices since it takes time for investments to 
come on stream. 
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